UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-7-2017

Barnes v. Jackson Clerk's Record Dckt. 44894

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Barnes v. Jackson Clerk's Record Dckt. 44894" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6824.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6824

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more
information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 44894

__________
CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE David

c. Nye District Judge.

For Appellant:
Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

For Respondent:
Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
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Case: CV-2014-0003466-OC Current Judge: David C Nye
Chad Barnes, etal. vs. Kirk Jackson

Chad Barnes, Jane Barnes vs. Kirk Jackson
Date

Code

User

8/29/2014

LOCT

MARLEA

er

David C Nye

NCOC

MARLEA

New Case Filed-Other Claims

David C Nye

COMP

MARLEA

Complaint Filed

David C Nye

SMIS

MARLEA

Summons Issued

David C Nye

MARLEA

Filing : AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F
and H(1) Paid by: holden kidwell Receipt
number: 0028134 Dated : 8/29/2014 Amount:
$221 .00 (Check) For:

David C Nye

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Barnes, Chad Attorney Retained Robert David C Nye
L. Harris

ATTR

CAMILLE

Plaintiff: Barnes, Jane Attorney Retained Robert David C Nye
L. Harris

TAMILYN

Filing : 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Racine
Law Office· Receipt number: 0032966 Dated:
10/10/2014 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For:
Jackson , Kirk (defendant)

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Answer and counterclaim; aty Tom Budge for
def/counterclaimant Kirk Jackson

David C Nye

AMYW

Defendant: Jackson, Kirk Attorney Retained
Thomas J Budge

David C Nye

10/16/2014

CAMILLE

Return of service = srvd on Kirk Jackson
9-24-2014

David C Nye

10/31/2014

CAMILLE

Answer to counterclaim;
plntfs

aty Robert Harris for

David C Nye

4/1/2015

CAMILLE

request for Trial setting ; aty Robert Harris for
Chad and Jane Barnes

David C Nye

4/6/2015

CAMILLE

Defendants response to request trial setting ;
aty Tom Budge

David C Nye

AMYW

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order; Isl J Nye , 5-1-15

David C Nye

AMYW

Joint Statement of Information for Scheduling
Order

David C Nye

9/3/2014

10/10/2014

ATTR

5/1/2015

ORDR

5/15/2015

Judge

5/29/2015

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 05/10/2016
09:00 AM)

David C Nye

3/2/2015

ORDR

AMYW

Order Setting Court Trial; matter set for 2 day
court trial on 5/10/16 at 9:00 a.m.; Isl J Nye,
6-2-15

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs witness disclosure; aty Robert Harris
for Chad and Jane Barnes

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 02/29/2016 03:00 PM)

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Motion for summary judgment; aty
Robert Harris

David C Nye

/11/2016
/14/2016
'15/2016

HRSC
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Case: CV-2014-0003466-OC Current Judge : David C Nye
Chad Barnes, etal. vs. Kirk Jackson

Chad Barnes, Jane Barnes vs. Kirk Jackson
Date

Code

1/15/2016

1/20/2016

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Craig V Bloxham; aty Robert Harris David C Nye

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment; aty Robert Harris

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing ; set for 2-29-2016 @ 3pm :
aty Robert Harris

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Substitution of counsel ; aty Peter Wells

David C Nye

CAMILLE

Defendants witness disclosure; aty Peter Wells David C Nye

1/22/2016

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Jackson , Kirk Attorney Retained
Peter M Wells

2/8/2016

CONT

AMYW

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment David C Nye
scheduled on 02/29/2016 03 :00 PM: Continued

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 03/14/2016 03 :00 PM)

David C Nye

NOTC

AMYW

Amended Notice of Hearing ; atty Robert Harris
for pltf

David C Nye

CONT

AMYW

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment David C Nye
scheduled on 03/14/2016 03:00 PM : Continued

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 04/04/2016 02:00 PM)

David C Nye

AMYW

Amended Notice Of Hearing (Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment)

David C Nye

CONT

AMYW

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment David C Nye
scheduled on 04/04/2016 02:00 PM: Continued

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
04/04/2016 02 :00 PM)

David C Nye

4/4/2016

HRHD

AMYW

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 04/04/2016 02 :00 PM: Hearing
Held

David C Nye

4/8/2016

CONT

AMYW

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on
05/10/2016 09:00 AM: Continued

David C Nye

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/22/2017
09:00 AM)

David C Nye

4/11/2016

ORDR

AMYW

Second Order Setting Court Trial; /s/ J Nye,
4-11-16

David C Nye

'/15/2016

NOTC

TAMILYN

Notice of Service-birst set of discovery requests
sent to atty Peter Wells by atty Robert Harris

David C Nye

/12/2016

NOTC

TAMILYN

Notice of Service-defendant's response to the
Barnes' first set of discovery sent to atty Harris
by atty Wells

David C Nye

14/2016

NOTC

TAMILYN

Notice of Taking Deposition of Kirk Jackson-by
atty Robert Harris

David C Nye

~8/2016

HRSC

TAMILYN

Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Motion
for Summary Judgment 10/31/2016 02:00 PM)

David C Nye

3/3/2016

3/25/2016

David C Nye
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Chad Barnes, etal. vs. Kirk Jackson

Chad Barnes, Jane Barnes vs. Kirk Jackson
Date

Code

User

10/3/2016

MEMO

TAMILYN

Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment-by atty Robert
Harris

David C Nye

TAMILYN

Declaration of Roy Calvin henderson

David C Nye

TAMILYN

Affidavit of Robert L. Harris

David C Nye

TAMILYN

Plaintiffs' Witness Disclosure-thru atty Robert
Harris

David C Nye

OBJT

AMYW

Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment; atty David C Nye
Peter Wells for def

MEMO

AMYW

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's
Objection to Plaintifrs Motion for Summary
Judgment; atty Peter Wells for def

David C Nye

AFFD

AMYW

Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in Support of
Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment; atty Peter Wells for def

David C Nye

AFFD

AMYW

Affidavit of Peter M. Wells; atty Peter Wells for
def

David C Nye

10/24/2016

MEMO

AMYW

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment; atty Robert
Harris for pltfs

David C Nye

10/31/2016

DCHH

AMYW

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment David C Nye
scheduled on 10/31/2016 02:00 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Less than 100 pages.

AMYW

Defendant's Witness Disclosure; atty Peter Wells David C Nye
for def

HRVC

AMYW

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on
02/22/2017 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

DEOP

AMYW

Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment;
David C Nye
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED, Summary Judgment granted in favor of
Defendant, Summary Judgment granted in favor
of plaintiff as to counterclaim; /s/ J Nye, 11-17-16

JDMT

AMYW

Judgment; Plaintifrs Complaint is dismissed,
Defendant's counterclaim is dismissed, case is
dismissed w/prejudice; /s/ J Nye, 11-17-16

David C Nye

CSTS

AMYW

Case Status Changed: Closed

David C Nye

MOTN

AMYW

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration; atty Robert David C Nye
Harris for pltff

MEMO

AMYW

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for David C Nye
Reconsideration; atty Robert Harris for pltf

AFFD

AMYW

Affidavit of Robert L. Harris in Support of
David C Nye
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration; atty Robert
Harris for pltf

AFFD
10/6/2016
10/17/2016

11/4/2016
11/17/2016

2/1/2016

Judge

David C Nye
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Case : CV-2014-0003466-0C Current Judge: David C Nye
Chad Barnes, etal. vs. Kirk Jackson

Chad Barnes, Jane Barnes vs. Kirk Jackson
Date

Code

User

12/1/2016

NOTC

AMYW

Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration ; atty Robert Harris for pltf

David C Nye

12/8/2016

HRSC

AMYW

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/22/2016 02 :00
PM) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration

David C Nye

CSTS

AMYW

Case Status Changed : Closed pending clerk
action

David C Nye

OBJT

AMYW

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration; atty Peter Wells for def

David C Nye

MEMO

AMYW

Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration ; atty Peter
Wells for def

David C Nye

AFFD

AMYW

David C Nye
Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in Support of
Defendant's Objection to Motion for Reconsider;
atty Peter Wells for def

12/20/2016

MEMO

AMYW

David C Nye
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration ; atty Robert Harris for
pltfs

12/22/2016

DCHH

AMYW

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
12/22/2016 02 :00 PM : District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Less than 100 pages.
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration

David C Nye

OCANO

Notice of Submission of Document; Peter M.
Wells, May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered ,
Attorney for Kirk Jackson, Defendant.

David C Nye

OCANO

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration : Robert L.
Harris, Attorney for Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane
Barnes

David C Nye

12/15/2016

12/29/2016

Judge

1/5/2017

RESP

AMYW

David C Nye
Response to Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration; atty Peter Wells for def

1/6/2017

MEOR

AMYW

Minute Entry and Order; matter taken under
advisement and written decision will be issued ;
/s/ J Nye, 1-6-17

AMYW

David C Nye
Supplemental Reply in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Reconsideration; atty Robert Harris for
pltfs

AMYW

Decision on Motion for Reconsideration ;
DENIED; /s/ J Nye, 1-25-17

OCANO

Filing : L4 - Appeal , Civil appeal or cross-appeal David C Nye
to Supreme Court Paid by: Holden, Kidwell ,
Hahn & Crapo. PLLC Receipt number: 0006443
Dated: 3/3/2017 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For:
Barnes, Chad (plaintiff) and Barnes, Jane
(plaintiff)

1/9/2017

/25/2017
(3/2017

DEOP

David C Nye

David C Nye
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Chad Barnes, etal. vs. Kirk Jackson
Chad Barnes, Jane Barnes vs . Kirk Jackson
Date

Code

User

3/3/2017

APSC
NOTC

OCANO
OCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

David C Nye

NOTICE OF APPEAL: Robert L. Harrison,
Attorney for Appellants, Chad Barnes and Jane
Barnes.

David C Nye

MISC

OCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and SC on 3-3-17.

David C Nye

MISC

OCANO

Received check# 55883 in the amount of
$100.00 for deposit on Clerks Record.

David C Nye

OCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT: Received Notice of
Appeal. Transcripts requested see Notice of
Appeal. Set Due Date - Transcripts 4-19-17.
Clerk's Record to SC on 5-24-17. Docket#
44894-2017 .

David C Nye

3/20/2017

Judge

3/22/2017

NOTC

OCANO

NOTICE OF LODGING OF TRANSCRIPTS BY; David C Nye
STEPHANIE MORSE ON 3-21-17 for the
following:
Plaintiffs Motin for Summary Judgement held
10-31-16 and Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration held 12-22-16.

4/7/2017

MISC

OCANO

CLERK'S RECORD Recieved in Court Records
on 4-10-17.

David C Nye
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HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.IJl<!.AU 0 9 1 •
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
BY -~~- _____
P.O. Box 50130
-0\JJU ( CLE RK
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiff,
vs.

COMPLAINT
Filing Fee: $221.00
Category: A.A

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant.

Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel,
complain and alleges against the Defendant Kirk Jackson ("Defendant" or "Jackson"), for cause of
action as follows:

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

This is an action concerning and requesting a declaration of forfeiture of a water right
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-222(2).

2.

A water right is real property as described in Idaho Code § 55-101.

COMPLAINT - Page I
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3.

Plaintiffs are hu band and wife who reside at 22284 N. Main, Downey, Idaho 83234, in
Bannock County, Idaho.

4.

Plaintiffs are the owners of certain property in Bannock County, Idaho-approximately 76
acres-located approximately two miles north of the City of Downey, Idaho, in the SEl/4
of Section 15 and NEl/4 of Section 22, Township llS, Range 37E.B.M (the "Plaintiffs'
Property").

5.

Plaintiffs' Property has appurtenant to it Water Right No. 29-14115 (hereinafter, simply
"29-14115"), a water right which was decreed on March 22, 2004 in the Snake River Basin
Adjudication by the District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho.
29-14115 allows for the irrigation of 62.27 acres of Plaintiffs' Property. 1

6.

Jackson resides at P.O Box 866, Pocatello, Idaho 83204.

7.

Jackson is the owner of certain property in Bannock County, Idaho-believed to be
approximately 50 to 65 acres in size-located directly east and adjacent to Plaintiffs'
Property in the SWl/4 of Section 14 and the NWl/4 of Section 23, Township llS, Range
37 E.B.M. (the "Jackson Property").

8.

Jackson acquired the Jackson Property on or about May 10, 2012 from Gary R. Rainsdon,
Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Craig Bloxham, pursuant to a warranty deed recorded in
the records of Bannock County, Idaho, as Instrument No. 21207710.

9.

The Jackson Property has appurtenant to it Water Right No. 29-14032 (hereinafter, simply
"29-14032"), a water right which was decreed on March 22, 2004 in the Snake River Basin

I In combination with another water right not involved in this action (Water Right No . 29-14114), which is diverted
from a separate water source (Yago Creek), the Plaintiffs can irrigate a total of 73.2 acres.
COMPLAINT - Page 2
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18.

Plaintiffs have been able to use such increased flows for the beneficial use of irrigation
under 29-14115 every year since 29-14032's non-use began.

19.

Because of the use of the increased flows in Spring Creek by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are a
"third party" who have made claim to Jackson's forfeited water. See, e.g., Sagewillow,
Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 838, 70 P.3d 669, 676 (2003);
Jenkins v. State, Dep't of Water Res., 103 Idaho 384,389,647 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1982).

20.

The filing of this action further constitutes a "claim of right" because Plaintiffs have
"instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture[.]" Sagewillow, Inc., 138 Idaho at 842, 70
P.3d at 680.

21.

On or about August 23, 2014, Plaintiffs noticed a decreased amount of flow in Spring
Creek, and upon further investigation, discovered that Jackson had constructed a new
concrete dam approximately thirty (30) feet above the Plaintiffs' historical point of
diversion.

22.

The concrete dam only has a small outlet pipe to allow a reduced amount of water to flow
down to Plaintiffs' point of diversion- which is also a point of diversion for another water
user on Spring Creek.

23.

The concrete dam has resulted in significantly diminished flows to Plaintiffs.

24.

The Jackson dam was constructed without notice to Plaintiffs.

25 .

When confronted by Plaintiff Chad Barnes regarding the newly-constructed dam and its
impact, Jackson and/or his agents refused to remove the Jackson dam.

26.

Jackson is currently in the process of constructing a pipeline associated with the Jackson
dam to carry water diverted from Spring Creek to the Jackson Property.

COMPLAINT - Page 4
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Adjudication (the "SRBA") by the District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of the State
of Idaho. 29-14032 allows for the irrigation of 41.9 acres of the Jackson Property.2
10.

Venue is proper pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-401.

11.

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 1-705 and 10-1201.

FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
12.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 11 of this Complaint as though
the same were here set in full.

13.

29-14115 and 29-14032 are authorized to divert from a certain water source known locally
as "Spring Creek" as described in the water rights reports obtained from the Idaho
Department of Water Resources ("IDWR" or "Department") attached hereto as Exhibits 1

and 2 respectively.
14.

Both 29-14115 and 29-14032 share the same priority date of May 19, 1920.

15.

Based upon information, belief, and/or personal knowledge, no portion of 29-14032 has
not been diverted and used since the mid-1990s until the present date, a time period when
the property was owned by Jackson and Jackson's predecessors-in-interest.

16.

For purposes of this action, the relevant period of non-use is from March 22, 2004-the
date of the SRBA partial decree for 29-14032-until the present day, a period of over ten
(10) years.

17.

As a result of 29-14032's non-use since March 22, 2004, the Plaintiffs have benefitted
because of the increased flow of water in Spring Creek. Plaintiffs have come to rely upon
such increa ed flows to fill 29-14115, their own authorized water right.

2 Similar to Plaintiffs, in combination with another water right not involved in this action (Water Right No .
29-14030), which is diverted from a separate water source (Yago Creek), Jackson can irrigate a total of 49.2 acres.
COMPLAINT - Page 3
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27.

Jackson's attempted resumption of a forfeited water right will injure Plaintiffs because it
will render flows historically available to Plaintiffs unavailable.

COUNTl
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT OF FORFEITURE OF A WATER RIGHT
IDAHO CODE § 42-222(2)
28.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 27 of this Verified Complaint as
though the same were here set in full.

29.

Idaho Code§ 42-222(2) provides, in relevant part: "All rights to the use of water acquired
under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five ( 5)
years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated and when any right to
the use of water shall be lost through nonuse or forfeiture such rights to such water shall
revert to the state and be again subject to appropriation under this chapter[.]."

30.

The entirety of 29-14032 has not been diverted or used for a period of at least five (5) years
since it was decreed by the SRBA court on March 22, 2004.

31.

Neither Jackson nor his predecessors-in-interest received approval of an application for
extension of time to avoid forfeiture from IDWR pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-222(2).

32.

None of the exceptions to forfeiture set forth in Idaho Code§ 42-223 apply to non-use of
29-14032.

33.

Resumption of use of the forfeited water right, 29-14032, is no longer a defense to
forfeiture as this action further constitutes a "claim of right" barring application of the
resumption of use doctrine because Plaintiffs have "instituted proceedings to declare a
forfeiture[.]" Sagewillow, Inc., 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.

34.

No other defenses to forfeiture apply to 29-14032.

COMPLAINT - Page 5
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35.

Because of 29-14032's non-u e for at least the statutorily-pre cribed period of five (5)
years, Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief in the form of a declaratory judgment
decreeing the forfeiture of 29-14032, thereby making 29-14032 of no further force, effect,
or validity.
COUNT2
ATTORNEY FEES

36.

Plaintiffs reallege the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 35 of this Complaint as though
the same were here set in full.

37.

As a result of Jackson's actions of constructing the dam and attempting to resume the use
of 29-14032, all to Plaintiffs' detriment and injury, Plaintiffs have been obligated to
employ the services of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.

38.

Plaintiffs have a right to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§§ 12-120, 12-121, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

39.

In the event this action is uncontested, Plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees in the

amount of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00).

RELIEF REQUESTED

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays for the following relief:
1.

That the court award judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and declare 29-14032 a forfeited water
right, thereby making 29-14032 of no further force, effect, or validity.

2.

That the court award reasonable costs and attorney fees to Plaintiffs in bringing this action
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

COMPLAINT - Page 6
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3.

For such other and further relief as the Comt deems just and appropriate.

Dated this ~

day of Augu t, 2014.

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL,

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

G:IWPDAT A\RUI\.TEMP CLIENT FILES\__BARNESICOMPLAINT.FINAL.DOCX
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Water Right Report
8/28/2014

WATER RIGHT NO. 29-14115

Owner Type
Name and Address
Current Owner CHAD BARNES
22284 N MAIN
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)317-8546
Current Owner R JANE BARNES
22284 N MAIN EXTENSION
DOWNEY, ID 83234
Priority Date: 05/19/1920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active

Source
Tributarv
UNNAMED STREAM SINKS

Beneficial Use From To Diversion Rate Volume
IRRIGATION 04/01 10/311.24 CFS
STOCKWATEROl/01 12/310.02 CFS
Total Diversion
1.24 CFS

Location of Point(s) of Diversion:

UNNAMED STREAMjSWSENWjSec. 14jTownship 1 lSjRange 37EjBANNOCK County

IRRIGATION Use:
15 of 514

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/RightReportAJ .asp ?BasinN umber=29&Seq uen... 8/28/2014

Page 2 of 3

Acre Limit: 62.27

Place(s) of use:
Place of Use Legal Description: IRRIGATION BANNOCK County

Townshi Rangrectionlo1 Tract Acres Lot~ract Acres Lorr•crcres LorractlA.£!!:!
11S

37E

15
22

NESE 1.1
NENE24

SWSE 2.8
WNE5.3

SESE40

Place of Use Legal Description:STOCKWATER same as IRRIGATlON

Total Acres: 73.2

Conditions of Approval:

l. X2? 1:his ri?h~ is ~imited to the irrigation of 62.27 acres within the authorized place of use in a
smgle 1mgat10n season.
Use of water under this right will be regulated by a watennaster with responsibility for the
2. ROS distribution of water among appropriators within a water district. At the time of this approval,
this water right is within State Water District No. 29H.
3 0lR When notified by the Department, the right holder shall install and maintain a measuring
·
device of a type acceptable to the Department as part of the diverting works.
X
Rights
29-14114 and 29-14115 when combined shall not exceed a total diversion rate of 1.47
4 35
·
cfs and the irrigation of 73 .2 acres.
5 05 The quantity of water under rights 29-14031, 29-14115 and 29-14032 when combined for
·
stockwater use shall not exceed 13,000 gallons per day.
6 R 63 This right when combined with aU other rights shall provide no more than 0.02 cfs per acre nor
·
more than 3.5 afa per acre at the field headgate for irrigation of the place of use.
7 08 The quantity of water decreed for this water right for stockwater use is not a determination of
·
historical beneficial use.
8. B0l Source is also known as Spring Creek.
Pursuant to Section 42-1412(6), Idaho Code, this water right is subject to such general
9 T 19 provisions necessary for the defmition of the rights or for the efficient administration of water
·
rights as may be determined by the Snake River Basin Adjudication court at a point in time no
later than the entry of the final unified decree.

Dates:
Licensed Date:
Decreed Date: 03/22/2004
Enlargement Use Priority Date:
16 of 514
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Enlargement Statute Priority Date:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Accepted:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Removed:
Application Received Date:
Protest Deadline Date:
Number of Protests: 0

Other Information:
State or Federal: S
Owner Name Connector: And
Water District Number:
Generic Max Rate per Acre: 0.02
Generic Max Volume per Acre: 3.5
Combined Acres Limit: 73 .2
Combined Volume Limit:
Combined Rate Limit: 1.47
Civil Case Number:
Old Case Number:
Decree Plantiff:
Decree Defendant:
Swan Falls Trust or Nontrust:
Swan Falls Dismissed:
OLE Act Number:
Cary Act Number:
Mitigation Plan: False

I Close I
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Water Right Report
8/28/2014

WATER RIGHT NO. 29-14032

Owner Type
Name and Address
Current Owner KIRK JACKSON
PO BOX 866
POCATELLO, ID 83204
(208)351-838 I
Original Owne CRAIG V BLOXHAM
20862 S CAMBRIDGE RD
POBOX227
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)897-5666
Original Owne VERN C BLOXHAM
494NMAIN
POBOX227
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)897-5666
Priority Date: 05/19/1920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active

Source
Tributarv
UNNAMED STREAM SINKS

Beneficial Use From To Diversion Rate Volume
IRRIGATION 04/01 10/31 0.84 CFS
STOCKWATER0I/0112/310.03 CFS
Total Diversion
0.84 CFS
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Location of Point(s) of Diversion:

UNNAMED STREAMISWSENW!Sec. I41Township 1 lSIRange 37EIBANNOCK County

IRRIGATION Use:
Acre Limit: 41.9

Place(s) of use:
Place of Use Legal Description: IRRIGATION BANNOCK County

Townshi Rang1Sectiolo1 Tract Acres L-01 Tract ~·lTralcrlTrac1~
1 IS

37E

14
23

NWSW 9.7
NWNW 1.5

SWSW 38

Place of Use Legal Description:STOCKWATER same as IRRIGATION

Total Acres: 49.2

Conditions of Approval:

1. BO 1 SOURCE IS ALSO KNOWN AS SPRING CREEK.
This partial decree is subject to such general provisions necessary for the definition of the
2 C 18 rights or for the efficient administration of the water rights as may be ultimately determined by
·
the Court at a point in time no later than the entry of a final unified decree. Section 42-1412
(6), Idaho Code.
ESS
USE OF THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 IS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATION
3
.
OF A COMBINED TOTAL OF 49.2 ACRES IN A SINGLE IRRIGATION SEASON.
THE QUANTITY OF WATER UNDER RIGHTS 29-14031 AND 29-14032 WHEN
4. OS COMBINED FOR STOCKWATER USE SHALL NOT EXCEED 13,000 GALLONS PER
DAY AND A DIVERSION RATE OF 0.03 CFS.
ESl
USE OF THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 IS LIMITED TO A TOTAL
5
.
COMBINED DIVERSION RA TE OF 0.99 CFS.
6 E62 THIS RIGHT WHEN COMBINED WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 AND 29-14032 SHALL
.
PROVIDE NO MORE THAN .02 CFS PER ACRE.
7 K0 6 THIS RIGHT IS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATION OF 41.9 ACRES WITHIN THE PLACE
·
OF USE DESCRIBED ABOVE IN A SINGLE IRRIGATION SEASON.
8. 08
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THE QUANTITY OF WATER DECREED FOR THIS WATER RIGHT FOR
STOCKWATER USE IS NOT A DETERMINATION OF HISTORICAL BENEFICIAL
USE.

Dates:
Licensed Date:
Decreed Date: 03/22/2004
Enlargement Use Priority Date:
Enlargement Statute Priority Date:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Accepted:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Removed:
Application Received Date:
Protest Deadline Date:
Number of Protests: 0

Other Information:
State or Federal: S
Owner Name Connector:
Water District Number:
Generic Max Rate per Acre: 0.02
Generic Max Volume per Acre: 3.5
Civil Case Number:
Old Case Number:
Decree Plantiff:
Decree Defendant:
Swan Falls Trust or Nontrust:
Swan Falls Dismissed:
DLE Act Number:
Cary Act Number:
Mitigation Plan: False
Close

I

I
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ThomasJ.Budge(ISB#7465)
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1
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY, 9ih~~Me&l0 ?
P. 0. Box 1391/201 E. Center St.
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
,'<
1'< cLffi""
Telephone: (208) 232-6101
Or.P
Fax: (208) 232 -6109
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Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant Kirk Jackson
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES, lmsband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs/ Counterdefend ants,

(Filing Fee $221.00)

v.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/ Counterclaimant.

Defendant Kirk Jackson, by and through counsel Thomas J. Budge of Racine, Olson,
Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, answers Plaintiffs' Complaint, and counterclaims, as
follows:
FIRST DEFENSE

Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
1.

Water right 29-2470 has not undergone five consecutive years of non-use since

the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court first issued a partial decree on
March 22, 2004.
THIRD DEFENSE

2. The non-use of water right 29-14032 alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint is exempt
from forfeiture under Idaho Code§ 42-223 and common law.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - Page 1
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FOURTH DEFENSE

3. Defendant resumed use of water right 29-2470 prior to the filing of Plaintiffs'
Complaint.
FIFTH DEFENSE

4. Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint except as
expressly admitted herein.
5. Answering paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
6. Answering paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein.
7. Answering paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein, with the clarification the Jackson Prope1iy is approximately 62
acres m size.
8. Answering paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the Jackson
Property was purchased from Ga1y R. Rainsdon, Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of
Craig Bloxham, but denies that it was purchased on or about May 10, 2012.
9. Answering paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits
the allegations contained therein.
10. Answering paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant incorporates by
reference his answers to paragraphs 1-11 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
11. Answering paragraphs 13 and 14 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the
allegations contained therein.
12. Answering paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein.
13. Answering paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
14. Answering paragraph 17 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein.
15. Answering paragraphs 18 and19 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies the
allegations contained therein.
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - Page 2
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16. Answering paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
17. Answering paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant is without sufficient information to admit or deny that on or about August 23, 2014, Plaintiffs noticed a
decreased amount of flow in Spring Creek. Defendant admits he constructed a new concrete dam approximately thirty (30) feet above Plaintiffs' historical point of diversion.
18. Answering paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies
the allegations contained therein.
19. Answering paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
20. Answering paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant states that the pipe
was installed before the Complaint in this matter was filed and, therefore, denies the allegations contained in paragraph 26.
21. Answering paragraph 2 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein.
22. Answering paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant incorporates by
reference his answers to paragraphs 1-2 7 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
23. Answering paragraphs 30 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
24. Answering paragraphs 30 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations contained therein.
25. Answering paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations contained therein.
26. Answering paragraphs 32, 33, 34 and 35 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant
denies the allegations contained therein.
2 7. Answering paragraph 3 6 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant incorporates by
reference his answers to paragraphs 1-3 5 of Plaintiffs' Complaint.
2 8. Answering paragraphs 3 7, 3 8 and 39 of Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendant denies
the allegations contained therein.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - Page 3
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,
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendant/Counterclaimant Kirk Jackson, by and through counsel, complains
against Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes, husband and wife,
as follows:
29. Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes own Idaho water right no. 29-14115.
30. Water right 29-14115 has not been put to beneficial use on a portion of the
Plaintiffs' Property for an excess of five years immediately prior to the filing of this counterclaim.
31. Water right 29-14115 is not protected from forfeiture by any of the forfeiture
exceptions found in Idaho Code§ 42-223.
32. Water right 29-14115 has been partially forfeited for non-use pursuant to in
Idaho Code§ 42-222.
33. The allegations made in paragraphs 31 and 32 are made in the alternative to the
defenses assorted in the Defendant's Answer in the event such defenses are rejected by
the Court.
34. Plaintiffs are wasting water by the use of a leaky pipe system.
35. Plaintiffs are illegally storing water in the pond in the NWSW Section 14, Township 11 South, Range 3 7E, Boise Meridian, without a water right therefore.
ATTORNEY FEES

36. Defendant/Counterclaimant re-alleges the allegations set forth above.
37. Defendant/Counterclaimant is entitled to an order from the Court granting its
costs and attorney fees pursuant to in Idaho Code§ 12-120 and in Idaho Code§ 12-121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

THEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaimant respectfully prays for the following
relief:
A. For an order declaring water right 29-2470 has not been forfeited pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 42-222(2).
B. For an order declaring water right 2 9-103 84 forfeited pursuant to Idaho Code §
42-222(2).

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - Page 4
25 of 514

C. F01 an order awarding Defendant/Counterclaimant his reasonable attorney fees
and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120 and Idaho Code§ 12-121.
D. For any further relief deemed just by the Court.

DATED this J_/cray of October, 2014.
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE
& BAILEY, CHARTERED

By: :::::?p""'°

-::/@?

THOMAS J. B

GE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the d 'aay of October, 2014, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Robert L. Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P. 0. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[ v]U. S. Mail
Postage Prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile - (208) 523-9518
[ ] Email - rharris@holdenlegal.com

~~
J.
THOMAS

BlJDG

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - Page 5
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES ,

Plaintiff(s) ,

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
Case Number: CV14-3466-0C

vs.
Service Documents:
Summons and Complaint

KIRK JACKSON ,

Defendant(s) .

I, Marc Jorgensen , being du ly sworn, depose and say that on September 24, 2014 at 8: 19 PM , I:
(PERSONAL SERVICE): Personally served a true and correct copy of the
Summons and Complaint in the above entitl ed matter

upon: Kirk Jackson
at: 4976 Kevin Ave. , Chubbuck, 1D83202.

service was made on: 09/24/2014 at 8: 19 PM

I ce rtify that I am over th e age of 18, a resident of the State of Id aho, I have no interest in the act ion, and I am a Process
Server, in good standing, in the judicial circuit in which the process was served.
Subscribed and sworn to before me on th e 26th day of September, 20 14 by
the affian ho is person,
know 1 Lo me.

Marc Jorgense n

NOTARY UBL
R THE STATE OF IDAHO
RESIDING AT: Blackfoot, Idaho
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES : 10 -,;>J - ,)~ IC-

MERRILEE JORGENSEN
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF IDAHO

Bulldog Lega l Support Inc.
P.O. Box 176
Blackfoot, 1D83221 -0176
208-782 -3S30

11111111111111111
IIIII IIIII IIII IIII
*10713*
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
rharris@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-- - - --

SUMMONS

vs.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant.

YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFFS
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER
NOTICE UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS.
READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.
TO:KIRKJACKSON
You are hereby notified that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate written
response must be filed with the above designated court within twenty (20) days after
service of this Summons on you. If you fail to respond, the court may enter judgment
against you as demanded by Plaintiffs in the Complaint.
SUMMONS - Page I

C
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A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the
advice or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that
your written response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected.
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule lO(a)(l) and other
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include:
1.

The title and number of this case.

2.

If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions

or denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim.
3.

Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature,

mailing address and telephone number of your attorney.
4.

Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs'

attorney, as designated above.
To determine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the
clerk of the above named court.

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

Dated:
Deputy

----------

G:IWPDATAIRLH\_Temp Client Filcsl_Barnes\Summons.docx:sm

SUMMONS - Page 2
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
rharris@holdenlegal.com
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HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant

Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel,
answers Kirk Jackson's ("Defendant 's") Counterclaim as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
1.

Defendant's Counterclaim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
2.

Plaintiffs deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Counterclaim except as expressly
admitted herein.

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLLAIM - Page I
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3.

Answering Paragraph 29, Plaintiffs admit the allegations contained therein.

4.

Answering Paragraphs 30, 31 , and 32, Plaintiffs deny the allegations contained therein.

5.

Answering Paragraph 33 , Plaintiffs incorporates their responses to Paragraphs 31 and 32
denying the allegations contained therein.

6.

Answering Paragraphs 34 and 35, Plaintiffs deny the allegations contained therein.

7.

Answering Paragraph 36, Plaintiff incorporates their prior responses.

8.

Answering Paragraph 37, Plaintiffs deny the allegations contained therein.

RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays for the following relief:

l.

That the court award judgment in favor of Plaintiffs declaring that Water Right No.
29-1 41 15 has neither been forfeited or partially forfeited;

2.

That the court award reasonable costs and attorney fees to Plaintiffs in responding to the
Plaintiffs Counterclaim pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121 and Rule 54 of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

Dated this 30th day of October, 2014.

Robert L. Harris
~
HOLDEN , KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLLAIM - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my
office in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 30 th day of October, 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of an Answer to Counterclaim on the persons listed below by first class mail,
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule
S(b), I.R.C .P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Thomas J. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered
P.O. Box 1391
201 E. Center Street
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax: 232-6 109

(~
( )
( )
( )

Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Mail

Robert L. Harri~
HOLDEN , KlDWELL, HAHN & C RAPO, P.L.L.C.

G:\WPDATA\RLH\ 17992 Barnes, Chad\P leadings\Answer.Counterclaim.docx

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLLAIM - Page 3
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Robert L. Harris, Esq, (ISB #7018)
rharris@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH ruDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

Case No. CV-2014-3466~oc

REQUEST FOR TRIAL SETTING

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defen.dant/Counterclaimant

Chad Barnes and Jane Bames (collectively "Plaintiffs"), by and thro\lgh their counsel, and
pursuant to Rule 40(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. request the Court to set the
above-captio11ed matter for trial.

1.

Nature of the Case: Declaratory Judgment for f01feiture of a water right (Water

Right No. 29-14032).

33 of 514
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2.

Court or Jury Case:

Court.

3.

Time Required for Trial: The estimated time required for trial of this matter is two

4.

Attorney Appearing at Trial. Robe1t L. Harris will appear for the Plaintiffs at trial.

days.

He is unavailable for trial on the following dates after the end of discovery: July 16-17, July
30-August 7, August 17, Sept. 28-0ct. 9.
5.

Mediation.

Plaintiffs do not believe that mediation would be helpful to the

resolution of this matter.
6.

Discovery. Discovery in this matter can be completed within ninety (90) days.

Dated this 1st day of April, 2015.

~
~L.~
Robe1t L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.LL.C.

REQUEST FOR TRIAL- SETTING - Page 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attomey in the State of Idaho, with my
office in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 1st day of April, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of an Answer to Counterclaim on the persons listed below by first class mail,
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule
5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Thomas J. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered
P.O. Box 1391
201 E. Center Street
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax; 232-6109

( )

Mail
( !,/ Overnight Mail
( vJ Facsimile
( ) Electronic Mail

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

G;\ WPDAT A\RLH\l 7992 Barnes, Chad\Pleadings\Request for Trial St\tting.docx

REQUEST FOR TlUAL SETTING - Page 3
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FAX No. 208 232 6109

Thomas J. Budge (ISB # 7465)
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY, CHARTERE D

201 E. Center St./ P. 0. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391
(208) 232 -6101-Phone
(208) 232-6109-Fax
Attorney for Defendant
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DISTRICT COU:RT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BANNOCK COUNTY

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/ Counterdefendants,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

Defendant's Response to Re ..
quest for Trial Setting

v.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,

Defendant/ Counterclaimant.

Defendant/Counterclaimant Kirk Jackson, by and through counsel,
responds to the Request for Trial Setting filed by Plaintiffs as follows:
1. Nature of the Case: Plaintiffs' complaint seeks a declaratory judg-

ment for forfeitute for the portion of water right 2 9-140 32 owned
by Defendant. Oefendant' s counterclaim seeks a declaratory judg-

ment that (a) a portion of Plaintiffs' portion ofwate.r right 29-14032

has been forfeited, (b) Plaintiffs are wasting water, and (c) Plaintiffs
are illegally storing water in a reservoir without·a water right. Since

filing Defendant's counterclaim, Defendant has discovered additional information that may require joining Craig Bloxham and/ or
Vern Bloxham as parties to this case.
2. CourtorJmyCase: Court

Defendant's Response to Request for Trial Settiug - 1
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3. Time Reqpired fol' Trial: Estimated two days.

4. Attorney Appeacing_at Trial: Thomas J. Budge will appear for the
Defend at.it at trial. He is unavailable for trial on the following dates
after the end of discovery: July 6-9, 16-17, 20; August 13-14, 18;
September 16-18; October 2; October 2 0-23.

5. Mediation: Defendant believes mediation would be helpful to the
resolution of this matter.
6. Discovery: Discovery in this matter can be completed within ninety
(90) days after additional necessary parties are joined in this case.
DATED this ~ay of April, 2015.
RACINE OLSON' NYE BUDGE &
BAILEY, CHARTERED

By:~

ThornasJ.13ud

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on the JJfa.ay of April, 2015, I served a true and correct
copy of the above document on the following petson(s) as follows:
Robert L. Hanis

D JJ-S. Mail/Postage Prepaid

HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO

~Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
D Overnight Mail
D Hand Delivery
18] E-mail

1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P. 0. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
rharris@holdenlegal.com

Defendant;s Response to Request £or Trial Setting -

2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No:CV-2014-0003466-OC
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF
INFORMATION FOR
SCHEDULING ORDER

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

A Complaint was filed in this matter on the 29th day of August, 2014 .

The

Defendant has now appeared and/or answered and the case is at issue.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 16, that the parties, through their
counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), confer and submit to the Court,
within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, a joint statement containing the
following information:
(1)

Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties.

(2)

Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are

contemplated.
(3)

Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions.

(4)

Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for trial

Case No. : CV-2014-0003466-OC
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preparation.
(5)

The agreed amount of time required for trial.

(6)

Whether the case presents any unusual times requirements for discovery.

(7)

Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation.

(8)

Three stipulated trial dates, one no less than six (6) months and no more

than nine (9) months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than nine (9)
months and no more than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order, and a third no
less than twelve (12) months and no more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this
Order. These trial dates cannot be during the first full week of any month.
(9) Whether there are other matters conducive to determination of the action that
the parties agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a
Scheduling Order.
The parties shall agree as to which party shall make the joint submission but, if they
cannot agree, Plaintiff shall be responsible to make the submission.
Upon receipt of this joint submission the Court will issue an Order setting the matter
for trial with appropriate dates for discovery, disclosure of witness, etc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the stipulation required
herein, within the fourteen (14) days set forth, the Court will set this matter for trial on a
date available to the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the submissions requested in the order are
deemed by the Court to constitute the scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a).
However, if either party wishes a more formal scheduling conference please contact the
Court's clerk and one will be scheduled.
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DATED this~I___ day of May, 2015.

oibCNYE
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Igf

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of May, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated .

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

Thomas J. Budge
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY
CHARTERED
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

D U.S. Mail
D E-Mail : rharris@holdenlegal.com
~Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 523-9518

D U.S. Mail
D E-Mail: tjb@racinelaw.net
~Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 232-6109

Robert Poleki
Clerk of the Court
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ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER
Page 3 of 3

40 of 514

David C. Nye
District Judge
624 E. Center Street, Room 303
Pocatello, ID 83201
208-236-7244
FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Date:

May 1, 2015

To:

Robert Harris; Thomas J. Budge

Fax:
Re:

(208) 523-9518; (208) 232-6109

Barnes v. Jackson
Attached is an Order for Submission of Information for Scheduling Order.
apologize that this was not sent out to you sooner.

I

The Court was not

aware until today that an Answer had been filed back in October of last year.

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 4 PAGE(S), INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET.

IF YOU DO

NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL 236-7244.
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David C. Nye
District Judge
624 E CentP.r Street, Room 303
Pocatello, ID 83201
208-236-7244
FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Date:

May 1, 2015

To:

Robett Harris; Thomas J. Budge

Fax:
Re:

(208) 523-9518; (208) 232-6109

Barnes v. Jackson
Attached is an Order for Sµbmission of Information for Scheduling Order. I
apologize that this was not sent out

to you sooner.

The Coutt was not

aware until today that an Answll'r had been fHed back in October of las/ year.

-

-

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 4 PAGE(S), INCLUDING THIS COVl=R SHEET. IF YOU DO
NOT R£CEIV£ ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL 216-7244.

42 of 514

T-378 P0002/0004 F-424

05-15-'15 14:04 FROM-

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, :P.L.L.C.
I 000 Rivetwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Auorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
Thomas J. Budge (ISB #7265)
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE, & BAILEY, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 1391
20 I E. Center Street
PocateJlo, ID 83204-1391
Attorneys for Kirk Jackson

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE. BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

vs.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

JOINT STATEMENT OF
INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING
ORDER

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Oefendant/Counterclaimant

Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes, by and through their counsel, and Kirk Jackson, by and
through his counsel, hereby submit this Joint Statement of JnformatiO'n for Scheduling Order

pursuant to the Court's Order for Submission ofInformation/or Scheduling Order dated May l,

2015.

JOINT STATEMENT OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER-Page 1
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T-378 P0003/0004 F-424

05-1 5-'1 5 14:05 FROM-

1.

Whether any service Is still needed upon any unserved parties: No.

2.

Whether motions to add new parties or othenvlse amend the pleadings are

contemplated: No.
3.

Whether the parties cua·l"ently contemplate or anticipate any pre.trial motions: Yes.
potentially summary judgment motions.

4.

Whether the case presents any unusual time requireme1lts for trial preparation: No.

5.

The agreed amount of time required for trial: 2 days.

6.

Whether the case pl'esents any unusual time requh·ements for discovery: No.

7.

Whethel' any party requt>,gfs court-ordered rnediation: Yes.

8.

Three stipulated trial dates:

a.

Between six (6) months and nine (9) months from May 1, 2015:

De-0ember 9~~10, 2015.
b.

Between nine (9) rnonths and twelve (12) months from May 1, 201S:

March 2-3, 2016.
c.

Between twelve (12) and fifteen (15) months from May 1, 2015: May
9-10, 2016.

9.

Whether there are other matters conducive to detnmination of the actin that the
parties agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a
Scheduling Order: None.

Dated this J..i!!'day of May. 2015.

~L-.~
Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

T.J. Budge

RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE, & BAILEY.
CHARTERED

JOINT STATEMENT OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER - Page 2
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T-378 P0004/0004 F-424

05-15-'15 14:05 FROM-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my
office in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 15 th day of May, 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the JOINT STATEMENT OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING
ORDER on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage thereon, or
by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P,
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Thomas J. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered
P.O: Box 1391
.
201 E. Center Street
Pocatello, ID 83204- 1391
Fax: 232-6109

( )
( )
( ~( )

Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Mail

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

CRAPo, P.L.Lc.

O:\WPDATA\RLH\17992 Barnes, Ch&d\Pleadings\Jolm Submisslon.docx
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T-378 P0001 /0004 F-424

05-15-'15 14:04 FROM-

·-11

Holden l\_1dwell

Hahn & Crapo
LAW

1000 ruvuwalk Drive, Suh<> 200
PO BoJt50 ISO
Tdw Falls, ld&ho 83405

P.L.L.c

OFFICES
Tel: (208) 523-0620
Pax: {208) sil-9518

www.holdtnle~l.e<>m
rhani~holdenlec~l.~m

DATE:

May 15, 2015

TO:

Honorable Judge David C. Nye

FAX#:

FROM:

Robert L. Hanis

FAX#:

RE:

Chad Bames et al vs. Kirk Jackson

NO. OF PAGES (INCLUDING TRANSMITTAL SHEET):

236-7208

4

ITEMS SENT:

Joint Statement oflnformation for Scheduling Order

ORIGINALS:

Sent by.Mail () Kept on File (X)

MESSAGE:
This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain
information that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosnre under applicable law. Jfyou al'e not
the intended recipient, any dissemination or distribution of this communication to other than the intended
recipient is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in ertor, please notify us
immediately by collect telephone at (208) 523-0620, and return the original message to us at the above
address via the U.S. Postal Se1vice. Thank you.

TELECOPIER OPERATOR,

Joan
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.

Case No:CV-2014-0003466-OC
ORDER SETTING COURT TRIAL

KIRK JACKSON , an individual
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
(1)

TRIAL DATE. This matter is set for COURT TRIAL on the 10TH DAY OF MAY,

2016, AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M., in Courtroom 300, Bannock County Courthouse,
Pocatello, Idaho.

A continuance of the trial date shall occur only upon written Motion or

Stipulated Motion to the Court which clearly states the reasons for the requested
continuance and which includes an acknowledgment and agreement signed by each
~

that certifies that the Motion to Continue has been discussed with and agreed to by

each party. All deadlines listed below shall apply to the trial setting first listed above. An
Order continuing the trial date to the backup trial date will not alter the deadlines set forth
in this Order, except for good cause shown.

Case No .: CV-2014-0003466-OC
ORDER SETTING COURT TRIAL
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(2)

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b), in lieu of a pre-trial

conference, trial counsel for the parties (or the parties if they are self-represented) are
ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the purpose of preparing a joint Pre-Trial Stipulation ,
which shall be submitted to the Court at least 21 days prior to Trial, and shall include:
(A) A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all
other parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all exhibits to be offered at trial by
both parties. The Exhibit List shall indicate: 1) by whom the exhibit is being
offered , 2) a brief description of the exhibit, 3) whether the parties have
stipulated to its admission , and if not, 4) the legal grounds for any objection . If
any exhibit includes a summary of other documents, such as medical expense
records, to be offered pursuant to I.RE. 1006, the summary shall be attached to
the Stipulation.
(8) A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered
in lieu of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in
which such evidence will be presented, and the legal grounds for any objection
to any such offer.
(C) A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends
to call to testify at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses.
Expert witnesses shall be identified as such . The Stipulation should also
identify whether any witness' testimony will be objected to in its entirety and the
legal grounds therefore.
(D) A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The
purpose of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is
to be included in pre-proof instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by
the Court.
(E) A statement that counsel have, in good faith , discussed settlement
unsuccessfully and/or completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was
ordered by the Court.
(F) A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.R.C.P. 26 to 37
have been complied with and all discovery responses supplemented as
required by the rules to reflect facts known to the date of the Stipulation.
(G) A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated , listing
wh ich party has the burden of proof as to each issue.
(H) A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary
proof.
(I) A list of any orders requested by the parties wh ich will expedite the trial.
(J) A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party
for voir dire or opening statement and, if so, an explanation of the reason more

Case No.: CV-2014-0003466-OC
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disclosure must be filed within 45 days of the disclosure or is deemed waived. Witnesses
not disclosed in responses to discovery and/or as required herein will be excluded at trial,
unless allowed by the Court in the interest of justice.

(6)

MOTIONS. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, and responses thereto, shall comply in all

respects with I.R.C.P. 56 and be filed no later than 90 days before trial.

ALL OTHER

MOTIONS, including any Motion in Limine, shall be filed and heard by the Court no later
than 30 days before trial. The original of all Motions and supporting submissions shall be
filed with the clerk of the court.

However, one (1) duplicate Judge's Copy of all

Motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting memorandum,
affidavits

and

documents,

shall

be

E-MAILED

to

the

deputy

clerk

at

amyw@bannockcounty.us. All other pleadings, notices, etc., should be filed with the
Clerk without copies to the Court's chambers.

(7)

STIPULATED MODIFICATIONS. The parties may stipulate to the modification of

the discovery, witness disclosure and motion deadlines stated herein only upon
submission of a stipulation to the Court and a Court Order modifying the deadlines. No
order modifying deadlines will be granted if it would result in a delay in the trial date,
without a formal motion to vacate the trial, and good cause shown .
(8)

TRIAL BRIEFS. Trial briefs are encouraged but not required . If submitted, trial

briefs should address substantive factual, legal and/or evidentiary issues the parties
believe are likely to arise during the trial, with appropriate citation to authority. Any trial
brief should be exchanged between the parties and submitted to the clerk of the court, and

Case No.: CV-2014-0003466-OC
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a duplicate Judge's Copy shall be submitted to the Court's chambers in Bannock County,
no later than 10 days prior to trial.

(9)

PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS, AND AN EXHIBIT LIST IN THE FORM ATTACHED

HERETO, shall be exchanged between the parties and filed with the Court no later than 10
days prior to trial.

Each party shall also lodge with the Court at chambers a duplicate

completed exhibit list plus one complete, duplicate marked set of that party's proposed
exhibits for the Court's use during the trial.

Unless otherwise ordered, Plaintiff shall

identify exhibits beginning with the number "1" and the Defendant shall identify exhibits
beginning with the letter "A."
(10)

MEDIATION. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(4), the parties are ORDERED to mediate

this matter, and shall comply with I.R.C.P. 16(k). Mediation must be held no later than 30
days prior to trial.
( 11)

TRIAL PROCEDURES. A total of TWO (2) trial days have been reserved for this

trial. If the parties believe that more trial days will be required , the parties are ORDERED
to notify the Court of this request no less than 60 days prior to trial. On the first day of trial ,
counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief status conference.
Unless otherwise ordered , or as modified during trial as necessary, trial days will begin at
9:00 a.m. and close at or about 5:00 p.m., with a one-hour lunch break.
(12)

HEARINGS OR CONFERENCES WITH THE COURT. All meetings, conferences,

and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with the Court's Clerk by
calling 208-236-7244 . No hearing shall be noticed without contacting the Clerk.

Case No.: CV-2014-0003466-OC
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(13)

ALTERNATE JUDGES. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(G),

that an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case, if the current
presiding judge is unavailable. The list of potential alternate judges is: 1) Honorable
Stephen S. Dunn; 2) Honorable Robert C. Naftz; 3) Honorable Mitchell W . Brown ; 4)
Honorable Jon Shindurling ; 5) Honorable William H. Woodland; 6) Honorable Richard T.
St. Clair. If the I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) disqualification has not previously been exercised , failure
to disqualify, without cause, any one of these alternate judges with in ten (10) days of the
date of this Order shall constitute a waiver of such right.
DATED this

2

,..J

Jt/ne_

day of-May, 2015.

DAVID C. NYE
District Judge

Case No .: CV-2014-0003466-OC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day or-U~ 2015, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated .

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

~

D

U.S. Mail

E-Mail: rharris@holdenlegal.com
Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 523-9518

Thomas J. Budge
% U.S.Mail
E-Mail: tjb@racinelaw.net
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY
Hand Deliver
CHARTERED
D Fax: (208) 232-6109
PO Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT

By

~(Ji.&-tti,L.Dep

C

k
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o-1 -0-7-' 1l3 17: 45 FROM- Ho1den f<i dirJe11

208-523-8518

T-870 P0002/000:3 F-177

Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
rbarris@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, 1~.L.L.C. cO,u J · \ \ '.\ i \\: 3l}
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
·' 1 , 1 )
P.O. Box 50130
y
-:·--,t -ldaho Falls, Idaho 83405
' 0E1- U"I ,, CLE 1 •
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Q~

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
'

'

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

Case No, CV-2014-3466-OC

PlLAINTIFFS'
WITNESS DISCLOSURE

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individuaJ,
Defendant/Counterclaimant

Chad Bames and Jane Barnes (the "Pl.aintjffs',), by and through their counsel, hereby
disclose the following fact ru1d expert witnesses for the above-entitled trial scheduled for May 10,

2016:
1.

Craig Bloxham (fact witness)

2.

Vem Bloxham (fact witness)

3.

Chad Barnes (fact witness}

4.

Jane Barnes (fact witness)

REQUEST FOR TfUAL SETTING - Page I
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01- 07-' 18 17: 45 FROM-

Holden Ki dwe11

208-523-851 8

T-tl70 P0003/0003 F-:-177
,·.

'

'

5.

I

t

,.
'

',

Kirk Jackson (fact witness)

Plaintiffs reserve the right to list other fact witnesses once discovery is completed.
'•'

The Plaintiffs do not presently intend to call any expe1t witnesses.

I

Dated this ?'h day of January, 2016.

*'~;t,~

L. . -f - .~ ~:.:J'-·-

Robert L. Harris
~
HOLDEN,. KlDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

ti

'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my
office in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 7th day of January, 2016, I served a tme and
con·ect copy of an Answer to Counterclaim on the persons listed below by first clai;s mail,
with the coITect postage thereon, or by causing the same to be de1ivered as defined by Rule
S(b), LR.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Servici~:

Thomas J. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered
P.O. Box 1391
201 E. Center Street
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax: 232-6109

( )

Mail

( )

Overnight Mail

( 0~acsimile
( )

-/.
ff~~

Electronic Mail

~

L-- - ,c- ~~.~-;/--

Robert L. Ha1Tis
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAI>O, P.L.L.C.
O;\WPDAT A\RLH\17992 Barnes, Chad\Pleadings\Plaintift's Witne.,s Disclosure.docx
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Robert L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)
rharris@holdenlegal.com
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes, by and through their counsel of record Holden, Kidwell,
Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, move this Court to
enter summary judgment in their behalf on all claims and counterclaims. This motion is supported
by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of

Craig V Bloxham.

Dated this ( ~

day of January 2016.

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

I -

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

PLAfNTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the
correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this 1,t;,~day of
January 2016.
Document Served:

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:

Thomas J. Budge
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, B UDG E,

P.O. 1391
201 East Center Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

& BAILEY, CHTD.

( 0"Mail
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile, (208) 232-6109
( ) Courthouse Box

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

G :\ WPDATA \RLH\17992 Barnes, Chad\P leadings\Summary Judgment MOTION.docx
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
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Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG V. BLOXHAM

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Baimock

)
) ss.
)

I, Craig Bloxham, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
And being so sworn I depose and say:

1.

I was born on

I am over the age of eighteen (l 8) and am competent to

testify to the matters contained herein.
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG C. BLOXHAM - Page I
57 of 514

2.

I currently reside in Bannock County, Idaho. My address is 20862 S. Cambridge Rd.,
Downey, Idaho 83234.

3.

My father is Vern Bloxham and he resides at 494 North Main, Downey, Idaho, 83234.

4.

I am familiar with a certain water right now owned by Kirk Jackson, which has been
assigned the number of29-14032. Water Right No. 29-14032 is a split of a water right
that that Vern and I owned, which was numbered as Water Right No. 29-10420. This
water right authorizes use of water from what is known locally as "Spring Creek."

5.

When we purchased the property Wilding Place, there was a wheel line that irrigated the
land in the SW1/4SW1/4 and portions of the NW1/4SW1/4 of Section 14, Township 1 lS,
Range 37E, that only used water from a small stream near the property known as Brush
Creek. This land is now owned by Kirk Jackson and was referred to by us as the " Wilding
place."

6.

We also owned a piece of property known as the "Penrose Place." We purchased this
prope11y in approximately May of 1974. When we purchased this property, there was a
ditch that ran from Spring Creek down across the NW1/4SW1/4 of Section 14, Township
1lS, Range 37E to the section line between sections 14 and 15, and the ditch turns south
and follows the section line south down to Brush Creek Road. The ditch was used to
divert Spring Creek water and apply it to the SE1/4SE1/4 of Section 15, Township I IS,
Range 37E. This is the property now owned by Chad and Jane Barnes.

7.

The ditch was also used to irrigate the portion of the NE1/4NE1/4 and the NW1/4NE1/4 of
Section 22, Township l IS , Range 37E north of Brush Creek Road with water from Spring
Creek. This portion was also referred to by us as a part of the "Wilding Place" which we
called the "lower Wilding place." This property is also owned by Chad and Jane Barnes.
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8.

When we purchased the Penrose Place, Robert Wilding used the ditch to irrigate the lower
Wilding place.

9.

Shortly after we purchased the Penrose Place, we, along with Robert Wilding, constructed
a containment and distribution pond in approximately 1975 that was used to store and
deliver water from Spring Creek and water from another creek known as Yago Creek.

10.

Shortly thereafter, in 1975, we replaced the ditch with a mainline that ran from the
distribution pond. We used an HR-45 Lister air-cooled tlu·ee cylinder diesel pump to
pump water from the pond into the mainline. Water dive11ed through the mainline was
used to irrigate the Pemose Place and the portion of the Wilding place south of the Penrose
Place.

11.

In approximately 1990, after we purchased the Wilding Place, we added pipe upgradient on
the mainline to construct a gravity pressurized system. Water was diverted from Spring
Creek just below its source by a headgate into a six-inch mainline 1100 feet down to a
valve that can divert water into a pond or, if it is closed, it will divert water into the intake
of the gravity pressurized system north of the distribution pond. This is how the system is
used today. The gravity pressurized system replaced the need to use the diesel pump to
pressurize the mainline.

12.

I consulted with the United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service in
the design of the gravity pressuri zed system, and recall that the conclusion for the flow
from the spring was approximately 220 gallons per minute, or what was referred to as a
"Miner's Stream." I also consulted with the USDA to assist with work for an erosion and
sedimentation problem, but the landowner where the spring that feeds Spring Creek is
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located would not allow us to do the project. A copy of a computation sheet outlining the
project is attached as Exhibit 1.
13.

We received funding from the USDA to also make other improvements, which included
construction of a four-inch water line and a two-inch water line, both of which run
southwest from the distribution pond. The USDA paid $3 ,500.00 of the $13 ,897.47 cost
of the project (pipe and materials). A copy of documents associated with this project is
attached as Exhibit 2.

14.

At some point between 1993 and 1996, and for one summer iITigating season, I used the
gravity pressurized system to try to irrigate the upper portion of the upper Wilding place.
I was able to gravity sprinkle approximately 15 acres of alfalfa to get it started. The rest of
the upper Wilding place was dry farmed. This is the one and only time that we irrigated
the upper Wilding place.

15.

I filed the claim in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (the "SRBA") for Water Right No.
29-10420. A copy of the claim filed in the SRBA on March 7, 1990 is attached hereto as
Exhibit 3. The water right claim was processed and we received a partial decree from the

SRBA court on March 17, 2004. However, the upper Wilding place has not been irrigated
with Spring Creek water since the mid-1990s.
16.

I am certain that Spring Creek water was not used to irrigate the upper Wilding place
between 2004 and 2012 because I owned the property at that time. The property was then
sold by the bankruptcy trustee as a result of my bankruptcy. As the owner of the property,
I never diverted and used water on the upper Wilding place after the mid-l 990s.

17.

I also know that water from Spring Creek has not been used by Kirk Jackson on the upper
Wilding place through the end of August 2014 because I am familiar with water
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distribution from Spring Creek.

I divert and use water from Spring Creek and have

assisted with distribution of water from the distribution pond and the diversion near the
location of the spring that feeds Spring Creek. In August of 2015, Kirk Jackson was still
installing his pipeline project. The system was not in place at the end of August of 2014.
18.

Kirk Jackson constructed a concrete diversion associated with his pipeline that has had an
extremely negative impact on me and other users of water on Spring Creek. It slowed the
flow and resulted in reduced water supply for myself and the other Spring Creek water
users. It also caused the excessive building up of sediment that backed into the spring
itself, which has reduced the outflow amount from the spring itself.

19.

Mr. Jackson never talked to me, and to my knowledge, did not talk to any other Spring
Creek water users before he constructed the concrete dam. I remain very concerned if he
is able to use his diversion and use water from Spring Creek. There is typically not
enough water to supply all of the water rights on the system. I have relied upon, and
others have relied upon, the water that has not been diverted by Kirk Jackson from Spring
Creek.

20.

My family sold the Penrose Place and the lower Wilding place to Chad and Jane Barnes on
January 31, 2014. We actively irrigated the property that Chad and Jane Barnes own up
until the time my family sold it to them.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
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Dated this

s1 11 day of December, 2015.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

I&~

day of December, 2015.

Notary Public for the State f Idaho
Residing at:
ltt,~
,, / ~
My Commission Expires: I( rI ( ,I 'Z,p/b

e
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 15 th day of January, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of an
Affidavit of Craig V. Bloxham on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Thomas J. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered
P.O. Box 1391
201 E. Center Street
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax: 232-6109

( ...Y
( )
( )
( )

Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Mail

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN &
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AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE
BANNOCK COUNTY ASC COMMITTEE OFFICE
FEDERAL BUILDING, U.S. COURTHOUSE
ROOM 112, 250 SOUTH 4TH AVENUE
POCATELLO, ID
83201

July 7, 1989
Vern C. Bloxham
Box 227
83234
Downey, ID
Dear Mr,

Bloxham:

Congratulations on your successful completion of your ACP project,
We are enclosing the funds earned by completing this project.
At this time we wish to remind you of the specification under which
payment is being made.
This practice is to be maintained during a
normal lifespan applicable to this particular project as determined
by the County Committee,
Periodic spot checks are made on practices performed and if it is
found the practice is not being maintained a refund can be requested
for the cost-shares paid,
If you have any questions concerning this payment,
contact this office,

please feel free to

Sincerely,

Sharon Stephens
County Executive Director

.:.
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CCC-184-1 (County)

USDA •A5C5

(11-14-84)

NOTE: Detach this statement and keep with your records.

I

I
i
I
I

03366966

PAYMENT STATEMENT

DATE: 07/07/89 PROGRAM: ACP
ST ~ CTY: 16-005-2 REFERENCE: 898010
PRODUC'ER: VERN C BLOXHAM
PAYEE: VERN C BLOXHAM
GROSS PAYMENT AMOUNT
$3,500.00
NET AMOUNT PAID
$3,500. 00

l
!

-

O

lJIJ@lJ®[fild]

., ,

rn~wlli

Offices in Downey, Inkom ,
Malad and Preston , Idaho

D

CHECKING

D

SAVINGS

D

LOAN

D

OTHER

ALL ITEMS ARE RECEIVED SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS ANO TERMS AS STATED ON DEPOSIT TICKETS CURRENTLY ISSUED.

402 IBD 7/H/89#060

$3,500. 00 D

3028073#

l_:,,_ , -

THIS I S YOUR RECEIPT , RETAIN UNTIL YOU HAVE VERIFIED IT WITH YOUR STATEMENT .

MEMBER FDIC
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v.

BJ,0:XHAM

Irrigation Material
Irrigation Aid Company- I reston, Idaho
Total cost of f:'. aterir-u.s

'.'\ 7,736.52

Monroe Inc.- Pocatello, Idaho
Cement- Di version J10x 1 1/3 yd
Cement- Spill way-/ 2./3 yd

166. 95

Total Labor CostItemized 1 i sting bel OH

5,994.00

Total Cost of Completed Project-

·n3 ,s97 .47

Itemized L.'.'1.bor (:or:rt Ford Tractor- 24 hrs.

:1

240.00
140.00
528.00
30.00
3,668.00

10. 00 per br

John l'eere Tr actor- 1 4 hrs. ···. J.O. 00 hr
Jo'.ord J3ack Hoe- 24 hrs. , , 2:2 .oo hr

Chev. Truck- 3 hrs

6)

10.00 per hr

covering & laying pipe ri • 70 per ft.

( 5240 ft.)
483.00
340.00

Robert Baugh- Labor & Di version material
Craig V. Bloxham- 68 hrs r-\;1 5.00 per hr
Vern C. Bloxham- 71 hrs ,;;\ 5.00 per. hr
Robert Georgson-

Labor

355.00
135.00

Gavin Sorensen-

Labor

75.00

Total Labor Co st

<'I

,;;,

5,994.00
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SPRDJG CRK8K RANCH

CONSERVATION 1:/ATJ~{ IMPR0VliJ'·1ENT
VEiRN C. BLOXHAM & CR.HG V. BLOXHAM
·~· ...

,:·. :
Irrigation Material

,i,

Irrigation Aid Company- Preston, Idaho
Total cost of Materials

..

....

_.,, .

~

Monroe Inc.- Pocatellot Idaho
Cement- Diversion Box 11/3 yd
Cement- Spill way- 2_/3 yd

7,736.52

166. 95

.:

Total Labor CostItemized 1 i sting below

5,994.00

Total .cost of Completed Project-

$13,897.47

\
Itemized Labor CostFord Tractor- 24 hrs. n 10.00 per hr
John · Deere Tractor- 14 hrs. , ·, 10.00 hr
Ford ;sack Hoe- 24 hrs.

i .

:•

. ..

.·.

·· ··•

:"'. ··· ~··

· ~· . ;

...

~-,.

22 .oo hr

Chev. Truck- 3 hrs@ 10.00 per hr
Covering & laying pipe i<~ • 70 per f t.
( 5240 ft.)
Robert Baugh- Labor & Diversion material

.I,, • •

~~.:~\.,;.:

(,l

•;/

...,1 •• •• •.•

···:

·.::-~

.:

.

• :·

.

;:'. :::y:.:~·-·;.'' .· .~.~·- , ::·· ..

Craig V. :Bl.ozj,.am- 68 hrs
Vern

c.

@

5.00 per hr

Bloxham.- 71 hrs r/'l 5.00 per hr

. Robert Georg~onGavin Sorensen-

Labor
Labor

240.00
140.00
528.00
30.00

.

•.,.:

:·· · ;-•

\.

3,668.00
483.00
340.00
355.00

· •;; t '. '.·.:'., •. ~ ,

.

I

.\~{;\f

-:._.,,/:{f"

135.00

75.00

.. ;·;,

.. . :· !.' .. ;:- :

Total Labor Cost

·~

..

'.':- :1~·j,

$ 5,994.00

.. ,: ,

' ',,\ ,; ',
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Irrigation !1Iaterial
Irrigation Aid Compan:f- Fre~,t on, Id aho
't'ota.l cost of ~'.atcr foL;

'; 7,736.52

Monroe Inc .- Poc atello , IdaJ-to
Cement- :Divers ion · -ex J. 1/3 yd
Cement- Spilhrn.y - ?h ~n1

166. 95

Total Labor costItemized l i r-rtin;'.); hc lo,:1

5 , 994 . 00

Total Cost of Completed Pro,ier:t-

,'~J.3,897 .47

Itemized Labor CostFord Tractor- 24 hrs . · · J. D. l1C1 ·;)er ;-·,-'-'

240 .00

John teere Tractor- 1 4 hr8 .

140 .00

· J.D. CO hr

Frird Back Hoe- 24 hr s . ,·, 22 . OO hr

528.00

Chev. Truck- 3 hrs r,1 J.0 .00 .J.lP,r h r

30.00

c overing & laying pipe
( 5240 ft.)

3, 668 .oo

' .70 per. ft .

Robert Baugh- Labor & T\j_ve rsion rrraterbl

483.00

Craig V. J:u.oy.ham- 68 hrs

340.00

Vern

c. N.oxham- 71

1 ···

h .r .: ; ·

5 . 00 per hr

~; .ou per

llr

355.00

Robert Georgson-

Labor

135. oo

Gavin Sorensen-

Labor

75.00

r_rotal Labor t o nt

.:l>

~

5,994.00
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,
IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
CIVIL CASE NUMBER:

IN RE THE GENERAL ADJUDICATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER FROM
THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN WATER SYSTEM.

39576

Ident. Number: A29-10420
Date Received: 3/07/1990
Receipt No: zt.J~'/
Received By:
_
NOTICE OF CLAIM TO A WATER RIGHT
ACQUIRED UNDER STATB LAW

1. Name:
Address:

VERN C. BLOXHAM
494 NORTH MAIN
DOWNEY, ID

208-897-5261
83234

OR

Name:
Address:

208-897-5971

CRAIG V. BLOXHAM
20862 s. CAMBRIDGE RD.
DOWNEY, ID

2. Date of Priority:

83234

MAY 19, 1876

3. source: SPRING CREEK

Trib. to: SINKS

4. Point of Diversion:

Township
11S

R,rnge
37E

Section
14

Lot

1/4 of 1/4 of 1/4
SW

SE

County

NW

BANNOCK

5. Description of diverting works:
CEMENT DIVERSION INTO PRIVATE DITCH
6. Water is used for the following purposes:

Purpose
IRRIGATION
STOCKWATER

From

03/15
01/01

To
11/15
12/31

7. Total Quantity Appropriated is:
3.400 C.F.S. (and/or}
8. Total consumptive use is

C.F.S

(or)

A. F.A.

3.400
0.030
A.F.A.

481.0 Acre Feet Per Annum.

9. Non-irrigation uses:
D/ 60 RANGE.

A29-10420

Page

1

Date:

03/07/90

MICROFILMED
NOV 13 1992
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10. Place of use:
Township
11S

Range
37E

Section
14

1/4 of 1/4
SW
NW
SW
SW

Lot

use
IRR
IRR

section Acres
15

NE
SW

se:

SE
SE

IRR
IRR

SE

IRR

Section Acres
NE
NW

22

NE

NE

IRR
IRR
section Acres

23

NW

NW

IRR
section Acres
Total Acres

Acres
37. 0
40.0
77.0
22.0
16.0
40.0
78.0
25.0

s.o

30.0
7.5
7.5
192.5

11. Place of use in counties: BANNOCK
12. Do you own the property listed above as place of use? YES
13. Other Water Rights Used:
NONE
14. Remarks:

WATER DIVERTED THROUGH THE YAGO-CAMBRIDGE DITCH

15. Basis of Claim: STATUTORY CLAIM

A29-10420

Page

2

Date:

03/07/90

MICROFILMED
NO~ 13 1992
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16. Signature(s)
(a.) By signing below, I/We acknowledge that I/We have received, read and
understand the form entitled "How you will receive notice in the Snake River
Basin: Adjudication." (b.) I/We do
do not _j(___ wish to receive and pay
a small annual fee for monthly copieicil' the docKetsheet.

Number of attachments:

roc- Individuals:

I/We do solemnly swear or affirm that the statements contained in the
foregoing document are t r £ corre:t~/;
Signature of Claimant(s):p.,:,~

-- -z,,~/;~

Date:

w~

Date:

State of Idaho
County of

k/t!'.i///'/e,

)

) ss.

)

before me t h ~ ~

~

Residing at

4

No ary P~ic

~x£~<' __.e?

My Commission Expires

A29-10420

Page

3

Date:

6 -/r-'7f'?7'{'

03/07/90

MICROFILMED
NOV 13 1992
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Robert L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)
rharris@holdenlegal.com
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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P.O. Box 50130
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (the "Barnes"), by and through their counsel of record
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., submit this memorandum in support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment.
The Barnes are entitled to summary judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56, because there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the forfeiture of the Defendant's water
right by non-use or the Barnes' use of their water right during the periods relevant to this case
and the Barnes are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, the Barnes are entitled
to attorney ' s fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, since the defenses and counterclaim are
frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.

I
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Barnes own property in Bannock County, located in the SE¼ of Section 15 and the
NE¼ of Section 22, Township 11 South, Range 37 East, Boise Meridian (the "Barnes Property").
Aff. of Craig Bloxham (hereinafter "Bloxham Aff."),

~

20; Complaint,

~

4; admitted in Answer

and Counterclaim , ~ 5. Defendant, Kirk Jackson ("Jackson"), owns some neighboring property
in the SW¼ of Section 14 of the same township (the "Jackson Property"). Jackson purchased the
Jackson Property from Gary R. Rainsdon, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Craig Bloxham.

(Complaint,~ 8; admitted in this regard in Answer and Counterclaim, ~ 8.) Jackson bought the
property in 2012. Bloxham Aff. , ~ 16.
Certain water rights are appurtenant to the Barnes Property, No. 29-14115 ("29-14115"),
and the Jackson Property, No. 29-14032 ("29-14032"), with the same priority date of May 19,
1920. (Complaint,~~ 5, 9, 14; admitted in Answer and Counterclaim,~~ 5, 9, 11.)

Both 29-

14115 and 29-14032 were decreed on March 22, 2004, by the Snake River Basin Adjudication
("SRBA"). (Complaint,~~ 5, 16; admitted in Answer and Counterclaim , ~~ 5, 13.)

The Barnes Property has been irrigated using 29-14115 for the entirety of the period
relevant to this case. In particular, Craig Bloxham used 29-14115 to irrigate the Barnes Property
from 2004 (when 29-14115 was decreed) until 2014 (when he sold the property to the Barnes).
Bloxham Aff.,

~

20. Through the 2014 irrigation season, the Barnes have irrigated the Barnes

property using 29-14115. Complaint~ 18; Bloxham Aff., ~ 20.
In contrast, the Jackson Property was not irrigated using 29-14032 (i.e., using water from
what is known as "Spring Creek") for a long time. In relevant part, Craig Bloxham, Jackson's
predecessor-in-interest, did not irrigate the Jackson Property with water from Spring Creek from
2004 (when 29-14032 was decreed) until 2012 (when the property was sold by the bankruptcy
2 -
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trustee to Jackson). Bloxham Aff.,

1 16.

Further, Jackson had not done anything to irrigate the

Jackson Property using 29-14032 until the end of August 2014, when he constructed a concrete
dam on Spring Creek. Bloxham Aff., 1 17. Even after constructing the dam, Jackson's system
for putting 29-14032 to beneficial use was not in place as late as August 2015. Bloxham Aff.,

1

17. Jackson admits that neither he, "nor his predecessor-in-interest [i.e., Bloxham] received
approval of an application for extension of time to avoid forfeiture from [the Idaho Department
of Water Resources] pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-222(2)." Complaint, 131; admitted in Answer

and Complaint,~ 25.
In late August 2014, Jackson unilaterally constructed a new concrete dam on Spring
Creek approximately 30 feet above the Barnes' historical point of diversion. Complaint,

,r 21;

admitted in relevant part in Answer and Counterclaim,~ 17; see also Bloxham Aff., 11 17-18. It
appears that Jackson now intends to use 29-14032, the water from Spring Creek, to irrigate the
Jackson Property- to the detriment of all the other water users on Spring Creek, who have come
to rely on the Spring Creek system without the strain of29-14032. See Bloxham Aff.,

~~

18-19.

The Barnes instituted this action on August 29, 2014, to have this Court declare that 2914032 is a forfeited water right and, therefore, Jackson does not have the right to divert Spring
Creek water. Complaint, pp. 1, 6.

II. ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When a
jury trial has been demanded, disputed facts are to be construed in favor of the non-moving
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the
3 -
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non-moving party. Without a demand for a jury trial, however, the court may construe facts
differently:
[I]f an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment. Rather, the judge is free to arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991); Blackmon v. Zufelt,
108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91, 92 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Riverside Development Co. v.
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982)). Further, to survive summary judgment,
the non-moving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions in response to a motion
for summary judgment. In other words, "[a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz,
Inc. , 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).
Here, the Barnes are entitled to summary judgment as to both of their claims and
Jackson's counterclaim. First, there is no genuine issue of material fact that 29-14032 was not
applied to beneficial use between 2004 and 2014; the Barnes have made a claim of right, either
by instituting this action or by using 29-14032 ' s water to satisfy their own water right, before
Jackson has resumed use of 29-14032.

Second, Jackson cannot show that 29-14115 has

undergone any five-year period of non-use and, consequently, cannot show that 29-14115 has
been forfeited. Finally, Jackson 's defenses and his counterclaim are frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation and this Court should award the Barnes their reasonable attorney' s fees in
bringing this action.

4
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A. Jackson, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has by operation of law forfeited
29-14032 in failing to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated for at
least five years.
In Idaho, a water right is "lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to
apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated. "

LC. § 42-222(2).

While

"[a]bandonments and forfeitures are not favored," Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50, 52
(1937), allowing unused water rights to perish and be beneficially used by another is an
affirmation of the "traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water resources of this
state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts through appropriation." See LC. §
42-226.
Here, the testimony of the prior owner of the Jackson Property, Craig Bloxham, shows
that he did not use 29-14032 to irrigate the Jackson Property between 2004, when 29-14032 was
decreed by the SRBA, and 2012, when the Jackson Property was sold by the trustee of
Bloxham's bankruptcy estate. Bloxham Aff. , ~ 16. 1 Further, because he still owns property that
uses water from Spring Creek, Bloxham "know[s] that water from Spring Creek has not be used
by Kirk Jackson on the [Jackson Property] through the end of August 2014." Bloxham Aff. ,
17.

,r

Finally, during "August 2015, Kirk Jackson was still installing his pipeline project."

Bloxham Aff. , ~ 17. Thus, there is competent evidence that from March 2004 to at least August
2015, the property owner of the Jackson Property (Bloxham and, after 2012, Jackson) was not
using 29-14032. As a result, 29-14032 has been forfeited by non-use. See I.C. § 42-222(2).

1

Bloxham refers to "Spring Creek water." Bloxham Aff., 1 16. This refers to 29-14032, since the water for 2914032 was taken from Spring Creek. Complaint, 1 13 ; admitted in Answer and Counterclaim , 1 11.
Additionally, Bloxham states that the Jackson Property "has not been irrigated with Spring Creek water since the
mid-1990s." Bloxham Aff., 115.

5 -
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There are some defenses at common law and provided by statute. See id. (referencing
I.C. § 42-223). Perhaps the most applicable at this point is the "resumption-of-use doctrine,"
which is described as an affirmative defense as follows:
although statutory abandonment did actually occur, the forfeiture is not
effective if, after the five-year period, the original owner or appropriator
resumed the use of the water prior to the claim of right by a third party.

Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831 , 836, 70 P.3d 669, 674 (2003)
(quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531 - 32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944)).

The

Com1 explained that
A third party has made a claim of right to the water if [1] the third party
has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or [2] has obtained
a valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date
prior to the resumption of use, or [3] has used the water pursuant to an
existing water right.

Sagewillow , 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (internal citations omitted).

Further, the

resumption can be made by a successor in interest to the original appropriator. Id. at 839, 70
P.3d at 677. Because forfeiture is effectuated by a failure to put the water right to beneficial use
for five consecutive years, any claimed resumption must put the water right to beneficial use
"upon the land to which the water right is appurtenant." See id. at 842, 70 P.3d at 680; see also
1.C. § 42-222(2).
In this case, it is anticipated that Jackson will defend his position that he "resumed use of
water right 29-(14032] prior to the filing of Plaintiffs' Complaint." Answer and Counterclaim, ,i
3.

However, Jackson' s attempt to invoke the resumption-of-use doctrine must fail for two

alternative reasons.
First, while Jackson admits he built a concrete dam above the Barnes' point of diversion
on Spring Creek (Answer and Counterclaim, ,i 17), and does not admit the specific date or
6
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timeframe during which he constructed the dam ; the evidence shows that it occurred during late
~~

17-19. Further, during "August of 2015, Kirk

Jackson was still installing his pipeline project.

The system was not in place at the end of

August 2014. Complaint,~ 21; Bloxham Aff.,

August of 2014." Bloxham Aff.

~

17. That means that Jackson had not begun applying the

water he intended to extract from Spring Creek to beneficial use for a substantial period of time,
and it is our understanding that he has not yet diverted water to his property. The Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that the Barnes' Complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment declaring
29-14032 had been forfeited by non-use, was filed on August 29, 2014-before Jackson has
applied water to beneficial use. Consequently, the Barnes have "made a claim of right to the
water" by "institut[ing] proceedings to declare a forfeiture," Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70
P.3d at 680; see also Complaint,~ 20 (alleging that this action constitutes a claim of right under
this rationale); admitted in Answer and Counterclaim,

~

16). The timing shows that Barnes'

claim of right occurred before Jackson had effectively resumed beneficially using 29-14032.
Thus, the resumption-of-use doctrine is not a valid defense.
Second, the Barnes, through their predecessor-in-interest, Bloxham, have made a claim of
right by beneficially using the water pursuant to an existing water right, 29-14115, that would
otherwise have been appropriated by Jackson under 29-14032 but for his non-use.

See

Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (citing Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Co., 40
Idaho 49, 231 P. 418 (1924)). This must be supported as a claim of right and must also be shown
to predate Jackson's resumption of use to defeat the affirmative defense. If the Barnes' use of
water qualifies as a claim of right and predates Jackson's resumed use of 29-14032, Jackson
cannot assert the resumption-of-use doctrine as a defense for his forfeiture. See Sagewillow, 138
Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.
7 -
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To qualify as a claim of right, the Barnes' water use requires "evidence showing that
resumption of use by [Jackson] would diminish the quantity of water being used by [the Barnes]
from an interconnected water source." Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 846, n. 3, 70 P.3d 669, at 684,
n. 3. 29-14032 and 29-14115 are interconnected because they both came from the same water
right and have the same elements of use. Spring Creek is over-appropriated. Bloxham Aff. , ~ 19
("There is typically not enough water to supply all of the water rights on the system" even
without Jackson resuming use of 29-14032). That demonstrates that the Barnes and other Spring
Creek water users will suffer from diminished quantities of water if Jackson resumes use of 2914032. Bloxham Aff.,

~~

17-19; see also Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 846, n. 3, 70 P.3d 669, at

684, n. 3 (discussing over-appropriation).
Barnes' claim of right by appropriation dates back to 2012, through their predecessor-ininterest, Craig Bloxham. Bloxham owned both the Barnes Property and the Jackson Property
until 2012, when the bankruptcy trustee sold the Jackson Property to Jackson. Bloxham Aff. , ,r,r
16, 20. Before that, 29-14115 was not held by a "third party" in relation to 29-14032 and
therefore could not establish a claim of right against 29-14115. However, when Jackson bought
the Jackson Property in 2012 from Bloxham's bankruptcy trustee, he also became the owner of
29-14032, the appurtenant water right. Bloxham Aff., ~ 16; Complaint , ~ 9; admitted in Answer

and Counterclaim, ~ 9. In 2014, Bloxham sold the Barnes Property and 29-14115 to the Barnes.
Bloxham Aff. ,

~

20. Thus, since 2012, 29-14115 has been held by a third party relative to

29-14032; first Bloxham and, later, the Barnes. Bloxham continued using 29-14115 to "actively
irrigate" the Barnes Property until he sold it to the Barnes in 2014. Bloxham Aff. ,

~

20. Thus,

any resumption of 29-14032 will diminish the overall quantity of water available for 29-14115,

8 -

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

89 of 514

which has been using the water as a third party relative to 29-14032 since 2012- well before
Jackson' s resumption of use of29-14032.
As a result, the resumption-of-use doctrine is not a defense to Jackson' s forfeiture of 2914032 since the Barnes have a claim ofright that predates any resumed beneficial use by Jackson
either by (I) filing this action on August 29, 2014, or (2) relying on water from the overappropriated Spring Creek since 2012, the quantity of which would be reduced by Jackson's
resumed use.

29-14032 was not used to irrigate the Jackson Property from 2004 to 2015 ;

therefore the Barnes are entitled to summary judgment declaring that 29-14032 has been
forfeited.

B. The Barnes, and their predecessor-in-interest, have not failed to apply 29-14115 to its
beneficial use for any five-year-long period and therefore have not forfeited their water
right.
The Barnes dispute Jackson' s counterclaim that "29-14115 has not been put to beneficial
use on a portion of the [Barnes Property] for an excess of five years immediately prior to the
filing of this counterclaim." Answer and Counterclaim , ,r 30. As the counterdefendants in this
regard, the Barnes may move for summary judgment on Jackson's claim "with or without
supporting affidavits."

I.R.C.P. 56(b).

The Barnes contend that they and Bloxham, their

predecessor-in-interest, have applied 29-14115 to irrigate the Barnes Property continuously since
2004, when 29-14115 was decreed by the SRBA. Jackson may be claiming that the Barnes (and
Bloxham before the Barnes) have not used 29-14115 to irrigate all of the property specified in
the decree. However, forfeiture relates to the water right's non-use and not the extent of its use
within the property designated in the water right itself. See Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735 , 738,
552 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1976). Since there has not been a five-year period of non-use of 29-14115

9
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as to the Barnes Property, there is not a genuine issue of material fact and the Barnes are entitled
to summary judgment dismissing Jackson 's unsubstantiated counterclaim.

C. The Barnes are entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party because Jackson's
defense and counterclaim are frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.
Whenever a civil action is "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation" the prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); LC.
§ 12-121. "When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably,
or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account." Nampa &

Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001).
However, a trial court may award attorney ' s fees on a pro rata basis for any claims or defenses
"necessitating this lawsuit that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without adequate foundation."

Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.3d l 072, 1080 (2014),
reh'g denied (Aug. 6, 2014) (reversing Idaho's prior interpretation of disallowing any award for
attorney's fees if any claim or defense was not frivolous). Or, if the entire case of one party is
frivolous, unreasonable, and without adequate foundation, the court may provide a complete
award of attorney's fees. See, e.g., Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342,347, 336 P.3d 275,280
(2014), reh'g denied (Nov. 6, 2014) (awarding attorney' s fees in whole when a case was based on
"mere assertion and unsubstantiated" facts). It is only if "there is a legitimate, triable issue of
fact or a legitimate issue of law" that a claim or defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation." Brannon v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 153 Idaho 843 , 857, 292 P.3d 234, 248
(2012).
Here, Jackson has made a mere assertion, based on unsubstantiated facts, that 29-14115
was not used for five years. The Barnes have supplied an affidavit from Jackson' s predecessor-
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in-interest stating that he did not use 29-14032 from 2004 until the property was sold in 2012
because of his bankruptcy. Bloxham Aff.,

,r

16. Therefore, Jackson' s main defense to the

Barnes' claim is that he has resumed use of 29-14032 before the Barnes made a claim of right;
however, that defense is also frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Jackson certainly
constructed a concrete dam on Spring Creek before the Barnes filed this action; but that is not the
same as resuming use of 29-14032. According to Craig Bloxham, who is still familiar with the
Spring Creek area since he continues to own property that relies on Spring Creek water, Jackson
had not, as of August 2015, completed the system necessary to put 29-14032 to beneficial uselong after this action was filed on August 29, 2014.

Bloxham Aff.,

,r

17; Complaint, p. 1.

Additionally, Bloxham (as the Barnes' predecessor-in-interest) relied on the non-use of29-14032
as a third party in 2012, which is also a claim of right- made long before Jackson began his
construction project in 2014.

Bloxham Aff. ,

11

16-17.

Therefore, the defenses offered by

Jackson are wholly without merit and present no legitimate, triable issue of fact or any legitimate
issue of law.

As a result, the Barnes should be awarded the entirety of their reasonable

attorney's fees necessitated by this case.

III. CONCLUSION
Summary judgment should be granted on the Barnes' behalf as to their claims and
Jackson's counterclaims. Jackson and his predecessor-in-interest did not use 29-14032 for more
than ten years. The Barnes established a claim of right before Jackson resumed use of 29-14032.
Further, Jackson cannot show a five-year period when 29-14115 was not used.

Jackson's

contentions are frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Therefore, the Barnes should
be awarded reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.

11
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Dated this / 5

~

day of January 2016.

~L-+~

Robert L. Harris

HOLDEN , KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the
correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this ~ day of
January 2016.
Document Served:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Thomas J. Budge
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE,

P.O. 1391
201 East Center Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

& BAILEY, CHTD.

( ~ii
( ) Hand Delivery
( ) Facsimile, (208) 232-6109
( ) Courthouse Box

Robert L. Harris, Esq.

·

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

G:\ WP DATA \RLH\ 17992 Barnes, Chad\Pleadings\Sununary Judgment MEMO.docx
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
rharris@holdenlegal.com
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants
NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 29THday of February, 2016, at 3:00 p.m., or as soon
thereafter

as

counsel

can

be

heard,

before

the

Honorable

David

C.

Nye,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants in the above-entitled action, comprised of Chad Barnes and Jane
Barnes, will call up for hearing the following petition: Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dated this 15 th day of January, 2016.

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 15 th day of January, 20 l 6, I served a true and correct copy of a
Notice of Hearing on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage thereon,
or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P.
Persons Served:

Method of Service:

Thomas J. Budge
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge, & Bailey, Chartered
P.O. Box 1391
201 E. Center Street
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391
Fax: 232-6109

(~
( )
( )
( )

Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Mail

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

G:\ WPDA TA \RLH\ 17992 Barnes, Chad\Pleadings\Notice of Hearing.20 16-01-15.docx
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I ,

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 W. Whitman/P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370
Telephone: 208-233-0132
Facsimile: 208-234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,

CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC
Plaintiffs,

SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL

vs.
KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Peter _M. Wells, of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered, and
Thomas Jeremy Budge, of the firm Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and hereby
stipulate and give notice to the Court and all counsel herein that in all further stages of the
proceedings herein, Peter M. Wells will appear as counsel of record for the Defendant, Kirk
Jackson.

1- 1s- 1r;_
DATE

~- ~~
PETER M. WELLS

May, Rammell & Thompson, Chtd.

~bl¼nt\S,7o,~
DATE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Substitution of Counsel was served on
the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

-~U.S.Mail
[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

DATED this !_J_ day of January, 2016.
By:

dtb- J--«_

May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered

r
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Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 W. Whitman/ P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370
Telephone: 208-233-0132
Facsimile: 208-234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,

CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC
Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANT'S WITNESS
DISCLOSURE

vs.
KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant, Kirk Jackson, by and through his attorney of record Peter M.
Wells, of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered, pursuant to this Court' s Order Setting
Court Trial issued on the 2nd day of June, 2015, and hereby submits Defendant's fact and expert
witnesses concerning the above matter.
1. Defendant, Kirk Jackson;

2. Debbie Jackson, Defendant's spouse;
3. Steve Criddle; and
4. James Cefalo- Mr. Cefalo is an employee with the Idaho Department of Water Resources
and may be called as a fact expert to lay foundation related to Idaho Department of Water
Resources documents and procedures.
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The parties have not completed discovery at this time, and Defendant re erves the right to
supplement this disclosUJe if it becomes necessary.
DATED this 20 th day of January, 2016.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Jv'111W!,v

f1t·UA€1..

For:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendant's Witness Disclosure was
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
DATED this 20 th day of January, 2016.

[x] U.S. Mail
[x] Facsimile 208-523-9518
[ ] Hand Deli very

By•L
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02-05-'1 6 15:32 FROM- Holden Kidwel 1

208-523-9518

...

T-053 P0002/ 0003 F-326
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
rha:rru@holdenlegal.com

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200

20 l6FEB-~

P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 8340S
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518

BY.

_J ]

·o · fu y CLERK

.....

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

vs.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant

'

.'

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 14T" day of March, 2016, at 3:00 p.m., or as soon
thereafter

as

counsel

can

be

heard,

before

the

Honorable

David

C.

Nye,

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants in the above--entitled action, comprised of Chad Barnes and Jane
Barnes, will call up for hearing the following petition: Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dated this

"7~

day ofFebrmu:y, 2016.

-Robert
~L. 'Harris
---~~
•HOLDEN; KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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02-05-'1 6 15:32 FROM- Holden Kidwell

208-523-9518

T-053 P0003/0003 F-326 .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the ~ day of February, 2016, I served a tme and correct
copy of an AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING on the persons listed below by first class mail,
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as defined by Rule 5(b),
I.R.C.P.
Method of Service:

Persons Served:
Peter M. Wells
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
216 W. Whitman
PO Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370
Fax: 234-2961

( )

Mail

( ) Overnight Mail
( ~ Facsimile
( ) Electronic Mail

~

L._ . - - ~

Robert L. Harri~
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.LLC.
G:\WPDATA\RLH\17992 Barnes, Chad\l>leadings\Amendcd Notice ofHearing.2016-02-05,doc.x
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II]

Holden KiJwell
Hahn & Crapo
LAW

,

208-523-9518

02-05-'16 15:32 FROM- Holden Kidwell

T-053 P0001/0003 F-328
I 000 :Riv«walk Drive, SUite 200

PO Box 50 !30
t~o Pall,, !dsM 8340S

P.L.L.c

OFFICES
Td: (208) S23-06l0

Fax: (208) ~3-9$ 18
www,h<)ldMJ~aa1.com

rhanis@holden.tasatooro

DATE:

February 5, 2016

TO:

Honorable Judge David C. Nye

FAX#:

236-7208

FROM:

Robert L. Harris

FAX#:

523-9518

RE:

Chad Barnes et al vs. Kirk Jackson

NO. OF PAGES (INCLUDING TRANSMITTAL SHEET):
ITEMS SENT:

Amended Notice of Hearing

ORIGINALS:

Sent by Mail () Kept on File (X)

3

MESSAGE:
This message is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may contain
infonuation that is privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not
the intended recipient, any dissemination or distribution of this communication to other than the intended
recipient is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us
immediately by collect telephone at (208) 523-0620, and return the original message to us at the above
address via the U.S. Postal Service. Thank you. • ,

TELECOPIER OPERATOR,
Joan
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SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
81\N
624 E. CENTER
CLE. t,
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83201

FILED
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OF THE COU T

2016~9: 22
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs .
KIRK JACKSON, an individual
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2tH'4.QQ03.4.6
~6~-o
~ c __

DEPUTY CLERK
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby reset for:
Motion for Summary Judgment
Judge:
Courtroom :

Monday, April 04, 2016
David C Nye
Room #300, Third Floor

02:00 PM

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on
file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Thursday, March 03 , 2016.

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL. HAHN
& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

D U.S. Mail
~ E-Mail: rharris@.holdenlegal.com
Hand Deliver
D Fax: (208) 523-9518

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON , CHTD.
216 W Whitman
PO Box 370
Pocatello , ID 83204-0370

t!U.S . Mail
E-Mail: pete@mrtlaw.net
D Hand Deliver
D Fax: (208) 234-2961

Dated: March 3rd, 2016
Robert Poleki
Clerk Of The District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No:CV-2014-0003466-OC

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

SECOND ORDER SETTING
COURT TRIAL

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
(1)

TRIAL DATE.

This matter is set for COURT TRIAL on the 22ND DAY OF

FEBRUARY, 2017, AT THE HOUR OF 9:00 A.M., in Courtroom 300, Bannock County

Courthouse, Pocatello, Idaho. A continuance of the trial date shall occur only upon written

Motion or Stipulated Motion to the Court which clearly states the reasons for the requested
continuance and which includes an acknowledgment and agreement signed by each
~

that certifies that the Motion to Continue has been discussed with and agreed to by

each party. All deadlines listed below shall apply to the trial setting first listed above. An
Order continuing the trial date to the backup trial date will not alter the deadlines set forth
in this Order, except for good cause shown.
(2)

PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE .

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(b), in lieu of a pre-trial

conference, trial counsel for the parties (or the parties if they are self-represented) are
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ORDERED to meet and/or confer for the purpose of preparing a joint Pre-Trial Stipulation,
which shall be submitted to the Court at least 21 days prior to Trial, and shall include:
(A) A statement that all exhibits to be offered at trial have been provided to all
other parties and attaching an Exhibit List of all exhibits to be offered at trial by
both parties. The Exhibit List shall indicate: 1) by whom the exhibit is being
offered, 2) a brief description of the exhibit, 3) whether the parties have
stipulated to its admission, and if not, 4) the legal grounds for any objection. If
any exhibit includes a summary of other documents, such as medical expense
records , to be offered pursuant to I.R.E. 1006, the summary shall be attached to
the Stipulation .
(B) A statement whether depositions or any discovery responses will be offered
in lieu of live testimony, and a list of what will actually be offered, the manner in
which such evidence will be presented , and the legal grounds for any objection
to any such offer.
(C) A list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which each party intends
to call to testify at trial, including anticipated rebuttal or impeachment witnesses.
Expert witnesses shall be identified as such . The Stipulation should also
identify whether any witness' testimony will be objected to in its entirety and the
legal grounds therefore.
(D) A brief non-argumentative summary of the factual nature of the case. The
purpose of the summary is to provide an overview of the case for the jury and is
to be included in pre-proof instructions to the jury, unless found inappropriate by
the Court.
(E) A statement that counsel have, in good faith , discussed settlement
unsuccessfully and/or completed mediation unsuccessfully, if mediation was
ordered by the Court.
(F) A statement that all pre-trial discovery procedures under I.R.C.P. 26 to 37
have been complied with and all discovery responses supplemented as
required by the rules to reflect facts known to the date of the Stipulation .
(G) A statement of all issues of fact and law which remain to be litigated , listing
which party has the burden of proof as to each issue.
(H) A list of any stipulated admissions of fact, which will avoid unnecessary
proof.
(I) A list of any orders requested by the parties which will expedite the trial.
(J) A statement as to whether counsel require more than 30 minutes per party
for voir dire or opening statement and , if so, an explanation of the reason more
time is needed.
These submissions wi ll be deemed by the Court to constitute the final pre-trial

Case No.: CV-2014-0003466-OC

SECOND ORDER SETTING COURT TRIAL
Page 2 of 7

107 of 514

conference required by IRCP 16(b). However, if either party wishes a more forma l pretrial conference the same should be requested in writing at least 60 days prior to trial
and one will be scheduled.
(3)

MOTIONS TO ADD NEW PARTIES OR AMEND PLEADINGS shall be filed no

later than 60 days after the date of this Order.
(4)

DISCOVERY must be served and completely responded to at least 60 days prior to

trial. This includes supplementation of discovery responses required by I.R.C.P. 26(e) ,
unless good cause is shown for late supplementation.

Discovery requests must be

responded to in a timely way as required by the I.R.C.P. The deadlines contained in this
Order cannot be used as a basis or reason for failing to timely respond to or supplement
properly served discovery, including requests for disclosure of witnesses and/or trial
exhibits. Discovery disputes will not be heard by the Court without the written certification
required by I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2).
(5)

WITNESS DISCLOSURE.

Except as previously disclosed in responses to

discovery requests, Plaintiff shall disclose all fact and expert witnesses no later than 140
days before trial. Defendants shall disclose their fact and expert witnesses no later than
110 days before trial. Rebuttal witnesses shall be disclosed no later than 80 days before
trial. Expert witnesses shall be disclosed in the manner and with the specificity required by
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).

Any objection to the I.R.C .P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) expert witness

disclosure must be filed within 45 days of the disclosure or is deemed wa ived . Witnesses
not disclosed in responses to discovery and/or as requ ired herein will be excluded at trial,
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unless allowed by the Court in the interest of justice.
(6)

MOTIONS. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS, and responses thereto, shall comply in all

respects with I.R.C.P. 56 and be filed no later than 90 days before trial.

ALL OTHER

MOTIONS, including any Motion in Limine, shall be filed and heard by the Court no later
than 30 days before trial. The original of all Motions and supporting submissions shall be
filed with the clerk of the court.

However, one (1) duplicate Judge's Copy of all

Motions, and any opposition thereto, together with supporting memorandum,
affidavits

and

documents,

shall

be

E-MAILED

to

the

deputy

clerk

at

amyw@bannockcounty.us. All other pleadings, notices, etc., should be filed with the
Clerk without copies to the Court's chambers.
(7)

STIPULATED MODIFICATIONS. The parties may stipulate to the modification of

the discovery, witness disclosure and motion deadlines stated herein only upon
submission of a stipulation to the Court and a Court Order modifying the deadlines. No
order modifying deadlines will be granted if it would result in a delay in the trial date,
without a formal motion to vacate the trial, and good cause shown.
(8)

TRIAL BRIEFS. Trial briefs are encouraged but not required . If submitted , trial

briefs should address substantive factual , legal and/or evidentiary issues the parties
believe are likely to arise during the trial, with appropriate citation to authority. Any trial
brief should be exchanged between the parties and submitted to the clerk of the court, and
a duplicate Judge's Copy shall be submitted to the Court's chambers in Bannock County,
no later than 10 days prior to trial.
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(9)

PRE-MARKED EXHIBITS, AND AN EXHIBIT LIST IN THE FORM ATTACHED

HERETO, shall be exchanged between the parties and filed with the Court no later than 10
days prior to trial.

Each party shall also lodge with the Court at chambers a duplicate

completed exhibit list plus one complete, duplicate marked set of that party's proposed
exhibits for the Court's use during the trial.

Unless otherwise ordered , Plaintiff shall

identify exhibits beginning with the number "1" and the Defendant shall identify exhibits
beginning with the letter "A"
(10)

MEDIATION. Mediation is highly recommended . Any formal mediation must occur

at least 60 days before the trial date. If the parties cannot agree on a mediator upon
motion by either party, the Court will appoint a mediator.
or

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(4), the parties are ORDERED to mediate this matter, and shall
comply with I.R.C.P. 16(k). Mediation must be held no later than 30 days prior to trial.
(11)

TRIAL PROCEDURES. A total of

this trial.

) trial days have been reserved for

If the parties believe that more trial days will be required , the parties are

ORDERED to notify the Court of this request no less than 60 days prior to trial. On the
first day of trial, counsel shall report to the Court's chambers at 8:30 a.m. for a brief status
conference. Unless otherwise ordered , or as modified during trial as necessary, trial days
will begin at 9:00 a.m. and close at or about 5:00 p.m ., with a one-hour lunch break.
(12)

HEARINGS OR CONFERENCES WITH THE COURT. All meetings, conferences,

and/or hearings with the Court shall be scheduled in advance with the Court's Clerk by
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calling 208-236-7244. No hearing shall be noticed without contacting the Clerk.
(13)

ALTERNATE JUDGES. Notice is hereby given, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1)(G),

that an alternate judge may be assigned to preside over the trial of this case, if the current
presiding judge is unavailable.

The list of potential alternate judges is:

1) Honorable

Stephen S. Dunn; 2) Honorable Robert C. Naftz; 3) Honorable Mitchell W . Brown; 4)
Honorable Jon Shindurling ; 5) Honorable William H. Woodland ; 6) Honorable Richard T.
St. Clair. If the I.R.C.P. 40(d)(1) disqualification has not previously been exercised , failure
to disqualify, without cause, any one of these alternate judges within ten (10) days of the
date of this Order shall constitute a waiver of such right.
DATED th is

//-f4. day of April, 2016 .

</~;-- ME=-~
DAVID C. NYE
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~
day of April , 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated .

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130

D

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
216 W Whitman
PO Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370

D

U.S. Mail

~ E-Mail: rharris@holdenlegal.com

D
D

Hand Deliver
Fax: (208) 523-9518

U.S. Mail
~ E-Mail : pete@mrtlaw.net
D Hand Deliver
D Fax: (208) 234-2961

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT

By

!1m1t ~ ,cl
Deputy

ler
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Robert L. Harris, Esq. (ISB #7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (ISB #9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone:
(208) 523-0620
Facsimile:
(208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
A ttorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

NOTICE OF SERVICE

vs.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defen<lant/Counterclaimant.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13 th day of July, 2016, I served a copy of The Barnes'
First Set of Discovery Requests to Kirk Jackson' s attorney, Peter M. Wells, by mailing and faxing
it to him at May, Ramrnell & Thompson, Chtd., PO Box 370, Pocatello, Idaho 83204 and fax
number 208-234-2961.
Dated this 13 th day of July, 2016.

~ t -. ~

Robert L. Harris, Esq.

'
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13 th day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by the
method indicated.

Document Served:

NOTICE OF SERVICE

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Peter M. Wells

( ~
ail
( ) Hand Delivery
( v1t'acsimile
( ) Courthouse Box
( ) Federal Express

& THOMPSON, CHTD.
216 W. Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Email: ete 1mtlaw.net
MAY RAMMELL

Robert L. Harris, Esq.

rl l ..

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

~ L . . . /_
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Peter M. Wells

MAv, RAMMELL & THOMPSON,

~

a:
0

CHTD.

Post Office Box 370
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: 208-233-0132
Facsimile: 208-234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH ITJDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,

CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC
NOTICE OF SERVICE
Plaintiffs,

vs.
KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned hereby certifies a true and correct copy of
Defendant's Response to the Barnes' First Set of Discovery was sent via U.S . mail, fax, and
email to the following:
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Fax: 208-523-9518

rharri" u hnld 'nlc!.!al.com
DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
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Robert L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.
l 000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Co1U1terdefendants,
v.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-0C
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION
OF KIRK JACKSON

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

TO:

KIRK JACKSON AND HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER M. \VELLS, OF
THE LAW FIRM MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, Chad Barnes and
Jane Barnes, will take the testimony upon oral examination of KIRK JACKSON pursuant to Rule
30 and other applicable rules of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This notice is provided in
accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Ptocedure 30(b)(l). The deposition will take place before a
comt reporter and Notary Public with the firm T&T Reporting LLC, on Septembet· 26, 2016, at
9:00 n.ln., and continuing from day to day until completion, at the offices of May, Rammell &
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08-14-'18 15:23 FROM- Holden Kidwell
.,. '

208-523-9518

T-817 P0003/0003 F-5'11

Thompson, Chtd., 216 West Whitman Sti·eet, Pocatello, Idaho 83204, at which time and place
you are notified to appear and take part in such examination.
Dated this 14(#\ day of September, 2016.

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby ce1iify that on the /~ay of September, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the document listed below on the persons listed below by the rnethod indicated.

Document Scnrcd:

NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION

OF KIRK JACKSON
Attomeys and/or Individuals Sel-ved:

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

Post Office Box 370
216 W, Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Email: 12ete@mrtlaw.net

(
(

) Mail
) Hand Delivety
acsimile
) Courthouse Box

( /4
(

Robert L. Hanis, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL> HAHN & CRAPO, P.LL.C.

0:\WPDA TA\RLH\17992 Darnes, Chad\Pleadings\Notice ofDeposition - J11ckson.docl<

2 -

NOTICE OFT AKrNG DEPOSlT!ON
OF KIRK JACKSON
117 of 514

09-28
18 'l 1 :03 FROM..
r

208-523-95'18

T-535

P0002/0003 F-113

FILED
BANNOCK .COUNTY
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Robe1t L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, F,L,L,C.
l 000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
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Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Case No. CV-2014-3466-0C

CHAD BARNES ;.uid JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs/Countetdefendants,

NOTICE OF HEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 31 st day of October, 2016, at 2:00 p.rn., or as soon
thereafter

as

counsel

can

be

heard,

before

the

Honorable

David

C.

Nye;

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants in the above-entitled action, comprised of Chad Barnes and Jane
Barnes, will call up for hearing the following: Motion for Summary Judgment.
Dated this ?,;t,~ day of September; 2016.

D.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

"l.0..-"' day of September, 2016, I served a true ~u1d correct copy

of the document listed below on the persons listed below by the method indicated.

Document Served:

NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS '
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attorneys and/or Individnals Setved:

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

Post Office Box 370
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Email: pete@mrt.law.net

(){)Mail
( ) Hand Deli very
( ) Facsimile
( ) Comthouse Box
(JJ Email
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Robert L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KIRK JACKSON, an individual ,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs Chad and Jane Barnes (the " Barnes") by and through their counsel of record
Holden, Kidwell , Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., submit this amended memorandum in support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 15, 2016.
The Barnes are entitled to summary judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
56, because there is no genuine issue of fact concerning the forfeiture of the Defendant's water
right by non-use or the Barnes use of their water right during the periods relevant to this case
and the Barnes are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, the Barnes are entitled
to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 , since the defenses and counterclaim are
frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.
l
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Barnes own prope1ty in Bannock County, located in the SE¼ of Section 15 and the
NE ¼ of Section 22, Township 11 South, Range 37 East, Boise Meridian (the " Barnes Property").
Affidavit of Craig Bloxham (hereinafter 'Bloxham Aff."),

Answer and Counterclaim (hereinafter "A nswer" ),

1 5.

1 20;

Complaint,

1 4;

admitted in

Defendant, Kirk Jackson ("Jackson"),

owns some neighboring property in the SW¼ of Section 14 of the same township consisting of
approximately 62 acres (the "Jackson Prope11y"). Jackson purchased the Jackson Property from
Gary R. Rainsdon, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Craig Bloxham. (Complaint,

1 8;

admitted in this regard in Answer, 1 8.) Jackson bought the property in 2012. Bloxham Aff.,

1

16.
Certain water rights are appurtenant to the Barnes Property, Water Right No. 29-14115
("29-14115"), and the Jackson Property, Water Right No . 29-14032 ("29-14032"), with the same
priority date of May 19, 1920. (Complaint, 11 5 9 14· admitted in Answer, 11 5, 9 11.) Both
29-14 115 and 29-14032 were decreed on March 22, 2004, in the Snake River Basin Adjudication
("SRBA") (Complaint,

11

5, 16; admitted in Answer

11

5, 13.), an administrative and legal

process that began in 1987 to inventory all water rights in the Snake River Basin drainage. The
SRBA is now complete, and a final unified decree for all water rights in the Snake River Basin
of

Idaho

(totaling

over

158,000

water

rights)

has

now

been

issued.

See

http ://www.srba.state.id.us/finaldecree.htm .
The Barnes Property has been irrigated using 29-14115 for the entirety of the period
relevant to this case. In particular, Craig Bloxham used 29-14115 to irrigate the Barnes Property
from 2004 (when 29-14115 was decreed) until 2014 (when he sold the property to the Barnes).
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Bloxham Aff. ,

ir20.

Through the 2014 irrigation season, the Barnes have i1Tigated the Barnes

prope1ty using 29-14115. Complaint ,r 18; Bloxham Aff. , ,r 20.
In contrast, the Jackson Property was not irrigated using 29-14032 (i.e. , using water from
what is known as " Spring Creek") for a long time . In relevant part, Craig Bloxham, Jackson ' s
predecessor-in-interest, did not irrigate the Jackson Property with water from Spring Creek from
2004 (when 29-14032 was decreed) until 2012 (when the property was sold by the bankruptcy
trustee to Jackson). Bloxham Aff. , ,r 16. Further, Jackson had not done anything to irrigate the
Jackson Property using 29-14032 until the end of August 2014, when he constructed a concrete
dam on Spring Creek in an attempt for Jackson to once again begin using water. Bloxham Aff. ,

,r 17.

Even after constructing the dam Jackson's system for putting 29-14032 to beneficial use

was not in place as late as August 2015. Bloxham Aff.,

,r

17. Jackson admits that neither he,

"nor his predecessor-in-interest [i.e., Bloxham] received approval of an application for extension
of time to avoid forfeiture from [the Idaho Department of Water Resources l pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 42-222(2)." Complaint, ,r 31; admitted in Answer, ,r 25.
In late August 2014 , Jackson unilaterally constructed a new concrete dam on Spring
Creek approximately 30 feet above the Barnes' historical point of diversion. Complaint,
admitted in relevant part in Answer,

,r

17· see also Bloxham Aff. ,

,r,r

,r 21;

17-18. It appears that

Jackson intended to use 29-14032, the water from Spring Creek, to irrigate the Jackson
Property- to the detriment of all the other water users on Spring Creek, who have come to rely
on the Spring Creek system without the strain of 29-14032. See Bloxham Aff.,

,r,r l 8-19.

The Barnes instituted this action on August 29, 2014, to have this Court declare that 2914032 is a forfeited water right and, therefore, Jackson does not have the right to divert Spring
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Creek water. Complaint, pp. 1 6. Jackson counterclaimed and alleged that Barnes has forfeited
the water right owned by Barnes (29-14115) to irrigate their property.
On January 15 , 2016 the Barnes filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (the

"Motion" ), a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgm ent, and the
Bloxham Aff.

In the intervening months, settlement negotiations have not been successful.

However, the Barnes have proceeded with this litigation and collected additional facts in support
of their motion- submitted contemporaneously herewith in the Affidavit of Robert L. Harris
("Harris Aff.' ) and the Declaration of Roy Calvin Henderson ("Henderson Deel.").

II. ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. " I.R.C.P. 56(c). When a
jury trial has been demanded disputed facts are to be construed in favor of the non-moving
party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. Without a demand for a jury trial , however, the court may construe facts
differently:
[l]f an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for
summary judgment. Rather, the judge is free to arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontrove1ted evidentiary facts.

Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991); Blackmon v. Zufelt;
108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91 , 92 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing Riverside Development Co. v.

Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982)). Further, to survive summary judgment,
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the non-moving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions in response to a motion
for summary judgment. In other words, " [a] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Samuel v. Hepworth , Nungester & Lezamiz,
Inc. , 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303 , 306 (2000).
Here, the Barnes are entitled to summary judgment as to both of their claims and
Jackson's counterclaim. First, there is no genuine issue of material fact that 29-14032 was not
applied to beneficial use on the Jackson Property for a period of five years ; the Barnes have
made a claim of right, either by instituting this action or, together with their predecessors in
interest, by using 29-14032's water to satisfy their own water right; which occurred before
Jackson attempted to use 29-14032 once again. Second, Jackson cannot show that 29-14115 has
undergone any five-year period of non-use on the Barnes property and, consequently, cannot
show that 29-14115 has been forfeited. Finally, Jackson's defenses and his counterclaim are
frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation and this Court should award the Barnes their
reasonable attorney ' s fees in bringing this action.

A. Jackson, together with his predecessor-in-interest, has forfeited 29-14032.
The analysis considering forfeiture of a water right properly considers: first, whether
there has been a forfeiture; second, whether there are any exemptions that prevent forfeiture; and,
third, if there has been a forfeiture with no applicable exemption, whether the water right owner
resumed use before other water right users made a claim of right or instituted proceedings to
adjudicate the forfeiture.
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1. 29-14032 has bee11forfeited because it has 11ot been applied to the beneficial
use for which it was appropriated for at least five years.

In Idaho, a water right is "lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to
apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated. "

l.C. § 42-222(2).

While

" [a]bandonments and forfeitures are not favored," Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50, 52
(1937), allowing unused water rights to perish and be beneficially used by another is an
affirmation of the "traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water resources of this
state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts through appropriation." See J.C. §
42-226.
Here, the testimony of the prior owner of the Jackson Property, Craig Bloxham, shows
that he did not use 29-14032 to irrigate the Jackson Property between March 22, 2004, when 2914032 was decreed in the SRBA, and 2012, when the Jackson Property was sold by the trustee of
Bloxham' s bankruptcy estate.

Bloxham Aff.,

,r

16 1; see also Henderson Deel.,

,r,r

5-7.

Regarding the status of a decreed water right in the SRBA, the law in Idaho is that " [o ]nee a
partial decree is issued for the water right, the non-user has five years within which to put the
water to beneficial use before the decreed right is subject to forfeiture. In Idaho a decreed water
right is not insulated from forfeiture, however, it has long been established that once the decree is
issued the statutory time period for non-use begins to run anew." In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576
Subcase No. 65-05663B (Wood v. Troutt)(ldaho Fifth Judicial Dist. - SRBA, May 2002) (Judge
Roger S. Burdick) at 21.

1

Bloxham refers to "Spring Creek water." Bloxham Aff. , 1 16. This refers to 29-14032, since the water for
29-14032 was taken from Spring Creek. Complaint, 1 13; admitted in Answer and Counterclaim , 1 11.
Additionally, Bloxham states that the Jackson Property "has not been irrigated with Spring Creek water since the
mid-I 990s ." Bloxham Aff., 1 15.
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While Jackson contests this by his own testimony- which will be addressed later in the
analysis, see Section II.A.3., infra- there is absolutely no contest of the fact that no irrigation
occurred on the Jackson Property from 2004 until July 2011.

Harris Aff. , Ex. C, pp. 6-7

(Interrogatory No. 10). Thus, for the analytical purposes of the five-year forfeiture of 29-14032,
there is no issue of material fact that, as an initial matter, 29- 14032 was forfeited by non-use by
2009. See l.C. § 42-222(2).
2. There are no exemptions applicable to prevent the forfeiture of 29-14032.

There are some defenses to forfeiture at common law and provided by statute. See id.
(referencing Idaho Code § 42-223).

The sole statutory exemption asserted by Jackson is

contained in Idaho Code § 42-223(6). Harris Aff. , Ex. C, p. 7 (Interrogatory No. 12). That
statute provides:
No portion of any water right shall be lost or forfeited for nonuse if the
nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner has
no control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of
water shall be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Idaho Code § 42-223(6). Specifically, in relation to this exemption, Jackson only asserts two
factual bases:

l. From June of 2006 to April of 2012 the property was under the control
of the United States Bankruptcy Trustee. The water right owner at that
time, Mr. Bloxham had no ability to control the water and the land to
which it was to be applied.
2. After purchasing the property in 2012, Bloxhams prevented Defendant
from exercising his water right as they told him they would not allow
him to access the diversion through their property or allow the water to
be transported through the customary transportation structure for the
water. Defendant therefore had to make other arrangements for the
transportation of his water and resumed use of the water in earnest in
2013.
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Harris Aff. , Ex. C, p. 7 (Interrogatory No. 12). However, neither of these reasons satisfied the
statutory requirements of Idaho Code§ 42-223(6) to exempt the forfeiture of29-14032.
First, possession of the Jackson Property by the Bankruptcy Trustee never created a
"circumstance[] over which the water right owner ha[d] no control." Idaho Code § 42-223(6).
As a matter of law, " [t]he commencement of a [bankruptcy] case ... creates an estate."

11

U.S.C. § 54l(a). The "estate is comprised of all of the following property, wherever located and
by whomever held: (1) Except as provided in [the bankruptcy exemptions], all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." Id. The bankruptcy
estate is controlled by the Bankruptcy Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 741. Here, Craig Bloxham- the
prior owner of the Jackson Property see Harris Aff., Ex. D, p. 5 (Request for Admission No.
l )-voluntarily filed bankruptcy on October 12, 2005.

Harris Aff., Ex. B, p. 1.

Craig

Bloxham's water right was his property at the time he fi led bankruptcy. See Idaho Code § 55101 (listing water rights as real property). As a water right, it is appurtenant to what is now
identified as the Jackson Property. Anderson v. Cummings, 81 Idaho 327, 335, 340 P.2d 1111 ,
1115 ( 1959) (A "decreed water right constitutes real property; such right is appurtenant to
appellants' lands to which the water represented thereby has been beneficially applied" (citations
omitted)). Thus, when Craig Bloxham filed bankruptcy, the water right was also part of the
estate, controlled by the Bankruptcy Trustee. Jackson agrees that the Bankruptcy Trustee owned
the Jackson Prope1ty and sold it to Jackson. HatTis Aff. , Ex. C, p. l O (Request for Admission
No. 1).
In updating the ownership of 29-14032 through the filing of a Notice of Change in Water

Right Ownership, Jackson provided the Trustee's Deed. Harris Aff., Ex. F, pp. 3-6. Contrary to

8 -

AMENDED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

127 of 514

Jackson's first claim, there was never a separation of ownership between the water right and the
Jackson Property; the Bankruptcy Trustee had exactly the same interest in both at exactly the
same time. For that reason, Jackson has no evidence " that the [B]ankruptcy [T]rustee would
have been prevented from irrigating the [Jackson P]roperty" when it was held by the Bankruptcy
Trustee:

Q.
[Mr. Harris] Do you have any evidence that the bankruptcy trustee
would have been prevented from irrigating the property during that time?
[Mr. Jackson] No, I don' t.
A.

Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 119:7-10. Consequently, there was never a circumstance beyond the control
of the water right holder caused by the bankruptcy of Craig Bloxham, because the Bankruptcy
Trustee had control of the property and the water right. The Bankruptcy Trustee could have
exercised the water right by diverting and using water on its property, or even leased the property
and asked that the property be irrigated. However the Bankruptcy Trustee did neither and in so
doing left the water right exposed and subject to forfeiture .
Jackson' s second contention, that the Bloxhams prevented him from accessing his water
in 2012, also fails.

As an initial matter, any exemption that is only efficacious in 2012 is

immaterial to preventing the forfeiture of 29-14032, because by 2012 the (more than) five years
necessary for forfeiture had already elapsed (see Section II.A. I., supra) and other water users
had already established a claim of right (see Section II.A.3., infra)-which renders this claimed
2012 exemption moot.
However, even on the merits, Jackson' s second argument fails . By statute, if a landowner
refuses to allow the passage of a ditch, canal, or conduit, the landowner may exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute an eminent domain action when denied access to the water source
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of his or her water right: "the person or persons desiring the right of way may proceed as in the
law of eminent domain. " Idaho Code § 42-1106; See also Telford Lands LLC v. Cain 154
Idaho 981 , 303 P.3d 1237 (2013) (Upholding action by landowner under eminent domain to
condemn pipeline easement). Further, to the extent that an open ditch already existed to the
Jackson property, the easement interest in having the water conveyed through it was appurtenant
to the Jackson Property and any interference with that right is actionable at law.
Again there is no genuine issue of fact- no exemption claimed by Jackson applies to
29-14032, and thus it was forfeited by 2009.
3. Beneficial Use of29-14032 was not Resumed before Other Water Users made a
Claim of Right to its Water.
Finally, because 29-14032 was forfeited by 2009 and no exemption applies the final
assertion made by Jackson seeks to apply the "resumption-of-use doctrine" which is described
as an affirmative defense as follows:
although statutory abandonment did actually occur, the forfeiture is not
effective if, after the five-year period, the original owner or appropriator
resumed the use of the water prior to the claim of right by a third party.

Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res. 138 Idaho 831 , 836, 70 P.3d 669, 674 (2003)
(quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531 - 32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944)). The
Court explained that
A third party has made a claim of right to the water if [ l] the third party
has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or [2] has obtained
a valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date
prior to the resumption of use, or [3] has used the water pursuant to an
existing water right.

Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (internal citations omitted).

Further, the

resumption can be made by a successor in interest to the original appropriator. Id. at 839, 70
IO -
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P.3d at 677. Because forfeiture is effectuated by a failure to put the water right to beneficial use
for five consecutive years, any claimed resumption must put the water right to beneficial use
" upon the land to which the water right is appurtenant." See id. at 842, 70 P.3d at 680; see also
LC. § 42-222(2).
In this case, Jackson contends that he "resumed use of water right 29-[ 14032] prior to the
filing of Plaintiffs' Complaint." Answer and Counterclaim,~ 3. In his responses to discovery
requests and deposition testimony, Jackson describes what he contends is the resumption of use
of 29-14032. However, it is important to note that as late as 2013, Jackson had represented to
the Natural Resources Conservation Service, a part of the United States Department of
Agriculture, that he "planned on putting in an orchard" (implying it did not already exist) but
agreed that the system he was then installing would not "ever be used to water the orchard."
Harris Aff. , Ex. E, p. 1. The testimony of Craig Bloxham, a prior owner of the property, and
Roy Henderson, a neighbor who literally lives across the street from the Jackson property and
has lived there for approximately thirty (30) years, is that the property was never irrigated.
Bloxham Aff. ,

~

16; see also Henderson Deel., ~,i 5-7. Because a court trial is scheduled, the

Court may arrive at the most probable inferences. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 437, 807 P.2d at 1275 .
In July 2011, Jackson claims that "Vern and Craig Bloxham" performed "flood irrigation
in [the] center of [the] property." Harris Aff., Ex. C, p. 7 (Interrogatory No. 10). Relating to his
inspection in July 2011, Jackson explains that he saw "some pipes strung out and water running
on the property" in July 2011. Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 26:21-23; see also HruTis Aff. , Ex. A, p. 35
(Deposition Exhibit 2, note the black line representing the pipe and the red circle demarking the
irrigated area). Jackson states that these pipes were flood irrigating about " 10 to 12 acres," but

11
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with some incongruous details.

Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 30: I 3- 31 :7.

For instance, Jackson

describes the topography of his property as "run[ning] downhill from north to south," with "a
ridge in the middle of the property" running east to west, but Jackson says that "the water was
north of that ridge where they were letting it run out," without any explanation for how this
alleged flooding would flow up the ridge and over to the south side of it. Harris Aff. , Ex. A,
29:21 - 30:12.

Jackson also observed, in 2011, that "it looked like [the Jackson Property] had

been used as grazing" for horses and "had not been well maintained" as evidenced by "[t]he type
of weeds that were growing." Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 31 :8-25. In fact, the "presence of those types
of weeds" indicated to Jackson that the Jackson Property /tad not been irrigated, but "had been
grazed, specifically horse grazed." Harris Aff. Ex. A, 32:1-7.
Additionally, it is relevant that in 2011 , only the Bankruptcy Trustee could authorize the
use of that water right. Jackson only infers that it was Craig Bloxham who was irrigating the 10
to 12 acres he saw being flood irrigated in July 201 l. Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 53 :3-15 . However,
even granting Jackson that inference (which may or may not be reasonable) for purposes of
summary judgment, such use by Craig Bloxham is not a resumption of use, because in 2011 tlte

water right was no longer Craig Bloxham's to use, as Jackson has adamantly pointed out that
the Bankruptcy Trustee is his "immediate predecessor-in-interest" in the Jackson Property and,
consequently, the appurtenant water rights thereto.

Jackson- who bears the burden on this

affirmative defense- has not presented any evidence that it was the Bankruptcy Trustee who was
flood irrigating in July 2011. Thus, there can be no argument for the resumption of use based on
Jackson ' s observations of flood irrigation.

12 -
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During the three months from July to September 2012, Jackson contends that he
" [h]auled water from source in a 500 gallon tank for saplings."

Harris Aff. , Ex. C, p. 6

(Interrogatory No . 10). Jackson explained that he used the 500 gallon tank "once" per instance,
"four or five times a week" for a period of "10 or 12" weeks. Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 54:5-24. This
amounts, even giving Jackson every reasonable inference, to no more than 30,000 gallons (500
gallons x 1 instance x 5 times per week x 12 weeks). While this may sound like a great deal of
water in terms of irrigation, this is only 0.092 acre feet. Harris Aff., Ex. G, p. 5 (showing that l
acre-foot of water is 325,850 gallons). For perspective, typically each acre of farmland in the
area of the Jackson Property applies 3.5 acre feet of water-or 1,140,475 gallons- per acre
during the irrigation season. Harris Aff. , Ex. G, p. 3 (showing a field headgate requirement of
3.5 acre-feet in the area of the Jackson Property); see also Harris Aff., Ex. H, p. 3 (the Water
Right Report for 29-14032 listing the "Generic Max Volume per Acre: 3.5"). Thus, Jackson's
contended 2012 water usage amounts to just over 3% of what would typically irrigate only one
acre of farmland. This de minimis amount is not sufficient to resume use of the water right.
From April through July 2013 , Jackson contends he "pumped water to flood irrigate [a]
wheat crop in [the] center to south area approximately IO acre area." H,UTis Aff. , Ex. C, p. 7
(Interrogatory No. 10). Jackson indicated that this area was "a little farther north" of the l O acres
allegedly irrigated in 2011. Han-is Aff., Ex. A, 55: 1-10. However, it appears that there is some
overlap between those acres, compare Harris Aff., Ex. A, p. 36 (Deposition Exhibit 7) with p. 35
(Deposition Exhibit 2, especially given the already-described topography of the Jackson
Property- " run[ning] downhill from north to south," with "a ridge in the middle of the prope1ty"
running east to west. Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 29:21 - 30:4.

13
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The final , relevant year of Jackson' s contended resumption is 2014, when he claims to
have "pumped water for fall planting" in September 2014. Harris Aff., Ex. C, p. 7 (Interrogatory
No. 10). However, this case was filed on August 29, 2014. Complain!, p. 1. Thus, the Barnes'
" instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture ' prior to any claimed resumption of use by Jackson
in September 2014 or thereafter, which renders any resumption after the institution of this action
ineffective. Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (citation omitted).
The institution of this action provides an irrefutable claim of right that renders impotent
any attempted resumption of use after August 29, 2014. Therefore, the only issues relate to
2011 , 2012, and 2013. Any resumption of use of29-14032 presented by Jackson in 2011 , 2012,
or 2013 , cannot be effective because by that time the Barnes' predecessor-in-interest, Bloxham,
had already "made a claim of right to the water" by "us[ing] the water pursuant to an existing
water right."

Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (citation omitted).

Bloxham

beneficially used the water pursuant to an existing water right, 29-14115 , that would othe1wise
have been appropriated by Jackson under 29-14032 but for his non-use. See Sagewillow, 138
Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (citing Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Co., 40 Idaho 49 231 P. 418
(1924)). This must be supported as a claim of right and must also be shown to predate Jackson' s
resumption of use to defeat the affirmative defense. ff the Barnes' use of water qualifies as a
claim of right and predates Jackson's resumed use of 29-14032, Jackson cannot assert the
resumption-of-use doctrine as a defense for his forfeiture. See Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70
P.3d at 680.
To qualify as a claim of right, the Barnes' water use requires " evidence showing that
resumption of use by [Jackson] would diminish the quantity of water being used by [the Barnes]
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from an interconnected water source." Sagewillow , 138 Idaho at 846, n. 3 70 P.3d 669, at 684,
n. 3. 29-14032 and 29-14115 are interconnected because they both came from the same "parent"
water right before the parent right was split into different portions for the Barnes Property and
the Jackson Property. Therefore, these water rights have the same elements of use.

Spring

Creek is over-appropriated. Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 117:4-19 (testimony from Kirk Jackson stating
that there is not enough water to satisfy all water rights on Springs Creek); see also Bloxham
Aff. , 1 19 ("There is typically not enough water to supply all of the water rights on the system"
even without Jackson resuming use of 29-14032). That demonstrates that the Barnes and other
Spring Creek water users will suffer from diminished quantities of water if Jackson resumes use
of 29-14032. Hanis Aff. , Ex. A 117: 16-19 ("Q. So if you stopped irrigating, that water would
be used and relied upon by Barnes and other users that have water rights on Spring Creek? A.
Yep."); see Bloxham Aff. , 1~ 17-19; see also Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 846, n. 3, 70 P.3d 669, at
684 n. 3 (discussing over-appropriation).
Because Spring Creek is over-appropriated, any use of the water forfeited by 29- 14032
by a third party water user on Spring Creek after 2009, is a claim of right to the water, batTing
Jackson' s resumption of use claim. Such a use was made by Vern and Craig Bloxham. As
pointed out above, see Section II.A.2. , supra, once Craig Bloxham filed bankruptcy, the Jackson
Property and the water right appurtenant thereto (29-14032) were under the control and,
according to Jackson, ownership of the Bankruptcy Trustee. Harris Aff. , Ex. D, p. 5 (Request for
Admission No. 1). Thus, the remaining water right owned by Vern and Craig Bloxham, which
would later be split into 29-14115 and the water right still owned by the Bloxhams, was an
"existing water right" held by third parties (relative to 29-14032, held by the Bankruptcy

15

-

AM ENDED M EMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM ENT

134 of 514

Trustee). The Bloxhams used their water rights, in full to "actively irrigate[] the property that
Chad and Jane Barnes [now] own up until" January 31 , 2014, when the Bloxhams sold the
Barnes Property to the Barnes. Bloxham Aff. ,

1 20.

Because the water available on Spring

Creek is "about one-fourth of what' s allocated [by water rights] on it ' Harris Aff. , Ex. A, 117:78, this use of water on the Barnes Property (by the Bloxhams), which occurred from the initial
forfeiture of29-14032 in 2009, until the Barnes purchased the property in 2014 i.s a claim of use
that preempts any portended resumption.
B. The Barnes, and their predecessor-in-interest, have not failed to apply 29-14115 to its
beneficial use for any five-year-long period and therefore have not forfeited their water
right.

The Barnes dispute Jackson' s counterclaim that "29-14115 has not been put to beneficial
use on a portion of the [Barnes Property] for an excess of five years immediately prior to the
filing of this counterclaim." Answer and Counterclaim , 1 30. As the counterdefendants in this
regard the Barnes may move for summary judgment on Jackson 's claim "with or without
supporting affidavits."

l.R.C.P. 56(b).

The Barnes contend that they and Bloxham, their

predecessor-in-interest, have applied 29-14115 to irrigate the Barnes Property continuously since
2004, when

29-14115 was decreed by the SRBA on March 22, 2004. It appears that Jackson

claims that the Barnes (and Bloxham before the Barnes) have not used 29-14115 to irrigate all of
the property specified in the decree. See Harris Aff. , Ex. C, pp. 7-8 (Interrogatory No. 14,
seeking "any and all periods of non-use of 29-14115 [Jackson] contend[s] have occurred since
2004," to which Jackson responds: "The center and North portions of Bloxhams' field was not
watered at all in 2011 , 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, or 2016"). However, these contentions are not
supported by evidence in the record, and in fact, are contrary to the statements made by the
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Barnes predecessor in interest, Craig Bloxham. Since there has not been a five-year period of
non-use of 29-14115 as to the Barnes Property, there is not a genuine issue of material fact and
the Barnes are entitled to summary judgment dismissing Jackson' s unsubstantiated counterclaim.
C. The Barnes are entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party because Jackson's
defense and counterclaim are frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.
Whenever a civil action is "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation" the prevailing party may be awarded attorney' s fees . l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); I.C.

§ 12-121. "When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously , unreasonably,
or without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account." Nampa &

Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Fed. Sctv. , 135 Idaho 518, 524, 20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001).
However, a trial court may award attorney' s fees on a pro rata basis for any claims or defenses
"necessitating this lawsuit that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without adequate foundation."

Idaho Milita,y Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen , 156 Idaho 624, 632, 329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014),
reh'g denied (Aug. 6 2014) (reversing Idaho ' s prior interpretation of disallowing any award for
attorney ' s fees if any claim or defense was not frivolous). Or, if the entire case of one party is
frivolous, unreasonable, and without adequate foundation, the court may provide a complete
award of attorney' s fees. See , e.g. , Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 347,336 P.3d 275 , 280
(2014), reh'g denied (Nov. 6, 2014) (awarding attorney's fees in whole when a case was based on
"mere assertion and unsubstantiated" facts). It is only if "there is a legitimate, triable issue of
fact or a legitimate issue of law" that a claim or defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation ." Brannon v. City of Coeur d 1Alene, 153 Idaho 843, 857, 292 P.3d 234, 248
(2012).

17 -
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change, that change will not take effect until May 1, 2017. Hoffer v. Shappard, 2016 Opinion
No. l 05 , Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 42087, at * 18-21 (September 28 2016).
Here, Jackson has made a mere asse1tion, based on unsubstantiated facts, that 29-14115
was not used for years. The Barnes have supplied an affidavit from Jackson's predecessor-ininterest stating that he did not use 29-14032 at any time since 2004.

Bloxham Aff. ,

1

16.

Therefore, Jackson's main defense to the Barnes' claim is that he has resumed use of 29-14032
before the Barnes made a claim of right; however, that defense is also frivolous, unreasonable,
and without foundation. 29-14032 was forfeited by 2009, and since Spring Creek is so overappropriated, as Jackson agrees, that forfeited water has been used by the Bloxhams and (now)
the Barnes since the moment it was forfeited. As a result, the Barnes should be awarded the
entirety of their reasonable attorney's fees necessitated by this case.

III. CONCLUSION
Summary judgment should be granted on the Barnes' behalf as to their claims and
Jackson ' s counterclaims.

Jackson and his predecessor-in-interest forfeited 29-14032.

No

exception to the forfeiture statute applies. The Barnes established a claim of right before Jackson
resumed use of 29-14032. Further, Jackson cannot show a five-year period when 29-14115 was
not used. Jackson's contentions are frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. Therefore,
the Barnes should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121.

Dated this

:3fP\

day of October 2016.

~ L. ~

Robert L. Harris

HOLD EN, KIDWELL, HAHN
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Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
Post Office Box 3 70
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Robert L. Harris, Esq.
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1

Robert L. Hanis (l.S.B. No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, BAHN & CRAPO, P,L,L,C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rhatTis@holden legal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.cQm

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefenda11ts,

v.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

DECLARATION OF
ROY CALVIN HENDERSON

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaim ant.

Roy Calvin Henderson, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen (18) and am competent to testify to the matters contained
herein based on my own knowledge. I was born on

2.

I am a farmer and rancher and have lived at 6593 E. Brush Creek Road, Downey, Idaho,
83234, since approximately 1985.

3.

I am familiar with a piece of property purchased by Mr. Kirk Jackson that is located
directly west of my home at 6593 E. Brush Creek Road, Downey, Idaho, 83234. The
property was previously owned by Louise Wilding when I moved into my home in 1985.
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4.

Because I lived right next to the Wilding property, I was familiar with it and observed the

farming and ranching activities that occut1ed ~n the property since 1985.
5.

When Ms. Wilding owned what is now the Jackson properly, I never saw her jrrigate it.
The property was only dry farmed and grazed.

6.

When the Bloxham family purchased the property from Ms. Wilding, I recall one year
when Craig Bloxham irrigated it. J believe it approximately twenty (20) years ago, but I
do not remember the exact year it was. It did not appear to me that the Bloxham family
was successful in their efforts to irrigate the property. I observed that they bad trouble
getting water to the property.

7.

Since the single instance when the Bloxham's irrigated what is now the Jackson property, I
have never seen it irrigated since, even after Kirk Jackson recently purchased the property.

I certify [or declare] under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that
the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this

k

day of September, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the
correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this ~ day of
October 2016.

Document Served :

DECLARATION OF ROY CAL VIN HENDERSON

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
Post Office Box 3 70
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-03 70
Fax:
(208)234-2961
Email: pete@mrtlaw.net

( ) Mail
( ...,..rfland-Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box
( ) Email

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Robert L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)

I

D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523 -0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email :
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys/or Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefend ants,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. HARRIS

V.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
TA TE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

I, Robert L. Harris, do so lemnly swear (or affi rm) that the test imony given in thi s sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
And being so sworn I depose and say:
l.

I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am competent to testify to the matters contained
herein.

-
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2.

I am an attorney practicing water law in Idaho since 2004.

3.

I represent Chad and Jane Barnes, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, in this matter.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the Deposition of
Kirk Jackson, including relevant exhibits, which occurred on September 26, 2016.
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Voluntary Petition filed by

5.

Craig Bloxham in the United State Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho on October
12, 2005, retrieved from the PACER online system on September 21, 2016.
Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Response to the

6.

Barnes' First Set of Discovery Requests.
Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Supplemental

7.

Response to the Barnes' First Set of Discovery Requests.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of one document, comprised of two

8.

pages, provided by Kirk Jackson in discovery in this matter, which Kirk Jackson has
represented are emails exchanged between him and Nate Matlack, an agent and employee
of the Natural Resources Conservation Service, a paii of the United States Department of
Agriculture.
Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Change in Water

9.

Right Ownership, filed by Kirk Jackson on May 31, 2012, and maintained by the Idaho
Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") in the backfile relating to Water Right No. 2914032, available online at IDWR's website, retrieved September 28, 2016.
Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the Watermaster Handbook,

10.

published by the IDWR, last updated July 10, 2013, and available online at
http://www.idwr.idaho .gov/files/districts/20130701 Watermaster Handbook .pdf.
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Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the Water Right Report for

11.

Water Right No. 29-14032, with Kirk Jackson listed as the current owner.
Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the Water Right Report for Water

12.

Right No. 29-14115, with Chad and Jane Barnes listed as the current owner.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETI-I NAUGHT.

Dated this

~ ,-£.

day of October, 2016.

Robert L. Harris, Esq.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

3
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1,ti. day of October, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or
document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by hand delivery, by mailing with the
correct postage thereon, or by facsimile a true and correct copy thereof on this ~ day of
October 2016.
Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. HARRIS

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL

& THOMPSON, CHTD.

Post Office Box 370
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
(208) 234-2961
Fax:
Email: pete@mrtlaw.net

( ) Mail
( .,.-rHand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box
( ) Email

Robel1 L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAI-IN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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In The Matter Of:
BARNES, et al. vs.
JACJ(SON

KIRK JACKSON
September 26, 2016

T&T Reporting, LLC
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 105
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 529-5491
office@ttreporting.com
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1

1

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SI XTH JUDIC I AL DI STRI CT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

2
3
4

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

5

Plaintiffs,
6

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

) Case No.
) CV - 2014 - 3466-

7

) oc
8
9

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,

)
)

Defendants.

10
11

12
13

DEPOSITION OF KIRK JACKSON
Monday, September 26, 2016, 9:00 a.m.
Pocatello, Idaho

14
15
16
17

18
19

BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of Kirk
Jackson was taken by the attorney for the plaintiffs
at the office of May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered,
located at 216 West Whitman Street, Pocatello, Idaho,
before Shantae Miller, Court Reporter and Notary
Public, in and for the State of Idaho, in the
above-entitled matter.

20
21
22

23
24
25

offlce@ttreportlng.com
T& T Reporting, LLC
208.529.6491
ttreportlng.com
208.529.5496 FAX
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(The deposition proceeded at 9:00 a.m.

1

2

as follows:)
Kirk Jackson,

3
4

produced as a witness at the instance of the

5

plaintiffs, having been first duly sworn, was

6

examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION

7
8

BY MR. HARRIS:

9

Q.

Could you please state your name?

10

A.

Kirk Jackson.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

Mr. Jackson, have you ever been

deposed before?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

First, let me introduce myself.

15

My name is Rob Harris, and I represent the Barnes in

16

this litigation, I think you're familiar with,

17

correct?

18

A.

Uh - huh.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

have been deposed.

21

A.

I don't know.

22

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

A fight over a road.

25

Q.

Okay.

23

So you mentioned before that you
When was that?
Six months ago maybe.

And what was the deposition

about?

Who was that with?
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1

A.

You know, one of the people involved was

2

Robby Scoonemachern (phonetic).

3

other people were.

4

Q.

5

I don't know who the

Did it relate to the property that you

own in Downey?

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

It related to some property in -- around

9

the Inkom area.

10
11

Okay.

Was it personal or business

A.

I guess it would be personal.

I lived

in that area was why I got sucked into it.
Q.

14

15

Q.

related?

12
13

What property did it relate to?

Were you represented by counsel in that

deposition?

16

A.

No.

I was just a witness.

17

Q.

I see.

So the road issue didn't deal

18

with your property specifically, i t was for someone

19

else?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

were in that case?

23

A.

Do you know who the plaintiffs

Yes, Scoonemacherns.

And, you know, I

24

would have trouble even spelling it.

25

pronouncing it.

I have trouble
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1

Q.

Okay.

2

A.

I don't know.

3

Do you remember the name of the attorney

Q.

5

that deposed you?

6

A.

8
9

They lived in that area,

too, but they lived the r e after I moved away.

4

7

Who we r e the defendants?

No.

I t wa s ove r here in the 1 51

building.
Q.

Okay.

Well, before we get started, I

just want to go thr ough a few rules, and these may

10

sound familiar to you.

This is a deposition where

11

I'm allowed to ask you questions, and so it's all

12

being recorded and we want to make sure that my

13

questions are clearly on the record and that your

14

answers are clearly on the record.

15

question without interruption, and then when you

16

answer, I won't interrupt you either and it makes it

17

a lot easier for the court reporter.

So let me ask a

18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

Since it's being recorded, we need you

20

to say yes or no.

21

nod our heads or say uh-huh or um.

22

say yes or no, that makes it clear on the record.

23

In everyday conversation we often
So if you would

If I ask a confusing question, which is

24

possible, probably likely, you can say - - ask me to

25

rephrase the question.

I'm not here to try to trick
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1

you, I'm here to try to find out more information

2

about the case that we have pending.
And then if you need a break at any

3
4

time, that's just fine, you just let us know.

5

would ask that if I ask a question, I want you to

6

answer it before we take a break.
Do you have any problem with any of

7

8

those rules?

9

A.

Nope.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

But I

Is there any reason that you

can't testify truthfully today?

12

A.

Nope.

13

Q.

Are you on any medications that might

14

interfere with your ability to testify today?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

What did you do to prepare for this

17

deposition?

18

A.

Nothing.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

Did you review any documents?

Did you discuss anything with

anyone who was not your attorney?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Are you married?

25

A.

Yes.
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1

out there and I walked around the property.

2

know,

3

I -- you know, if I was going to increase my bid, I

4

needed more information.

5

the perimeter of the property.

6

both of the water sources.

8

I had gone out and looked at it previously, but

Q.

7

So I went out and walked
I went and located

Nobody told you you couldn't be on the

property, right?

9

A.

Well, it's for sale.

10

Q.

Right.

11

walk the property?

12

A.

It was afternoon.

13

Q.

What did you observe?

14

A.

In general about the property?

15

Q.

Correct.

16

You

What time of the day did you

I ...

What

What do you remember about

that visit?

A.

17

Well,

there was -- there was a gate at

18

-- it's hard to describe the corner that this gate is

19

at.

20

There was a gate where animals could go in and out.

21

There were horses grazing on the property.

22

some pipes strung out and water running on the

23

property.

24

middle of the west property line -- I mean, north and

25

south-wise, close to the middle, there were several

It's along the north border of the property.

There was

Along the west border, maybe close to the
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1

pipes strung out and just water runn i ng out of the

2

end.

3

downhill.
Q.

4

5

So they were flood irrigating, letting it run

Do you know whose horses were on the

property?

6

A.

Bloxhams.

The gate that was opened was

7

between that property and the piece that Bloxhams

8

still own.

9

Q.

10

Okay.

What type of sprinkler pipe were

strung out?

11

A.

Aluminum 40 - footers.

12

Q.

With Rain Birds on them?

13

A.

A couple of them had Rain Birds.

A

14

couple of them had the risers were busted off.

15

was no end plug in the pipe, they was just letting

16

the water run out the end.

17
18
19
20

21

22
23

There

Q.

Do you know where the water was coming

A.

Yeah, from the mainline that runs down

from?

the west property line.
Q.

Did you trace that mainline back to the

source of water?
A.

You can trace that mainline back.

Of

24

course, you can see the risers all the way along the

25

west property line.

If you stand at the - - we really
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1

should have named some of these corners.
MR. HARRIS:

2

I ' l l tell you what, hold that

3

thought .

I 1 m going to have the court reporter mark

4

another exhibit as Exhibit-2.
(EXHIBI T- 2 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTI FI CATION)

5

Q.

6

(BY MR. HARRIS) You•ve been handed

7

Exhibit-2, which I will represent to you is an

8

illustrative map that I prepared with GIS software.

9

And the blue line depicts the water rights shapefile

10

that was generated by the Idaho Department of Water

11

Resources, and it 1 s over a 2013 aerial photo.

12
13

Does that generally look like the
62-acre parcel that we•ve been discussing?

14

A.

Yeah.

15

Q.

And to be clear, the blue line does not

16

represent the property boundary, it 1 s just the

17

authorized water right area within the property?

18

A.

Correct.

19

Q.

Okay.

So you had mentioned - - well,

20

I 1 ll have you do this on the official exhibit.

21

There's a Sharpie right here.

22

outline of the property that -- or the area that you

23

indicate was being flood irrigated in late July of

24

2011?

25

A.

Could you draw an

Right about here.
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1
2

Q.

Is that just the pipe?

So that line is

the pipe --

3

A.

4

Q.

Yes.
the black line is the pipe?
If you could take this red, could you

5

6

depict where the water was flood irrigating, the area

7

that was actually irrigated?

8

A.

You know,

9

Q.

Okay.

something like this, roughly.

So you've marked with a red

10

circle kind of more on the southern end of the

11

property

--

12

A.

Uh-huh.

13

Q.

--

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And your discovery responses indicated

where it was irrigated?

16

towards the middle of the property.

17

accurate?

18

A.

Is that more

Well, that's kind of towards the middle.

19

I mean, north and south-wise.

20

little bit off the middle there, but ...

21
22

Q.

You know, maybe I'm a

What's the topography like at that

location?

23

A.

It runs downhill from north to south.

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

So running the water out lets it run
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1

2
3
4
5

6

7

downhill towards the south.
Q.

And is there kind of a ridge in the

middle of that property?
A.

Yes.

And the water was north of that

ridge where they were letting it run out.

Q.

So you walked the entire perimeter of

the property; is that right?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And there was a valve on with pipes run

10

to the east, and they were just flood irrigating the

11

area that you marked in red?

12

A.

Yep.

13

Q.

Do you know approximately how many acres

14

they were flood irrigating?

15

estimate?

16

A.

What's your best

It would be hard to say because they had

17

some pipes there that weren't hooked up.

So all you

18

did is slam another pipe on and you move your

19

irrigation 40 feet further to the east.

20

the capability of probably watering 10 or 12 acres

21

maybe, 15.

22

Q.

So, I mean,

But my question isn't about the

23

capability, it's what did you actually observe.

24

many acres did you observe being flood irrigated?

25

And I'm asking approximately.

How

I recognize you didn't
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1

2

measure it.
A.

Yeah,

I didn't measure it.

3

that was green

4

something like 10 or 12 acres.

5
6

Q.

prior experience with farming?
A.

Yeah.

8

Q.

Okay.

10
11

that was greener than the rest was

And your estimate is just based on your

7

9

The area

Anything else that you observed

in your visit?
A.

I don't know, about this property or the

surrounding?

12

Q.

No, this property.

13

A.

You know, it looked like it had been

14

used as grazing.

15

foliage from grazing horses.

16

maintained.

17

18

Q.

There was a lot of damage to the
Had not been well

What makes you say that i t had not been

well maintained?

19

A.

The type of weeds that were growing.

20

Q.

What type of weeds were growing?

21

A.

A lot of Kochia,

22

There was

some kind of a ground spurge.

23

Q.

Leafy spurge?

24

A.

No.

25

thistle.

No.

A ground cover type spurge

that chokes out everything.
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1

Q.

In your experience with the presence of

2

those types of weeds, does that indicate to you that

3

it had been actively farmed o r cultivated or not

4

actively farmed and cultivated?

5

A.

No, it indicated that it had been

6

grazed, specifically horse grazed.

7

difference between horse and cow grazing.

8
9

10

Q.

How did you know that they were the

Bloxhams• horses?
A.

Well, at the time I didn't.

11

knew they were horses.

12

opened into that other property.

13

14
15

You can tell the

Q.

I mean, I

I knew there was a gate that

How did you find out later on that it

was the Bloxhams• horses?
A.

Oh, you know, as I would be down there,

16

I would see them over around their house.

17

mean, you assume that they're their horses.

18
19

Q.

So,

I

What was the total time you spent at the

property?

20

A.

That day?

21

Q.

Correct.

22

A.

Oh, maybe three or four hours.

23

Q.

Anything else that you observed that you

24

25

remember from that visit?
A.

Not that I can think of right off.
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1

orchard?

2

A.

Yeah.

3

Q.

Could you take that same red Sharpie and

4

draw on Exhibit-3 where the orchard is located?

5

Actually, it might be easier -- is it easier on this

6

one, on Exhibit-2?

7

to --

I don't know where it 's easier

8

A.

Okay.

9

Q.

Let's actually hold on.

Let's have you

10

do it -- we've already got red circled.

11

you do it in black.

We'll have

12

A.

Black?

13

Q.

Yeah.

14

A.

Didn't bring pink, huh?

15

Q.

I did not.

16

A.

Boy, I'm going to guess it ' s something

17

like this.

18

Q.

So you've drawn on Exhibit - 2 a black

19

circle, and that ' s where the orchard is located.

20

you know how many acres approximately the orchard

21

consists of?

22

A.

Currently a couple acres.

23

Q.

Two acres?

24

A.

Yeah.

25

Do

Most of them died, so it's

smaller than it was.
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1

Q.

What trees did you plant?

2

A.

Apple, pear, plum, chestnut, and

3

hazelnut.
Q.

How many trees approximately did you

6

A.

Oh, over a hundred.

7

Q.

Were they saplings?

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

How many survived?

10

A.

About 30.

11

MR. HARRIS:

4
5

plant?

Okay.

I'm going to have you --

12

well, let's do this:

13

a break because she's furiously typing.

14

okay if we take about a five-minute break?
MR. WELLS:

15

About every hour I like to take
So is it

Sure.

(Whereupon, a break was taken.)

16

(BY MR. HARRIS) Mr. Jackson, we're just

17

Q.

18

back from a break.

19

you're under oath to testify truthfully.

20

couple of follow-up questions and then we'll go onto

21

another topic.

I do have a

You mentioned Mr. Stewart lives south of

22
23

the property.

24

visible?

25

I just want to remind you that

A.

On either Exhibit-2 or -3, is his home

Yes.
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Q.

1

2

Could you on Exhibit-3 with this r ed

Sharpie draw a circle around his home?

3

Okay.

4

You indicated that you had planted an

5

orchard.

Thank you.

When did you actually plant the trees?

6

A.

2012.

7

Q.

When in 2012?

8

A.

Spring.

9

property.

10
11

You know, after I bought the

Q.

It looks like the property purchased end

of April 2012 --

12

A.

Yeah.

13

Q.

-- so when after that did you plant

A.

I would say May or June, somewhere right

14
15
16
17

them?

in there.
Q.

Okay.

I want you to now look at these

18

discovery responses, and that is Exhibit-4.

19

already turned you to the right page, it•s at the

20

very bottom.

21

observations of irrigation on the property and I want

22

to just walk through each one of these.

23

I've

We asked you a question about your

First you indicate,

11

Vern and Craig

24

Bloxham - July 2011 - flood irrigation in center

25

property.

11

And we•ve already talked about that in
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1

this deposition, correct?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

What I do want to ask you more

4

specifically is:

5

Craig Bloxham, or do you know for surety that they

6

were out there flood irrigating the property?
A.

7
8

Well, the water was coming out of their

pipeline.
Q.

9

10

Do you asswne that it was Vern and

Okay.

But you didn't actually

physically see them out irrigating the property?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

You assumed that because the pipeline is

13

on their property that it was from them; is that

14

fair?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Okay.

The next one you have down is

17

"Kirk Jackson - 2012 - July through September.

18

Hauled water from source in a 500 gallon tank for

19

saplings."

20
21

Could you describe how you hauled the
water up there for the orchard?

22

A.

With a truck and towed it.

23

Q.

How did you fill the truck?

24

A.

With a pump.

25

Q.

Was that above or below the Barnes•
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1

diversion did you put the pump in?

2

A.

Above.

3

Q.

Okay.

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And how many times did you fill the

6

Was that a portable pump?

500-gallon tank?

A.

7

Oh, gee,

I don't know.

Whenever we went

I mean, we were going out several times a week

8

out.

9

and filling it.

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

Maybe 10 or 12.

13

Q.

How many is several?

14

A.

No, more than that.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

Well, I guess it would depend on the

10
11

Several times a week for how many

weeks?

Twice?

How many?

17

week.

But, you know , whenever I was working out

18

there,

I would do that and then we would go out

19

specifically to do that.

20

probably four or five times a week.

21

Q.

I would say at least

Well, my question is:

How many times

22

did you fill the tank each time you watered the

23

saplings?

24

A.

Usually once.

25

Q.

Okay.

If you'll turn the page,

the next
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1

time that you allege that some irrigation occurred on

2

the property was April through July of 2013, pumped

3

water to flood irrigate wheat crop in center to south

4

area approximately 10 acres.

5

10 - acre parcel that you circled in red on Exhibit-2,

6

or is it a different 10 acres that you indicate was

7

irrigated?

8

A.

9

10

13

It was a little farther north.

I was

irrigating a little farther north than what I had
seen that previously.
MR. HARRIS:

11

12

Is that the same

We'll have the court reporter

mark this as another exhibit.
(EXHIBIT-7 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION)
MR. HARRIS:

14

I'm going to hand you what's

15

been marked as Exhibit-7.

16

Exhibit-2 other than -- did you say you had a gold

17

Sharpie?

18

REPORTER:

19

Q.

20

the colors we can.

21

It's identical to

Yeah.

(BY MR. HARRIS) We're going to use all

Could you indicate on Exhibit-7 where

22

the approximate 10 acres were that you indicate were

23

irrigated?

24

A.

I would say something like this.

25

Q.

Okay.

Thank you for doing that.
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What pump did you use to pump water up

1

2

to flood irrigate the wheat crop?
A.

3

I rented a pump.

4

don't remember the brand.

5

had a BMW engine.

It was a -- oh, I

It was European brand.

6

Q.

Who did you rent it from?

7

A.

I don't recall the name.

It was a

8

wildland fire response company out of the Lola

9

valley.

10

Q.

Out of the what valley?

11

A.

Lola valley.

12

Q.

Where is the Lola valley?

13

A.

North of Salmon.

14

Q.

You mean Lolo?

15

A.

Yeah.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

A.

Lolo Valley.

18

Q.

We'll both look at a map and decide

19

later.

I

It

No, it's Lola, isn't it?

think it's Lolo but - -

20

A.

It could be.

21

Q.

Was there a contact person?

22

A.

You know,

I don't remember.

I was

23

looking for a pump with line, and that's kind of hard

24

to find a small pump with flexible line.

25

Q.

So then did you drive to Salmon to pick
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1

up the pump?

2

A.

He met me halfway.

3

Q.

Where did you meet?

4

A.

Oh, I don't know, one of them little

5

towns between Salmon and Idaho Falls.

6

Q.

And this was in 2013?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Was that the spring or the summer of

A.

Well, it had to be the spring if I was

9

2013?

10
11

using it in April, so ...

12
13'

Q.

Okay.

So the pump had a line attached

A.

It had lines with it.

to it?

14

It rolled up

15

lines in a couple of -- I don't know what you would

16

call them.

17

Q.

Like a firehose almost?

18

A.

Yeah, firehoses.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

line came with it?

21

A.

22

25

approximately, of

I think there was about a thousand or

1,200 feet with it.

23
24

How many feet,

Q.

Did you add any more line of your own to

A.

I did for a while.

it?
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1

2

And why did you flood irrigate the 10

A.

Well, because I had a wheat crop in.

acres?

3

4

Q.

I

wanted to -- I wanted more yield.
Q.

Did you plant your entire property with

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And you flood irrigated about 10 acres'

10

A.

Yeah, roughly.

11

Q.

Okay.

5

6

9

wheat?

worth?

Next on your responses you

12

indicate that in September of 2014 you "pumped water

13

for fall planting."

Is it the same pump --

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

-- that you used?
Okay.

16

What pump did you use in 2014?

17

A.

I used a submersible pump.

18

Q.

And was this on Spring Creek?

19

A.

This was -- the pump?

20

Q.

Yeah.

21

A.

No,

it was on my property.

22

using water out of Spring Creek, yes.

23

don't understand what you're asking.

24

Q.

25

physically placed?

That's fair.

We were
I guess I

Where was the pump

In Spring Creek?
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1

2

A.

On my property.

Roughly where I drew

that ditch in at on Exhibit

3

Q.

Right here?

4

A.

-- - 3.

5

Q.

Maybe I could ask it bette r this way:

6

Explain the irrigation system.

7

down the ditch to the pump and then into your lines?

8

Just describe it for me.
A.

9

Did you run water

I ran water down my pipeline that I

10

installed into a hole, pumped out of the hole into a

11

line that I had laying on top of the ground.

12

13

Q.

And that pipeline was that that was

placed when you worked with the NRCS, correct?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

This is different?

16

A.

Let•s stop.

Yes, the pipeline from

17

Spring Creek to my property was part of the NRCS

18

project.

19

Q.

In September of 2014?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

And we 1 ll talk more about that in

22

a minute, but I just want to keep going down these

23

questions.

24
25

So you ran it, had a submersible pump,
and then that irrigated -- you said

11

pumped water for
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1

fall planting."

Was that on the same 10 acres?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Okay.

Well, some of it.
How many acres did you pump,

4

then -- or how many acres did you spread water on in

5

September of 2014?

6

A.

7

Eight or ten.
Q.

8

9

So within the gold area that you drew,

it's eight acres within that?

10
11

Oh, you know, something like eight.

A.

I would say it would be maybe a little

north of that.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

Part of it, it would be the same.

14

Q.

And then in 2015 you have use for stock

15

water and for irrigation for south area of property.

16

A.

Yep.

17

Q.

Okay.

On the same map that you have the

18

gold box, when you say "south area of the property,

19

is that something different than the gold box?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

Exhibit-7.

23

A.

I would say maybe something like this.

24

Q.

About how many acres do you think that

25

Let's use red,

11

this is again on

Could you draw where that was located?

is?
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1

A.

Oh, yeah, 10 or 12.

2

Q.

And then it says,

"for stock water use."

3

What stock water system was on the property at this

4

time?

5

A.

The NRCS system.

6

Q.

And 2016 looks pretty identical to '15

7

in terms of the stock water use and the irrigation of

8

the south area; is that correct?

9

the same acreage?

Did you irrigate

10

A.

For a time.

11

Q.

What do you mean by that?

12

A.

Well, I irrigated up until about the

13

10th of July when your client decided to turn his

14

water on.

15

Q.

This was in 2016?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

What was the point of diversion that you

18
19

20

used in 2015 and 2016?
A.

A temporary pipe that I put in after my

main system was torn out.

21

Q.

By Craig Bloxham?

22

A.

Yes, and others.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

25

And that temporary pipe, is that

upstream from the Barnes' point of diversion?
A.

Yes.
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1

driving by, but I was building fence all the way

2

around my place.

3

property line.

I was building fence along my west

4

Q.

But you weren't there 24/7?

5

A.

Nope.

6

Q.

Were you working full time at the same

7

time you were driving down and checking on the

8

property?
not really.

9

A.

No,

10

Q.

Are you working full time now?

11

A.

Not really.

12

Q.

What do you mean by "not really"?

13

A.

I work three days a week or something.

14

Q.

Well, okay.

So at the time you

15

purchased the property, were you working three days a

16

week?

17

A.

Yeah, about that.

18

Q.

Okay.

19

But you went down there three to

four times a week as well?

20

A.

Yeah.

21

Q.

Would you travel down there on the

22

weekends

--

23

A.

Yeah.

24

Q.

--

25

A.

Well, sometimes in the day, sometimes

or sorry, evenings?
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1

2

the evening, sometimes weekend.
Q.

Okay.

And after the Barnes purchased

3

the property, have they only irrigated the south part

4

of the property?

5

A.

They irrigated more of the property.

6

Q.

Okay.

Have you ever talked to them

7

about any pressure issues they may have on their

8

property?

9

A.

Oh, they have pressure issues.

10

Q.

You think those are the same pressure

11

issues that occurred on your property through the

12

historic irrigation system?

13

A.

I don't understand what you're asking.

14

Q.

Let me ask it a better way.

15

A.

Yeah.

16

Q.

Did you ever try to use the mainline

I ...

17

that runs along the east side of their property to

18

irrigate your property?

19

A.

I was denied access to it.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

What have been your observations

of flows in Spring Creek?

22

A.

Pretty consistent.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

A.

Rarely a change in it, unless you get a

25

heavy rainstorm that runs water directly into the
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1

ditch.

But the flow of Spring Creek, you can't see a

2

difference in it,

3

not changed in five years.
Q.

4

spring, fall, year to year.

It has

Would you agree, though, that there's

5

not enough water to satisfy all the water right users

6

on that stream?
A.

7
8

allocated on it.

9

10

13

14

Q.

I'm not sure I understand.

A.

Well, if you divide 230 by 9, you get

There's

about

11
12

There's about one-fourth of what's

what?

25 inches -- 26 inches of water, right?
Q.

So you agree with me there's not enough

water to satisfy all the water rights?

15

A.

No, there's not.

16

Q.

So if you stopped irrigating,

that water

17

would be used and relied upon by Barnes and other

18

users that have water rights on Spring Creek?
Yep.

19

A.

20

MR. HARRIS:

Let's take a five-minute break.

21

I'm just going to look over my notes, but I think I'm

22

almost done.

23

We won't break for lunch because I really think we

24

can make it through.

25

of follow-up questions, so -- but I think we can get

Well, let's take a ten-minute break.

I don't know if you have a lot
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1

done here pretty quick.
(Whereupon, a break was taken.)

2

Q.

3

(BY MR. HARRIS) Okay.

4

the record.

5

you're still under oath.

We are back on

Just remind you, Mr. Jackson, that

I have a couple follow-up questions.

6
7

believe you testified that you first became

8

acquainted with this property in 2011?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Do you have any evidence of how the

I

11

property was irrigated or if it was irrigated between

12

2004 and 2011?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Did you ever have any conversations with

15

the bankruptcy trustee at all prior to purchasing the

16

property?

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

So you would have never had a

19

conversation with him about what irrigation was

20

occurring on the property?

21

A.

You don't talk to the bankruptcy

22

trustee.

If you call them, they just send you

23

somewhere else.

They won't talk to you.

24

Q.

Where do they send you?

25

A.

To the Realtor.
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Q.

1

2

Okay.

Any evidence from the Realtor of

irrigation that was occurring on your

3

A.

Nope.

4

Q.

-- property between 2004 and 2011?
That was a no?

5

6

A.

No.

7

Q.

Do you have any evidence that the

8

bankruptcy trustee would have been prevented from

9

irrigating the property during that time?

10

A.

No, I don't.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

And you're currently irrigating

the property, is that through a temporary setup?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

Well, sorry.

15

It's through the NRCS.
I didn't ask that very

well.
The diversion structure --

16
17

A.

Oh.

18

Q.

-- was taken out by Craig Bloxham.

19

are you checking up water to getting it into your

20

system now?

21
22
23

24
25

A.

How

Just got a pipe in the -- there's

an unneeded structure that I put back in.
Q.

"There's an unneeded structure," I don't

know what that means.
A.

Well, I put a small concrete structure
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

1

2
3

STATE OF IDAHO

4

COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

ss.
5

6
7
8
9

10
11

12
13
14

I, Shantae Miller, CSR, RPR, CRR and Notary
Public in and for the State of Idaho, do hereby
certify:
That prior to being examined Kirk Jackson, the
witness named in the foregoing deposition, was by me
duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth;
That said deposition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and
thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction,
and that the foregoing transcript contains a full,
true, and verbatim record of said deposition.
I further certify that I have no interest in the
event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 28th day of
September 2016.

15

16

'
'
'

17

''

SHANTAE MILLER
NOTARY P UBLIC

STATE OF IDAHO

·~-----"""~~_..,, "

18

"'

j

19
Shantae Miller
Idaho CSR, RPR, CRR
Notary Public in and for
the State of Idaho

20
21
22
23
24

My Commission Expires:

1-03-2017
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(Official Form l) (12/03)
FORM Bl
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United States Bankruptcy Court

Desc Main

Vo lu ntary Petition

District of Idaho
Name of Debtor (if individual, enter Last, First, Middle):
Bloxham , Craig

Name of Joint Debtor (Spouse) (Last, First, Middle):

All Other Na mes used by the Debtor in the last 6 years
(include ma1Tied, ma ide n, and trade names):

All Other Names used by the Joint Debtor in the last 6 yea rs
(include married, maiden, and trade names):

(if more than one, state

Last four digits of Soc. Sec. No./ Complete EIN or other Tax I.D . No.
all ):

(if

Street Address of Debtor (No. & Street, City, State & Zip Code):
20862 S. Cambridge Road
Downey, ID 83234

Street Address of Joint Debto r (No. & Street, City, State & Zip Code):

Co unty of Res idence or of the
Principal Place of Business:

County of Residence or of th e
Principal Place of Business:

Last four digits of Soc. Sec. No./ Complete EIN or other Tax I.D. No.
more than one, state all ):

Bannock

Mailing Address of Debtor (if different from street address):

Mailing Address of Joint Debtor (if different from street address):

Location of Prin cipal Assets of Bus iness Debtor
(if different from street address above ):

Information Regarding the Debtor (Check the App licable Boxes)
Venue (Check any app lica ble box)
• Debtor has bee n domiciled or has had a residence, principal place of business, or principal assets in this Distri ct for 180 days imm ediately
preceding th e date of this petition or for a longer part of such 180 days th an in any other District.
0 There is a bankruptcy case concerning debtor's affiliate, general pnctncr, or partnership pending in th is Distri ct.

D
0
0

Type of Debtor (Check all boxes that apply)
0 Railroad
Individual(s)
Coqwration
D Stockbroker
Partnership
0 Commodity Broker
Other
D Clea ring Bank

•

Nature of Debts (Check one box)
Consumer/Non-Business
0 Business

•

•

0
0
•

D
D
D

Chapter 11 Small Business (Check all boxes that apply)
Debtor is a small bus iness as defin ed in 11 U.S.C. ~ 101
Debtor is and elects to be considered a sma ll business und er
11 U.S.C. § I 121(e) (Optional)

Chapter or Section of Ba nkruptcy Code Under Which
the Petition is Filed (Check one box)
0 Chapter 11
0 Chapter 13
Chapter 7
Chapter 9
D Chapter 12
Sec. 304 - Case anci ll a1y to foreign proceed ing
Filing Fee (Check one box)
Full Filing Fee allached
Fi ling Fee to be paid in installments (Applicable to individuals only.)
Must attach signed application for the co utt's consideration
certifying that the debtor is unable to pay fee except in installments.
Rule 1006(b). See Official Form No. 3.

Statistical/Administrative Information (Estimates only)
D Debtor estimates that fonds will be ava ilab le for di stribution lo unsecured creditors.
• Debtor estimates th at, after any exempt prope1ty is excl ud ed and administrative expenses paid, there
will be no funds ava ilable for di stribution to unsecured creditors.
Estimated Number of Creditors
Estim ated Assets
$50,001 to
SO lo
$50,000
$100,000

D

•
•

Estim ated Debts
S50,001 to
SO lo
S50.000
S100.000

D

1-15

•

16-49

50-99

100-199

200-999

D

D

D

D

THIS SPACE IS FOR COURT USE ONLY

1000-over

D

S100,001 to
S500,000

$500,001 to
$1 million

S1.000,001 to
s10 million

$10,000,001 to
S50 million

$50,000,001 10
S100 million

D

D

D

D

D

D

S100.001 to
S500.000

$500.001 to
S1 million

S1 ,000,001 to
S10 million

s10.000.001 to
S50 million

S50.000,001 to
S100 million

More than
$100 million

D

D

D

D

D

D

More than

S100 million
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Vo lu ntary Petition
([his page

11111

Filed 10/12/05 Entered 10/12
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FORi\ l Bl , Page 2

Blox ham , Craig

t be completed and filed in eve1:v case)

Location
Where Fi led: ·None·

Desc Main

/ 15 :44:18

I

Prior Bankruptcy Case Filed Within La t 6 Year (If more than one, attach addi tional sheet)
Date Filed:
Ca e umber:

I

Pending Bankrup tcy Case Filed by any Spouse, Partner, or Affiliate of this Debtor (If more than one, attach additional sheet)
Name of Debtor:
Ca e Number:
Date Filed:
Bloxham Oil , LLC
04-40271
District:

Relationship:
partner in business

Judge:

Signatures
Signa lu1·e(s) of Dcbtor(s) (lndiviclual/Joint)
I dec lare under pena lty of perjury th at the in fo rm ati on prov ided in th is
petition is t111e and correct.
[If petitioner is an individual whose debts are primari ly consumer debts
and has chosen lo file under chapter 7] l am aware th at I may proceed
under chapter 7, I I 12, or 13 of title 11 , United Stales Code, understand
the rel ief available under each such chapter, and choose lo proceed under
chap ter 7.
I request relief in accordance with the chapter of ti tle 11 , United States
Code, specified in this petition.

X

Isl Cra ig Bloxham

Signature of Debtor Craig Bloxham

X

Ex hi bit A

(To be completed if debtor is required to file periodic reports (e.g., fonns
l0K and I0Q) with the Securities and Exchange orrnnission pursuant to
Section 13 or l 5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act or 1934 and is
requesting relief under chapter 11 )
D Exhibit A is attached and made a part of thi petition.
Ex hibit B

(To be completed if debtor is an individual
whose debts are primarily consumer debts)
I, the attorney for the petitioner named in the fo regoing pe tition , declare
that I have infonned !lie petitioner that [he or she] may proceed under
chapter 7, 11 , 12, or 13 of title 11 , United Stales ode, and have
exp lained the relief available under each such chapter.

X
Signature of Joi nt Debtor

Isl Craig R. Jorgensen
Signature of Attorney for Deblor(s)

October 12, 2005

Date

Craig R. Jorgensen

Telephone Number (If not represented by attorney)
October 12, 2005

Date

X

Signature of Attorney
Isl Craig R. Jorgensen
Signature of Allomey for Debtor(s)
Craig R. Jorgensen

Printed Name of Allomey for Debtor(s)

Ex hibit C

Does th e debtor own or have possession of any property th al poses
a threat of imminent and identifiab le harm to pub lic hea lth or
safety?
D Yes, and Exhibit C is auached and made a part of this petition .
No

a

Signature ofNon-Atlorncy Peti tion Preparer

I cert ify that l am a bank111 plcy petition preparer as defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ I 10 tliat I prepared this documen t for compen ation, and that I have
provided the debtor with a copy ofthi documen t.

Craig R. Jorgense n, Attornei'. at Law

Finn Name

Printed Name of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer

1246 Yellowstone, Suite A4
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904

Address

Social Security r umber (Req uired by 11 U.S.C.~ I I0(c).)

Emai l: Biggunlaw@cableone .net

208-237-4100 Fax : 208-237-1706

Telephone Nu mber

Add ress

Oc tober 12, 2005

Names and Social Security number or all other ind ividu als who
prepared or assisted in preparing this document:

Date
Si0 naturc of Debtor (Corpo ration/Partnership)
I declare under penally of perjury that the infonnation provided in this
petition is lnre and correct, and that I have been authorized to file Lhi
petition on behalf of the debtor.
The debtor request relief in accordance with the chapter oflitle 11 ,
United Stales Code spec ified in this petition.

If more than one person prepared this docume nt, attach add itional
sheets confonn ing lo the appropriate official fonn for each person.

X

X
ignature of Authorized Individual
Printed Name of Authorized Individ ual
Title of Authorized Individ ual
Date

Signature ofBankrnplcy Petition Preparer
Date
A bankruptcy peti tion preparer's fai lure lo comply with the
provisions of title 11 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure may result in fines or imprisonment or both. II
U.S.C. § 11 0; 18 U.S.C. § 156.
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Desc Main

Dougs Repair Service
PO Box 110
Downey , ID 83234

Express Recovery Services
PO Box 26415
Salt Lake City , UT 84126

Qwest
Payment Center
Denver , CO 80244

US Cellular
PO Box 0203
Palatine , IL 60055-0203

Utah Power
PO Box 25308
Salt Lake City , UT 84125

Valley Oi l Co .
114 s . Hwy 91
Downey , ID 83234

Wilson
McCo l l
PO Box 1544
Boise , ID 83701

Zions Ban k
PO Box 30813
Salt Lake City , UT 84130
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Peter M. Wells
MAY, R.AMMTILL & THOMPSON, Ci~rn.
Post Office Box 370
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: 208-233-0132
Facsimile: 208-234-296 l
Idaho State Bar No. 7724

Attorney.for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDA.HO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES cmd
JANE BARNES,

CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC

Plaintiffs,

vs.

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO THE
BARNES' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS

KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant.

GENERAL OBJECTION
Defendant objects to The Barnes' First Set ofDiscovelJ' Requests to the extent lhat they
call for information and documents which arc privileged, including, but nol limited to, items of

information and documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, requests for
infonnation or documents wbicb fall within !he attorney/client privilege, or requests that are

vague, overbroad, inelevant and uuduly burdensome.
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INTERROGATOR.JES
fNTERROGATORY NO. l:

Please. identify each individual who answered or provided

information necessary to respond to the following interrogatories, requests for production aud
requests for admission.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Kirk Jackson
INTERROGATORY NO.

2.: Please ide.nlify each and every person known to

yot1 who has

any knowledge or who purports to have knowledge of any of the facts of this case.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
Kirk. Jackson

Co le Johnson
Steve Criddle
Nate Mat lack
Michelle Pak
Martha Nunez-Higgins
INTERROGATORY NO. ;1:

With respect to eacb person identified in response to

lnterrogato1y No. 2, please set forth in detail the person's relationship to the facts of this case,
and describe in detail the facts you believe are or may be known to such person.
RESPONSE TO JNTERROGATORY NO. 3:
Kirk Jackson - Defendant in case, Owner of waler 1ighl on Spring Creek.
Cole Johnson - Mr. Johnson has knowledge of irrigation done by Mr. Jackson in 2013.
Steve Criddle- Knowledge of ini gation related to the subject property.
Nate Matlack NRCS- Was one of the people from the NRCS that worked with Mr. Jackson
related to the Jackson property. This person bas information related to the project thal Mr.
Jackson was going to build on the Jackson property.
Michelle Pak- NRCS- See Nate Matlack above.
Mrutha Nunez- NRCS- See Nate Matlack above.
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INTER.RO ATORY NO. ,1 : liar each fact set forth in response to 1lltcrrogatory No . 3, above,
identify any and all documents that relate to , describe, support, or otherwise reflect th e facts

known to each person.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
Defendant at this time does not k;10w all of the infonnation that is availab le to each person
identified above as Defendant can

1101

read the minds of the individuals above. However,

Defendant docs asseti that the following documents would assist Lo describe, supporl, or
otherwise reflect the facts known lo each person:
Copy of contrnct between NRCS and l(jrk Jackson
IO Photographs that are attached.
Copy of Idaho Statute , Title 42 §42-223
Aerial map of area around the Barnes/ BJ ox.ham/ Jackson/ and Koester fam1s
Map detail of Bloxbam's irrigation system
Trnstec's Deed of property from Bankmptcy Court- estate of Craig Bloxham,

to l(jrk Jackson (purchase of property)
2 aerial maps of area including Jackson's property from USDA 2015 and Idaho Dept. of
Water Resources 2009 ,
Flex PVC pipe dimensions

Information provided lo Kirk Jackson prior to purchasing property.
Aerial maps provided by Idaho Dept. of Water Resourses 2009 and 2011 .
Lel1er communication between Nate Matlack of NR.CS and Kirk Jackson.
Conservation Program Contract
INTERROGATORY NQ., .5_: Please identify each person you expect to caJI as an expert
witness il1 the trial of this matter. For each such expert, state the following:
(a) A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed by each expert and the basis and

reasons therefore;
(b) The data or information considered by each expert in fanning the opinions:

(c) Each expert witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored by the
expert within the preceding Len years;
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t<l)

The: compensation to be paid for the cxpcn wi tness 's testimony ; and

(e)

A listing of any other cases in which the expert bas tes tifi ed as an expert at trial or by

deposition within tbe preceding four years
RESPONS E TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

J\t the current time Defendant has not

identified an expe1t witness that may be called to lesti fy in this case. If an expert is identified to
testify, Defendan t will supplement this interrogatory in accordance with th e Court's scheduling
order in this case.

fNTERROGATORY NO . .6: Please state the full name, current address, and telephone
number of each and every person, including parties, you iotend to ca ll as a witness to testify on
your behalf in tltis action, and pl ease state with particularity the substance of tbe facts and
opinions to which each such person is expected to Lesli ly.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
Kirk Jackson - will testify as to all facts lo10wn by hi mself related lo hi s purchase of the
property and understanding tl1at the property had water rights attached to the property. He will

lesti fy that be irrigated the property Ln 2013 when be µurchased the water. He will testify that the
Bloxhams attempted to prevent him from irrigating the property when he purchased the property
and that he made an agreement with a neighbor to all ow him to run a waler line that would allow
him to uTigate. Mr. Jackson will further testify that he did not even lolow of the Barnes'
involvement with the properties in question until Mr. Barnes approached Mr, Jackson in the fa ll
of 2014 angry about Mr. Jackson irri.gating the Jackson property. Mr. Jackson reserves the right
to testify Lo additional facts and evidence to rebut any statements made by Plaintiff's witnesses in
this matter.
PO Box 866
Pocatell o, ID 83204
(208)351-8381

Cole Johnson - Mr. Jolmson assisted Mr. Jackson in constn1cting irrigation works and in
inigating on Jackson Property in 2013,
617 W. Main
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Lava Hot Springs, 1D 8324(>
(208) 776-5150

Steve Cridd le- Will testify that he was born and raised in Cambridge area and is familiar with
the irri gation water and sources in that area. He will testify as lo the ti.mes and places thal he has
witnessed waler on the Barnes and Jackson properties.
Contact information for Mr. Criddle will be supplemented when it is recieved.
Nate Matlack- Ts expected lo testify cons istent. with emai l he sent Lo Defendant on June 2,
2016 ..

NRCS
155.l Baldy Ave.

Pocatello, ID 83201
(208)239-3435 ext. 3

Miche!Je Pak- Ms . Pak will be expected to testify relative lo her involvement in the NRCS

contract of Defendant.
NRCS
1551 Baldy Ave.

Pocatello, ID 83201
(208)239-3435 ext. 3

Martha Nunez-Higgins- Ms. Nunez-Higgins will be expected to testify relative to her
involvement in the NRCS contract of Defendant.
NRCS

1551 Baldy Ave.
Poca tello, JD 83201
(208)239-3435 ext. 3
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INTERROGATORY NO.

Z: Please identify in full and complete detail any statements,

affidavits, photographs, drawi11gs, illustraLions. written documents , electronic m ssagc, , diaries ,
ca lendars, notes, journals, tape recordings and/or video tapes of which you arc aware that perta in
lo any issues in Lhi s litigation.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO . 7:

Please see response to Interrogatory No. 4

above .
INTERROGATORY NO . .8.: Please identify and describe in detail any and all representations
you have made to NRCS relating to your Syslem.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Defendant stated that he would use. stock water
and irrigation for an orchard as is reflected in the email from Nate Matlack to Defendant dated
Jtme 2, 2016.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2.: Please identify each and eve1y NRCS employee or agent with
whom you have communicated relating to yom System.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

To the best of Defendant's lmowlectge he

commun icated with the individuals identified below. However, he may have communicated with
others as well, but lo the best of bi knowledge these were th e people that he communicated with
related to substantive things on his project.
Nate Matlack
Michelle Pak
Martha Nunez-Higgins
INTERROGATORY NO.10:

Please identify each and every person you claim has used

water diverted pursuant to 29-14032 since 2004, together with the timeframe each individual
who used water diverted pursuant to 29-1403 2, and the use to which each individual pul such
water diverted pursuant to 29-14032.
RESPONSE IQ INTERROGATORY~ J.JL

Vero and Craig Bloxlrnm - July 201 l- flood

irrigation in center of property.

Kirk Jackson - 2012- July through September. Hauled water from source in a 500 gallon tank
for saplings.
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Kirk Jackson - 201 3 - Apri l through July, pumped waler to flood trrigalc wl1eat crop

111

center to south area approximately 10 acre area.
Kirk Jackson - September 2014 - pumped water for fall planting.
Kirk Jackson - 20 l 5 use for stock waler, and irrigation for South area or property.
Kirk Jackson - 2016 use for stock waler, and irriga tion of South area.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11 : Please state when

y011

claim to have res umed using

29-14032 and describe in detai l how you resumed such use, including the beuefic ial use to whicl.1
you claim to have put 29-14032 (i.e. , the acres. if any, that you irriga ted and the location of such
acres).
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please see response to lnterrogatory No. l 0.
INTERROGATORY NO .

11:

Please identify which exemptions provided in Idaho Code §

42-223 and common law you claim exempt 29-14032 from forfei ture.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO . 12:
Defendant asserts the following defenses to forfeiture: I.C. 42-223(6)
I. From June of 2006 to April of 2012 the property was under the control of the United

States Ba nkruptcy Trusl_ee. The water right owner at that time, Mr. Bloxham had no
abili ty to control the water and the land to which it was to be app lied.
2. After purcbasi11g the property in 20 l 2, BJoxhams prevented Defendant from exercis ing
his water right as they told him they would not allow him lo access the diversion through
thier property or allow the water to be transported through the cu lomaiy transport ation
structure for the water. Defendant therefore had to make other arrangements for tbe
h·,-msportation of his water and resumed use of the water in earnest in 20 13.
INTERROGATORY NO..

U: Please describe in detail any and all fac ts reJatii1g lo you r

contended application of each exemption identified in response lo Inten-ogatory No. 12, above.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please se.e response to lnten-ogato1y No. 12.
INTERROGATORY NO .

H:

Please identify aud describe in detail any and all periods of

non-use of 29-14115 you contend have occurred since 2004.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14:
Period of non-use :
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The center and North portion s of 131oxhams ' rtcld was not watered at all m 2011 , 201 2, 201 3,
2014 2015,or20L6.
Prior to 2011 , Defendant was not familiar with the property.
TNTERROGATOR.Y NQ 15: Please identify and describe in delail each and every portion of
!he Barnes' Property on which you claim water diverted pursuant lo 29-14115 has nol been pul
to beneficial use.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 15 :
20l1-2013 - time in which Bloxham owned the property prior to selling to Barnes - The
propc11y was leased to a dry farmer from Soda Springs. April through July 2012 and April to
July 2013, a wheel like was set at· south end of tJ1c Bloxham field and ten in one place for weeks
at a time.
INTERROGATORY NO . .l_Q:

Pl ea ·e describe the parts or your System, if any, that the

NRCS either paid for or reimbursed you for.
RESPONSE TO JNTERROGATORY NO. 16:

NRCS reimbursed Defendant for pipeline

by the fool, holding tank, solar pump and other items needed for system; except for th e concrete
structure that was torn out in 20 15.

INTERROGATORY NO. l]: For each Request for Admission (below) to which you respond
in any fonn other than an unequivocal adru.ission, please iden1ify and describe in detail the bases
in fact and law for your denial or conditional ad.mjssion. In responding to this lnterrogato1y,
please identify the Request for Admission for which you are providing the bases in fact and law
for your response.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1.L

See the Answers to the Request for

Admissions below.

I I I

I I I
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REQUESTS FOR PRUDUCTIOI\
REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO . l : Please produce any and all expert reports prepared
by any expert retained by you in this matter.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION

~

.L

Defonda111 will supp lement if

ex.pert witnesses are identified.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce any and all documents identified in

response to the above Jnlerrogatorics or used to derive the information for your answers to The

Barnes· First Ser ofDiscove,y Requests.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Please see !'he attached.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NQ. l: Please proclnce copies of any and all documented
communjcations Lbat you have had with (ei ther sent to or received from) the NRCS relating to
your System.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please see the at1ached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce any and all doctUnents that you
have received from or sent to NRCS re lating lo your System.

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please see the attacbed.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 00. .5,: Please produce any and all documents that relate to
your response to rnterrogatory No. 10, above.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please see the attached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO..,, 6.:

For each exemption identified in response to

Interrogatory No. 12, above, please produce any and all documents evidencing the appli cation of
such exemption, identifying the clai.med exemption or exemptions to which each you claim each
document applies.
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO . 6: Please see the attached.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce aJ1y and al l documents you have
evidencing your contention that the Barnes are using a leaky pipe system.
ANSWER TO REQUEST fOR PRODUCTION NO.

7: Please see the attached.
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REOLJEST FOR PRODU TION _Q_ ~: Please produce any and all document y u have
evidencing your contention that the Barnes are illegally storing waler in a pond in tbe
NW1/.1SW¼ of Seel ion 14 Township 11 South, Range 37 East, Boise Meridian.

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: NIA
RBQUES'( FOR PRODU CTION NO . .2: For each Request for Admission (below) to which
you respond in any form other tban an unequivocal admission, please produce any and all

documents and/or electronic documents which support or relate to your reasons for provid in g a
denial or conditional admission. In responding to this Request for Production, please idenli fy the
Request for Admission for which you are producing each document or electronic document.

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTJON NO . 9: Please see tbe attached.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. l:

Please admit that Craig Bloxham is your predecessor-in-interest in

owning what is now the Jackson Property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST

~

l: Deny. Craig Bloxlrnm is not Defendant's immediate

predecessor-in-interest on hi s property, the Federal Bankruptcy Court is.

REQUEST NO. 2: Please admit that Craig Bloxham, your predecessor in interest, did not
irrigate the Jackson Property witll water from Spring Creek from 2004 until 2012.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. i:

Deny. See Answer to Response to Request for

Admission No. l above.
REQUEST NO. J,: Please admit that you did not use any water from Spring Creek lo irrigate

the Jackson Property until 2015.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: Deny. See Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 above.

REQUEST NO. 1: Please admit thaL prior to construction of your System, there was no
system capable of diverting water for irriga tion or stockwater pw-poses to the Jackson Prnperty.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO.

1: Deny. The field had previously beeu irrigated th.rough

the same system that delivers water to the Barnes' property.

REQUEST NO. ~: Please admit that you represented to NRCS officials that your System
was to be used for stocb:vater purposes only.
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RESPONSt: TO REQUEST NO. }.: Deny. See the email of Nale Matlack dated June 2 ,
2016.

REQUEST NO. 6: Please adm it that you in stalled the concrete spring box portion of your
system withoul the approva l or knowledge o[NR.CS representatives.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6: Admit.
REQUEST NO . 1: Please admit that the concrete spring box that yon installed was not an
approved NRCS-designed strnctme.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1:

Deny. The concrete strnctnre met all design

requirements required by NRCS.

REQUEST NO . .S.: Please admit that the solar pump designed and approved by the NRCS for
450 watts and 0.2 horsepower is not enough sufficient to be used for irrigation purposes under
29- 14032.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. -8_: Admit. The solar pump is not' sufficient to be used for
irrigation.
REQUEST NO. 2: Please admit that the NRCS design was to have a 2" pipe running from
the point of diversion and not a 6'' pipe that you actually installed.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO . .2_:

Admit. NRCS showed the project with a 2" pipe;

however, Defendant was able to use a larger pipe, providing he paid for the difference in cost.
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that tl1e NRCS did not pay for or reimburse you for the 6" pipe
yo u instaUed.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. lQ:

Deny. NRCS reimbmsed Defendant for the pipe.

NRCS paid for pipe by footage. They allow a size of pipe other than 2" to be installed. they pay

according to a "by the foot" schedule tha1 sets the price paid.
REQUEST NO . 11: Admit that you did not contact Barnes or Craig Bloxham prior to
installation of the concrete box.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. il: Admit. However, Defendant did communicate with
Vern Bloxham numerous times in 2013, and told him that Defendant was going to access
Defendant's water from Spring Creek. Defendant did not know Bamcs, nor had any knowledge
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of his purchase of, or interest in, prior Bloxham owned properly when Defendant installed his
concrete boxes.

REQUEST NU. 11: Admit that lhe concrete box checks up water and obstructs flow down to
Barnes' and Bloxham's poinl of diversion into their water delivery system.

lifSfONSE IQ REQUEST l'fil... 12.: Deny. Defendant does not believe his structure has lhe
effect on the system claimed by Barnes.

DATED this 12 th day of August, 2016.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attomeys for Plainl{/J
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VER.IflCATION

STATE OF IDAJ--1O

:ss
County of - - - I, KIRK JACKSON , being fu-st duly sworn, deposes and says:

Thal he is the De fendant in the above-ent itled action; that he has read the foregoing
Defendant's Response to the Barnes' First Set o/Disco1 1e1J1 Requests, knows the contents thereof,
and believes the same to be true and correct.

KJRK JACKSON
SUBSCRJBED AND SWORN to before me this _ _ day of August, 2016.
[SEAL]

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at: _ _ _ _ _ __ _
My Commission Expires: _ __
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· Peter M. Wells
· .MAY, RAMMBLL & THOMPSON, CHTD,

Post Office Box 370
216 W. Whitman Street
. Pocatello; Idaho 83204-03 70
Telephone: 208-233-0132
:Facsimile: 208-234-2961
·Idaho State Bar No. 7·724

'Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
· CHAD BARNES and
. . JANE BARNES,

CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC
Plaintiffs,

vs.

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSE TO THE BARNES' FIRST SET
OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS

: K.IRK'JACKSON,
Defendant.

GENERAL OBJECTION
Defendant objects to The Barnes' First Set of Discovery Requests to the extent that they
call for ·information and documents which are privileged, including, but not limited to, items of
· informatlon and documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, requests for
information or documents which fall within the attomey/client privilege, or requests that are
vague, overbroad, irrelevant and unduly burdensome.
'

'
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These documents would include any and all emails between Defendant and Defendant's
. ~ouns_el; any and all letters from Defendant's counsel to Defendant; further any correspondence
of any kind between Defendant and Defendant's counsel is protected by privilege.

INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY~ 4: For each fact set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 3, above,
. ~dentify any and all documents that relate to, describe, suppo1t, or otherwise reflect the facts
known to each person.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 4:
.Defendant at this time does not know all of the infonnation that is available to each person
· id~ntified abov~ as Defendant can not read the minds of the individuals above, However,
. Defendant does assert that the following documents would assist to describe, support, or
otherwise reflect the facts known to each person:
Copy of contract between NRCS and Kirk Jackson
10 Photographs that are attached in color.
Copy of Idaho Statute , Title 42 §42-223
· . Aerial map of area around the Barnes/ Bloxham/ Jackson/ and Koester farms
· Map detail of Bloxham's irrigation system
• · Trustee's Deed of property from Bankruptcy Court- estate of Craig Bloxham,
to Kirk Jackson (purchase of property)
2 aerial maps of area including Jackson's property from USDA 2015 and Idaho Dept. of

· Water.Resources 2009.
· Flex PVC pipe dimensions
Information provided to Kirk Jackson prior to purchasing property
Aerial maps provided by Idaho Dept. of Water Resources 2009 and 2011 .
Email communication between Nate Matlack ofNRCS and Kirk Jackson.
· . Conservation Program Contract

INTERROGATORY No.. .8.: Please identify and describe in detail any and all representations
y9u have made to NRCS relating to your System.
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· RESPONSE I.Q INTERROGATORY NQ.. .t Defendant stated that he would use stock water
and irrigation for an orchard. The original Response to Interrogatory No. 8 stated this
_corre~pon~ence was reflected in the email from Nate Matlack to Defendant dated June 2, 2016.
However, the date provided of June 2, 2016, was a typo that was reflective of a date that Counsel
. for Defendant received a copy of this email. The actual email date between Nate Matlack and
Defendant was actually April 4, 2016. The email is attached to this Supplemental Response.

INTERROGATORY liCl. ll: Please identify and describe in detail each and every portion of
the ~ilrne~' Property on which you claim water diverted pursuant to 29-1411S has not been put

to beneficial use.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15:
From 2011-2013 - Bloxham owned the property prior to selling to Barnes. During this time,
the entire property was leased to a dry farmer from Soda Springs. The majority of the property
.was never .irrigated during this time. During this time Bloxham put a wheel line at that South end
of
. the field
. that was not moved. The wheel line would sit in one place for weeks at a time with

. water running through it. At most, three (3) acres were irrigated on the Barnes' property during
this time.

INTERROGATORY

N.Q.

16.: Please describe the parts of your System, if any, that the

NRCS either paid for or reimbursed you for.

·.. RESPONSE ID INTERROGATORY ~ ~ Defendant is not sure why Plaintiff does not
.\lnderstan_d Defendant's previous answer to this Interrogatory. In an attempt to help Plaintiff
understand, Defendant would state that the NRCS reimbursed Defendant for the pipeline
installed by Defendant, the holding tank, solar pump and other items needed for the system;
except for the concrete structure that was tom out in 2015. The NRCS only paid for the cost ofa
·-2_,i pipe ~ven though Defendant installed a 611 pipe, Further clarification can be seen in the email

,from Nat~ Matlack to Defendant dated April 4, 2016, wherein Mr. Matlack explains how the
NRCS
. .cost shared on the irrigation project.

INTERROGATORY NQ. ll: For each Request for Admission (below) to which you respond
in any· form other than an unequivocal admission, please identify and describe in detail the bases
·b;1'

f~ct and law for your denial or conditional admission. In responding to this Interrogatory,
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· please identify the Request for Admission for which you are providing the bases in fact and law
· for your response.

RESPONSE IQ INTERROGATORY

.
Admissions below.

N{l. ~

See the Answers to the Request for

.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

REQUEST EQR PRODUCTION ~ 2: Please produce any and all documents identified in
response to the above Interrogatories or used to derive the information for your answers to The
Barnes' First Set of Discovery Requests.

: ANSWER IO REQUEST mR PRODUCTION

~ ~

Please see the attached

Supplemental Information.

· · REQUEST m& PRODUCTION NQ.. l: Please produce copies of any and all documented
communications
that you have had with (either sent to or received from) the NRCS relating to
. .
. your System.
..

: ANSWER IO REQUEST

EQB.

PRODUCTION ~

l;,

Please see the attached

· s·upplemental Information that includes the emails between Defendant and NRCS Agent Nate
Matlack.

REQUEST
.
'

EQB.

PRODUCTION

~

~: Please produce any and all documents that you

have received from or sent to NRCS relating to your System.

· ANSWER IO REQUEST

fQR

PRODUCTION

NQ,, ~

Please see the attached the

documents.

· REQUEST EQR PRODUCTION NO.. B.: Please produce any and all documents you have
~vide~cing your contention that the Barnes are illegally storing water in a pond in the
.NW¼SW¼ of Section 14, Township 11 South, Range 37 East, Boise Meridian,

: ANS.WER IO REQUEST E.OR PRODUCTION ~ .t NIA; Defendant does not have any
.documents that are responsive to this Request.

· R8QUEST EQB. PRODUCTION llil 2: For each Request for Admission (below) to which
Y,OU

r~spo~d in any form other than an unequivocal admission, please produce any and all

:documents and/or electronic documents which support or relate to your 1·easons for pl'oviding a
CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC-DBPBNDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO THE BARNES' FIRST
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: ·deJtial or conditional admission, In responding to this Request for Production, please identify the
· Request for Admission for which you are producing each document or electronic document.

ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 9: Please sec the attached.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
: -REQUEST NQ.. 1: Please admit that Craig Bloxham is yo\lr predecessor-in-interest in
: owning what is now the Jackson Property.

· . RESPONSE IQ REQUEST N.0.1: Deny, Craig Bloxham ls not Defendant's immediate
predecessor-in-interest on his property, the Federal Bankn,ptcy Court is. Craig Bloxham owned
t~e properly at some point prior to Jackson's ownership of the property.

: ·REQUEST NQ.. 2,: Please admit that Craig Bloxham, your predecessor in interest. did not
: irrigate the Jackson Property with water from Spring Creek from 2004 until 2012.

· . RESPONSE IQ REQUEST

NQ.

2: Deny. See Answer to Response to Request for

Admission No. 1 above. Furthermore, Defendant personally witnessed flood irrigation on the
p~operty purchased by Jackson in 2011. The flood irrigation on Jackson's property was taking
place in the center portion of Jackson's property,

: · . REQUEST HQ. J.: Please admit that you did not use any water from Spring Creek to irrigate
· the Jackson Property until 2015.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO, 3: Deny. See Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 above.
. REQUEST ~ S,: Please admit that you represented to NRCS officials that your System
was to be used for stock water purposes only,

: · . RESPONSE m REQUEST NQ.. S,: Deny. Defendant told NRCS officials that he would use
·the system to also irrigate an orchard, See the email from Nate Matlack dated April 4, 2016,

REQUEST NQ. 2: Please admit that the concrete spring box tbat you installed was not an
'

.

.approved NRCS-designed structure.

: RESPONSE TO REQUEST

~

1:

Deny. The concrete structure met all design

'

·requirements required by NRCS. See the attached contract between the NRCS and Defendant for
·the specifications,

REQUEST NQ. 1.Q: Admit that the NRCS did not pay for or reimburse you ~or the 6 pipe
11

'

.

.you installed.
CASBNO; CV-2014-0003466-0C-DBPBNDANT'S SUPPLBMENTAL RESPONSE TO THB BARNES' PlRST
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RESPONSE IQ REQUEST

N.Q,. 10:

Deny. NRCS reimbursed Defendant for the pipe.

NRCS paid for pipe by footage. They allow a size of pipe other than 2" to be installed. They pay

.

.according .to a "by the foot" schedule that sets the price paid. The NRCS paid for the cost of a 211
pipe.
DATED this 9th day of September, 2016.

MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/-

PETER.wELLS
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VBRJFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County .o f ~

I, KJRK JACKSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is the Defendant in the above-entitled action; that he has read the foregoing
Defendants Response to the Barnes' First Set ofDiscovery Requests, knows the contents thereof,
-and.believes the same to be true and correct.

·s_UBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /' ( day of September, 2016.

['SEAL]

CASB NO. CV-2014-0003466-0C- DEPENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO THB BARNES' FIRST
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Subject: RE: water
From:

Matlack, Nate - NRCS, Pocatello, ID (Nate.Matlack@ld.usda.gov)

To:

sledh88@yahoo.com;

Date:

Monday, April 4, 2016 12:24 PM

Kirk,

As requested, here is a timeline of events from NRCS point of view:

Received application for our EQIP program in September 2013. Made several field visits at that time at met with Kirk to
determine goals and objectives. These were to provide stock water and cross fencing to his pastures so he could
implement a sustainable grazing system. It is also noted in our planning and implementation notes that he also planned on
putting in an orchard. However, NRCS doesn't have any recollection or documentation that the planned stock water
pipeline would ever be used to water the orchard. Kirk did however provide water rights documentation to NRCS that
included the water right #29-14032 for 0.84 cfs and 0.030 cfs of stock water.

We signed a contract on 6/27/14 for Kirk to install a structure for water control, pipeline (2" HDPE recommended) a
storage tank, solar pump, and frost free livestock watering troughs. The project was intensively surveyed, an easement
was obtained to cross LAK Land's field, and many discussions were made with Kirk on structural practices. While
completing the engineering design, it was discovered that Kirk put in his own structure without an approved NRCS
design. As a result, NRCS didn't cost share that structure however, it was adequate to provide the necessary stock water
to the system. Kirk also installed 6" PVC pipe from the structure to the tank. NRCS said that was fine, and that we could
only justifying paying the rate of the needed 2" HDPE. The system was designed to water a maximum of 55 cows @ 20
gal/hd/day totaling 1,100 gallons/day or 0.8 GPM. This is less than the legal water right of 13.46 GPM. Kirk installed a
below ground, concrete tank with a 959 gallon capacity and a solar pump sized at less than 0.2 hp. Kirk installed 2"
HDPE pipe from the storage tank to the two frost free troughs. Everything met specifications and was cost shared except
for the water control structure.

Please let me know if you have further questions, or want a copy of the "as built" engineering design.

Thanks, and I hope you get the situation resolved.

Nate Matlack
District Conservationist
Pocatello/Fort Hall
USDA NRCS
lSSl Baldy Ave., Suite 2
ebout:blenk
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I lln

Pocatello, ID. 83201
(208) 237-4628 X 125 office
(208) 821-5845 Cell

From: sled 88 [mailto:sledh88@yahoo.com]
Sent: Monday, April 04, 2016 8:55 AM

To: Matlack, Nate - NRCS, Pocatello, ID <Nate.Matlack@id.usda.gov>
Subject: water

thanks for your help on this nate

kirk Jackson

This electronic message contains information generated by the USDA solely for the intended recipients. Any
unauthorized interception of this message or the use or disclosure of the information it contains may violate the
law and subject the violator to civil or criminal penalties. If you believe you have received this message in error,
please notify the sender and delete the email immediately.

eoout:blenk
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STATE OF IDAHO
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

RECE \V ED

Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership

MAY 3 1 20\2

· Department ol Water.Resources
Eastern Renton .

1. List the numbers or all waler rights ancl/or ncljudicntion claim records lo be changed. lf you only ncqu1rc,rn porl1on or
the water right or adjudication elnim, check "}'es" in the "Split? " column.
- - -- .,---- - - ,- - - - - - . - Waler Right/C loirn No.
Water lli ght/Claim No,
Wnter Right/Clnim No.
Split?

- ---tr -=---+--:--------,-----'-'~ - - -~

Yes

0
0

Yes

D

Yes

2.

PrevioL1s Owner's Name:

3.

New Owner(s)/Clnimnnl(s):

Yes

D

Yes

0

0
Yes 0

Yes

C'
9 /J_ {_C?_,..i...-:c--=--=--'-'-~-- - - - - - - - - --__ J<{ \_ _f_(_J...__~ L~ -~..:.....J-- ~ ..::__~~~::;.\,-- -- - _ _ _ _ __ _

V q;. 1
Nnmc of current wuter I i~oidcrici~lmnnl

Nnmo orcnch new owner n~ li~tccl on tho convcyonce docuni.!11 !

New owner continued

0

N;;-111i co~cclor -[] ni~I

___._f_,_t1__,fi
C£-----'>--<'-----"'?---'
',('--J.t-

O nnct/01·

or

- - - -·- -·-·- - -

01

Muilil'~O'
;:__
lclr....!:
css:::.,,
· '1.--4---~f_f..(;J_
:.. _ _ _ _

£

o(

<g""/

;2L) <£

-~b~ - 3 5: r -<[JJY 5' I f. fl)_t-, si:;,~ @?~ho o
Telephone

Em nil

4. lf the woter rights n11cl/or adjudicotlon eloims were split, how did lhe division occur?
D The wRLer rights or claims were diviclecl as speeiCicolly iclenti fiecl in o c\eccl, contrnct, or other convcyMco document.
~ho water rights or claims were cllvicled proportionately bosecl on the portion of their plnce(s) of uso ocquired by the
now owner.

I

5. Dote you acquired the waler rights and/or claims lislecl nbovc:

2-

6. This form must be signed and submitted with the following REQUIRED items:
• A copy of the conveyance document - worranty deed, quitclaim deed, court decree, contract of sole, etc. The
conveyance document must include n !ego \ description of the property or dcsc1 iption of the water right(s) if no lone! is
conveyed.
o Pini map, survey mop or nerinl photogrnph which clenrly shows th1,; pince of use nnc\ point of diversion for each wolcr
righl nncl/or cloim Iisled above (if necessnry to clnrify divis ion of wnlcr rights or complex property desc ri ptions).
o Piling fee (sec instructions for further explnnntion):
o $25 per 1111divided waler right.
o $ I00 per spfil waler righl.
o No (ee is required fo1· pending ocljudicntion cloims.

_7/}j/ (_2-

'/. Signnlure:

Tille, irnppticnble

SignnLmc:
Siannture

For IDWR Offlc~ Us
Receiplecl by
Approv~d b•

or new ownerlctnimnill

/y:

""' I0
up

DoLo
_ _ _ . Proce,~ecl by
_

t 11le,

~f

Dntc

IDr4#

,r 11pptic11ble

Dnle

f 3 _.(.Q '.YJJ

/

••«•pt No
Dnle

.

Recoipl Am!.

$&OD .--

1:L_

."'IJPPORT D TA

rorm l\2-240/42 -1409(61 Rev 07/10
/

'N FILE

~.cffl-11>4 I q
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First American Title Company
2240 E. Center, Pocatello, Idaho 83201
(208)232-6224,(208)232-6257

Title Transmittal

May 11, 2012
File No. : 363991-P

Kirk L. Jackson
P.O. Box866
Pocatello, ID 83204

PROPERTY:

Bareground, Downey, ID 83234

ENCLOSED please find the following for your records:
•

Policy of Title Insurance - To Follow

•

Trustee's Deed

The new home or other real estate you have purchased is protected with a Policy of Title Insurance
issued by First American Title Company. We have assigned the above number to your records to assure
prompt processing of future title orders involving the property.
We appreciate the opportunity of serving you and will be glad to assist you in any way, remembering that

PROTECTION OF YOUR PROPERTY IS YOUR FIRST CONSIDERATION - AND OURS.
Sincerely,

Collette Scott
enc.
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TRUSTEE'S DEED

(A 3u'6"'-iti I
1_ _ _ _, 20 12,
This Trustee's Deed to real property is made on this ~ a y of _ ap;L___,._

by GARY L. RAIN SD ON, (hereafter "Trustee"), who is the authoriz.ed and acting Trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of CRAIG BLOXHAM, (hereafter "Debtor") as Gra11tor, and KIRK L.
* *a married man
JACKSON, as Purchaser, of certain real property located near Downey, Bannock CoW1ty, Idaho.

MAILING ADDRESS: P.O. BOX 866, POCATELLO, ID 83204
WHEREAS, Trustee filed with the Court a "Notice of Trustee's Motion to SeU Real
Property Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and For Authority to Pay Real Estate
Corrnnission" dated February 3, 2012, (hereafter "Notice of Sale"), together with a "Trustee's
Motion to Sell Real Property Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests" dated February 3, 2012,
(hereafter "Motion"), on the real property descnbed hereafter; served copies of said Motion and
Notice of Sale upon all parties-in-interest as required by law; there being no objections to said
Notice of Sale; the Court having entered its Order approving the sale on the terms and conditions
contained in the Notice of Sale dated April 25, 2012; and the sa~ having been made pursuam

lu

the tenns and conditions set forth in said Motion and Notice ofSale;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Trustee, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him under
the laws and statutes of the United States Code, and in consideration of the cash sum oflhiny-fiv1:
Thousand Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($35,300.00), and other valuable consideration to him
paid by the Purchaser, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby transfer, sell and
convey to Purchaser, in its "AS IS" condition and without warranty of any nature whatsoever, either
express or implied, free and clear of any and all liens or claim; of interest, aU of the right, title and
interest of the bankruptcy estate of Craig Bloxham, Debtors in BK Case No. 05-42930-JDP, m and
TRIBTEES DEED - Page 1
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TRUSTEE'S DEED

,,~day of_ f1rn,l}_
This Trustee's Deed to real property is rmde on this !!/II._
~_,..
______,. 2012,
by GARY L. RAIN SD ON, (hereafter ''frustee'1, who is the authorized and acting Trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of CRAIG BLOXHAM, (hereafter "Debtor'1 as Grantor, and IORK L.
* *a married man
JACKSON, as Purchaser, of certain real property located near Downey, BeMock County, Idaho.
MAILING ADDRESS: P,O, BOX 866, POCATELLO, ID 83204
WHEREAS, Trustee filed with the Court a "Notice of Trustee's Motion to Sell Real
Property Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests and For Authority to Pay Real Estate
Conunission" dated February 3, 2012, (hereafter "Notice of Sale"), together with a ''Trustee's
Motion to Sell Real Property Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests" dated February 3, 2012,
(hereafter "Motion'), on the real property descnbed hereafter; served copies of said Motion and
Notice of Sele upon all parties-in-interest as required by law; there being no objections to said
Notice of Sale; the Court having entered its Order approving the sale on the tem1S and conditions
contained in the Notice of Sale dated April 25, 2012; and the sale having been rmde pursuant to
the tenm and conditions set forth in said Motion and Notice of Sale;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Trustee, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him \Dlder
the laws and statutes of the United States Code, and in consideration of the cash sum of Thirty-Five
Thousand Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($35,300.00), and other valuable consideration to him
paid by the Purchaser, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby transfer, sell and
convey to Purchaser, in its "AS IS" condition and without warranty of any nature whatsoever, either
express or implied, free and clear of any and all liens or claims of interest, all of the right, title and
interest of the bankruptcy estate of Craig Bloxham, Debtors in BK Case No. 0S-42930-JDP, in and
TRl5TEE'S DF..llD • Page 1
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to that certain real property more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor, Gary L. Rainsdon, does hereto set his hand the
day and year first above written.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Twin Falls

)
: ss
)

4fr,/

,

On this ~ Y of
2012, before me, the undersigned Notary
Public, in and for said State and County, personally appeared Gary L. Rainsdon, known or
identified to me to be the Chapter 7 Trustee in the above-captioned bankruptcy matter, and the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same,
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this
Certificate first above written.

(SEAL)

Residin
Commission expires: _ _.:;._____.......,__.,____
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EXHIBIT A
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: Real property In the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, described as

follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND LOCATED IN SECTIONS 14, AND 23, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTH, RANGE,
37 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO, AND FURTHER DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 14, FROM WHICH THE NORTH
QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 22 BEARS SOUTH 89°54'13" EAST 2644.51 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 00°04'30" EAST 1396.96 FEET ALONG THE WEST LINE OF SAID
SECTION 14 TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, "A.A. HUDSON PLS 4735", SAT ON
A FENCE LINE; THENCE NORTH 38°00'17" EAST 103.33 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE
TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH 44°13'06" EAST 149,09 FEET ALONG
SAID FENCE LINE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH 32°53'09" EAST
129.53 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH
31°08'40" EAST 21.25 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP;
THENCE NORTH 14°13'40" EAST 28,52 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A 5/8"
REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH 01 °17'53" EAST 126.53 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE
LINE TO A FOUND PIPE; THENCE NORTH 65°37'22" EAST 1168.91 FEET ALONG AN
EXISTING FENCE LINE TO AN INTERSECTING FENCE LINE; THENCE SOUTH 00°34'30"
EAST 1157 .24 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED,
PLS 4735; THENCE SOUTH 07°27'39" WEST 189,66 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A
5/8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 4735; SOUTH 04°55'53" WEST 74,16 FEET
ALONG THE WESTERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE OF BURSH CREEK ROAD TO A 5/8"
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 4735; THENCE SOUTH 00°07'28" WEST 932,12 FEET
ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE TO A FOUND 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP
LABELED, PLS 9163 SET ON THE SOUTH LINE OF SAID SECTION 14; THENCE NORTH
89°39'52" WEST 990,50 FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH LINE TO A FOUND 5/8" REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163 SET ON THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THAT PARCEL OF
LAND OWNED BY DARWIN A. AND SHIRLY J. STEWART AS RECORDED UNDER
INSTRUMENT NUMBER 20616636 IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF BANNOCK COUNTY;
THENCE SOUTH 243.05 FEET ALONG THE WEST LINE OF SAID STEWART PARCEL TO A
FOUND 5/8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163 SET ON A FENCE LINE; THENCE
SOUTH 89°23'06" WEST 309.79 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE AND ITS EXTENSION
TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP (LS 9163); THENCE NORTH 00°04'07" WEST 243.05
FEET ALONG THE WEST LINE OF SAID SECTION 23 TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

In re:

)
)

CRAIG BLOXHAM,

)

Debtor.

)

Case No . 05-42930-JDP
(Chapter 7)

)

ORDER APPROVING SALE BY TRUSTEE AND PAYMENT OF REALTOR FEES

Hearing on the Trustee's Motion to Sell Real Property Free and Clear of Liens and O1her
Interests and for Authority to Pay Real Estate Commission {"Motion") came before lhe Cou n fo r
hearing on March 27, 2012. Gary L. Rainsdon ("Trustee") appeared by and through his counsel or
record, and no other party appeared in person or through counsel. The Court having heard argumcn ls
of counsel , no objection having been filed thereto, and good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sale of the estate's right, title, and interest in an d to lhe
real property consisting of approximately 62 acres of bare ground located near Downey, Idaho ("Rea I
Property") to Kirk Jackson for the cash sum of $35,300.00 is hereby approved. The sale is free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances and is made "AS IS" and ''WHERE IS" without warranty of any
nature .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that at closing the Closing Agent is hereby authori zed

hi pn)

to Town & Country Really, John Chidester, a commission of (6%) .

.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In re:

)
)

CRAIG BLOXHAM,

)

Debtor.

)
)

Cnse No. 05-42930-JDP
(Chapter 7)

ORDER APPROVING SALE BY TRUSTEE AND PAYMENT OF REALTOR FEES

Hearing on the Trustee's Motion to Sell Real Property Free and Clear of Liens nnd Other
Interests and For Authority

10

Pay Real Estate Commission (''Motion") came before the Court for

hearing on March 27, 2012. Gary L. Rainsdon ("Tnistee") appeared by and through his counsel of
record, and no other party appeared in person or through counsel. The Court having heard arguments
of counsel, no objection having been filed thereto, nnd good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sale of the estate's right, title, and interest in and to the
real property consisting of approximately 62 acres ofbare ground locnted near Downey, Idaho ("Real
Property") to Kirk Jackson for the cash sum of $35,300.00 is hereby approved. The sale is free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances and is made "AS IS" and "WHERE IS" without warranty of any
nature.
IT IS FURTH ER ORD BRED that at closing the Closing Agent is hereby authorized 10 pay
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Case 05-42930-JDP

Doc 83

Filea 04/25/12 Entered 04/25/12 15:57:02
Document
Page 2 of 2

Desc Main

Dated : April 25, 2012

Honorable Jim D. Pappas
United States Bankrnptcy Judge
Submitted by:
Brett R. Cahoon
Attorney for Gary L. Rainsdon, Trnstee

221 of 514

222 of 514

Exhibit G
to the
Affidavit of
Robert L. Harris

223 of 514

Watermaster
Handbook
Statute update through May 20 13

Id aho Department of Water Resources
322 Front Street, PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-9800
208.287.4800
www.idwr.idaho.gov
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Preface
Proper water distribution under Idaho water law and the appropriation system is the primary goal
and responsibility of all Idaho watermasters. Daily water di stribution, record keeping,
measurement and general water district management c·an be a challenge. While the difficulty
associated with these tasks depends upon the size and complexity of the individual water district,
most of the principles and concepts involved are common to all districts. The purpose of this
handbook therefore is to provide a quick reference when questions arise concerning water
districts, and to provide all watennasters with the basic information needed to deliver water and
manage a water district.
This handbook is divided into several sections involving different aspects of water delivery and
water district management. Each section, while not all inclusive, is intended to stand alone and
provide information when questions are raised concerning water districts and watermaster duties.
Further information and assistance may be obtained by contacting any one of the Idaho
Department of Water Resources offices listed on the following page.

Last updated 07/ I0/2013
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IRRIGATION SEASON OF USE,
CONSUMPTIVE IRRIGATION and
FIELD HEADGA TE REQUIREMENTS
SEASON OF USE
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Map 8. 1: Consumpt ive Irrigati on Requirement, Field Headgate Requ irement, and Season of Use.
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Appendix E
Supplemental
Information
for Voting in Water District Elections Under I.C. 42-605
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Water Conversion Factors
I cubic foot of water =

7.4805 gallons =

62.37 pounds

I CFS =

448.83 ga llons/minute =

26,930 gallons/hour

I CFS =

646,315 ga llons/day =

1.9835 AF/day

I CFS =

59.502 AF/month (30 days) =

723.94 AF/year

1 Acre-Foot =

enough water to cover I acre of land one foot deep

I Acre-Foot =

43,560 cubic feet =

325,850 ga llons

I cubic meter per second =

35.31 CFS =

15,850 ga llons/minute

l million gallons =

3.0689 AF

I million gallons per day =

1,120.147 AF per year

I Miner's Inch =

9GPM =

0.02 CFS

CFS = Cubic Feet per Second
AF = Acre Feet
GPM = Gallons per Minute
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9/30/2016

Water Right Report

I Close I
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Water Right Report
9/30/2016

WATER RIGHT NO . 29-14032

Owner Type

Name and Address

Current Owner KlRK JACKSON
PO BOX 866
POCATELLO, ID 83204
(208)351-8381
Original Owner CRAIG V BLOXHAM
20862 S CAMBRIDGE RD
PO BOX 227
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)897-5666
Original Owner VERN C BLOXHAM
494 N MAfN
PO BOX 227
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)897-5666
Priority Date : 05/ 19/1920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active

Source

!Tributary

UNNAMED STREAM SINKS

Beneficial Use From To Diversion Rate Volume

IRRIGATION 04/01 10/31 0.84 CFS
STOCK WATER 01/01 12/31 0.03 CFS
Total Diversion
0.84 CFS

Location of Point(s) of Diversion:

UNNAMED STREAM ISWSENWISec. I41Township 1lSIRange 37EIBANNOCK County
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/RightReportAJ .asp?BasinNumber=29&SequenceNumber=14032&SplitSuffix= %20%20&TypeWaterRight=True
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1/3

9/30/2016

Water Right Report

IRRIGATION Use:
Acre Limit: 41.9

Place(s) of use:
Place of Use Legal Description: IRRIGATION BANNOCK County

Township Range Section Lot Tract Acres Lot Tract Acres Lot Tract Acres Lot Tract Acres

II S

37E

14
23

NWSW 9.7
NWNW 1.5

SWSW 38

Place of Use Legal Description :STOCKWATER same as IRRIGATION

Total Acres: 49.2

Conditions of Approval:

l. BO I SOURCE IS ALSO KNOWN AS SPRING CREEK.
This partial decree is subject to such general provisions necessary for the definition of the rights or for
2. C 18 the efficient administration of the water rights as may be ultimately determined by the Court at a point in
time no later than the entry of a final unified decree . Section 42-1412(6), Idaho Code.
3 ESS USE OF THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 IS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATION OF A
.
COMBINED TOTAL OF 49.2 ACRES IN A SINGLE IRRIGATION SEASON.
THE QUANTITY OF WATER UNDER RIGHTS 29-14031 AND 29-14032 WHEN COMBINED FOR
4. NOS STOCK WATER USE SHALL NOT EXCEED 13,000 GALLONS PER DAY AND A DIVERSION
RATE OF 0.03 CFS.
5 ES I USE OF THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 JS LIMITED TO A TOTAL COMBINED
DIVERSION RATE OF 0.99 CFS.
.
6 EG 2 THIS RIGHT WHEN COMBINED WITH RIGHT NO . 29-14030 AND 29-14032 SHALL PROVIDE
.
NO MORE THAN .02 CFS PER ACRE.
7 KOG THIS RIGHT JS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATfON OF 41.9 ACRES WITHIN THE PLACE OF USE
.
DESCRIBED ABOVE IN A SINGLE IRRIGATION SEASON.
8 NOS THE QUANTITY OF WATER DEC REED FOR THIS WATER RIGHT FOR STOCK WATER USE IS
.
NOT A DETERMINATION OF HISTORICAL BENEFICIAL USE.

Dates:
Licensed Date:
Decreed Date: 03/22/2004
Enlargement Use Priority Date:
Enlargement Statute Priority Date:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Accepted:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Removed :
Application Received Date:
Protest Deadline Date:
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/R ightR eportAJ .asp?Basi nN umber= 29&SequenceN umber= 14032&Spl itSuffi x= %20%20&TypeWaterRight= True
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9/30/2016

Water Right Report

Number of Protests: 0

Other Information:
State or Federa l: S
Owner Name Connector:
Water District Number:
Generic Max Rate per Acre: 0.02
Generic Max Volume per Acre : 3.5
Civi l Case Number:
Old Case Number:
Decree Plantiff:
Decree Defendant:
Swan Falls Trust or Nontrust:
Swan Fal ls Dismissed:
OLE Act Number:
Cary Act Number:
tl°n Plan: False

r·fg
0

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearchlRightReportAJ .asp?BasinNumber=29&SequenceNumber=14032&SplitSuffix=%20%20&TypeWaterRight=True

232 of 514

3.'3

Exhibit I
to the
Affidavit of
Robert L. Harris

233 of 514

9/30/2016

Water Right Report

I Close I
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Water Right Report
9/30/2016

WATER RJGHTNO . 29-14115

Owner Type

Name and Address

Current Owner CHAD BARN ES
22284 N MAIN
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)317-8546
Current Owner R JAN E BARNES
22284 N MAIN EX TEN Sf ON
DOWNEY, ID 83234
Priority Date: 05/ l 9/ l 920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active

Source

ITributarv

UNNAMED STREAM SINKS

Beneficial Use From To Diversion Rate Volume

IRRIGATION 04/01 10/31 1.24 CFS
STOCKWATER 01/01 12/31 0.02 CFS
1.24 CFS
Total Diversion

Location of Point(s) of Diversion:

UNNAM ED STREAMISWSENWISec. 141Township 1lSIRange 37EIBANNOCK County

IRRIGATION Use:
Acre Limit: 62.27

Place(s) of use:
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/RightReportAJ .asp?Basi nN umber= 29&SequenceN umber= 14115&Spl itSuffi x= %20%20&TypeWaterR ight= True
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Water Right Report

9/30/2016

Place of Use Legal Description: IRRIGATION BANNOCK County

To·wnship Range Section Lot Tract Acres Lot Tract Acres Lot Tract Acres Lot Tract Acres

JJS

37£

15
22

NESE l.l
NENE 24

SWSE 2.8
NWNE 5.3

SESE40

Place of Use Legal Description:STOCKWATER same as IRRIGATION

Total Acres: 73.2

Conditions of Approval:

I. X 27 !h_is ri_ght is limited to the irrigation of 62 .27 acres within the authorized place of use in a single
ll'rtgat1on season.
Use of water under this right will be regulated by a watermaster with responsibility for the distribution of
2. ROS water among appropriators within a water district. At the time of this approval this water right is within
State Water District No. 29H.
R
3 01 When notified by the Department, the right holder shall install and maintain a measuring device of a type
·
acceptable to the Department as part of the diverting works.
X
4 35 Rights 29-14114 and 29-14 11 5 when combined shall not exceed a total cl iversion rate of 1.4 7 cfs and the
·
irrigat ion of 73 .2 acres.
5 NOS The quantity of water under rights 29-14031, 29-14115 and 29-14032 when combined for stock water use
·
shall not exceed 13,000 gallons per day.
6 R63 This right when combined with all other rights shall provide no more than 0.02 cfs per acr nor more
·
than 3.5 afa per acre at the field headgate for irrigation of the place of use .
7 _N0 8 The qu~ntity of water decreed for this water right for stockwater use is not a determination of historical
benefic ial use.
8. BO 1 Source is alJo known as Spring Creek.
Pursuant to Section 42- 1412(6) , Idaho Code, this water right is subject to such general provisions
T
necessary
for the definition of the rights or for the efficient administration of water rights as may be
9 19
·
determined by the Snake River Basin Adjudication court at a point in time no later than the entry of the
final unified decree .

Dates:
Licensed Date:
Decreed Date: 03/22/2004
Enlargement Use Priority Date:
Enlargement Statute Priority Date:
Water Supply Bank Enrollment Date Accepted :
Water Supply Bank Enro ll ment Date Removed:
Application Received Date:
Protest Deadline Date:
Number of Protests: 0

Other Information :
State or Federa l: S
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExlSearchlRightReportAJ.asp?BasinN umber= 29&SequenceN umber= 1411 S&SplitSuffix= %20%20&TypeWaterRight=True
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9/30/2016

Water Right Report

Owner Name Connector: And
Water District Number:
Generic Max Rate per Acre : 0.02
Generic Max Volume per Acre: 3.5
Combined Acres Limit: 73 .2
Combined Volume Limit:
Combined Rate Limit: 1.47
Civi l Case Number:
Old Case Number:
Decree Plantiff:
Decree Defendant:
Swan Fal ls Trust or Nontrust:
Swan Falls Dismissed:
OLE Act Number:
Cary Act Number:
IM.t' getl°'1 Plan: False

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/R ightReportAJ .asp?BasinNum ber= 29&SequenceN umber= 1411 S&SplitSuffix= %20%20&TypeWaterRight= True
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208-523-8518

'I o-b5~' 18 17: 58 FROM-

Robe1t L. Ha1Tis, Esq. (ISB #7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (ISB #9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
I 00_0 Riverwalk Dr., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 523-0620
Facsimile:
(208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

FILED
BANNOCK COUNTY

CLERK OF TH E COURT

2016 OCT BY - --v--- - - -

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendm1ts,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS DISCLOSURE

v.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Connterclaimant.

Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (the "Bames"), by and through their cotlllsel of record
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., as required by the Court's Second Order Setting Court

Trial (filed April 11, 2016), hereby discloses the following fact and expe1t witnesses for the
above-entitled trial scheduled for Febmary 22, 2017:
I.

Chad Barnes (fact witness), Plaintiff/Counterdefendant;

2.

Jane Barnes (fact witness), Plaintiff/Counterdefendant;

3.

Craig Bloxham (fact witness);

4.

Roy Henderson (fact witness); and

PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS DISCLOSURE

Pagel
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208-523-9518

T--726 P0003/0004 F-084

Any and all individuals listed in Kirk Jackson·s discovery re~:ponses or witness

disclosures.
The Barnes do not have any expert witnesses to disclose at this time. However, the Barnes
reserve the right to list other fact and/or expert witnesses once discove1y is completed
and/or in rebuttal to any disclosures by Kirk Jackson.

Dated th.is .£,day of October, 2016.

1~t-.~

Robe1t L. Harris, Esq.

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L,C.

PLAIN'fIFFS' WITNESS DISCLOSURE
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208-523-95']8
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T--726 P0004/0004 F-084

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~ day of October, 2016, I served a trne and correct copy of

the document listed below on the persons listed below by the method indicated.
Docmnents Served: Pltlilltif.fs' Witness Disclosure
Person(s) Served:
Peter M. Wells
MAY, RA.MM8LL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

Post Otlice Box 370
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-03 70
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Email: pete@mrtlaw.net

Method of Service:

( )
( )

..-

(·--f
( )
( )

First Class Mail
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Mail
FedEx

Robe1t L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

G:\WPDATA \RU-1\17992 Barnes, Chad\Pleadings\Plaintin's Witness Disclosure.docx

PLAINTIFFS' WITNESS DISCLOSURE
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Peter M . Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
216 W. Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant

COMES NOW Defendant Kirk Jackson, by and through his attorney of record Peter M.
Wells, of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered, and hereby objects to Plaintiffs

Motion For Summary Judgment. This Objection is supported by the Affidavit of Peter M Wells,
the Affidavit ofKirk Jackson, and Memorandum ofLaw filed contemporaneously herewith and
incorporated herein by this reference.
Dated this 19th day of October, 2016.

./pETER M. WELLS

May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
CASE NO . CV-2014-3466-OC OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAG E l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Kirk Jackson was served on
the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

-H:li] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile 208-523-9518
[x] Hand Delivery

DATED this 17th day of October, 2016.

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PAGE 2
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FILED
BANNOCK COUNTY

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
216 W. Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724

CLERK OF THE COURT

2016 OCT I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KIRK JACKSON,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant

COMES NOW Defendant Kirk Jackson, by and through his counsel of record, May,
Rammell, and Thompson Chartered, and submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
This case turns on the murky interrelationship of water rights, property transfers, and
bankruptcy law. It is a first of its kind, as far as counsel can find, and presents novel issues that

CV-2014-3466-OC: Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment Page 1
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tie together the forfeiture of water rights under l.C. § 42-222 and the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
362. It is very easy to get lost in the facts of this case due to the many moving pieces involved.
There is a dispute of material fact related to the ownership of property, water rights, and
dates of use of water rights. Consequently, this matter is not ripe for dismissal on summary
judgment, and must proceed to trial so this court can weigh the conflicting factual accounts and
determine whether Plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant forfeited
his water right, and whether Plaintiff can prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant
is not entitled to one of the defenses to forfeiture. There is also a dispute of fact related to
forfeiture of the Plaintiff's water right as there is conflicting testimony related to what portions of
Plaintiff's property was irrigated.

FACTS
There are principally four (4) important parties to this case. Craig Bloxham and Eagle
Eyes, Ltd. 1, hereinafter Bloxham, Chad and Jane Barnes, hereinafter Barnes, Kirk Jackson,
hereinafter Jackson, and the Bankruptcy Trustee, hereinafter Trustee.
There are two (2) pieces of property that are crucial to an understanding of the case. The
properties sit side by side and share a boundary between them on the West and East side of the
properties. Attached to the Affidavit of Peter M. Wells as Exhibit l, is map generated by the
Idaho Department of Water Resources which shows the layout of these properties. The two (2)
properties are outlined in pink with the blue line running from top to bottom dividing the two
properties along the section line. These properties were originally owned during the relevant
portions of this case by Bloxham and Eagle Eyes, Ltd. Barnes now owns the West property and
Jackson now owns the East property. Aff. Kirk Jackson, 2.

It is unknown for sure at this· point what the true interrelationship between Craig Bloxham and Eagle Eyes,
Ltd. , is but it is assumed that Eagle Eyes Ltd., is a family corporation for the Bloxham family. As discovery
is ongoing, it is anticipated that this information will be presented at trial.

1

CV-2014-3466-OC: Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment Page 2
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Craig Bloxham is the son of Vern Bloxham. AjJ. Craig Bloxham

,r 3. Craig Bloxham

received his ownership interest in the property at issue "via deed from Robert L. Wilding and
Louise Wilding dated February 19, 1992, to Vern C. Bloxham and Delores K. Bloxham, husband
and wife, and Craig V. Bloxham and Carol M. Bloxham, husband and wife. The deed is recorded
February 21, 1992 as instrument number 92002511 and a quit claim deed from Wilding Ranches,
Inc. to Vern C. Bloxham ahd Delores K. Bloxham, husband and wife, and Craig V. Bloxham and
Carol M. Bloxham, husband and wife, dated January 14, 1992. The deed is recorded January 15,
1992, as instrument number 9200650; and a Corporation Deed from Wilding Ranches, Inc., to
Vern C. Bloxham and Delores K. Bloxham, husband and wife, and Craig V. Bloxham and Carol
M. Bloxham, husband and wife, dated June 13, 1990, and recorded Jurie 15, 1990, as instrument
number 90007690. Vern C. Bloxham and Delores K. Bloxham transferred their interest in the
property to Eagle Eyes, Ltd. by virtue by a corrected warranty deed recorded November 25, 2003
as instrument number 20331543." Affidavit of Peter M. Wells, Ex. 2., Craig Bloxham Bankruptcy,
Doc. 36,

,r 3. Because Craig Bloxham never deeded his interest in the property to the Trust or

Eagles Eyes, Ltd., he had an ownership interest in the property when Water Right No. 29-10420
was entered by the SRBA Water Court through a partial decree. Id.
The SRBA Water Court issued a Partial Decree for Water Right 29-10420 on March 22,
2004. Affidavit ofPeter M. Wells, Ex. 3, Partial Decree Water Right No. 29-10420. Water Right
No. 29-10420 is diverted from a source known locally as Spring Creek. A.ff Craig Bloxham,

,r 4 .

Water Right No. 29-10420 was decreed to irrigate the property owned by Craig Bloxham and
Eagle Eyes Ltd., as outlined in Exhibit 1, attached to the Affidavit of Peter M. Wells. Bloxham
claimed he never irrigated the property in Section 14 (Jackson's property), but did irrigate fully
the property in section 15 and 22. A.ff Craig Bloxham, ,r 16, 20. "There is typically not enough
water to supply all of the water rights on the system." Aff. Craig Bloxham, ,r 19. Water Right No.

CV~2014-3466-OC: Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment Page 3
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29-10420 was the only water right authorized to divert from Spring Creek for i1Tigation. 2
Affidavit of Peter M Wells, Exibit 6, Proof Report from IDWR.

On October 12, 2005, Craig Bloxham filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. Exhibit B, attached
to the Affidavit of Robert L. Harris. When Craig Bloxham filed bankruptcy, any interest he had

in real property became part of his bankruptcy estate. On April 26, 2012, Jackson purchased the
property he now owns from the bankruptcy trustee. Aff. Peter M. Wells, Ex. 4; Trustees Deed to
Kirk Jackson. After purchasing his property from the Bankruptcy Trustee, Jackson was told by

Vern Bloxham that Jackson would not be allowed to take Jackson's water across Vern Bloxham's
property to deliver the irrigation water to Jackson's property. A.ff Kirk Jackson,

11 4-5.See also,

Aff. Peter M Wells, Ex. 5, Excerpts Depa. Kirk Jackson, p. 99-102. Jackson therefore purchased

an easement from a different neighbor for $2,000 that would allow Jackson to take his water to
his property without crossing Vern Bloxham's property. Aff. Kirk Jackson

1 7.

On May 31, 2012, a Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership was filed with IDWR.
Exhibit F, attached to the .Affidavit of Robert L. Harris. Water Right number 29-10420 was split

into two Water Rights, 29-14031 and 29-14032. Jackson obtained 29-14032. Bloxham retained
29-14031. These were the only two water rights then existing that used Spring Creek. Affidavit of
Peter M. Wells, Exibit 6, Proof Report from IDWR.

Jackson's intent when he purchased the property was to build a place to live, and put in a
twenty (20) acre orchard. Aff. Kirk Jackson ,I 8. In May or June of 2012, Kirk Jackson planted
over a hundred fruit trees on his property. Alf. Kirk Jackson 8. After purchasing the easement
from a neighbor, he began to dig a pipeline for his irrigation system. He designed and had built a
diversion structure that would allow him to take 40% of the water from Spring Creek to satisfy

There may be one other water right that diverts from Spring Creek for stock water purposes, but for
irrigation purposes, 29-10420 was the only right decreed for Spring Creek.

2

CV-2014-3466-OC: Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
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his right. The 40% he would take, would not be the full amount his water right would authorize
him to take. Id.
W11ile his system was being installed, Jackson began to use the water from Spring Creek
to the best of his ability. From July to September 2012, Jackson hauled water to his trees from
Spring Creek with a 500 gallon water truck. A.ff. Peter M. Wells, Exhibit 7, Depa. Kirk Jackson,

p. 53-61. Then in beginning in April of2013 and continuing through July of 2013, Kirk Jackson
pumped water from Spring Creek to his property to irrigate ten ( 10) acres of wheat he planted
there. Id. Jackson rented a pump to irrigate the wheat, and continued to water the trees. Id. Then
in the Fall of 2014, Jackson used his water from Spring Creek to irrigate his ground as part of his
fall planting. Id. In 2015 and 2016, Jackson's use of his water right was curtailed as a result of
Craig Bloxham destroying Jackson's headgate. Id. Craig Bloxham would ultimately plead guilty
in Bannock County Case, CR-2015-14311-MD, to a violation ofl.C. 18-4306, Water/Injuries to
Ditches, Canals and Appertuants,a misdemeanor. Craig Bloxham was ordered to pay restitution
in the amount $3,534.14 fo_r his destruction of Jackson 's headgate. A.ff. Peter M Wells, Ex. 8.
After Jackson purchased the his property from the bankruptcy trustee, he spent 4-5 days
per week at his property. A.ff. Kirk Jackson, ~ 29. During this time he observed the property that
was retained by Bloxham. Id. He noticed that the only irrigation taking place on the Bloxham
property was a wheel line at the southernmost part of the field. Id. The wheel line was turned on,
but was only moved occasionally. Id. He noticed that the property in 2012 and 2013 was
actually farmed by Dow Barker, a dry farmer that Jackson was friends with. Id. at 30. Jackson
did not see any sign of someone actively attempting to irrigate the Bloxham property until 2014
when he was approached by Barnes related to Jackson's use Spring Creek. Id. at 31.
Wllen Barnes purchased his property from Vern Bloxham he applied to change the
ownership of Water Right 29-14031. A.ff. Peter M. Wells, Ex. 9; Ex. 11. The Idaho Department of

CV-2014-3466-OC : Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's
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Water Resources split Water Right 29-14031 and created 29-14115, which became Barnes' water
right. Id. Thus Jackson's Water Right today is 29-14032, Bames's Water Right is 29-14115, and
Bloxham 's Water Right is 29-14031. All of these water rights came from the parent right,
29-10420.Aff. Peter M Wells, Ex.JO. The amount of water authorized to irrigate under the three
existing rights, equals the same amount of water that the original parent right authorized to be
diverted from Spring Creek in the Partial Decree.
Barnes now claims that Jackson forfeited any right to his water due to a failure of
Jackson's predecessor in interest to use the water right. This allegation is meritless as it
misconstrnes the existing water rights at the relevant time frames, and disregards the automatic
stay provisions of 11 USC 362. Barnes' demand for summary judgment must be denied. The
remainder of this memorandum will lay out the standards to be employed by the Court, and the
reasons that Barnes' Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
It is undisputed that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for a Motion for
Summary Judgment, and that Summary Judgment must be rendered forthwith if the Pleadings,
Depositions, and Admissions on File, together with the Affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to Judgment as a matter
of Law. I.R. C.P 56(c). Upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, all disputed facts are liberally
constrned in favor of the non-moving party. McCoy vs Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769 (1991). The
burden of proving the absence of material fact rests at all times upon the moving party, and this
burden is an onerous one because even "circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of
material fact." Id. "Nevertheless, where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court
rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
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possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the
conflict between those inferences." Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 517(1982).
Idaho Code section 42-222 requires that failure to use water rights for a tenn of five (5)
years shall cause those water rights to be forfeited. However," ... abandonments and forfeitures
are not favored." Zezi v Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 713 (1937). "The party asserting that a water
right has been forfeited by nonuse for a period of five (5) years has the burden of proving the
forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence." Sagewillow, Inc. vs Idaho Dep i of Water Res., 13 8
Idaho 831, 842 (2003). "Although the owner of the water right h~s the burden of raising defenses
to statutory forfeiture, the burden of persuasion remains on the party claiming that the water was
forfeited, and that party must disprove the defense." Id. "Clear and convincing evidence is
generally understood to be 'evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain."' In re Delivery Call ofA&B Irrigation Dist., 153 Idaho 500,516,284 P.3d
225,241 (2012).
There are a number of defenses to statutory forfeiture. Some of those defenses are
identified in Idaho Code section 42-223. However, "the Legislature does not intend through
enactment of this section to diminish or impair any statutory or common law exception or
defense to forfeiture existing on the date of enactment or amendment of this section or to
preclude judicial or administrative recognition of other exceptions or defenses to forfeiture
recognized in Idaho case law or other provisions of the Idaho Code." I.C. § 42-223 Therefore,
there may be other exceptions to forfeiture not identified specifically in Idaho Code Section
42-223.
Idaho Code Section 42-223(6) states, "No portion of any water rights shall be lost or
forfeited for non use if the nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner
has no control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of water shall be
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determined on a case by case basis." In at least one case, it has been held that interference with
the administration of the diversion of th_e water right by third pa1iies will not be a situation that
leads to forfeiture. See Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82 ( 1999) (several

factors outside of ASCC's control, such as the destruction of the ditch connecting the Peiper land
to the headgate, the neighbor's unwillingness to allow reconstruction of the ditch, and the
Peipers' individual decision not to use ASCC water).
Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831 (2003) is the seminal case
regarding forfeiture. Pursuant to this case, the resumption of the use doctrine prevents statutory
forfeiture if the use of the water is resumed prior to a claim of right by a third party. Sagewillow,

Inc., 138 Idaho at 830. "A third party has made a claim to the water if the third party has either
instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or has obtained a valid water right authorizing the
use of such water with a priority date prior to the resumption of use, or has used the water
pursuant to an existing water right." Id. In the case at bar, Kirk Jackson's water right was never
forfeited because all of the available water assigned to the water right was used on the property
and any nonuse of water on Jackson's property was the result of lack of water; fmthermore, the
statutory period of non-use was tolled during the time the real property was part of the
bankruptcy estate.
AIJ of the available water was used by Jackson's predecessors in interest.

First and foremost, it is important to remember that until 2012 Water Right 29-14032 did
not exist. Up until May 2012, when Jackson applied for a change of ownership, the only water
right authorized to irrigate Jackson's property and Barnes' property was 29-10420. In 2004,
when the Partial Decree was entered, Water Right 29-10420 was actually owned by Craig
Bloxham and Eagle Eyes Ltd., as a result of the ownership of the property at that time 29-10420
was the only right decreed to irrigate from Spring Creek. The place of use for that water right
was the property that Barnes now owns and the property that Jackson now owns. Both parcels
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were owned by Bloxham and Eagle Eyes , Ltd. There was a dispute as to who actually owned the
prope1ty that Jackson would eventually purchase from the bankruptcy trustee until 4/12/2012
when Eagle Eyes, Ltd., and the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee entered into an agreement related
to who would retain what portions of the property. 3 Aff. Peter M Wells, Ex. 11, Doc. 76.
According to Craig V. Bloxham, "There is typically not enough water to supply all of the
water rights on the system." Aff Craig v. Bloxham, ~19. Bloxham and his family were using the
water, to irrigate a portion of the property that would later become Barnes' property. Id. at 20.

Aff. Kirk Jackson~ 29-30. This is not because of an intent to abandon the water on the property
that would one day become Jackson's property, as Bloxham makes no mention of that intent. He
never filed any abandonment paperwork with IDWR. It would be illogical to believe that he
· would file the claim for the water and then simply abandon it within a year of it being decreed.
Instead, the logical inference that must be drawn is that he did like most farmers do when they
don't hav_e the full water allotment decreed, he used the available water in the location at the time
where he thought he could get the best use. This is the same thing that Barnes has been doing
since he bought the property. Since purchasing the property, Barnes has not watered his full
allotment of ground. Aff. Kirk Jackson,

~

34-35. There is simply not enough water to fully

irrigate any one right.

It would be impossible for Bloxham or anyone else to create more water to use on the
portion of Bloxham 's property that would one day belong to Jackson. The amount of water that a
stream produces is beyond the control of the water user. Therefore, failure to use the water on
Jackson's property up and until 2012, was outside the control of Jackson or Bloxham. Jackson's

Apparently, Bloxham did not disclose his interest in the property when he filed for bankruptcy. He thought
he had transferred any interest he had in the property when the property was transferred to Eagle Eyes,
Ltd. This may have even been his intent. Eagle Eyes, Ltd., and the Bankruptcy Trustee did not sort out the
ownership of the property until the Stipulation was reached in April 2012. This fact is apparent in Bloxham's
affidavit where he states he owned the property until 2012. Aff. Craig Bloxham ,r 16.

3
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predecessor in interest was using all of the available water until 2012 when Jackson acquired
Water Right 29-14032.
Once Jackson received water right 29-14032 he began working to put it to beneficial use.
A.ff Kirk Jackson. He started by planting an orchard, and crops. Aff. Kirk Jackson,

~

8. He was

denied access to the historical diversion and mode of delivery by Vern Bloxham. Aff. Kirk
Jackson, 14-5. Rather than go to war with his neighbors, and pursue legal action against them to
enforce his rights, he chose to purchase an easement from a different neighbor and begin
construction of his own water system. Aff. Kirk Jackson, ,r6-7. He put out a significant amount of
time and money to attempt to get his system up and running. Aff. Kirk Jackson,

17.Within two

(2) years of purchasing the property, he began diverting 40% of the stream to which he was
entitled. A.ff. Kirk Jackson, ,r27. Then Bloxham destroyed his diversion system. Aff. Kirk
Jackson, 136. The criminal destruction of his water system by Bloxham is an act that is beyond
his control, and his inability to use his water for the last few years can not be considered
forfeiture as a result of the criminal acts of a third party. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment must be denied.

BANKRUPTCY AUTOMATIC STAY TOLLS STATUTORY FIVE YEAR NON
USE. NO FORFEITURE COULD BE DECREED SO LONG AS PROPERTY WAS PART
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE.
The court may also consider the effect of the bankruptcy stay on the statutory timeframe
related to forfeiture. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay immediately
arises. 11 U.S.C. §362(a). 11 USC§ 362(3) prevents any entity from" .. . any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over
property of the estate." 11 USC 362(c)(l) provides that property continues to be protected by the
stay so long as the property remains in the bankruptcy estate. See Gardner v United States, 913
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F.2d 1515, 1518 (10th Cir. 1990). "[The stay] is designed to effect an immediate freeze of the
status quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition actions, judicial or nonjudicial, in
nonbankruptcy fora against ... or affecting the property of the estate." Hillis Motors v. Haw.

Auto. Dealers' Ass'n (In re Hillis Motors), 997 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1993). "Accordingly,
section 362 is extremely broad in scope and should apply to almost any type of fo1mal or
info1mal action against ... the property of the estate." Delpit v Commissioner, 18 F.3d 768, 771
(9th Cir. 1994).
In this case, Water Right 29-10420 decreed on lyiarch 17, 2004, was owned by Craig
Bloxham and Eagle Eyes Ltd. in undivided shares. Affidavit ofPeter M. Wells, Ex. 2., Craig

Bloxham Bankruptcy, Doc. 36, , 2. Craig Bloxham filed for Bankruptcy on October 12, 2005. Id.
at

,1. When Bloxham filed for bankruptcy, the water rights and real property should have been

included in the bankruptcy estate. No action could be brought against the property that would
affect the property so long as the property was in the bankruptcy estate. 11 USC 362(a). Any
action related to a forfeiture or the running of the forfeiture time while the property was in the
bankruptcy estate would affect the status quo of the property. Therefore, the five (5) year period
of nonuse referenced in Idaho Code section 42-222 must be tolled during the period of time the
property is in the bankruptcy estate. If it were otherwise, the status quo of the property would be
affected and the purpose of the automatic stay would be thwarted.
The Partial Decree was entered for Water Right 29-10420 on March 22, 2004. Aff Peter

M. Wells, Ex. 3. Bloxham's bankruptcy estate was created on October 12, 2005. The period of
nonuse on Jackson 's property was 569 days prior to the bankruptcy being entered. The property
in question was not removed from the bankruptcy estate until April 2012 when Jackson
purchased the property. Jackson resumed use of the water on bis property in 2013 when be leased
a pump and irrigated his property. Alf Kirk Jackson, 25. There was not enough water in Spring
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Creek for him to take his full allotment, but he did take 40% of the stream.Id. By beginning to
irrigate in 2013, Jackson began reusing the available water before the five (5) year timeframe of
LC. 42-222 expired.
Plaintiff may argue that Jackson stopped irrigating in 2015. However this argument is
also without merit as the reason for Jackson's hiatus in using his water right is the result of the
criminal acts of Craig Bloxham in destroying Jackson's head gate. AjJ. Kirk Jackson, 37.
Bloxham's destruction of Jackson's water system can not be used against Jackson as a reason
justifying forfeiture. A third party's criminal acts are certainly a circumstance outside the control
of the water user and should fit squarely inside the defense of l.C. 42-223(6).
Plaintiff has forfeited a portion of their water right.

Summary Judgment is not appropriate related to Defendant's Counterclaim that
Plaintiff's water right has been forfeited for a period of nonuse from 2011-2016. There is a
clearly a dispute of fact, as pointed out in Plaintiff's Amended Memorandum related to this issue.
Plaintiff claims that his predecessor in interest will testify that Bloxham used the "water rights in
full," to actively irrigate the Barnes' property. See Amended Memorandum, p.16. However, this
statement is not accurate.
Bloxham actually testified that, "We actively irrigated the property that Chad and Jane
Barnes own up until the time my family sold it to them." Aff. Craig Bloxham,

~

20. This is

completely different than saying that they used the water right in full. In fact, Bloxham states that
there is not enough water in Spring Creek "typically ... to supply all of the water rights on the
system." Id. at 19. If there is not enough water in the system to satisfy all of the water rights on
the system, then how could they have been using the water rights in full after 2012 when Jackson
began irrigating?
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Jackson testified that from 2011 to 2015 he personally witnessed the irrigation practices
on the property that would come to belong to Barnes. "After I purchased my property from the
bankruptcy trustee, I spent 4-5 days per week at the property. During this time I observed the
prope1ty that was retained by Bloxham. I noticed that the only irrigation taking place on the
Bloxham property was a wheel line at the southernmost part of the field. The wheel line was
turned on, but was only moved occasionally." Aff. Kirk Jackson, ~j 29. "I observed that the
property retained by Bloxham in 2012 and 2013 was actually fanned by Dow Barker, a dry
farmer that I was friends with." Id. at 30. "I did not see any sign of any person actively
attempting to irrigate the Bloxham property until 2014 when I was approached by Barnes related
to my use of Spring Creek." Id. at 31. "In fact, the only portion of the now Barnes' property that
was irrigated was the southernly portion of the property." Id. at 32. "In 2012 and 2013, the most
they irrigated on the now Barnes' property was 4-5 acres." Id. at 33. "In 2014, 2015, and 2016
the most they could have irrigated was 25-30 acres." Id. at 34. "In 2016, Barnes did not even tum
on his irrigation until July of 2016." Id. 35. Thus there is a genuine issue of material fact related
to the time frames that the property was irrigated and the amounts that were irrigated. Summary
Judgment is therefore not appropriate on these claims. Further, because summary judgment is not
appropriate, attorney's fees are likewise not appropriate for consideration at this juncture.

Conclusion
Barnes has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Jackson forfeited
his water right. Barnes has to prove that Jackson did not apply his water right to a beneficial use
for a period of five (5) year. l.C. 42-222. Barnes also has to disprove Jackson's defenses to
forfeiture. Barnes can not meet these burdens.
The only water right that existed from 2004 to 2012 was 29-10420. That right was owned
by Craig Bloxham and Eagle Eyes, Ltd. The water could be used on the property that would be
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owned by Barnes and the property that would be owned by Jackson. There was not enough water
to irrigate both parcels, so Bloxham chose to inigate the parcel that would one day belong to
Bames. Bloxham was using the full stream of water from Spring Creek to water Barnes' future
property. Bloxham can not create water out of thin air. The lack of water to fulfill the allocation
to 29-10420 is a circumstance that was beyond the control of Bloxham and therefore can not be a
basis for forfeiture of the water right that Jackson would one day acquire. J.C. 42-223(6).
If the court determines that Bloxham's inability to create water to irrigate the property
that Jackson would one day buy is not a justification for failing to inigate Jackson's future
property, the time period for forfeiture required by I.C. 42-222 did not expire prior to Jackson
beginning to inigate his property. 11 USC 362 provides for an automatic stay which maintains
the status quo related to bankruptcy estate property. Because the status quo of the property is
stayed during the pendency of the bankruptcy, Jackson's use of his 40% of the water in 2014 was
inside the five (5) limitation period of I.C. 42-222 and no forfeiture could have occurred.
For all of the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment must be
denied.

DATED this-4 day of October, 2016.

MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

~~
PETER M. WELLS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that a copy of the foregoing Defendant's Memorandum In Support of
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following
named person(s) at the address(es) shown and in the manner indicated.

Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile 208-523-9518
[x] Hand Delivery

DATED this (_f_ day of October, 2016 .

.I

MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
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Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
216 W. Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724

NNOCK COUNTY
C~ERK OF THE COURT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH WDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
KIRK JACKSON,

Defendant

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bannock

AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK JACKSON IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S'
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

)
: ss
)

I, Kirk Jackson after being duly sworn, do depose and state:
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify to the matters stated here in.
2. I am the owner of certain property located in Downey, Idaho. This property is bordered on the
west by property owned at this by Chad and Jane Barnes.
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3. I purchased my property from the bankruptcy trustee in 2012. Prior to the bankruptcy trustee
being in possession of the property, the property was owned by Eagle Eyes Ltd., and Craig
Bloxham.
4. Shortly after pur_chasing my property from the bankruptcy trustee, in May or June of 2012, I
talked to Vern Bloxham about being able to take my water out of the historical diversion point
which was not located on his property. However, it was my understanding he owned the
diversion structure and the pipeline to get the water to my property.
5. Vern Bloxham told me that I would not be allowed to use the historical diversion point nor the
historical water transportation mechanisms. He told me that if I attempted to use those things
that he would cut the ditch and the main line.
6. I determined, that rather than go to war with my neighbors related to this issue, that I would find
another way to get the water to my property.
7. I purchased an easement from a different neighbor so that I could construct a pipeline to get the
water to my property. It cost me $2,000 to purchase this easement. By purchasing the easement,
I was able to get the water from Spring Creek to my property.
8. I originally purchased the property from the bankruptcy trustee for the intent of building a place
to live, and an orchard. I planned on having a twenty (20) acre orchard that would be watered by
Spring Creek.
9. In May or June of 2012, I planted over 100 fruit trees on my property.
10. After purchasing an easement from the neighbor, I began to dig a pipeline for my irrigation
system.
11. I worked with the NRCS to design and build a diversion structure that would accommodate my
40% of water from Spring Creek.
12. I told the NRCS that I intended to have an orchard and that I would also need stock water.
13. The NRCS cost shared with me on the portion of the irrigation system that was used for the
stock water.
14. My irrigation system was designed to use 40% of the water in Spring Creek.
15 . Vern Bloxham told me that the Army Corp of Engineers had measured Spring Creek and that it
had a flow rate of 230 gal/min. He did not tell me what year that measurement occurred.
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16. I have detennined that Spring Creek typically has about 240 gallons per minute . That flow rate is
constant and does not change substantially throughout the year. I first measured the water flow in
Spring Creek in 2014. It was about 240 gallons per minute.

17. I have built weirs before and had them in inspected. In approximately 2002, I was instructed by an
investigator from the Idaho Department of Water Resources on the proper method to build a weir and
measure the flow of the water through the weir.

18. Using that instruction I built a weir in 2002, and measured the flow. My wier was inspected by IDWR
and it was detennined to be satisfactory.

19. Since that time I have built about half a dozen different weirs and have measured flow through them.
20. As a result I am familiar with the process of building weirs and measuring flow through the wier.
21. I followed the same process that I was instructed on in 2002 when I measured the flow of water in 2014
in Spring Creek.

22. I measured the water flow by placing the full stream of Spring Creek through a six (6) inch pipe, about
18" long. This told me how many square inches of water was being displaced. The water was 3" deep
coming out the back of the pipe. It was therefore displacing 14.1 square inches of water. This equates
to 240 gallons per minute.

23. 240 gallons per minute is far less than the total amount of water that was originally decreed to Water
Right 29-10420, which was owned by Craig Bloxham and Eagle Eyes, Ltd.
24. In fact, my water right is for .840 cfs. This is equates to 377.01 gal/minute.

25. In 2013 I pumped water from Spring Creek with a portable diesel pump. There was not enough water to
fill my full right but I did take at least 40% of the stream. I put the water on the north and central
portions of the property to irrigate wheat.

26. In 2014, I completed the diversion and pipeline that I had originally begun when I purchased the
easement in 2013.

27. Beginning in the fall of 2014, I began to divert 40% of Spring Creek to my property. I used the water in
2014 for the purpose of fall planting. I planted white wheat and sainfoin.

28. I used 40% of the water because I own about 40% of the original ground that Water Right
29-10420 was decreed to irrigate.
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29. After I purchased my prope1ty from the bankrnptcy trustee, I spent 4-5 days per week at the
property. During this time I observed the property that was retained by Bloxham. I noticed that
the only irrigation taking place on the Bloxham property was a wheel line at the southernmost
part of the field. The wheel line was turned on, but was only moved occasionally.
30. I observed that the property retained by Bloxham in 2012 and 2013 was actually farmed by
Dow Barker, a dry farmer that I was friends with.
31. I did not see any sign of any person actively attempting to irrigate the Bloxham property until
2014 when I was approached by Barnes related to my use of Spring Creek.
32. In fact, the only portion of the now Barnes property that was irrigated was the southernly
portion of the property.
33. In 2012 and 2013, the most they irrigated on the now Barnes' property was 4-5 acres.
34. In 2014, 2015, and 2016 the most they could have irrigated was 25-30 acres.
35. In 2016, Barnes did not even tum on his irrigation until July of 2016.
36. In July of 2015, Craig Bloxham destroyed my diversion strncture. He was ultimately charged
with a misdemeanor related to this destrnction. He was ordered to pay restitution in the amount
of$3,534.14. To this date, he has paid $70 towards the restitution.
37. Had Craig Bloxham not destroyed my diversion strncture, I would have continued to irrigate my
property with 40% of the Spring Creek stream.
38. I have plans to reinstall a diversion system to continue irrigating my property.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this

__l day of October, 2016.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, Notary, this /--(~~ of October, 2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Kirk Jackson was served on
the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

'1•] U.S. Mail
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC . P--{~] F~csimile 208-523-9518
P.O. Box 50130
[x] Hand Delivery
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
DATED this 17th day of October, 2016.

By:

4 /f ,.,.,/'

,.,,u..__

May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
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Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
216 W. Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH WDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF PETER M. WELLS

vs.
KJRK JACKSON,

Defendant

STATE OF IDAHO

)
: ss

County of Bannock

)

I, Peter M. Wells, after being duly sworn, do depose and state:
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify to the matters stated here in.
2. I am the attorney of record for the Defendant Kirk Jackson in this case.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of imagery maps that I received from the
Idaho Department of Water Resources on October 14, 2016. These imagery maps show the
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location of use of Water Right number 29-10420 for the years 2004, 2006, and 2009. This
imagery is being provided for demonstrative purposes.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Motion to Approve Sale of Real
Property (Burden) this document was printed from the Pacer website related to Case number
05-42930-JDP. This is Document 36 and is from the Craig Bloxham Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. This
document was printed on or about October 15, 2016.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Partial Decree of Water Right
29-10420. This document was received from the Idaho Department of Water Resources on or
about October 14, 2016.
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Trustees Deed that was issued to
Kirk Jackson when he purchased the property at issue in this case on or about April 26, 2012.
This Document is recorded in the Bannock County Recorder's Office as instrument number
21207710.
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of Excerpts of the Deposition of Kirk
Jackson taken September 26, 2016.
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the ProofReport/or Water Right
29-10420. This document was obtained from the Idaho Department of Water Resources on or
about October 15, 2016.
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of the Deposition Excerpts from the
Deposition ofKirk Jackson taken September 26, 2016.
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 are true and correct copies of the Idaho Repository Record for
Bannock County Case Number CR-2015-14311. This document was printed from the Idaho
Repository on October 16, 2016.
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Change in Water Right
Ownership for Chad and Jane Barnes received by the Idaho Department of Water Resources on
February 28, 2014. This document was obtained from the Idaho Department of Water Resources
website at: http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/Docslmages/ly_Ol_.PDF, on October
16, 2016.
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12. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of the Pedigree History .for Water Right
29-10420. This document was obtained from the Idaho Department of Water Resources website,
at:

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/viewPedigree.asp?BasinNumber=29&SequenceNu
mbe1 - 14115&SplitSuffix=%20%20&Process=WR, on October 16, 2016.
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of the Deeds transferring the property
from Craig Bloxham and Eagle Eyes, Ltd., to Vern Bloxham and Delores Bloxham, and the
deed transferring the property from Vern Bloxham and Delores Bloxham to Chad and Jane
Barnes, recorded at the Bannock County Recorder 's Office as instrument numbers, 21400286
and 21401249 respectively.

Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this 17th day of October, 2016.

PETER M. WELLS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, Notary, this

[SEAL]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Peter M Wells was served on
the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

°4:.,]

Robert Lynn Hanis
U.S . Mail
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC {..J[f.] Facsimile 208-523-9518
P.O. Box 50130
~] Hand Delivery
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
DATED this 17th day of October, 2016.

By

.,4,j: l,_/.u,_
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
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CRAIG R. JORGENSEN (#1990)
Attorney At Law
920 East Clark
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4904
Telephone: (208) 237-4100
Facsimile: (208) 237-1706
Attorney.for Debtor

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

IN RE THE MATTER OF:

CRAIG V. BLOXHAM

Debtor.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 05 -42930 JDP

MOTION TO APPROVE SALE
OF REAL PROPERTY
(BURDEN)

Debtor, Craig V. Bloxham, would show the Court the following:
I.

Debtor filed his Petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on October 12,

2005, Debtor brings this Motion to Approve Sale of Creditor Real Property to Lany and Dianna

J. Burden. This Motion is brought pursuant to 11 USC § 363 & LBR 2002-1 . The property to be
sold is described on Exhibit "A" hereto.
2.

Debtor may have an ownership interest in real property which is located near

Downey, Idaho. Pmtions of the property may also be owned by Eagle Eyes, Ltd., a Delaware
Corporation. Debtor represents that debtor and thus the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, Gary
Rainsdon, may have an interest in the property on account of defects which may have occurred
in transferring the property several years ago.
3.

As Counsel understands it, the potential ownership interest of Craig V. Bloxham

in the property, subject to the sale, is derivative: (A) through a Deed from Robert L. Wilding and
MOTION TO APPROVE SALE- Page 1
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Louise Wilding dated February 19, 1992 - to Vern C. Bloxham and Delores K. Bloxham,
husband and wife, and Craig V . Bloxham and Carol M. Bloxham, husband and wife. The deed is
recorded February 21, 1992 as instmment No. 92002511: and (B) A Quit Claim Deed from
Wilding Ranches, Inc. to Vern C. Bloxham and Delores K. Bloxham, husband and wife, and
Craig V. Bloxham and Carol M. Bloxham, husband and wife, dated 14 January 1992. The Deed
is recorded January 15, 1992 as instmment No. 9200650: and (C) A Corporation Deed from
Wilding Ranches, Inc., to Vern C. Bloxham and Delores K. Bloxham, husband and wife, Craig
V. Bloxham and Carol M. Bloxham, husband and wife, dated 13 June 1990, and recorded June
15 , 1990 as instmment No. 90007690: and (D) It had been the intent of Vern and Dolores
Bloxham and Craig Bloxham to hold this real property in the name of the Vern C. Bloxham and
Delores K. Bloxham Living Agreement of Trust (hereinafter the "Tmst"). This trust conveyed its
interest to Eagle Eyes, Ltd. by virtue of a corrected Warranty Deed dated 21 October 2003 and
recorded November 25, 2003 as instrument No. 20331543.
Thus, there was no conveyance from Craig Bloxham to the Trust, nor from Craig
Bloxham to Eagle Eyes, Ltd. Therefore, through a lack of conveyance Craig V . Bloxham' s
Bankruptcy Trustee may have an ownership interest in the land.
Craig Bloxham and Carol Bloxham were divorced in 1996 and Carol Bloxham has no
legal or equitable interest in the property.
4.

Debtor (and Eagle Eyes, Ltd.) has entered a Purchase and Sale Agreement

(hereinafter "Sale Agreement"), with Larry and Dianna Burden. The sales price is $119,600.00
due at closing. Other terms and conditions are set forth in the Sale Agreement. (A copy of the
Sale Agreement is available from Debtor's Counsel). The sale will be clear of the lien claims
and leasehold interests so as to deliver possession and clear title to the Buyer. The time and
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place of the Sale is set forth in the Sale Agreement and will be as soon after the bankruptcy Court
gives its approval. The estimated fair market value is $119,600.00 is detennined by Debtor's
familiarity with sales of other parcels near Downey, Idaho. Debtor understands there is
approximately 104.8 acres. The sale includes water rights.
5.

Debtor is infom1ed that on account of the alleged ownership interest of Debtor,

the following creditors assert or may assert or many asset liens against the property.
MBNA America Bank MA
Amount $14,831.12
Judgment Lien
Instrument No. 205 06167 - April 4, 2005
Case No. CV 04 5515 OC - Bannock County
State of Idaho
State Tax Commission
March 31, 2006
Lien No. T 280251 and lien No. T 353330
State of Idaho
ex. Rel. Industrial Commission
Amount $5,000.00
Judgment lien
May 10, 2007
Instrument No. 20711013
State of Idaho
Dept. of Welfare
Child Support
Febmary 12, 2007
Lien No. T 314096
The lien information contained in this paragraph is derived from a "Commitment for Title
Insurance" issued by First American Title Co-Order No. 234505-P. (A copy is available through
Debtor's Counsel).

MOTION TO APPROVE SALE - Page 3
273 of 514

Case 05-42930-JDP

6.

36

Filed 08/15/08 Entered 08/:
Doc ument
Page 4 of 6

8 15:50:35

Desc Main

Debtor desires to sell (pursuant to 11 USC § 363(f)) said property free and clear

of the asserted liens, with the liens, if any, attaching to the Debtor's share of the proceeds.
Debtor further desires to hold (as closing agent) the proceeds pending detennination of the value
of each secured creditor's collateral and pending apportionment by the court of the sales proceeds
among the various claimants and apportioning the proceeds among parcels attributable to Craig
Bloxham's interest vis-a-vis Eagle Eyes, Ltd. Debtor takes no specific position in this matter of
the respective entitlements of the Chapter 7 Trustee, the lien claimants or Eagle Eyes, LTD.
7.

Debtor also proposes to pay out of the proceeds of such sale, the Sellers portion of

closing costs including, without limitation, attorney's fees incuned in bringing this Motion and
preparing the Sale Agreement, the costs of a survey, and other closing costs.
8.

Debtor represents further that a similar Motion to Approve Sale for a nearby

parcel (a sale to Rory and Sandra Barnes for $5,000.00) is filed contemporaneously with this
motion. Debtor takes no specific position regarding the respective entitlement to the proceeds as
between the Chapter 7 Trustee, the lien claimants or Eagle Eyes, LTD.
WHEREFORE, Debtors pray for an Order (a) allowing the sale on terms set forth in the
Sale Agreement, free and clear of liens, with the liens, if any, attaching to the Debtor's share of
proceeds; (b) payment of the costs of sale as set forth herein; and (c) for such other and further
relief as is just and proper.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ _ day of August, 2008

Isl- - - - - - - - - - - - CRAIG R. JORGENSEN
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby ce11ify that on the _ _ _ day of August, 2008, I served a tme and correct copy
of the foregoing pleading on the following person(s) listed below as well as on the attached pages
by U.S. Mail.
Sam Hopkins, Trustee (Bloxham Oil)
ID07@ecfcbis.com
Jeff Wilson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701-1544

MBNA America Bank MA
c/o Jeff Wilson
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701-1544

Gary Rainsdon, Trustee
ustp.regionl 8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

State of Idaho - State Tax Commission
611 Wilson St., Suite 5
Pocatello, ID 83201-5029

Dan Green
Attorney at law
20 I E. Center
P.O. Box 1391
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391

State of Idaho
ex. Rel. Industrial Commission
700 S. Clearwater
Boise, Idaho 83712

Monte Gray
Service, Spinner & Gray
P.O. Box 6009
Pocatello, ID 83205-6009

State of Idaho
Department of Welfare
Child Support
421 Memorial Dr.
Pocatello, ID 83201

U.S. Trustee
M.K. Center Plaza
720 Park Blvd., Ste. 220
Boise, ID 83 712
Eagle Eyes, LTD
P.O. Box 227
Downey, ID 83234
Carol Metcalf, f.k.a (Bloxham)
634 N. Main
Downey, ID 83234
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Additionally, a copy of the foregoing was served on the parties listed on the attached
mailing matrix by first class mail, postage prepaid.

Isl- -- - -- -- -- CRAIG R. JORGENSEN
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2004 MAR 22 PM 02:00
DISTRICT COURT· SRllA
TWIN PALLS CO., IDAHO
PILBD _ _ _ _ _ __
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF THB Fil'TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THB
STATB OP IDAHO, I N AND POR THB COUNTY OP TWIN PALLS

In Re SRBA

PAATIAL DBCRBE PURSUANT TO
I.R.C . P . 54(b) FOR

cue No . 39576
Water Right 29 - 10420

NAMB AND ADDRESS:

CRAIG V BLOXHAM
20862 S CAMBRIOOB
0 BOX 227
DOWNEY, ID 83234

RD P

VBRN C BLOXHAM
494 N MA.IN P
0 BOX 227
DOWNBY, ID 83234
SOURCB,

UNNAMBD STRBI\M

QUANTITY :

2 . 24

TRIBUTARY : SINKS

CPS

THE QUANTITY OP WATER UNDER THIS RIGHT FOR STOCKWATBR USB SHALL
NOT BXC88D 13,000 GALLONS PER DAY.

':::1

USB OP THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-10419 IS LIMITED TO A TOTAL
COMBINED DIVBRSION RATE OP 2.64 CPS .
THIS RIGHT WHBN COMBINED WITH RIGHT NO. 29-10419 AND 29-10420
SHALL PROVIDB NO MORB THAN . 02 CFS PBR ACRE .
PRIORITY DATB:

05/19/1920

POINT OP DIVERSION :

TllS R37E S14

PURPOSB AND
PBRIOD OP USE,

PLACB OP USE:

PURPOSE OP USS
Irrigation
Stockweter

Irrigation
TllS R378 S14
SlS
822
S23
131.6 Acrea Total
Stockwater
Same as Irrigation

SWSBNW

Within BaMock county

PBRIOD OP USB
04-01 TO 10-31
01-01 TO 12-31

NWSW 9.7
NES1! 1.1
SESB 40.0
NENE 24 . 0
NWNW 4.7

QUANTITY
2 . 24 CPS
0. 03 CPS
Within Bannock County
SWSW 38.0
swsa 8.a
NWNB

5.3

Within Bannock County

OSB OP THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO . 29•10419 IS LIMITED TO THE
IRRIGATION OP A COMBINED TOTAL OP 131 . 6 ACRBS IN A SINOLB
IRRIGATION SBASON .
THIS RIGHT IS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATION OP 112,0 ACRBS WITHIN
THE PLACE OP USB DBSCRIBBD ABOVB IN A SINGLB IRRIGATION SEASON.
OTHBR PROVISIONS NECBSSARY FOR DBPINITION OR ADMINISTRATION OF THIS WATER RIGHT:

THI QUANTITY OF WATBR DBCRBBD FOR THIS WATBR RIGHT POR
STOCICWATER USI IS NOT A DETERMINATION OP HISTORICAL BENEFICIAL
USE.
THIS PARTIAL D6CRBB IS SUBJBCT TO SUCH GBNBRAL PROVISIONS
NBCBSSARY FOR THB DBFINITION OF THI RIGHTS OR FOR THI BPPICIBNT
ADMINISTRATION OP THB WATER RIGHTS AS MAY BB ULTIMATBLY
DBTIRMINBD BY THB COURT AT A POINT IN TIME NO t.ATBR THAN THE
Bln'RY OP A PINAL UNIFIED DBCRBB. I . C. SBCTION 42-1412(6),

SRBA PARTIAL DBCRBB PURSUANT
Water Right 29·10420

TO

I . R.C.P. 54(b)

PAGE l
Mar-17-2004
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SRBA Partial Decree Pursuant to I.R.C.P . 54 (bl

(continued)

RULB s,(b) CiRTIFICATB
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgn,ent or order, it ia hereby CBRTIFIBD, in accordance
with Rule s,(bl, I.R.C.P . , that the court ha• det•rmined that there ia no ju1t reaaon tor d•lay ot th• entry ot a
final judgMent and that the court has and doe, hereby direct that the
ve judgaent or order shall be a final
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may ba taken aa rovided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

/....
Jo

Melanaon
eaiding Judge of the
Snake River Basin Adjudication

SRBA PAATIAL DBCRBB PURSUANT TO I,R,C,P, s,(b)
Water Right 29-10,20
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TRUSTEE'S DEED

~,l) 3 L

~.C,?t (

~ -

Thi-; Trustee's Deed to real property is rmde on ili6 l/i.._ day of

/Jm ,tl
~

, 2012,

by GARY L. RAINSDON, (hereafter 'Tm tee"), who is the authoru..ed and acting Trustee of tllC
bankruptcy estate of CRAJG BWXHAM, (hereafter "Dcbto.r'1) as Grantor, and KIRK L
* *a married man
JACKSON, as Purchaser, of certain real property located near Downey, Bannock County, Idaho.
MAILJNG ADDRESS: P.O. BOX 866, POCATELLO, 1D 83204
WHEREAS, Trustee fii!d with the Court a ''Notx:e of Trustee's Mot~n to Sell Real
Property Free and Clear of Liem and Other Interests and For Authority to Pay Real Estate

Commission" dated February 3, 2012, (hereafter "Noti:e of Sale"), togctl-.er with a 'Tru.5tec's
Motion to Sell Real Property Free and Clear of Liens and Other Interests" dated February 3, 2012,
· (hereafter "Motion"), on the real property described hereafter; se,ved cop£s of saKI Mot:Dn and
Notice of Sak upon all patties- in-interest as requited by law; there being no objections to saKI
Notice of Sale; the Court having entered its Order approving the sale on the tenrn and condifuns

contained in the Notice of Sale dated April 25, 2012; and the sale having been trade pursuant to

the t.enns and conditions set forth in saxl Motion and Notice of Sale;
NOW, TIIBREFORE, the Trustee, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him under

the Jaws and statutes of the United States Code, a11d .in con~ideration of tJ~ cash sum of Thirty-Five

TilOusand Three Hundred and 00/J 00 Dollars ($35,300.00), aud other valuab~ considerntion to him
pail by the Purchaser, receipt whereof is l~reby acknowledged, does hereby transfer, sell am
convey to Purchaser, .in its "AS IS" condition and withoU1 warranty of any nature whal'.oever, either
express or irq:>lied, free and clear of any and

an oons or cla.itrn of interest, all of the right, tile and

interest of the bankruptcy estate of Craig Bloxham, Debtors in BK Case No. 05-42930-JDP, in and
TRIBUFS DEE> ~ Page 1

JACKSON00B
281 of 514

lo that certain real. prope1iy more particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto and
incorporated by reference.

TN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor, Gary L. Rainsdon, does hereto set his hand the

~~~~

day and year firsl above written.

GARY~NSDON, TRUSTEE

STATE OF JDAIJO
Counly of Twin Falls

· ri-..Ji!..:._

)
: ss
)

J1 ·/
r-1/?('

1
On this
day of
, 2012, before me, the undersigned Nota,y
Public, in and for said State and County, personally appeared Gary L. Rainsdon, known or
identified to me to be the hapter 7 Trustee in the above-capti ned bankruptcy matter, a11d the
person whose name is subscribed lo the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.

1N WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this
Certificate first above written.

(SEAL)
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EXHIBIT A
LEGAL DESCRIPTION: Real property in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, described as

follows:

A PARCEL OF LAND LOCATED IN SECTIONS 14, AND 23, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTif, RANGE,
37 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO, AND FURTHER DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 14, FROM WHICH llfE NORTH
QUARTER CORNER OF secnoN 22 BEARS SOUTH 89°54' 13" EAST 2644.51 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 00°04'30" EAST 1396.96 FEET ALONG llfE WEST UNE OF SAID
SECTION 14 TO A 5 / 8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, "A.A, HUDSON PLS 4735", SAT ON
A FENCE UNE; THENCE NORTH 38°00'17" EAST 103.33 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE
TO A 5/ 8" REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH 44°13'06" EAST 149.09 FEET ALONG
SAID FENCE UNE TO A 5/ 8" REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH 32°53'09" EAST
129.53 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A 5 / 8" REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH
31 °08'40" EAST 21.25 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A 5/ 8" REBAR WITH CAP;
THENCE NORTH 14°13'40" EAST 28.52 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A 5/8"
REBAR WITH CAP; THENCE NORTH 01 °17'53" EAST 126.53 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE
UNE TO A FOUND PIPE; THENCE NORTH 65°37'22" EAST 1168.91 FEET ALONG AN
EXISTING FENCE UNE TO AN INTERSECTING FENCE UNE; THENCE SOUTH 00°34'30n
EAST 1157.24 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A 5/ 8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED,
PLS 4735; llfENCE SOUTH 07°27'39" WEST 189.66 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A
5/8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 4735; SOUTH 04°55'53" WEST 74.16 FEET
ALONG THE WESTERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE OF BURSH CREEK ROAD TO A 5/Sn
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 4735; THENCE SOUTH 00°07'28" WEST 932.12 FEET
ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE TO A FOUND 5/ 8" REBAR WITH CAP
LABELED, PLS 9163 SET ON THE SOUTH UNE OF SAID SEcnON 14; THENCE NORTH
89°39'S2" WEST 990.50 f,EET ALONG SAID SOUTH UNE TO A FOUND 5/ 8" REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163 SET ON THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THAT PARCEL OF
LAND OWNED BY DARWIN A. AND SHIRLY J. STEWART AS RECORDED UNDER
INSTRUMENT NUMBER 20616636 IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF BANNOCK COUNTY;
THENCE SOllTH 243.05 FEET ALONG THE WEST UNE OF SAID STEWART PARCEL TO A
FOUND 5 / 8" REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163 SET ON A FENCE UNE; THENCE
SOUTH 89°23'06" WEST 309.79 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE AND ITS EXTENSION
TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP (LS 9163); THENCE NORTH 00°04'07" WEST 243.05
FEET ALONG THE WEST UNE OF SAID SECTION 23 TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
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A. Because we designed it so it wouldn't.
Q. When you say "we," who is "we"?
A. Primarily me.
Q. Okay. uwe" usually implies two, so is
it just you that designed the structure?
A. Well, I had a little help from a friend
ofminc.
Q. Who is that?
A. Greg Robinson.
Q. Who is Greg Robinson?
A. He's a guy that's got, I don't know,
30 years in construction.
Q. Is he an irrlgator?
A. He's a concrete guy.
Q. Okay. So has he constructed diversion
structures before?
A. I don't know.
Q. So you basically got a concrete guy to
help pour the box, but the design was your design
really?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Why didn't you discuss it with
Barnes or any other downstream neighbor?
A. Well, l didn't know Barnes was involved.
Okay?
······----, ... ,..... .. -.
~

~
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September
26,
__;;_
_
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Q. But my question is: You didn't think
that consulting with them to make sure they were okay
with it, that's not something you ever 1hought to do?
A. Vern Bloxham was not okay with me having
a water right. Okay? He was denying me access to
the water. He was denying me access across his
property where the historic ditch was to get to the
water. I had to go buy an easement from someone
else.
Q. Did he ever express to you why he was
denying you access?
A. Because he didn't want me to have water.
Q. Was that an Jndlcation to you that the
property didn't have water rights?
A. No. I had already been to the NRC -- or

the division of water resources and confirmed that it
did have water rights.
Q. Let me rephrase the question. Do you
think it was an indication at all that there were no
valid water rights or rights that had been forfeited
associated with the property?
A. No.
Q. He never said, "They've been forfeited"?

A. No.
Q. What did he actually say to you?

..
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l

2
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4

s
6
7
8

9

Q. Okay.
A. He didn't buy his property until, like,
February of 2014. Okay? I didn't even know who he
was. And as far as discussing it with Bloxhams, I
had. I had discussed it with Vern on numerous
occasions.
Q. When did you have those discussions?
A. Starting in 2012.

Q.

When was the last conversation you had
with Vern Bloxham about the design?
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l
2
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A. About the design of the structure?

9
10
11

12

Q. Correct.

12

13
14

A. We never talked about the design of the

13
14

10

15

16
17
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19
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21
22
23
24

25

structure.

Q. Well, my line of questioning relates to
the design of the structure. So A. Okay. I never discussed the specifics
of the structure with anyone.
Q. Okay. My question Is why?
A. I didn't see a need.
Q. You didn't think that It- a diversion
structure could delay water or change the historic
hydrology of the spring that could effect their
historic diversion structure?
A. I designed it so it wouldn't.

\lin -1 · "l' r ipt'. 11

15

16
17
18

19

A. He said I wasn't going across his
property to get to my water.
Q. Okay. So there was an easement dispute.
Did he ever say anything about the water rights?

A. You know, whenever the subject of water
came up, he would just ask me how I was going to get
to it.
Q. Okay. So he focused on the easement
issue?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. But I want to understand your
testimony. You still didn't want - well, let me
strike that and ask it this way: You were aware
there was a historic diversion point down below where
you put in your system?

A. Yeah.
Q. And did you not inquire as to anybody
who used that system?
A. I think I've already answered that. I

23

talked to Vern Bloxham. Vern Bloxham owned all of
that property -Q. So you were aware A. -- until February of 2014.

24
25

Q. So you were aware that was his historic
diversion point -

20
21
22
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1

A . Yes.

1

2

Q. - and you weren't buying all the

2

3
4
5
6

7
8
9

10
11
I

1

Page 103

12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
122
23
24

25

property that Vern owned, that there were others that
would also be using that diversion structure,
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Why didn't you want to tie the system
Into that historic diversion structure? That's where
the water right was authorized to be diverted from.
A. Well, J mean, it would be only logical
that if Vern is nol going to let me go across his
property to get to my water, that he's nol going to
let me use his diversion to get to my water.
Q. But the spring and the diversion are not
on Vern Bloxham's property. Aren't they on someone
else's property?
A . Yeah, Dale Koester.
Q. Correct.
A. Koester Brothers.
Q. If you wanted to tie Into the system
because you obtained a slice of his prior water
right, you could have tied into that historic
diversion system on the Koester property?
A. No, not without his pennission. Koester
may own the property, Yem owns the diversion.

there belongs to Craig. He doesn't even own the
house he lives in.

Q. Well, records indicate he still owns a
small acreage so he still actually takes out of that
5 diversion. And my question is simply: Did you talk
6 to him? And l think your answer was no?
3

4

7

A. No.

8

Q. Okay.

9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17
18

19
2o
21

22
23

24

25

A. What records? Oh, never mind. I can't
ask you a question.
Q. That's right.
A. Let me rephrase that, then.
Q. No.
A. Let me make it a statement.
Q. No, you can't do that. You've only got
to answer my questions.
A. All right. But thank you.
MR. WELLS: We've been going about another
hour. l don't know if you're ready for another break
or what your plans arc?
MR. HARRIS: Are you okay to go until about
noon?
THE REPORTER: Yeah.
MR. HARRIS: I'm okay if you guys arc.
MR. WELLS: Yeah.

Page 104

Page 102

Q. (BY MR. HARRIS) When did you start to
insfall the diversion structure?
A. August of 2014.
Q. And after you started to Install It,
what wos the Orst Interaction you had with either

15

Q. Well, correct. But then you bought a
portion of the property that was authorized to be
irrigated out of that point of diversion.
A. Yeah, and he denied me access to it.
Q. To the diversion Itself or running It
across your property?
A. Running it -- going across his property
to get to it. He denied me the use of the pipeline
down the west side of our -- of my property. He said
I wasn't using anything of his. I wasn't going
across his property to get my water.
Q. Okay. And did you ever have a
conversation with Craig Bloxham about that?
A. No . Craig didn't own anything. Still
doesn't own anything.

16

Q. Well. who owned the property prlor to

16

17

the bankruptcy trustee deeding you the property?
A. Craig owned the 62 acres l bought.
Q. Correct.

17
19

Q. Okay. Anything else?

Everything else was in Vern's name.

20
21
22

A. Oh, he made several threats, but, you

1
2

3

4

s
6

7
8

9
10

11

12
13
14

18
19

~o

A.

23

Q. That's right. And my question is: Why
didn't you talk to Craig about the diversion
structure?

24
25

A. Because he didn't own anything. You
understand by the time I bought the property, nothing

21
22

l.
2
3

4
5

6

7

8
9

10
ll

12

Jane or Chad Barnes?
A. Oh, once the diversion and most of the
pipeline -- most of the pipeline was in, l was across
Koestcr's property, I was turning and going onto
mine, when suddenly there was a guy standing out in
Bloxham's field screaming at me. I had no idea who
he was.

13

Q. Okay. What did he say to you?

14

A. He told me I better go get a lawyer

15

18

23

24
25

before I finished that, and I better stop right where
I was, and I didn't have a water right, and l
couldn't change the point of diversion and all of
that.

know .. .

Q.

Okay. What did you say hack to him?
A. Well, I said, "I do have a water right ,
and uccording to NRCS, the point of diversion is a
I0-acre piece and I didn't go off of it. And I don't

--------·
\ fin-{ ."',ct'ipt x:
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Water Right 29-14031
Owner Type
Current Owner

Name and Address
CRAIG V BLOXHAM
20862 S CAMBRIDGE RD
PO BOX 227
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)897-5666

Current Owner

VERN C BLOXHAM
494 N MAIN
PO BOX 227
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)897-5666

Priority Date: 5/19/1920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active
Source
UNNAMED STREAM

Tributary
SINKS

Beneficial Use
IRRIGATION
STOCKWATER

From
To
04/01
10/31
12/31
01/01
Total Diversion

Source and Point(s) of Diversion
UNNAMED STREAM
Place Of Use
IRRIGATION

Diversion Rate
0.160 CFS
0.010 CFS
0.160 CFS

SWSENW

Sec. 14, Twp 11S, Rge 37E, BANNOCK County

WI·th·In

Twp

Rng

Sec

11S

37E

15

11S

37E

23

BANNOCK Coun1y
NE
NE NW SW SE NE

Volume

NW
NW SW

SE

NE

SW
NW SW

SE
SE

NE

NW

SW

SE

Totals

6.0

6.0

3.2

3.2
Right Acre Limit: 7.8
POU Total Acres: 9.2

STOCKWATER Same as IRRIGATION
Conditions of Approval:
1.
B01
Source is also known as Spring Creek.
2.
N05
The quantity of water under rights 29-14031, 29-14115 and 29-14032 when combined
for stockwater use shall not exceed 13,000 gallons per day and a diversion rate of 0.03
cfs.
3.
T19
Pursuant to Section 42-1412(6), Idaho Code, this water right is subject to such general
provisions necessary for the definition of the rights or for the efficient administration of
water rights as may be determined by the Snake River Basin Adjudication court at a

Page 1 of 6
288 of 514
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10/14/2016

Proof Report

4.

X27

5.

R63

6.

X35

7.

NOB

point in time no later than the entry of the final unified decree.
This right is limited to the irrigation of 7.83 acres within the authorized place of use in a
single irrigation season.
This right when combined with all other rights shall provide no more than 0.02 cfs per
acre nor more than 3.5 afa per acre at the field headgate for irrigation of the place of
use.
Rights 29-14029 and 29-14031 when combined shall not exceed a total diversion rate
of 0.18 cfs and the irrigation of 9.2 acres.
The quantity of water decreed for this water right for stockwater use is not a
determination of historical beneficial use.
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Proof Report
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Water Right 29-14032
Owner Type
Current Owner

Name and Address
KIRK JACKSON
PO BOX 866
POCATELLO, ID 83204
(208)351-8381

Priority Date: 5/19/1920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active

Tributary
SINKS

Source
UNNAMED STREAM
Beneficial Use
IRRIGATION
STOCKWATER

From
To
04/01
10/31
01/01
12/31
Total Diversion

Source and Point(s) of Diversion
UNNAMED STREAM
Place Of Use
IR RI GATION

SWSENW

Volume

Sec. 14, Twp 11 S, Rge 37E,

BANNOCK County

. h.In
Wit

Twp

Rno Sec

11S

37E

14

11S

37E

23

BANNOCK County
NE
NE NW SW SE NE

Diversion Rate
0.840 CFS
0.030 CFS
0.840 CFS

NW
NW SW

SE

NE

SW
NW SW
9.7

SE
SE

NE

NW

SW

SE

Totals

38.0

47.7

1.5

1.5
Right Acre Limit: 41 .9
POU Total Acres : 49 .2

STOCKWATER Same as IRRIGATION
Conditions of Approval:
1.
B01
SOURCE IS ALSO KNOWN AS SPRING CREEK.
2.
C18
This partial decree is subject to such general provisions necessary for the definition of
the rights or for the efficient administration of the water rights as may be ultimately
determined by the Court at a point in time no later than the entry of a final unified
decree. Section 42-1412(6), Idaho Code.
USE OF THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 IS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATION
3.
E55
OF A COMBINED TOTAL OF 49.2 ACRES IN A SINGLE IRRIGATION SEASON .
4.
N05
THE QUANTITY OF WATER UNDER RIGHTS 29-14031 AND 29-14032 WHEN
COMBINED FOR STOCKWATER USE SHALL NOT EXCEED 13,000 GALLONS PER
DAY AND A DIVERSION RATE OF 0.03 CFS.
5.
E51
USE OF THIS RIGHT WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 IS LIMITED TO A TOTAL
COMBINED DIVERSION RATE OF 0.99 CFS.
6.
E62
THIS RIGHT WHEN COMBINED WITH RIGHT NO. 29-14030 AND 29-14032 SHALL
PROVIDE NO MORE THAN .02 CFS PER ACRE.
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Proof Report

7.

K06

8.

NOB

Page

10/14/2016

THIS RIGHT IS LIMITED TO THE IRRIGATION OF 41 .9 ACRES WITHIN THE PLACE
OF USE DESCRIBED ABOVE IN A SINGLE IRRIGATION SEASON.
THE QUANTITY OF WATER DECREED FOR THIS WATER RIGHT FOR
STOCKWATER USE IS NOT A DETERMINATION OF HISTORICAL BENEFICIAL
USE.
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Proof Report

10/14/2016

Water Right 29-14115
Owner Type
Current Owner

Name and Address
CHAD BARNES
22284 N MAIN
DOWNEY, ID 83234
(208)317-8546

Current Owner

R JANE BARNES
22284 N MAIN EXTENSION
DOWNEY, ID 83234

Priority Date: 5/19/1920
Basis: Decreed
Status: Active
Source
UNNAMED STREAM

Tributary
SINKS

Beneficial Use
IRRIGATION
STOCKWATER

From

Place Of Use
IRRIGATION WI·th·In BANNOCK County
NE
Twp Rng Sec NE
NW SW SE NE
37E

15

11S

37E

22

Diversion Rate

04/01
10/31
01/01
12/31
Total Diversion

Source and Point(s) of Diversion
UNNAMED STREAM

11S

To

SWSENW

NW
NW SW

1.240 CFS
0.020 CFS
1.240 CFS

Sec.14, Twp 11S, Rge 37E,

SE

NE

SW
NW SW

SE

NE
1.1

24 .0

5.3

Volume

NW

BANNOCK County

SE
SW ·SE
2.8

40.0

Totals
43.9
29.3

Right Acre Limit: 62.3
POU Total Acres : 73.2

STOCKWATER Same as IRRIGATION
Conditions of Approval:
1.
X27
This right is limited to the irrigation of 62.27 acres within the authorized place of use in a
single irrigation season .
2.
ROS
Use of water under this right will be regulated by a watermaster with responsibility for
the distribution of water among appropriators within a water district. At the time of this
approval, this water right is within State Water District No. 29H.
3.
01 R
When notified by the Department, the right holder shall install and maintain a measuring
device of a type acceptable to the Department as part of the diverting works.
4.
X35
Rights 29-14114 and 29-14115 when combined shall not exceed a total diversion rate
of 1.47 cfs and the irrigation of 73.2 acres.
5.
NOS
The quantity of water under rights 29-14031, 29-14115 and 29-14032 when combined

Page
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
Proof Report

6.

R63

7.

NOS

8.
9.

B01
T19

10/14/2016

for stockwater use shall not exceed 13,000 gallons per day.
This right when combined with all other rights shall provide no more than 0.02 cfs per
acre nor more than 3.5 afa per acre at the field headgate for irrigation of the place of
use.
The quantity of water decreed for this water right for stockwater use is not a
determination of historical beneficial use.
Source is also known as Spring Creek.
Pursuant to Section 42-1412(6), Idaho Code , this water right is subject to such general
provisions necessary for the definition of the rights or for the efficient administration of
water rights as may be determined by the Snake River Basin Adjudication court at a
point in time no later than the entry of the final unified decree.
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Page

1

this deposition, correct?

1

2

A. Con-eel.
Q. What J do wirnt to ask you more
specifically is: Do you assume that it was Vern and
Craig Bloxham, or do you know for surety thal they
were out there flood irrigatin g th e property?
A. Well, lhc water was com ing oul 11f thcir
pipeline.
Q. Okay. Rut you didn't actually
ph)'Sically see them out irrigating th e proper~·?
A . No.
Q. You assumed that because the pipeline is
on their proper~' thal it was from them: is that

2

3

4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11

12

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24

25

1

fair'?
A . Yes.

Q. Okay. The next one you have down is
"Kirk Jackson - 2012 - July through September.
Hauled water from source in a 500 gallon tank for
saplings."
Could you describe how you hauJed the
w,1ter up there for the orchard '!
A. With a truck and towed it.
Q. How did you fill the truck '!
A. With a pump.
Q. Was that above or below the Barnes'

3

4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11

12

13
14

15
16

55 1

ti me th at you allege th at some irrigation occurred on
the prop ert)· was April throu gh .July of 2013 , pumped
water to flood irrigate wheat crop in center to south
area ap1noximntely 10 ncres. ls that the same ·
10-acre parcel Uint yuu circled in red on Exhibit-2,
or is it a different IO acres that you indicate was
irrigated?
A. It was a littl e farther north. I was
irrigati ng a liti lc fa rther north than what J had
seen that prev iously.
MR. HARRIS: We'll have the court reporter
mark this as an11ther ex hi bi t.
(EXHIBIT-7 WAS MARK ED FOR lDENTI FICATION)
]\:JR. HARRIS: T'm going to hand you what's
been marked as Exhi bit-?. It 's identi ca l to

Exhibit-:! other than -- did yo11 say you had a gold
Sharpie?
REPORTER: Yeah.
Q. (BY MR. HARRIS) We're going to use all
2 o the colors we can.
21
Could you indicate on Exhibit-7 where
2 2 the approximate 10 acres were that you indicate were
2 3 irrigated?
24
A . l would ~ay something like this.
25
Q. Okay. Thank you for doing that.

17
18
19

I

I
Page 54

1
2

3

4
s

diversion did you put tb e pump in ?
A . Above.
Q. Okay. Was that a portable pump'!

A. Yes.
Q. And how many times did you fill the

Page 56

1
2

3
4

s

6

500-gallon tank'!

6

7

A. Oh. gee, l don't know. Wh enever we went
out. I mean, we were going out several times a week
and fillin g ii.
Q. Okay. Several times a week for how man y
weeks?
A. Maybe 10 or 12.
Q. How many is several'! Twice?
A. No. more than th at.
Q. Okay. How man)"?
A. Well l guess ii would depend on the
week. But. _ou know, whenever I wa working ou t
there, l would do that and then we would go out
specifically to do that. J would ~ay al least
probabl y four or fi ve times a week.
Q. Well, my (JUCstion is: How many times
did you 1111 the tank each time you watered the

7

8

9

10
' 11

12

13

14
15
16
17
i 18
19
20
21

22

25

saplings'!
A . Usually once.
Q. Okay. If you'll tnrn the page, the next

\}ill•

l 'ii I ijlf

23

24

I,

8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19
2o

21
22
23

j 24

25

Whal pump did you use to pump water up
to flood irriga1·e the whent crop?
A. I rented a pump. Jt was a -- oh. I
don'I remember the brand. lt was European brand . Ii
had a BMW engine.
Q. Who did you rent it from'!
A. J don't reca ll the name. II was a
wildl and fi re response company out of th e Lo la
valley.
Q. Out of the what· valle~·?
A . Lola vall ey.
Q. Where is the Lola valley?
A. No1thof Salmon .
Q. You mean Lolo'?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Lolo Valley. Nu. it's Lul a, isn't it ?
Q. We'll both look at a map and decide
later. I think it's Lolo but -A. It could be.
Q. Was there a contact person?

A. You know, l don't remember. I was
looking fo r a pump with line. and that's kind o f hard
tu fi nd a small pump with flex ible line.
Q. So th en did you drive to Salmon lo pick
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1
2
3
4

5

6
7
8

9

10
11
12

Page 59

up the pump?
A . He met me halt\vay.
Q. Where did yo u m eet ?

1

2
3

A. Oh. I don't know . one of them little
towns between Salmon and lJaho Falls.
Q. And this was in 2013 ?

4

A. Yes.
Q. Was tlrnt the sprin g or th e s umm er of
2013?
A. Well. it had to be the spring ifl was

7

s
6
8

9
10
11

usi ng it in April. so ...
Q. Okay. So the pump had a line au-ached

12

13

to it'!

13

14

A. lt had lines with it. It ro lled up
lines in a coup le of -- I don't know what you would

14
15

call them.
Q. Like a firchose almost'?
A. Yeah, firchoscs.
Q. Okay. How mau y feet , approximately, of

16
17

j20

line came with it ?

121

A. Tthink there was about a thousand or
1.200 feet wi th it.
Q. Did you add any rnorc lin e of your own to
it ?
A . J did for a while.

20
21

15

16
17
I

18
19

22
23
24
125

18
19

22
23
I 24

_ j"

A. On my property. Roughly where l d rew
that d itch in at on Exhibi1 -Q. Right here?
A. -- -3 .
Q. Maybe I could ask it beHer this way:
K~ plain the irrigation system. Did you run water
down the ditch to the pump and then into your lines'!
.Just describe it for me.

A. ·1 ran wa1eJ down my pipeline th at 1
installed into a hole, pumped out of the hole into a
li ne that I had layi ng on top of the ground.
Q. And that pipeline was that tfo1t was
plllced when you worked with the N RCS, co rrect?
A. I o.
Q. Thi is different'!
A. Let's stop. Yes, the pipeline from
Sprin g Creek to my property was part of th e NRCS

project.
Q. In September of 2014'!
A . Yes.
Q. Okay. And we'll talk more about that in
a minute, but I just want to keep going rlown th ese
question s.
So you ran it, h ad a s ubmersible pump.
anrl th en that irrigated -- you said "pumped water for

Page 60

Page 58

1
2

3
4
5
6

7

i

Ii

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15

16
17

Q. A nd why did you nood irrigate the I II

124
· 25

physically pla ced'! In Sprin g Creek'?

19

20
21
22
23

L
Ill

2
3

A. Well. because J had a wheflt crop in . I
wanted to -- I \Vantcd more yield .
Q. Did you pla nt your e ntire property with
wheat?
A. Yes.
Q. And you tlood irrigated about IO acres'
worth?
A. Yeah. roughly .
Q. Oka)'· Next on yo ur r esponses yo u
inclicatc that in Scpf-embcr of2014 you "pumped water
for fall plant ing." Is it th e sa me pump -·
A. No .
Q. -- that you u sed ?
Okay. What pump did yon use in 2014?

A. I used a submersible pump.
Q. And was this 011 Spring Creek?
A. This was -- the pump?
Q. Yeah.
A. No it was on my property. We were
u. ing water out of' Spring Creek. yes. J guess I
don't understand what you're ask ing .
Q. That's fair. Where was the pump

18

1

acres?

4

s
6

7

8
9
10

11
12
13
14

15

16
17
18
19

fall plantin g." Was that on the sa me IO acres'?
A. No . \ \'ell. some of it.
Q. Okay. How many acres rlid you pump,
then -- or how many acres did you spread water on in
September of2014?

A. Oh. you know. someth ing like eight.
Eight or ten .
Q. So within the gold area that you drew,
il" s eight acres within that'?
A . l would say it woulJ be maybe a li1tlc
north of that.
Q. Okay.
A. Part ofit, it would he the same.
Q. And then in 2015 yo n have use for stock
wat·er and for irrigation for south area of proper()·.
A . Yep.
Q . Oka)'· On th e same map that yon have the
gold box, wh en you say "south area of the property,"
is that something different than the gold box?

Ye .

20

A.

21
22

Q. Okay. Let's use red , this is again on

23
24
25

Ex hibit-7 . Coulrl you draw where that was loca ted'?
A. r wou ld say maybe something like thi s.
Q. About how many acres do you think that
is'?

J
'I ljll l

office@ ttreportin g.com
T&T R eportin g, LLC
208.529.5491
ttrcporting.com
208.529.5496 FAX

(15) Pages 57 - 60
296 of 514

KIRK JACKSON
Se ptember 26, 2016

BARNES, ct al. vs.
.JA CKSO N

Page

1
2
3

4
5

6
7

8

9

10
ll

I12
13
14
1

15

16
17
18
119

2o

21

22
23
24

25

A . Oh, yeah , 10 or 12 .
Q. And then it sa~·s, "for stock water use."
What stock water system was 011 the prop erty at this
time?
A . The NRCS system .
Q. And 2 016 looks pretty identical to ' 15
in terms of the stock water 11 c and thr irrigation of
the south nrea ; is that corrccl? Did you irriga1('
the same acre11ge'?
I\. For a time.
Q. What do ~·ou mean by thnt?
A. \VelL I irri gated up until about the
10th of .July when your cli ent decided to turn his
water on .
Q. This was in 2016?
A. Yes.
Q. What wa the point of diversion that you
used in 2015 and 2016'?
A. A temporary pipe that I put in after my
main system was tom out.
Q. By Craig Bloxham?
A. Yes. and others.
Q. Okay. And t·hat temporary pipe, is that
upstream from the Barnes' point of diversion?
A. Yes.

4
5

6
7

Q. To make sure that the water right fit
wi th whcr(' you were pulling w11tcr -A. Yes .
Q. -- 80 feet above the diversion'?
A. Tha t's con ect.
Q . And that ha s not been approved yet, has
it'?

A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. So were you using water from
10 an unauthorized point of diver ion in September 2015
11 and '16?
12
A . Not to my point of view.
13
Q. Okay.
14
A. 111 2013 l wen t into the division of
15 water resources. I asked them what I needed to do to
16 put in a second diversion and a pipeli ne be1:a use I
17 was being denied access to my wa ter. And they looked
18 it up, they told me that a long as I stayed on the
19
I0-acre piece that was designated as the point of
2 o diversion, 1hey felt I wa fine.
21
Q. Okay. \:Vho told you that?
22
A. 1 don't recall hi name. I have his
2 3 business card .
Q. Was it James Cefalo'?
24
A. i o.
8

9
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1
2
3

4

s
6

7

8

Q. How far upstream?
/\ . 82 fee l.
Q . Now. you're also involved iu a separnte
aclministrafh·c proceedin g before the Jdaho Department
of Water Resources to amend your wllfer rights,
correct?
A. Yeah .
Q. Okay. Why did ) 'OIi file that application
for transfer?
A. I don't beli eve it is an application for
transfer. i · ii?
Q. l won't mark it. this might refresh your
memory. But I can represent to you that's the

I.~~
18

19
20
12 1

22
23
24
1
25

document and it says at the top "Application For
Transfer.'' So "transfer" i term of art in the water
law world. It means you change one of the clements
of tlw water right.
A. All right. Yep.
Q. Do you recall filing that npplication'?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And I protested on behalf of the Barnes,
correct'!
A . Yep, that's correct.
Q. What was the purpose of that transfer?

A.. It was for my point uf diversion.
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1
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

10

11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Q . Was it Blake Jordan'?
A. l don't think so.
Q. Was it Dennis Dunn?
A. No, it wasn't Dennis.
Q. Okay. So in this trnnsfer application,
there's a map associated with it that says "Current
POD" and "J>roposed POD"· do )'OU see that?
A. Yep.
Q. Did the Depnrtment of Water Resources
help you prepare lhat mnp?
A. Yeah, Tthink so.
Q. And it depicts the r ed dot is different
than the green dot, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And so is it still your position that
you're not changing the point of diversion of the
historic point of divc!rsion for the water rights?
A . No. that wasn't my position to begin
with. My pos ition wa · J had gone to the Department
of Water Resource and been told that· as long as T
stayed on the 10-acrc piece -- becau ·c the point of
diversion for this water rig.ht is a I 0-acre piece of
ground , they told me as long as I i-taycd on the JO
acres. J wasn't changi ng the point of dive rsion. And
I think if you read the law, th at's what it says.

L

"]111-l
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Case Number Resu lt Page
Bannock
1 Cases Found.
State of Idaho vs. Craig V Bloxham
No hearings scheduled
C

CR-2015-0014311ase : MD

Magistrate Judge: R. Todd Garbett

Charges: Violation Date Charge

Citat ion

07/24/2015 Original: 118-7001 {F}
Property-Malicious Injury
to Property
Amended: 118-4306
Water-Injuries to Ditches,
Canals and Appurtenances
Officer: Bannock County,
Prosecutor, 9000

Amou nt$3 566.68
due:
'
Degree

Closed
pending
clerk action

Disposition

Felony
Finding: Guilty
Misdemeanor Disposition
date: 07/28/2016
Fines/fees: $173.50
Jail: 60 days
Suspended Jail: 60
days
Probation Type:
Unsupervised
Term: 24 months

Regis~er Date
of actions:

09/30/2015
09/30/2015
09/30/2015
09/30/2015
09/30/2015
09/30/2015
09/30/2015
09/30/2015
10/08/2015
10/08/2015

Kim
New Case Filed-Felony
Prosecutor Assigned Matthew G Kerbs
Criminal Complaint; Malicious Injury to Property, IC 18-7001;
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 10/16/2015 01 :15 PM)
Summons Issued Bloxham, Craig V
Felony Summons Issued
Case Sealed
Summons Returned Bloxham, Craig V; SERVED 10-6-15
Felony Summons Returned

1011612015 Defendan~: Bloxham, Craig V Order Appointing Public Defender Public defender Randall
D Schulthtes

10/16/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 11/05/2015 10:30 AM)
10/16/2015 Order to Attend Preliminary Hearing
1011612015 H_earing result for Arraignment scheduled on 10/16/2015 01 :00 PM: Arraignment/
First Appearance Summons

10/22/2015 FIRST Request for Discovery/DA
1110512015 Hear!ng result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 11/05/2015 10:30 AM:
Continued

11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/05/2015
11/13/2015
11/19/2015

Waiver Of Speedy Trial
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 11/19/2015 10 :30 AM)
Notice Of Hearing
Response TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY/PA
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 12/03/2015 10 :30 AM)

1111912015 Hear!ng result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 11/19/2015 10:30 AM:
Continued
,
11/19/2015 Notice Of Hearing
1210312015 Hea_rin_g result fo: Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 12/03/2015 10:30 AM:
Prel1m1nary Hearing Held

12/09/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 12/14/2015 09:30 AM)
1210912015 Prosecuting Attorney's Information; Charge "Malicious Injury to Property, IC 187001;"
Hearing result for Arraignment scheduled on 12/14/2015 09 :30 AM : District Court
113

https:l/www.idcourts .us/repository/caseNumberResults.do
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12/14/2015 Hearing Held Court Reporter: Sheri Nothelphim Number of Transcript Pages for this
hearing estimated: less 100
12/14/2015 Plea is entered for charge: - NG (118-7001 {F} Property-Malicious Injury to Property)
12/14/2015 Request for Discovery (Kerbs for State)
12/15/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Pre-trial Conference 02/01/2016 04:00 PM)
12/15/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/17/2016 09:00 AM)
1211512015 Minute Entry and Order; Def plea not guilty; set trial and pretrial; release continued;
transcript of preliminary hearing ordered; s/ J Dunn 12/15/15
12/31/2015 Transcript Filed 12/3/15 preliminary hearing
01/29/2016 Continued (Jury Trial 03/15/2016 09:00 AM)
0112912016 Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference scheduled on 02/01/2016 04:00 PM: Hearing
Held
01/29/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Pre-trial Conference 02/29/2016 04:00 PM)
02/09/2016 Supplemental Response to Request fro Discovery (Kerbs for State)
03/03/2016 Continued (Jury Trial 05/17/2016 09:00 AM)
0310312016 Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference scheduled on 02/29/2016 04:00 PM: Hearing
Held
03/03/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Pre-trial Conference 05/02/2016 04:00 PM)
05/03/2016 Stipulation to Continue Trial Setting ICR 27 (Def; Schul;thies)
05/04/2016 Continued (Jury Trial 06/21/2016 09:00 AM)
0510412016 Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference scheduled on 05/02/2016 04:00 PM: Hearing
Held
05/04/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Pre-trial Conference 06/06/2016 04:00 PM)
06/01/2016 Motion to Dismiss or Amend (Schulhties for Def)
06/01/2016 Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Amend (Schulthies for Def)
06/02/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/06/2016 09:30 AM)
0610612016 Charge Reduced Or Amended (118-4306 Water-Injuries to Ditches, Canals and
Appurtenances)
06/06/2016 Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 06/21/2016 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated
0610612016 Hearing result for Pre-trial Conference scheduled on 06/06/2016 04:00 PM: Hearing
Vacated
0610612016 Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/06/2016 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing
Held Court Reporter: Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:
0610812016 Minute Entry and Order; Amended Pros Atty Info filed; case REMANDED to Judge
Garbett; J Dunn
06/09/2016 Hearing Scheduled (State/County PD Pretrial Conference 06/23/2016 11 :00 AM)
06/09/2016 Notice Of Hearing
0612312016 Hearing result for State/County PD Pretrial Conference scheduled on 06/23/2016
11:00 AM: Continued: Pretiral Stipulation and Orders/ Garbett 6/23/16
0612312016 Hearing Sc~eduled (Restitution Hearing 07/28/2016 03:00 PM) will be senetenced at
the same time
07/28/2016 Restitution Ordered 3543.18 victim# 1
0712812016 Hearing result for Restitution Hearing scheduled on 07/28/2016 03:00 PM: Hearing
Held will be sentenced at the same time
Court
Finding: Guilty- (118-4306 Water-Injuries to Ditches, Canals and
0712812016
Appurtenances)
0712812016 Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4306 Water-Injuries to Ditches, Canals and
Appurtenances) Confinement terms: Jail: 60 days. Suspended jail: 60 days.
0712812016 Probation Ordered (118-4306 Water-Injuries to Ditches, Canals and Appurtenances)
Probation term: 0 years 24 months 0 days. (Unsupervised)
07/28/2016 Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action
0712812016 Sentenced To Pay Fine 157.50 charge: 118-4306 Water-Injuries to Ditches, Canals
and Appurtenances

2/3
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EXHIBIT9
AFFIDAVIT OF
PETER M. WELLS
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1.

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES

FEB 2 8 2014

Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership

Departmant of Water Resourcer
Eastern Region

List the nwnbers of all water rights and/or adjudication claim records to be changed. If you only acquired a portion of
the water right or adjudication claim, check "Yes" in the "Split?" column.
Water Right/Claim No.

Split?

Water Right/Claim No.

Yes D

[)

Yes D

1
/l/0?-/ <z_q'
JJ) l~ll'i_
1,l 1I : Yes
1

Yes 0

Yes 0

D
Yes D

Yes

Yes

Water Right/Claim No.

Split?

iq-- /l/(}2--1<&t~ri ~7'-IYes J;i

__ Z..1 ~-

2.

RECEIVED

.
STATE OF IDAHO

Fonn 42-248/42-1409(6} Rev. 03/1 3

Yes

D
D

Split?

I

D
Yes D
Yes O

1

Yes D

1

Yes D

Yes

i

Previous Owner's Name:

3. New Owner(s)/Claimant(s):
Name connector
Mailing address

O and D or

and/or

jJ)__ -~23-Lj,_ ___

State

City

ZlP

/ L>S 3 ;7 - 85L/~
Telephone

4.

Email

If the water rights and/or adjudication claims were split, how did the division occur?

D The water rights or claims were divided as specifically identified in a deed, contract, or other conveyance document.
D The water rights or claims were divided proportionately based on the portion of their place(s) of use acquired by the new owner.
__,_,./f-/~72'-'/~/,-;...1-'L/:,._.,._ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

5.

Date you acquired ihe water rights and/or claims listed above : _

6.

If the water right described herein has been rented from the Water Supply Bank, rental proceeds will be disbursed in the following
manner regardless of any arrangements between the buyer(s) and sell er(s) to the contrary:
• Rental payments will go to the lessor(s) of record at the beginning of the rental season.
• If a change in ownership is processed by the Department during a rental season, rental payment will be made to the person or
entity who is the lessor of record at the beginning of that rental season.
• New lessor(s) of record will receive payment after the following rental season.

7.

This form must be signed and submitted with the following REQUIRED items:
• A copy of the conveyance document - warranty deed, quitclaim deed, court decree, contract of sale, etc. The conveyance
document must include a legal description of the property or description of the water right(s) if no land is conveyed.
• Plat map, survey map or aerial photograph which clearly shows the place of use and point of diversion for each water right
and/or claim listed above (if necessary to clarify division of water rights or complex property descriptions).
• Filing fee (see instructions for fimher explanation):
o $25 per undivided water right.
o $100 per split water right.
o No fee is required for pending adjudication claims.

8.

Signature:

t,-t/ f· ~~Title, if applicable

Date

Signature:
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WARRANTY DEED
File No.: 488793-P ( ci)

Date: January 28, 2014

D

For Value Received, Vern Bloxham and Dolores Bloxham, husband and wife, hereinafter called the ~
~.
Granter, hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Chad Barnes and R. Jane Barnes, husband
and wife, hereinafter called the Grantee, whose current address is 22284 N Main
Extension, Downey, IO 83234, the following described premises, situated in Bannock County,
Idaho, to~wit:

Legal Description attached hereto as Exhibit A, and by this referenced incorporated herein,
SUBJECT TO all easements, right of ways, covenants, restrictions, reservations, applicable building and
zoning ordinances and use regulations and restrictions of record, and payment of accruing present year
taxes and assessments as agreed to by parties above.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with its appurtenances, unto the said Grantee, and to the
Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said
Grantee, that the Grantor Is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all
encumbrances except current years taxes, levies, and assessments, and except U.S. Patent reservations,
restrictions, easements of record and easements visible upon the premises, and that Granter will warrant
and defend the same from all claims whatsoever.
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,t ~~A 13.tt2 :)~4--r~
Dolores Bloxham

STATE OF

ss.
COU NTY OF
On this
2 °t day of January, 2014, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
·appeared Vern Bloxham and Dolores Bloxham, known or identified to me to be the person(s) whose
name(s) is/ are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the
'
same.

Notary
for
the
I Public
of
Residing at: $ G<:.a rj e {.,( T
My Commission Expires:
} · 2 - 2.0 I'-/

tA+c...t\

State

+.

NOTARY PUBLIC

GLEN A.PAGE
582526
COMMISSION EXPIRES
MARCH 2, 2014
STATE OF UTAH
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EXHIBIT A
A PARCEL OF LAND LOCATED IN SECTIONS 15 AND 22, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTH, RANGE 37
EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO ANO FURTHER DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15 FROM WHICH THE SOUTH
QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15 BEARS NORTH 89°54'13" WEST 2644.51 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 00° 04'07" EAST 681.66 FEET ALONG THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 22
TO A POINT ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE OF BRUSH CREEK ROAD;
THENCE SOUTH 80°09'28" WEST 1435.34 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE TO
A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 03°53'13" WEST 95,74 FEET TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS
9163;
THENCE SOUTH 89°40'47" WEST 310.92 FEET TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS
9163 SET ON THE EASTERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE OF CAMBRIDGE ROAD; THENCE
NORTH 04°59'14" WEST 493.87 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE LINE TO A FOUND
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 85°49'47" EAST 405.97 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE TO A FOUND REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 00°36'54" WEST 162.22 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A FOUND REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 03°12'13" WEST 152.06 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A POINT ON THE
NORTH UNE OF SAID SECTION 22;
THENCE SOUTH 89°54'13" EAST 36.25 FEET ALONG SAID NORTH LINE;
THENCE NORTH 07°05'44" WEST 197.22 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH
CAP LABELED, PLS 4735;
THENCE NORTH 08°35'33" WEST 501.08 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A FOUND 5/8"
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, LS 2341;
THENCE NORTH 09°42'10" WEST 569.70 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE TO A FENCE
CORNER; THENCE NORTH 78°29'42" EAST 559.39 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE;
THENCE NORTH 84°37'33" EAST 21.44 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE;
THENCE NORTH 88°41'17" EAST 970,65 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE LINE AND IT'S EXTENSION
TO A POINT ON THE EAST UNE OF SAID SECTION 15;
THENCE SOUTH 00°04'30" WEST 1390.79 FEET ALONG SAID EAST LINE TO THE TRUE POINT
OF BEGINNING.
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www.idwr.idaho.gov/apr

'3earctvviewPedigree.asp?BasinNumber=29&Sequence

r= 14032&SplitSuffix= &Process=WR

Pedigree Search (History of Water Right Number
splits)
Water Right Pedigree for 29-10420
-- Water Right Number/ Status /Reason for split
--29-10420 /PARENT /Ownership Change
--29-14031 /Active /Ownership Change
--29-14115 /Active /Ownership Change
--29-14032 /Active /Ownership Change

1/1

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/vieNPedigree.asp?BasinNumber=29&SequenceNum ber=14032&Spl itSuffix=%20%20&Process=WR
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Electronically Recorded by Simplifile

AFTER RECORDING MAIL TO:
Vern Bloxham and Dolores Bloxham
494 North Main
Downey, ID 83234

QUITCLAIM DEED
File No.: 488793-P (ci)

Date: January 03, 2014

For Value Received, Craig V, Bloxham as his sole and separate property and Eagle Eyes, Ltd., a
Deleware corporation, do(es) hereby convey, release, remise, and forever quit claim unto Vern
Bloxham and Dolores Bloxham, husband and wife, whose address Is 494 North Main, Downey,
ID 83234, herein after called the Grantee, the following described premises situated in Ban~ock
County, Idaho, to-wit:
Legal Description attached hereto as Exhibit A, and by this referenced Incorporated herein.

together with its appurtenances.
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In strument: 21400286 Page :0

APN :

Quitclaim Deed • continued

File No.: 488793-P (ci)

Date: 01/03/2014

Craig V. Bloxham

STATE OF
COUNTYOF

(]UhJ/1.&l A
S~tJ\M--/

)

ss.
)

On this O'i day of January, 2014, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
appeared Juli Bolxham, ltf:lewn or identified to me, to be the Chairperson of the Corporation that
executed the instrument or the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said Corporation,
and acknowledged to me that such Corporation executed the same.

Nota
ubllc of .f' 4,.,_, /.-, l o1i...~r1,
Residing at: , s,>"I" \-( s -i- ~ v l)t("" u
Commission Expires:
O'-' { 1.-1, / 1>~

c;

on-

Page 2 of 4
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Instrument : 21400286 Page :0

APN:

Dated:

Qultdalm Deed • contlnued

File No. : 488793-P (cl)
Date: 01/03/2014

.JAN -;J, 2..014-

Eagle Eyes, Ltd.

STATE OF
COUNlY OF

)

ss.
)

On this _
day of January, 2014, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally
appeared lull Bolxham, known or identified to me, to be the Chairperson of the Corporation that
executed the instrument or the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said Corporation,
and acknowledged to me that such Corporation executed the same.

Notary Public of _ _ _ _ __
Residing at: _ _ _ _ __
Commission Expires: _ __ _ _ __

Page 2 of 4
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APN:

Quitclaim Deed - continued

Idaho

STATE OF

FIie No.: 488793-P (d)
Date: 01/03/2014

)

ss.
Bannock

COUNTY OF

)

On this .:S~) day of January, 2014, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared
Craig V. Bloxham, known or identified to me to be the person(s) whose name(s) is subscribed to the

within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

.....
" e1. ,,,

,,,, UB,,,,,.'•,··. -
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J'l'ATE
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,,,,..,. .
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~

.

....

.

...-

<Tfwa.h1Ak/2J

Notary Public of Idaho
Residing at: Po Q. ATh"1.-W
/ f)
Commission Expires:
·, - I 7 -Zo t 8

~'\
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Quitclaim Deed • continued

File No. : 488793-P (cl)
Date : 01/03/2014

EXHIBIT A
A PARCEL OF LAND LOCATED IN SECTIONS 15 AND 22, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTH, RANGE 37
EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO AND FURTHER DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15 FROM WHICH THE SOUTH
QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15 BEARS NORTH 89°54'13" WEST 2644.51 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 00° 04'07" EAST 681.66 FEET ALONG THE EAST UNE OF SAID SECTION 22
TO A POINT ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE OF BRUSH CREEK ROAD;
THENCE SOUTH 80°09'28" WEST 1435.34 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE TO
A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 03°53'13" WEST 95.74 FEET TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS

9163;
THENCE SOUTH 89°40'47" WEST 310.92 FEET TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS
9163 SET ON THE EASTERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE OF CAMBRIDGE ROAD; THENCE
NORTH 04°59'14" WEST 493.87 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE TO A FOUND
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 85°49'47" EAST 405.97 FEET ALONG A FENCE UNE TO A FOUND REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 00°36'54" WEST 162.22 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A FOUND REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 03°12'13" WEST 152.06 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A POINT ON THE
NORTH UNE OF SAID SECTION 22;
THENCE SOUTH 89°54'13" EAST 36,25 FEET ALONG SAID NORTH UNE;
THENCE NORTH 07°05'44" WEST 197.22 FEET ALONG A FENCE UNE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH
CAP LABELED, PLS 4735;
THENCE NORTH 08°35'33" WEST 501.08 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A FOUND 5/8"
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, LS 2341;
THENCE NORTH 09°42'10" WEST 569.70 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A FENCE
CORNER; THENCE NORTH 78°29'42" EAST 559.39 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE;
THENCE NORTH 84°37'33" EAST 21.44 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE;
THENCE NORTH 88°41'17" EAST 970.65 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE AND IT'S EXTENSION
TO A POINT ON THE EAST UNE OF SAID SECTION 15;
THENCE SOUTH 00°04'30" WEST 1390.79 FEET ALONG SAID EAST UNE TO THE TRUE POINT
OF BEGINNING.

r
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WARRANTY DEED
File No.: 488793-P ( cl)

Date: January 28, 2014

For Value Received, Vern Bloxham and Dolores Bloxham, husband and wife, hereinafter called the
Grantor, hereby grants, bargains, sells and conveys unto Chad Barnes and R. Jane Barnes, husband
and wife, hereinafter called the Grantee, whose current address is 22284 N Main
Extension, Downey, ID 83234, the following described premises, situated In Bannock County,
Idaho, to-wit:

~.t)

Legal Description attached hereto as Exhibit A, and by this referenced Incorporated herein.
SUBJECT TO all easements, right of ways, covenants, restrictions, reservations, applicable building and
zoning ordinances and use regulations and restrictions of record, and payment of accruing present year
taxes and assessments as agreed to by parties above.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with its appurtenances, unto the said Grantee, and to the
Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. And the said Grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said
Grantee, that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of said premises; that said premises are free from all
encumbrances except current years taxes, levies, and assessments, and except U.S. Patent reservations,
restrictions, easements of record and easements visible upon the premises, and that Grantor will warrant
and defend the same from all claims whatsoever.
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,t /J~Al>up~001ores Bloxham

STATE OF

)
ss.

COUNlY OF

)

On this
2 °t day of January, 2014, before me, a Notary Public In and for said State, personally
appeared Vern Bloxham and Dolores Bloxham, known or Identified to me to be the person(s) whose
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the
same.
'

the
Notary 1 \ Public
for
of
l.{TG..r\
Residing at: 2+· C, ~'j e U1
My Commission Expires:
3 · 2 - 20 /l/

State

NOTARY PUBLIC

GLENR, PAGE
582526
COMMISSION EXPIRES
MARCH 2, 2014
STATE OF UTAH
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EXHIBIT A
A PARCEL OF LAND LOCATED IN SECTIONS 15 AND 22, TOWNSHIP 11 SOUTH, RANGE 37
EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO AND FURTHER DESCRIBED AS
FOLLOWS:
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15 FROM WHICH THE SOUTH
QUARTER CORNER OF SAID SECTION 15 BEARS NORTH 89°54'13" WEST 2644.51 FEET;
THENCE SOUTH 00° 04'07" EAST 681.66 FEET ALONG THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 22
TO A POINT ON THE NORTHERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE OF BRUSH CREEK ROAD;
THENCE SOUTH 80°09'28" WEST 1435.34 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE TO
A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 03°53'13" WEST 95.74 FEET TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS

9163;
THENCE SOUTH 89°40'47" WEST 310.92 FEET TO A FOUND REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS
9163 SET ON THE EASTERLY RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE OF CAMBRIDGE ROAD; THENCE
NORTH 04°59'14" WEST 493.87 FEET ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY FENCE UNE TO A FOUND
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 85°49'47" EAST 405.97 FEET ALONG A FENCE UNE TO A FOUND REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 00°36'54" WEST 162,22 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A FOUND REBAR
WITH CAP LABELED, PLS 9163;
THENCE NORTH 03°12'13" WEST 152,06 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A POINT ON THE
NORTH LINE OF SAID SECTION 22;
THENCE SOUTH 89°54'13" EAST 36.25 FEET ALONG SAID NORTH UNE;
THENCE NORTH 07°05'44" WEST 197.22 FEET ALONG A FENCE LINE TO A 5/8" REBAR WITH
CAP LABELED, PLS 4735;
THENCE NORTH 08°35'33" WEST 501.08 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A FOUND 5/8"
REBAR WITH CAP LABELED, LS 2341;
THENCE NORTH 09°42'10" WEST 569.70 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE TO A FENCE
CORNER; THENCE NORTH 78°29'42" EAST 559.39 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE;
THENCE NORTH 84°37'33" EAST 21.44 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE;
THENCE NORTH 88°41'17" EAST 970.65 FEET ALONG SAID FENCE UNE AND IT'S EXTENSION
TO A POINT ON THE EAST LINE OF SAID SECTION 15;
THENCE SOUTH 00°04'30" WEST 1390.79 FEET ALONG SAID EAST UNE TO THE TRUE POINT
OF BEGINNING.
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Robert L. Harris (I. S.B. No. 70 I 8)
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
I 000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holden1ega1.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
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Attorneys for had and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARN ES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Countcrclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (the "Barneses"), by and through their counsel of record
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., submit this reply memorandum in support of their

Motion/or Summa,yJudgment filed January 15, 2016.
The Barneses are entitled to summary judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56, because- despite the arguments of Kirk Jackson ("Jackson") otherwise- there is
no genuine issue of fact concerning the forfeiture of Jackson's water right by non-use or the
Barneses' use of their water right during the periods relevant to this case and the Barnes are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Further, the Barneses are entitled to attorney ' s fees
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 , since the defenses and counterclaim are frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Barneses incorporate their prior description of the facts giving rise to this case and
will use the same terms defined in the Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment, filed October 3, 2016 (the "Amended MSJ Memorandum"). In response
to the Amended MSJ Memorandum and in opposition to the Barneses ' Motion for Summary
Judgment, on October 17, 2016, Jackson filed an Objection to Motion/or Summary Judgment, a
Memorandum in Support of Defendant 's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summa,y Judgment

(the " Objection Memorandum"), and two supporting affidavits.
Jackson's Objection Memorandum does not truly contest any factual point relating to
whether 29-14032 has been forfeited. Instead, the Objection Memorandum makes two legal
arguments, which are addressed below. See Section IL, infra. However, when asked to "identify
which exemptions provided in Idaho Code § 42-223 and common law you claim exempt 2914032 from forfeiture," Harris Aff, Ex. C, p. 7 (Interrogatory No. 12), Jackson only responded
with the two issues argued in the Amended MSJ Memorandum, p. 16- namely, (l) that the
Jackson property was under the control of the Bankruptcy Trustee and thus it was beyond
Bloxham's control to irrigate with 29-14032; and (2) that Bloxham's actions in preventing
Jackson from accessing his water right across the Bloxham Property were beyond Jackson's
control and prevented Jackson from exercising 29-14032. Harris Aff., Ex. C, p. 7 (Response to
IntetTOgatory No. 12). Jackson abandons these arguments and has not contested them, at a
minimum entitling the Barneses to summary judgment on those issues.
Instead, the Objection Memorandum makes two new arguments, which were not
identified in discovery. Despite the difficulties inherent in being asked to hit a moving target, the
Barneses are still entitled to summary judgment because they have shown, by clear and
convincing evidence, that 29-14032 has been forfeited by five years of non-use; that no
2 -
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exemptions prevent its forfeiture ; and that use of 29-14032 was not resumed before another
claim of right had been made.

Further, neither of Jackson' s legal arguments raised in the

Objection Memorandum are availing.

II. ARGUMENT
A. Jackson, together with his predecessors-in-interest, has forfeited 29-14032.
Jackson argues that his " water right was never forfeited because [ 1] all of the available
water assigned to the water right was used on the prope1ty and any non[-]use of water on
Jackson ' s property was the result of lack of water; futthermore, [2] the statutory period of nonuse was tolled during the time the real property was part of the bankruptcy estate." Objection

Memorandum, p. 8. Each of these arguments, addressed in turn below, are inc01Tect.
First, the "lack of water" claimed by Jackson as a circumstance beyond his control
misapprehends Idaho water law because the Jackson Property, to which his water right is (and
was) appurtenant was entitled to water during the entire forfeiture period of non-use. Thus,
Jackson ' s water right, 29-14032, was forfeited because, despite being available to some water in
priority, there was no water actually applied to the Jackson property for (at least) the five-year
statutory forfeiture period.
Second, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (the "Automatic Stay" or "§ 362") does not apply as Jackson
claims. The application of the Automatic Stay to toll a statutory time period was settled in Idaho
and a majority of jurisdictions some 30 years ago, in favor of applying 11 U.S.C. § l 08 (which
explicitly tolls time) rather than § 362. While the Barneses have not found a case with these
exact facts, there is no reason to distinguish the running of a statutory forfeiture period from the
expiration of a statutory right of redemption following a foreclosure.

3 -
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1. The use of the available water, even all the available water, elsewhere by

Jackson's predecessors-in-interest is irrelevant to the consideration of whether
29-14032, Jackson's portion of 29-10420, was forfeited by five years of non-use
011 the Jackson Property.
One point that must be addressed is Jackson ' s statement that "it is important to remember
that until 2012[,] Water Right 29-14032 did not exist,' and the implication that it would be
impossible to forfeit something by five years of non-use when it has not existed for five years.

Objection Memorandum , p. 8. The implication is absolutely incorrect, and Jackson' s statement
is only partially correct. Before 2012, there was no water right numbered 29- 14032; however
that is because what is now 29-14032 was part of 29-10420 (which Jackson appropriately calls
the "parent right, ' Objection Memorandum, p. 6). A water right is a 'complement of, or one of
the appurtenances of, the land or other thing to which, through necessity, said water is being
applied. "

rdaho

Code § 42-101.

Thus, whenever the land is conveyed, any water right

associated with the land is also conveyed, unless the deed makes special mention or deals
otherwise with the water right. See Russell v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, _ _ , 118 P. 501 , 502 (1911).
The split is merely an administrative action, routinely completed by the Idaho Department of
Water Resources (" IDWR") in order to track actual ownership of the water right. See Mullinix v.

Kil/gore's Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269,272, 346 P.3d 286, 289 (2015). It is for this
reason that even though Jackson submitted the Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership on
May 31 , 2012, his ownership of the water right (which would be administratively assigned
number 29-14032) dated back to April 26, 2012- when he purchased the Jackson Property ( even
though Jackson erroneously indicated he acquired the water right on May l 0, 2012). Harris AjJ.,
Ex. F. When only part of the property associated with a water right is sold, the water right is
split propo11ionately according to the acreage, again unless the deed reserves the water right or
expressly asserts a different allocation of the split of the water right. See Russell v. Irish , 20

4 -
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Idaho 194 _

, 118 P. 501 , 502 (1911) ( In the first place, it is well established that a water right

is an appm1enance to the land on which it has been and will pass by conveyance of the land. A
division of the land would divide the appurtenant water right in the same proportion as it
divided the land . .. It had become appurtenant to the whole tract, and not to a specific portion

thereof, or alone to the 60 acres retained by [Russell]" (emphasis added)). Further, such a split
water right would share the very same priority date with all of the other rights derived from the
same parent right.
The priority date of a water right is of vital importance. This is because "[a]s between
appropriators [of water], the first in time is the first in right." Idaho Code § 42-106. Thus, the
priority· date of a water right records when the water was first legally appropriated. When a
water right is split, as described above, each child right shares the same priority date as its parent
right. Here, this is demonstrated by the fact that each of the water rights split from 29-10420 has
exactly the same priority date: May 19, 1920. See Affidavit of Peter M Well ·, Ex. 6, pp. I , 3,
and 5 (showing, respectively, this priority date for 29-14031 , the Bloxham right; 29-14032, the
Jackson right; and 29-14115, the Bameses right). Sharing a priority date is the reason that split
rights will share any and all available water "in proportion to the share that each [property]
represents of the property described [in the decreed parent right]." Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho
461 , 467,690 P.2d 916,922 (1984).
The final important doctrine underlying discussion of Jackson's first argument is par1ial
forfeiture of a water right. While Idaho Code § 42-222(2) does not mention partial forfeiture, the
Idaho Supreme Court has unequivocally held "that partial forfeiture is provided for by (Idaho
Code]§ 42-222(2)." State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727 735 947 P.2d
400, 408 ( 1997). The Court explained:

5 -
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A water user is not entitled to waste water. It follows that a water right
holder cannot avoid a partial forfeiture by wasting that portion of his or
her water right that cannot be put to beneficial use during any part of the
statutory period. If a water user cannot apply a portion of a water right to
beneficial use during any part of the statutory period , but must waste the
water in order to divert the full amount of the water right, a forfeiture has
taken place.

Id. In other words, mere use of a water right is insufficient to save it from forfeiture or partial
forfeiture- the water must be put to beneficial use.

Id.

In this way, forfeiture and partial

forfeiture further the important "goal of securing maximum use and benefit of our natural water
resources" by ensuring "that water [is] put to beneficial use"-if not by one person, then by
another. Id. A well-known Idaho treatise regarding water law provides a helpful example:
consider the situation where a farmer has a 4 cfs [or cubic feet per second]
water right to irrigate 200 acres, but then takes 50 acres out of irrigation
for use as a processing facility, a housing development, or some other nonirrigated use. The "forfeiture clock" would begin running as to a portion of
the water right. After five years, one-fourth of the water right, or 1 cfs,
would be subject to a ruling that it had been forfeited. Such a result is
hardly surprising, given that the foundational principles of the prior
appropriation doctrine are beneficial use, the avoidance of waste and
maximum use of the resource.
Jeffrey C. Fereday et al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK 43 (Givens Pursley LLP, September 1, 2016)
(available at: http://www.givenspursley.com/uploads/pdf/water-law-handbook-9-15-16.pdf) .
It is because of this proper understanding of the genesis of 29-14032 and the doctrine of
partial forfeiture that Jackson's first argument is unavailing. The crux of Jackson's argument
reduces to: 29-14032 "was never forfeited because all of the available water assigned to the
water right was used on the property and any nonuse of water on Jackson's property was the
result of a lack of water," and since " the amount of water that a stream produces is beyond the
control of the water user ... [the] failure to use the water on Jackson's property up [to] and until
2012, was outside the control of Jackson or Bloxham." Objection Memorandum, pp. 8-9.

6 -
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Jackson ' s argument incorrectly focuses on the overall availability of water from the
spring rather than the properties' entitlement to water. A water right is "forfeited by a failure
for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated.'
Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Jackson 's argument, that the limited availability of water was beyond
his control, sounds appealing because it is logically true; neither Jackson nor anyone else can
"create more water to use." Objection Memorandum p. 9. However, the relevant issue is how
much of the Jackson Property was entitled to receive the limited water available. Whether under
one right, 29-10420, or under multi.pie child rights, the priority date for the water right

appurtenant to the Jackson Property has always been the same as the water rights
appurtenant to the Bloxham Property or the Barnes Property. C hus, the Jackson Property
has always had the same entitlement to any water available that any other area irrigated by 2910420 had. Bloxham's decision to irrigate the Barnes Property and not the Jackson Prope11y 1
effected a forfeiture of that portion of his right appurtenant to the Jackson Property, which would
later be denoted as 29-14032.
In part, Jackson attempts to rebut this by arguing that Bloxham never intended to
abandon the water right on the Jackson Property. Objection Memorandum, p. 9. Jackson also
contends that the "logical inference" drawn from that absence of intent somehow helps him.

Objection Memorandum, p. 9. However, this tangent misses the point. Abandonment is not the
same as forfeiture-they are two separate processes.

Compare Idaho Code § 42-222(2)

(regarding forfeiture that contains no intent requirement); with Idaho Code§ 42-237 (mentioning

This is not to say that Bloxham, or any irrigator, has to choose between under-irrigating the entire area allowed
under the water right or forfeiting part of the water right. Other options exist, and could have been taken by
Bloxham . For instance, Bloxham could have rotated the location of his irrigation. Since five consecutive years
of non-use forfeit a water right, as long as every part of an authorized place of use is irrigated at least once in a
five year rotation, no portion of the water right is forfeited-even though there was never enough water to
simultaneously irrigate all of the property. That did not occur here.
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abandonment); see also Idaho Department of Water Resources, NOTICE OF ABA DO ME T OF
WATER RIGHT (Rev. 02/ 11) (available at: https ://www.idwr.idaho.gov/files/water-rights/noticeof-abandonment-of-water-right.pdf). While abandonment requires intent (the requisite proof of
mental state), forfeiture clearly does not. See Jenkins v. State Dep 't of Water Resources, 103
Idaho 384, 647 P.2d 1256 (1982) (describing that abandonment ofa water right requires (1) an
intent to give up the right, and (2) an actual relinquishment or surrender of the right.). As a
result, any discussion of Bloxham's intent, or any inference drawn therefrom (reasonable,
logical or otherwise) is absolutely irrelevant to the present consideration of forfeiture.
Here, during the forfeiture timeframe- March 22, 2004, through March 22, 2009Bloxham (and later, the Bankruptcy Trustee) was entitled to use the available water to irrigate
the Jackson Property, in an amount proportional to the percentage of Jackson Property to all of
the property irrigable under 29-10420. This corresponds to the assumption in the example above
that the farmer is entitled to use ¼ of his water ri ght (or 1 cfs out of the decreed 4 cfs) on the 50
acres of his 200-acre farm. Jeffrey C. Fereday et al., WATER L AW HA DBOOK 43. Just as the
fa rmer partially forfeits his water right (i.e., that portion appurtenant to the 50 acres) after five
years of non-use in that example; Bloxham (and later, the Bankruptcy Trustee) forfeited the
portion of 29-10420 appurtenant to the Jackson Property.
The timeline (and the fact of Bloxham's bankruptcy) complicates the facts of this case,
but not the analysis. 29-10420 allowed the itTigation of what would become the Bloxham
Property, the Jackson Property, and the Barnes Property- which are each now irrigated by child
rights, portions of 29-10420, denoted 29-14031, 29-14032, and 29-14115, respectively, by
IDWR. The 'forfeiture clock for 29-10420 was reset by the partial decree of 29- 10420 by the
Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") Court on March 22 , 2004.

8 -
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Bloxham nor anyone else before Jackson ever irrigated the Jackson Property after that date.

Bloxham A.ff,

,1 15-16.

Once Bloxham declared bankruptcy and the Jackson Property entered

his bankruptcy estate ( under the control of the Bankruptcy Trustee), that po1tion of 29-10420
appurtenant to the Jackson Property also entered the bankruptcy estate and came under the
Bankruptcy Trustee's control. However, the Bankruptcy Trustee never used that portion of the
water right (or leased the property to someone who would use it). Thus, by March 22, 2009, the
water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property- now known as 29-14032- was forfeited .2
Jackson has provided no evidence- by affidavit or otherwise-of irrigation before 2012
to rebut the evidence provided by Barnes clearly and convincingly showing that no irrigation
occurred on what would eventually become the Jackson Property after 29-14032 was decreed in
2004 up until at least 2012 when Jackson purchased the property.

Accordingly, summary

judgment in favor of the Bameses is warranted.

2. The Automatic Stay iu the Bankruptcy Code does not operate to toll Idaho's
Statutory Forfeiture period of Water Right 29-14032.
Jackson asserts the application of a portion of the Automatic Stay, which prevents any
entity from taking "any act to obtain possession of propetty of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate." Objection Memorandum , p. 10 (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)). Jackson argues, only in the most generic tenns, that the Automatic Stay,
contained in the Bankruptcy Code, must act in all instances to preserve the "status quo" of the
bankruptcy estate. Objection Memorandum, pp. 10-11. Jackson points out that the result of
applying 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) in this manner is that "the five (5) year period of nonuse
referenced in Idaho Code section 42-222 must be tolled during the period of time the property is
Whether this is a complete forfeiture depends on perspective, but is irrelevant to the conclusion. From the point
of view of the Bankruptcy Trustee (and Jackson), it is a complete forfeiture of the water right appurtenant to the
Jackson Property. From the point of view of Bloxham (and 29- 10420), it is a partial forfeiture of that portion of
the water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property. In either case, however it is termed, the result is the same.
9 -

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM ENT

326 of 514

in the bankruptcy estate" or else "the status quo of the property would be affected and the
purpose of the automatic stay would be thwarted." Objectfon Memorandum, p. 11. Because this
argument can only affect the five years of non-use, it only challenges whether there was ever a
forfeiture of 29-14032, and does not relate in any way to exceptions to forfeiture or resumption
of use. However, Jackson's argument ignores the text of the Bankruptcy Code, stretches one
rationale for the Automatic Stay beyond its limits, and ignores Idaho state law that defines the
prope11y interest that is a water right. Accordingly, this Court should find that 29-14032 was
forfeited by March 22, 2009, after five-years of non-use following its decree (as part of parent
right 29-10420) in the SRBA Court on March 22, 2004. Idaho Code § 42-222(2); see also

Bloxham A.ff.,

~~

15-16; id., Ex. 3. Each of the reasons articulated below is a separate reason

why Jackson's argument is unpersuasive.

a. To the extent the Automatic Stay applies as Jackson contends, the police
and regulatory power enforcement exception allows Idaho Code
§ 42-222(2) to operate.
As an initial matter, the application of 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), an exception to the
Automatic Stay, necessarily presupposes the applicability of the Automatic Stay.

While the

Bameses challenge the applicability of the Automatic Stay, see below, for purposes of this
argument, the Barneses accept (as contended by Jackson) that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) could bar
the application of Idaho Code § 42-222(2) to effect the forfeiture of 29-14032 after five
consecutive years of non-use of the water right-depending on the determination of the
applicability of the exception contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).
The Automatic Stay specifically "does not operate as a stay" under certain circumstances.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b). The relevant exception to this case excepts the stay
under paragraph (1 ), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit' s or
10
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organization's police and regulatory power, including the enforcement of a
judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or
proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit 's
or organization's police or regulatory power.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). This section evidences the "intent that a governmental unit's police or
regulatory action not be litigated in federal bankruptcy court" by "exempt[ing] such an action
from the reach of the automatic stay." City & County of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433
F.3d 1115 1127 (9 th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit3 requires the application of "two alternative
tests to determine whether the actions of a governmental unit are in exercise of its police and
regulatory power as defined in 11 U.S .C. section 362(b )(4): the ' pecuniary purpose ' and the
public policy' test. Satisfaction of either test will suffice to exempt the action from the reach of
the automatic stay." Id. at 1123-24 (internal citations and footnote omitted, emphasis added).
The unstated prerequisite to this analysis is that a governmental unit is acting. While the
active nature of forfeiture under [daho Code § 42-222(2) is fu11her contested below, see Section
[I.A.2.b. , inj,-a , it is presumed for the sake of this argument-co1Tesponding to the presumption
that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (staying "any act to obtain possession ... or to exercise control over
property of the estate" (emphasis added)) applies here. Further, the "acting" party under Idaho
Code § 42-222(2) is the State of Idaho. While the Barneses are asserting that Jackson (and his
predecessors-in-interest) forfeited 29-14032, there is no third party involved in the forfeiture
period, which is five years of non-use. Idaho Code § 42-222(2). It is only the State, "acting"
through the statute, on the owner of the water right (Jackson and his predecessors-in-interest)
that effects the forfeiture. See id.

Idaho state courts are obliged to follow the federal courts' interpretation of federal law, such as the Bankruptcy
Code. James v. City of Boise, Idaho, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686, 193 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2016) ("The Idaho Supreme
Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court's interpretation of federal law"). Because
Idaho is in the Ninth Circuit, this principle demonstrates that the interpretation of federal law provided by the
Ninth Circuit is also binding on Idaho federal and state courts, while the precedent of other courts is persuasive.
11
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First, " [u]nder the pecuniary purpose test, the court determines whether the government
action relates primari ly to the protection of the government's pecuniary interest in the debtor's
property or to matters of safety and welfare." PG & E Co,p., 433 F.3d at 1124-25 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). "If the action primarily seeks to protect the govermnent' s pecuniary
interest, the automatic stay applies. If the suit primari ly seeks to protect the public safety and
welfare, the automatic stay does not apply." Id. at 1124.
Here, the water right forfeiture specified in Idaho Code § 42-222(2) does not relate in any
way to any pecuniary interest of the State of Idaho. Idaho does not get the water back, 4 re-sell
the same water right, or profit in any way from the forfeiture of a water right under Idaho Code

§ 42-222(2). Once forfeited, "such rights to such water ... revert to the state and [are] again
subject to appropriation." Idaho Code § 42-222(2). The beneficial use of water resources is
"declared to be a public use" in the Idaho Constitution. IDAHO CONST. , Art. XV, § 1. Thus,
while " [a]bandonments and forfeitures are not favored " Zezi v. Lighifool, 57 Idaho 707 68 P.2d
50, 52 (1937), allowing wmsed water rights to perish and be beneficially used by another is an
affirmation of the "traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water resources of this
state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts through appropriation." See I.C. §
42-226. Thus the action undertaken by Idaho (i.e. through the forfeiture statute, Idaho Code §
42-222(2)) is in accordance with this traditional policy for the public welfare. As a result, the
pecuniary purpose test is satisfied, meaning 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) excepts the application of
Idaho's forfeiture statute from the staying effects of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).

In a nuance addressed in greater detail below, see Section 11.A.2.d. infra, all of the water flowing in the state of
Idaho (literally all the molecules of H20) belong to the state, Idaho Code § 42-10 l , which then issues water
rights to use that water. The water right (i. e., permission to use the state's water) is the property interest. See
Idaho Code § 55- lOI (including a water right in the definition of real property) . Thus, it is a misnomer (albeit
an understandable one) to perceive that the State of Idaho actually gets anything "back" when a water right is
forfeited , since all the state ever conveyed was permission- akin to a license or grant- to use Idaho' s resource.
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Second ' [u]nder the 'public purpose test, the court determines whether the government
seeks to ' effectuate public policy ' or to adjudicate ' private rights.' '

Id. at 1125 (citation

omitted). ' If the primary purpose of the suit is to effectuate public policy, then the exception to
the automatic stay applies.

However, a suit does not satisfy the public purpose test if it is

brought primarily to advantage discrete and identifiable individuals or entities rather than some
broader segment of the public." Id. (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Here again, Idaho ' s forfeiture statute Idaho Code § 42-222(2), seeks to effectuate the
public policy of having water resources put to beneficial use. That is its primary focus. It is
meant to benefit the citizens of Idaho as a whole. It is difficult to see how Idaho Code § 42222(2) could adjudicate private rights, since there is no actual adjudication involved with the
operation of the five-year forfeiture period.

Further, the forfeiture statute does not benefit

discrete and identifiable individuals; it merely effects the forfeiture of an unused water right.
The fact that a discrete group of individuals- i. e., those asserting forfeiture-may benefit does
not mean that the primary purpose of the forfeiture statute is to benefit them, when the statute
itself does not benefit one person at another' s expense, but applies generally throughout the state.
In sum, the application of Idaho Code § 42-222(2)-to the extent that is an "action"
within the purview of the Automatic Stay- falls within the exception delineated by l l U.S.C. §
362(b)(4) because, while it only has to satisfy one of the Ninth Circuit's tests, it actually satisfies
both. Consequently, Jackson ' s argument that the Automatic Stay tolls the five-year forfeiture
period fails.

b. The Automatic Stay does not apply lo the forfeiture o(a water right, which
requires no affirmative action.
Most courts that have faced the issue of the interaction between the Automatic Stay and
the running of a period of time mandated by statute have been faced with the issue of a right of
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redemption following a foreclosure expiring. While this is not exactly the same as the forfeiture
of a water right, the analysis is persuasive, compelling, and would apply to a statutory forfeiture
period (i.e., the five years of non-use described in Idaho Code§ 42-222) as well as to the period
of time in which a right of redemption must be exercised. This issue was heavily litigated in the
infancy of the Bankruptcy Code (which replaced the prior Bankruptcy Act in 1979) and thus
most of the germane cases arise out of the early 1980s.
The only subsection of the Automatic Stay asserted by Jackson provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, [the filing of a
bankruptcy petition] operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of .. . .
any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of prope11y from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (emphasis added). The legislative history behind this statute shows that

Congress intended the scope of the Automatic Stay's protections to be broad: "All proceedings
are stayed , including arbitration license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings.
Proceeding in this sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceedings even if they are
not before governmental tribunals. "

H.R. Rep. 95-595 , 340, 1978 U.S .C.C.A.N. 5963 , 6297

(emphasis added). Thus, "Paragraph (3) stays any act to obtain property of the estate ... or
property from the estate." Id. at 341 , 1978 U.S.C.C .A.N. at 6298 (emphasis added). Simply, the
Automatic Stay does not apply to toll the running of the forfeiture period mandated by Idaho
Code § 42-222(2) because the running of time is not an act or proceeding that can be stayed.
"Though the circumstances provided for in [the Automatic Stay] are extremely broad , it
seeks to stay affirmative conduct of creditors that would better their position vis-a-vis other
creditors and provide the debtor with some breathing space safe from the hounding of creditors.
Section 362 does not purpoti to alter existing rights between the parties." in re Pridham, 31 B.R.
497, 498 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983). Thus, " [s]ection 362 stays only ' acts' or ' proceedings' of
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nondebtors. What the debtor needs to do to reacquire the property is irrelevant to this analysis.
Under Oregon 's redemption procedure it is clear the purchaser need only wait for the fullness of
time to be blessed with fee title." In re Petersen, 42 B.R. 39, 40 (Bankr. Or. 1984). Simply,
" [t]he mere running of time on contractual rights is not an act of a creditor within the meaning of
Section 362(a)."

Pridham, 31 B.R. at 499.

To ho ld otherwise is to engage in a fiction

(considering the passage of time to be an act) that "would go beyond the scope of conduct sought
to be controlled by Section 362(a)." Id.
The Eighth Circuit has explained that " § 362(a) cannot be read to stay the mere running
of a statutory time period" because the Eighth Circuit cannot agree "that an automatic transfer of
property, following the expiration of a period of[time], constitutes either an ' act ' or ' proceeding '
or the ' enforcement' of a right, within the meaning of§ 362(a)." Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of
Montev;deo, Minn. , 719 F.2d 270, 276 (8 th Cir. 1983). "That Congress intended § 362(a) to
prohibit only certain types of affirmative actions is evidenced by its use of the tenns [' act' or
' proceeding' or ' enforcement' ] and by a corresponding failure to use terms which appropriately
describe the suspension or extension of a statutory time period." Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis
added) .
Here, the thing Jackson is attempting to use § 362(a) to stay is the passage of time itself
or, more particularly, the passage of time in relation to Idaho Code § 42-222(2). That forfeiture
statute categorically provides that a water right is " lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of
five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated. " LC. § 42-222(2).
As the courts above have pointed out, the passage of time is not an act, proceeding, or
enforcement of a right. The Automatic Stay is meant to protect the debtor from the actions of
other entities and individuals- meaning affirmative actions taken by other persons. It is not

l
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meant to protect a debtor from the operation of a statute, the passage of a statutorily-mandated
time period, or from the consequences of his own inaction. These functions are accomplished by
a different statute.
c. The Bankruptcy Code's Tolling Statute, 11 US. C. § 108, rather than the

Automatic Stay applies to any interaction with the five year grace period
involved in Idaho Code§ 42-222(2).
Jackson's argument appeals to portions of the policy underlying the Automatic Stay, but
ignores the complete context of the Bankruptcy Code, which includes a statute that specifically
tolls time limitations. This tolling statute states, in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section [relating to time limitations
for when a debtor must commence an action], if applicable non bankruptcy law, an
order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period
within which the debtor ... may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof of
claim or loss, cure a default, or perform any other similar act, and such period
has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may only
file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later of( 1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occuning on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (emphasis added). This section is meant to "pe1mit the trustee, when he steps
into the shoes of the debtor, an extension of time for filing an action or doing some other act that
is required to preserve the debtor's rights." H.R. Rep. 95-595, 318, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6275;

see also S. Rep. 95-989, 30-31, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5816-17. It is impo11ant to note that
the "order for relief' referenced in 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(2) is not the final discharge, but is "[t]he
commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of [the Bankruptcy Code]." 11 U .S.C. §
30l(b).
An important principle of construing the Bankruptcy Code, like any act enacted as a
cohesive scheme, is that "where one section of the Code explicitly governs an issue, another
section should not be interpreted to cause an irreconcilable conflict." In re Liddle, 75 B.R. 41,
16
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44 (Bankr. Mont. 1987) (quoting In re Cucumber Creek Development, Inc., 33 B.R. 820, 822 (D.
Colo. 1983)). The goal is to read "potentially conflicting statutes in a manner to give full effect
to both sections." Pridham, 31 B.R. at 499.
In the context of this discussion, " [t]he Bankruptcy Code contains a specific statute, 11
U.S.C. § 108, which clearly defines the effect of the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding on
time periods which have commenced and which might affect the debtor and other interested
parties." Petersen , 42 B.R. at 41. "Specifically, § 108(b) requires the trustee, or debtor-inpossession, to act within the time period established by that subsection if he is to avoid the effect
of non-action. If this court were to find that § 362(a) tolled the debtor's period of redemption, it
would necessarily also need to find that with regard to periods of redemption the statute of
limitations established by § 108(b) is superfluous. Nothing in the legislative history of § 108
indicates a congressional intent that that section not apply to any and all relevant time periods
within which the debtor and other interested parties find themselves. " Id.
Thus, the fact "that Congress expressly addressed the issue of the time in which a debtor
will have to cure a default in 11 U.S.C. Section 108(b)," is an "important factor in interpreting
the scope of Section 362( a) to not include the running of time within the automatic stay." Id. In
other words, if a court " interpreted Section 362(a) to apply to the running of time for the curing
of a default, Section 108(a) would be superfluous because the cure period would never expire
absent relief from the stay being granted. " Id. Because such superfluities ought to be avoided in
harmonizing two statutes, a court should " hold[] the running of time to be outside the scope of
the stay imposed by Section 362, [in order to] give full effect to the intention of Congress as
expressed by Section 108(a)." Id.
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Stated differently, " [s]ection I 08(b) is a clear Congressional command that the rights of a
redemption purchaser can be stayed for no longer than sixty (60) days. " In re Rullerbush, 34
B.R. 101 , 102 (E.D. Mich. 1982). This clear Congressional command is so unambiguous that
even a Bankruptcy Court's general equitable power to "issue any order process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]," 11 U.S.C. §
l05(a) is "overruled with respect to this case by 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)," and cannot extend any
applicable deadlines beyond what § l 08 allows since to do so would be to subve1t, rather than
carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Rutterbush, 34 B.R. at 102.
This reasoning is reflected in the view of this issue taken by a majority of courts, which is
that "§ 362 is inapplicable, and that state redemption rights may be preserved and extended only
to the extent provided by§ 108." Liddle, 75 B.R. at 42 (quoting Cucumber Creek Development,
33 B.R. at 821 ). This majority view has been adopted by numerous district and bankruptcy
courts and in several circuits. Johnson, 719 F.2d at 278 (the Eighth Circuit)· Matter of Tynan
773 F.2d 177, 179-80 (7 th Cir. 1985); In re Glenn , 760 F.2d 1428, 1440 (6 th Cir. 1985); Counties
Contracting and Construction Co. v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 1054, 1059 (3 rd Cir.
1988); see also In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying § 362 to stay any action to
enforce a lien, but§ l08(c) to toll the running of time to renew the lien); In re Shamus Holdings,
LLC, 642 F.3d 263 (1 st Cir. 2011) (contrasting the Automatic Stay of§ 362(a) with the "tolling
provision" of§ l 08 and applying them similar to Morton).

It does not appear that the minority view has been accepted by any circuit- but only by
district and bankruptcy courts applying unique state law requiring a divergence from the majority
rule. State law becomes relevant because prope1ty rights are defined by state law unless there is
a direct conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. Butner v. U.S. , 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918,
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59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); see also Section 11.A.2.d., infra. For example this minority view is held
in Arizona, where- under Arizona state law and the Ninth Circuit' s interpretation of Arizona
state law under the Bankrnptcy Act, which preceded the current Bankruptcy Code- " the right of
redemption under the Arizona statute is a matter of state law and is prope1ty of the estate ... and
[thus the Automatic Stay] tolls the running of a debtor's statutory right of redemption in
Arizona." In re Sapphire Investments, 19 B.R. 492 , 495 (Bankr. Ari z. 1982). However, this
minority view has only "been reached in jurisdictions which require that some affirmative

action be taken by a creditor or by a third party in order to transfer full title to property upon the
expiration of the period of redemption ." Johnson 719 F.2d at 277 (emphasis added) ; see also
Section 11.A.2.b. supra.
While the Ninth Circuit itself has not explicitly spoken on this issue, both the Ninth
Circuit' s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (the " BAP") and the Idaho Bankruptcy Court have adopted
the majority position more than thirty years ago.

The BAP explained, § I 08

provides for

extensions of time to perform various acts. ' In re Santa Fe Development and Mortg. Corp., 16
B.R. 165, 167 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981). "The purpose of section 108 is to permit the trustee, when
he steps into the shoes of the debtor[,] an extension of time for filing an action or doing some

other act that is required to preserve the debtor's rights." Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Idaho Bankruptcy Court has found that a " right of redemption, which had
not yet expired as of the date of the commencement of the case under Title 11, became property
of the [bankruptcy] estate." Matter of Markee, 31 B.R. 429, 431 (Bankr. Idaho 1983). The court
was careful to note that the right of redemption "was not expanded or enhanced by the fact

of bankruptcy." Id. (emphasis added). Nor can it be, because property rights are defined by
state law unless there is a direct conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. Butner , 440 U.S. at 55 99
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S.Ct. at 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136; see also Section II.A.2.d. , infra.

The bankruptcy estate only

included what the debtor possessed- a right to redeem that "is limited solely to the ability to
redeem within the statutory period; [because] title passes to the buyer at the foreclosure sale
subject only to this conditional interest." Markee , 31 B.R. at 431 . The Idaho Bankruptcy Court
held that the "trustee 's .. . right to redeem is limited by § 108(b) of the [Bankruptcy] Code." Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, the trustee had to exercise the right to redeem by the later of: (a) the
expiration of the redemption period or (b) 60 days after the filing of the petition for relief. Id. ;

see also 11 U.S.C. § 108(b). The court explained that the Automatic Stay
is not involved in the instant situation. That section enjoins acts taken by
creditors; it does not concern the tolling of time. Section 108 is
specifically addressed to limitations of time and the trustee' s right to
perform in regard thereto. Its operation controls. Section 362 does not,
either by its terms or when read in conjunction with the more specific
§ 108(b), "stay" the running of the statutory redemption period.

Markee, 31 B.R. at 431.
Here, Jackson ' s appeal to§ 362(a) ignores§ 108. As the Idaho Bankruptcy Court, and a
majority of courts, have held, the Automatic Stay is not a time-tolling statute; the Bankruptcy
Code contains a statute, § 108, that specifically performs that function.

To apply the much

broader §362(a) instead of§ 108 is to render § 108 superfluous, of no effect or application, and a
nullity- which this Court cannot do unless there is no possible means of hannonizing these two
statutes. This haimonization is accomplished by allowing each statute to function within its
intended sphere: § 362 prevents any person from taking any action against the debtor or property
of the estate, while § 108 provides the debtor (and trustee) at least 60 days of relief from the
operation of a statute, the passage of a statutorily-mandated time period, or from the
consequences of the debtor's inaction.
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Idaho law does not require any affirmative action to effect the forfeiture of a water
right described in Idaho Code § 42-222(2).

According to the language of that statute, the

forfeiture is automatic upon five years of non-use. See Idaho Code § 42-222(2). It does take a
third party (in this case, the Bameses), later, to assert and demand the adjudication of the
forfeiture because of certain statutory exceptions (see Idaho Code § 42-223) and common law
exceptions (e.g., the resumption of use doctrine) that may apply. However, this third party does
not effect the forfeiture, but merely brings the issue to a head for adjudication. The forfeiture is
accomplished by the mere passage of time during which a water right is not beneficially used, in
whole or in part.
Once Bloxham filed bankruptcy, the Trustee had the later of the expiration of the
forfeiture period (i.e., until March 22, 2009; five years from the commencement of the water
right's non-use subsequent to its decree in the SRBA Court on March 22, 2009, see Bloxham

Aff., 11 15-16; id. , Ex. 3) or 60 days after Bloxham filed (i.e., December 11 , 2005; 60 days after
Bloxham his Voluntary Petition to commence his bankruptcy on October 12, 2005 see Harris

Alf., Ex. C, p. 1). By operation of 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(l), this gave the Bankruptcy Trustee 41
months to use the water right on the Jackson Prope11y. He did not do so, and thus forfeited the
water right (a portion of29-10420) by operation ofldaho Code§ 42-222(2) on March 22, 2009.
d. Because there is no direct conflict between Idaho Code § 42-222(2) and

the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to enlarge or
create a substantive property right, which is defined by State law.
To interpret and apply the Automatic Stay as Jackson proposes would read into the
Automatic Stay a result Congress did not intend and impem1issibly enlarge or create a
substantive property right. The Supreme Com1 has explained: "Property interests are created and
defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved
21
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in a bankruptcy proceeding." Butner, 440 U.S. at 55, 99 S.Ct. at 918 , 59 L.Ed.2d 136. Thus,
" [i]n bankruptcy cases the rights of par1ies in [property] are governed by state laws unless there
are contrary provisions in the Bankruptcy Code." In re Dulan, 52 B.R. 739, 741 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1985). In Dulan, the Court explained that " [u]nder California law, where an option is given
for a specified period, it generally must be exercised within that period." Id. at 742. The only
contrary provision of the Bankruptcy Code was Section 108(b), which "extended the time to
exercise the option to extend the lease in this case." Id. The Automatic Stay was not a contrary
provision, because § 108 specifically applied. See id.; see also Section Il.A .2.c., supra.
Courts have been faced with the 'status quo ' argument before. In response, the Eighth
Circuit eloquently explained:
Even accepting the debtor's argument that § 362(a) is designed in part to
preserve the status quo as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy, their
right remains only to redeem the property within the period
established by statute. To hold that § 362(a) operates as an automatic
stay of the running of the statutory period of redemption would be to
enlarge property rights created by state law, a result we view as
unjustified by the language of § 362(a) and as unintended by
Congress.

Johnson, 719 F.2d at 277 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Third Circuit has explained:
Despite [debtor' s] argument that the purpose of§ 362 is to maintain the
status quo of the debtor's property rights by forbidding acts taken to
eradicate the property interest provided by the grace period, the effect of
this rationale would permit [a debtor or a trustee] to forestall taking any
action concerning renewal throughout the duration of the bankruptcy,
clearly an unintended result.

Counties Contracting and Constr. Co., 855 F.2d at 1059. Thus, while the status quo argument
seizes on a major policy behind the Automatic Stay in § 362(a), any application of§ 362, rather
than § 108, to create an "extension of the redemption period constitute[s] an impermissible

creation of a property right." Tynan , 773 F.2d at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Because state law defines property rights, the definition and scope of a water right under
Idaho law is extremely important to the consideration of this issue. A water right grants the
ability to use water resources in the state of Idaho. See Idaho Code § 42-101. As previously
explained with regard to forfeiture:
In Idaho, a water right is "lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of
five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was
appropriated." LC. § 42-222(2). While "(a]bandonments and forfeitures
are not favored, " Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50, 52 (1937),
allowing unused water rights to perish and be beneficially used by another
is an affirmation of the "traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring
the water resources of this state to be devoted to beneficial use in
reasonable amounts through appropriation. " See LC.§ 42-226.

Amended MSJ Memorandum, p. 6.
An Idaho water right is, for lack of a better term, a ' use-it-or-lose-it' piece of property. It
is a grant from the State of Idaho, allowing a person to beneficially use water-the state's
resource. The grant contemplates forfeiture after non-use, but contains a grace period 5 of five
years. Idaho Code § 42-222(2). There is no direct conflict between Idaho 's law regarding water
rights and the Bankruptcy Code. If a water right is about to be forfeited and, on the day before
forfeiture occurs, a person files bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C . § 108(b)(2) will toll forfeiture for the
minimum amount of time Congress has determined a trustee needs to "cure a default, or perform
any other similar act" (i.e., put the water right to beneficial use to avoid forfeiture, either directly
or by renting the property to be used in the manner contemplated by the water right). On the
other hand, where- as was the case here- a water right will not be forfeited for longer than 60
days, 11 U.S .C. § 108(b)(l) preserves that longer period during which the trustee can perform
any "act that is required to preserve the debtor's rights ." Santa Fe Development and Mortg.

Co1p. , 16 B.R. at 167. Any application of the Automatic Stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 not only
A grace period is a "period of extra time allowed for taking some required action .. . without incurring the usual
penalty for being late." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (9 th ed. 2009).
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ove1Tides § 108, needlessly rendering it superfluous, but also unnecessarily manufactures a
conflict between § 362 and Idaho law, that- Jackson argues- must be resolved by expanding
and creating more of a property interest in a water right than is specified in Idaho law. Such an
argument is at odds with the majority rule in effect in Idaho and stated by the BAP more than 30
years ago.
This Court should follow the majority rule and find that only § 108, not the Automatic
Stay(§ 362), applied to the water right involved in Bloxham's bankruptcy- which was forfeited
by March 22, 2009.
B. Jackson has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact contesting
whether 29-14115 has been forfeited.
As Counterdefendants facing Jackson's counterclaim, the Bameses may move for
summary judgment with an argument "that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact." I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l)(B). The Bameses dispute Jackson's counterclaim and
"contend that they and Bloxham, their predecessor-in-interest, have applied 29-14115 to i1Tigate
the Barnes Property continuously since 2004, when 29-14115 was decreed by the SRBA on
March 22, 2004." Amended MSJ Memorandum, p. 16. Jackson argues that the Barneses' water
right, 29-14115, "has been forfeited [by] a period of nonuse from 2011-2016," and that there is
"clearly a dispute of fact" as to this point. Objection Memorandum, p. 12.
However, while Jackson argues that the five-year period of non-use began in 2011, he
does not offer any evidence or even testimony in support of this 2011 commencement date. See
Objection Memorandum, p. 13; see also Jackson A.ff,

,r,r

29-35 (commencing with "[a]fter I

purchased my property from the bankruptcy trustee"- which demonstrably occu1Ted on April 26,
2012, per Wells A.ff,

,r

6 and id., Ex. 4, p. 1-and never mentioning 2011 at all). The only

assertions relating to 2011 are in the Objection Memorandum and blanket asse1tions in discovery
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without any evidentiary support or testimony. See Harris Ajf, Ex. C, pp. 7-8 (Interrogatory No.
14, seeking "any and all periods of non-use of 29-14115 [Jackson] contend[ s] have occmTed
since 2004," to which Jackson responds: "The center and North portions of Bloxhams' field was
not watered at all in 2011 , 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 , or 2016"). In contrast, the Barneses have
provided evidence that the Barnes Prope11y has been irrigated. Bloxham Ajf,

,r,r 8-10, 15,

20.

Because Jackson has not presented any evidence regarding 2011, the earliest his claimed "period
of non-use" could begin is April 26, 2012; which means that a five-year period of non-use
(necessary for forfeiture, per Idaho Code § 42-222(2)) cannot even conclude until the future
date of April 26, 2017. Thus, the Barneses are entitled to summary judgment on this issue and
Jackson ' s counterclaim should be dismissed.
C. The Barneses are entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party because Jackson's
defense and counterclaim are frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.

This Com1 may award attorney fees to a prevailing party when a case, such as this, was
"defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. "

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

54(e)(l); LC. § 12-121. Here, both Jackson ' s defenses and his counterclaim have been frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation.
Jackson' s defenses to the Barneses' lawsuit have not only changed over time, without
supplemental discovery responses disclosing the additional theories of non-forfeiture-creating
an unreasonable moving target on summary judgment- but have also been substantively,
demonstrably, and obviously deficient. After disclosing two theories in discovery and facing a
summary judgment motion addressing them, Jackson has chosen not even to provide any
argument sustaining them. Rather, Jackson has moved on to two new and unavailing theories.
As demonstrated above, both of these new theories are erroneous. As to Jackson's first theory,
relating to Bloxham's use of all available water (which Jackson uses to support his argument, but
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then undercuts as unclear from the Bloxham Aff.), such use is absolutely irrelevant to the
consideration of whether 29-14032 , Jackson's po11ion of29-10420, was forfeited by five years

of non-use on the Jackson Property. The forfeiture analysis does not consider where wate;}
was used or what water was available, but considers only whether water was used pursuant to a
water right on the parcel specified in the water right. See Section II.A. I., infi·j

Jackson's

second theory, invoking the Automatic Stay of the Bankruptcy Code, is also unavailing and two
citations extolling the policy of preserving the status quo and the stay s broad applicability are
insufficient to adequately raise the argument-which is complex, detailed, and has been settled
in Idaho (and a majority of other jurisdictions) for more than 30 years. See Section II.A.2 ., infra.
Because these arguments and Jackson 's defense in general , has been frivolous, unreasonable and
without foundation, this Court should award the Barneses their reasonable attorney fees.
Further, Jackson's counterclaim has been extremely frivolous, unreasonable

and

baseless. The five- year period of non-use necessary for forfeiture is clearly mandated by statute.
Idaho Code § 42-222(2).

Nevertheless, Jackson has not even alleged anything (let alone

provided any evidence) dating from prior to 201 I.

Jackson cannot even produce evidence

relating to 2011 , in response to the Barneses' Motion for Summary Judgment. Despite this clear
lack of knowledge and evidence, Jackson alleged, in October 2014, that the Barneses' water right
was forfeited by a period of non-use in "excess of five years immediately prior to the filing of
this counterclaim." Answer and Counterclaim, ~ 30 (filed October 10, 2014); see also id , ~~ 2933. Jackson ' s counterclaim appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to the Barneses' lawsuit lacking
any foundation. However, even when Jackson found no evidence supporting his counterclaim,
he has persisted to this point by not withdrawing or voluntarily dismissing this counterclaim.
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For these reasons, the Barneses are entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code§ 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e).
III. CONCLUSION

The certainty the Barnses enjoyed with their water supply was abruptly disrupted in the
summer of 2014 when Jackson constructed a concrete diversion upstream from the Barneses'
diversion without approval from the Idaho Department of Water Resources, without any notice
of consultation with Bloxham or the Barneses, and without approval from the NRCS for the
design of such a structure- all of which occuned after Jackson represented to the NRCS that he
was only installing a small stockwater system.

In addition to the physical intrusion to the

Bameses water supply caused by Jackson' s illegal diversion, Jackson also now seeks to legally
intrude into the water supply relied upon by Bloxham and the Barneses in an already overappropriated source after Jacksons' water right- 29-14032- had been forfeited. The injury to
the other water users on Spring Creek- including the Barneses- can be remedied with the
adjudication of 29-14032 ' s forfeiture .
Based upon the record before the court, summary judgment should be granted on the
Barneses' behalf as to their claims and Jackson' s counterclaims. Jackson and his predecessorsin-interest forfeited 29-14032. Jackson has not rebutted any of the arguments from the Amended

MSJ Memorandum, but has instead offered two new legal arguments. However, neither of these
arguments undermine that conclusion. Despite being entitled to water, none was applied to the
Jackson Property for (at least) a time period of five consecutive years. Further, 11 U.S.C. §
108(b), not the Automatic Stay of 11 U.S .C. § 362(a) applies to toll the forfeiture period; which,
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(l) concluded as normal on March 22, 2009- which is when the
water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property was forfeited.
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Further Jackson has not shown any five-year period when 29-14115 was not used since
he has provided absolutely no evidence (although he has provided argument) regarding the use of
29-14115 in 2011.
Finally, Jackson's contentions have been frivolous, unreasonable, and without
foundation. Therefore, the Barneses should be awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §
12-121.

Dated this

-z l~

day of October 2016.

~ L.
Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Peter M. Wells

MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED
216 W. Whitman/ P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370
Telephone: 208-233-0132
Facsimile: 208-234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and
CASE NO. CV-2014-0003466-OC

JANE BARNES,
Plaintiff's,

DEFENDANT'S WITNESS
DISCLOSURE

vs.

KlRK JACKSON,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, Kirk Jackson, by and through his attorney of record Peter M.
Wells, of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered, pursuant to this Court's Scheduling

Order, hereby submits the following list of witnesses anticipated to be called by Defendant in
this action:

1. Kirk Jackson

2. Cole Johnson
3. Steve Criddle
4. Nate Matlack

5. Miche1le Pak

6. Martha Nunez-Higgins
7. Greg Robinson
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DATED this 4th day of November, 2016.
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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PETER M. WELLS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendants Witness Disclosure was
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.

Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[x] U.S. Mail
[x] Facsimile 208-523-9518

[ ) Hand Delivery

DATED this 4th day of November, 2016.

By:~
J
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
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COURT MINUTES
CV-2014-0003466-OC
Chad Barnes, et al. vs. Kirk Jackson
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment
Hearing date: 10/31/2016
Time: 2:04 pm
Judge: David C Nye
Courtroom: Room #300, Third Floor
Court reporter: Stephanie Morse
Minutes Clerk: Amy Beers
Robert Harris - Attorney for Plaintiffs
Peter Wells - Attorney for Defendant

2:04

Begins
Robert Harris, oral argument

2:49

Peter Wells, responsive argument
Robert Harris, rebuttal argument
Court takes matter under advisement and will issue a written decision.

3:12

End
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
STATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC
Plaintiff,
DECISION ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant.

Hon. David C. Nye

On January 15, 2016, Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (collectively "Barnes"), filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court held oral argument on October 31, 2016, and took the
matter under advisement. After reviewing the record and the briefing in this matter, the Cou1t
now issues the following decision DENYING the Motion.
As a threshold matter, the Court will address the question of jurisdiction. Although not
raised by either party, a brief analysis is important. In 1987, the State of Idaho commenced the
Snake River Basic Adjudication (SRBA) for the purpose of inventorying water claims in Idaho.
During the pendency of the SRBA, any claims or issues related to water rights were taken up
almost exclusively by that Court. The SRBA however has issued its final findings and is now
closed. To the Comt's knowledge this is one of the first, if not the first case, dealing with
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forfeiture post-SRBA, therefore jurisdiction is a relevant question. Under Idaho Code Section

42, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDRW) is vested with the authority to handle all
matters relating to the administration of water uses and water rights. With the SRBA closed, the
IDWR once again stands at the forefront of any water rights issues. 1 Why then did Plaintiffs file
this matter in District Court?
Succinctly put, under Idaho Code § 55-101(3), that which is appurtenant to land is
considered real prope1iy. In Idaho, water rights are appurtenant to the land; therefore, such
matters can be validly brought in front of a court of general jurisdiction such as was done here.
Plaintiffs could have brought this matter before the IDWR, and for subject matter expertise and
judicial economy,2 that would have been a good choice, but there is nothing which would legally
preclude them from bringing it before this Court instead. The Court finds therefore that it does
have jurisdiction and that the matters are ripe for review.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 22, 2004, the SRBA issued a Partial Decree for Water Right 29-10420 to Craig
Bloxham. Bloxham was the predecessor in interest to both pa1iies in the present litigation.
Bloxham's property is located in Bannock County, Idaho near the city of Downey and has been
owned by his family for over 40 years.

This is not to say that the IDWR ever gave up any authority. While the SRBA was ongoing, for
expediency, judicial economy, and uniformity, that forum took up most matters relating to a decreed
water right. Once decreed, if changes were sought, the party could go back to the SRBA or to the TDWR.
Both agencies have been heavily involved in these matters over the last 30 years, but now with the
conclusion of the SRBA, all administrative matters have reverted to the IDWR.
2 As a pending transfer action has been undertaken in that forum relative to this case.
1
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On October 12, 2005 , Bloxham filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. On April 26, 2012, Kirk
Jackson purchased certain property from the bankruptcy trustee. As Jackson did not purchase the
whole of the property, the appurtenant water right was split proportionally. On May 31, 20 I 2, a
Notice of Change in Water Rights Ownership was filed with IDWR. Water Right 29-10420 was
split into Water Right 29-14031 and Water Right 29-14032. Jackson obtained 29-14032 and
Bloxham's bankruptcy estate retained 29-14031. On January 31, 2014, Chad and Jane Barnes
purchased the other portion of Bloxham's property and with it, Water Right 29-14031.
On August 29, 2014, Barnes filed suit against Jackson requesting a declaration of
forfeiture of a water right pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Barnes alleges that Jackson has
not used his water right for the statutory period and therefore has forfeited it. On October 10,
2014, Jackson filed an answer denying forfeiture and a counterclaim alleging that Barnes has not
been using his water right either and that if his rights are forfeited, Barnes' should likewise be
forfeited. On January 15, 2016, Barnes moved for Summary Judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL ST AND ARD
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate
only when "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving pai1y is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."3 Generally, the record is to be construed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summai·y judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that

3Smith

v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 ( 1996) (quoting I.R.C.P.
56(c)); See also, Moss v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., I03 Idaho 298, 303, 647 P.2d 754, 758
( 1982).
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party's favor. 4 However, the standard differs when the court, rather than a jury, will be the
ultimate trier of facts. When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may,
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the
undisputed evidentiary facts. 5 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (whether a jury is
involved or not) the Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve controverted
factual issues.6
Initially, the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests
with the patty moving for summary judgment. 7 If the moving party can "establishes the absence
of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of
material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. " 8 If the moving party is
successful in shifting the burden to the nonmoving party to show the existence of an issue of fact
on the challenged element, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forth with evidence setting forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial on the challenged elements. 9

If the nonmoving party fails to do so, it will result in a court granting an order of
summary judgment in favor of the moving party. 10 However, summary judgment is not proper if

4

Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695 , 697-98 (2007). See also, Herra v. Conner, 111
Idaho 1012, 729 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1986).
5 Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 220 P.3d 575 (2009).
6 Altman v. Arndt, I 09 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1985).
7 Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695 , 697-98 (2007).
8 Levinger v. M ercy Med. Ctr., Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 195, 75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003).
9 Id.
10 Id.
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reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the
available evidence. 11
DISCUSSION
This case is brought by Barnes in an effort to have Jackson's water right deemed forfeited
for non-use. Idaho Code 42-222(2) governs such fo1feiture :
All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost
and forfeited by a failure for the te1m of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial
use for which it was appropriated and when any right to the use of water shall be lost
through nonuse or forfeiture such rights to such water shall revert to the state and be
again subject to appropriation under this chapter; except that any right to the use of
water shall not be lost through forfeiture by the failure to apply the water to
beneficial use under certain circumstances as specified in section 42-223, Idaho
Code.
Forfeitures are disfavored under Idaho law and the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently
held that forfeiture must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.12 Essentially, the party
claiming a water right is forfeited must prove that (1) five years of non-use has occmTed, (2) there
are no exceptions under Idaho Code § 42-223, and (3) there are no defenses which can effectively
be raised. Although the claimant of the water right has the burden of raising defenses to statut01y
forfeiture, the burden of persuasion remains on the party claiming that the water right was
forfeited. 13
Barnes contends, and is co1Tect, that Jackson has never claimed any exceptions under Idaho
Code§ 42-223. That leaves for discussion the statutory five year period of non-use and any defenses
Jackson has raised. Each will be addressed in tum.

11

Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv. , LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 746, 215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009).
v. State Dept. of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 389,647 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1982).
13 Sagewillow v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 ldaho 831 , 842, 70P.3d 669, 680 (2003).

12 Jenkins
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5 Years of Non-Use
During the pendency of any water right claim in the SRBA, the statutory five year period
was tolled 14 • In this case, that would mean that the five years could not start running until 2004. 15
Barnes contends that from 2004 to 2012, Water Right 29-14032 16 was not put to beneficial use and
should therefore be forfeited. This assertion is based upon the affidavit of Craig Bloxham, the
previous owner, who stated that he had not watered that po11ion of land which would eventually
become the Jackson property during that timeframe. This assertion however misses the mark.
Forfeiture of a water right relates to the water right's non-use, not the extent of the right's
use, or non-use, within the property that the water right is attached to. 17 In essence, forfeiture occurs
when the owner does not use his full water right. In this case, until the parent right was split in 2012,
the water right was appurtenant to the whole of Bloxham's prope1ty and Bloxhan1 has never
testified that he failed to use his full water right. To the contrary, he has stated that "there is typically
not enough water to supply all of the water 1ights on the system." 18 Simply because Bloxham chose
not to water that portion of land that would eventually become Jackson's prope1ty does not mean
that he forfeited his water right. It appears Bloxham chose not to water the future Jackson property
because of difficulties, but the reason doesn't matter. That [parent] water right was attached to the

14

In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 36-02708 et al. (Facility Volume cases) (Idaho Fifth
Judicial Dist., May 2002) (R. Barry Wood presiding); In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 6505663B (Wood v. Troutt) (Idaho Fifth Judicial Dist. - SRBA, May 2002) (Judge Roger S. Burdick).
15 Neither patty is claiming that the period should run from any other date; however, Bloxham testified in
hi s affidavit that he has not watered what became the Jackson property since the mid-1990s . While that
may have been the case, the statutory clock did not sta1t until the decree of rights in 2004.
16 Jackson contends that Water Right 29-14032 did not exist unti l 2012. It did exist, but as pa1t of the
parent Water Right 29-10420, along with 29-14031. Although not designated as such until 20 I2, of
necessity both 14031 and 14032 were part of 10420 and thus were also given a decree date of 2004.
17 Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735,738,552 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1976).
18 Affidavit of Craig Bloxham, paragraph 19.
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whole property and Bloxham was using it how he saw fit. The only question then could be one of
partial forfeiture, but Bloxham never indicated any instance where he did not use his full amount, or
in the least, the full amoru1t available to him. The Comt again stresses that the water right is what is
at issue. Any kind of forfeiture, even pa1tial, occurs if the water right is not being used, not if the
land ru1der said water right is not being used. 19 There is no indication of any forfeiture here.
During oral argument Barnes cited to a Water Law Handbook for one exan1ple, and both
parties used the example of pivot comers. All of the exan1ples presented were relevant and correct
but were based upon whether or not the full appropriation of water was being used. Redundant as it
is, the Court must point out again that the water right is what must be the focus of inquiry. If a
farmer sets aside not only a physical pivot corner, but also the water amount needed to water it, that
portion of the water right can truly be lost, not because the land was not used, but because the water
was not used. 20 If the farmer didn't water his pivot comers because he did not have enough water, he
has not forfeited anything, but that is different than the situation in which he could have watered, but
chose not to. There is a substantial difference between "could not" and "would not."
Such may have been the case here. It is not clear whether Bloxhan1 was using his full right
(all inferences appear that he was), but if he was, and was putting his full share to beneficial use regardless of where on his property - then no forfeiture has occurred. Fmthermore, if Bloxham

The Court is not trying to split a hair too finely here because the legal test of beneficial use of necessity
asks what the water is being used for, but it does not ask where the water is being used within the subject
prope1ty. Barnes clearly recognizes this because he uses this same reasoning as a defense against
Jackson's counterclaim.
20 If the farmer has IO cfs for his I000 acre field , and holds out I 00 acres and Icfs for his corners he may
lose that I cfs due to partial forfeiture, BUT if he holds out those 100 acres and then uses the extra I cfs
elsewhere on his property (the same property that water right is attached to), he is still using the water for
beneficial use and it is not forfeited. Fu1thermore, the farmer could even transfer that right to some other
place or use and avoid forfeiture altogether.
19
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wasn't using his full share and now wants to asse1t that he did prutially forfeit his water right (in that
he did not use all of his allotment), the result must of necessity be as to one, as to all. The forfeiture
would not magically only cut out Jackson's property, but would reduce the water right allocation as
a whole and both subsequent prope1ty owners' shares would decrease. Furthermore, now that claims
have been made upon said rights, any claim for forfeiture during Bloxhrun's time would be barred.
Because Bloxhrun never forfeited any of his [pru·ent] water right it can hardly be said that
one of the children rights relates back to 2004 to begin the statutory five year period. That may be
the decree date, but the child rights existence was, at that time, still as part of the parent right. The
Court must focus therefore on the pru·ent right as a whole, not what portions would someday
become the children rights, and their associated property. Although Bloxhrun may have "forfeited"
his land because he did not water it, the Court looks to the water right itself, not the appurtenant

land, and by all accounts Bloxham put that (the water right) to full and beneficial use.
Because Bloxhrun did not forfeit any of his water right, the statutory period could not have
begun until April 2012 when Jackson bought the property. That period would need to run until April
201 7 to comply with the Statute. The five year period has not run therefore a statutory forfeiture has
not OCCUITed.
Although the above analysis is dispositive, the Court will unde1take a brief discussion as to
the defense of resumption as that will also beru· on the Comt's final outcome.
Resumption of Use Doctrine
The most common defense to a claim of forfeiture is that of resumption of use. The Idaho
Supreme Corut has held that:

Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 8 of 13
357 of 514

Under the resumption-of-use doctrine, statutory forfeiture is not effective if, after the
five-year period of nonuse, use of the water is resumed prior to the claim of right by
a third party. A third party has made a claim of right to the water if the third party
has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or has obtained a valid water
right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date prior to the resumption of
use, or has used the water pursuant to an existing water right. 2 1
At some point in time near the filing of this litigation Jackson constructed a dam to dive1t
water to his property. Because of uncertainties as to which occurred first - the filing of this litigation
or the building of the dam - Barnes claims that it is not this litigation which defeats Jackson's
resumption of use defense, but rather in accordance with Sagewillow, it was their reliance on
Jackson's "extra" water which predates, and defeats, his resumption. The building of a dam
however is of little consequence to the Court, when, as acknowledged by Barnes during oral
argument, Jackson testified to trying to use the water as early as 2012 22

-

two years before Barnes

even bought the property.
Jackson affirmatively resumed use prior to Barnes purchase of the adjacent property in
2014, therefore Barnes is baned from asse1ting that they had relied upon Jackson's un-used water
since 2012. In their briefing, Barnes seems to imply that they are somehow connected to their
predecessor in interest, Craig Bloxham, and therefore their timeframe can include time prior to their
ownership. There is no statutory or legal basis for such a claim and as Bloxham is not a party to this
litigation it does not make logical sense that the Barnes are somehow grandfathered in to his usage,
or reliance, upon Jackson's unused water. Jackson's resumption of use defense stands.

21 Sagewillow
22

138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Deposition of Kirk Jackson, pg 53-61.
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Counterclaim
Jackson has filed a counterclaim in this action alleging that Barnes has forfeited a portion of
his water right because of non-use. Jackson claims that because Bloxham testified that there is not
usually enough water to supply the whole system, he could not have been using all the water and
therefore some of it could be forfeited. As outlined above however, as long as a person uses the full
amount that is available to him, it is deemed to be his full amount, whether or not it is the full cfs
allotment decreed in the actual water right. Furthermore, Jackson's allegations that Barnes has not
irrigated "all" of his property are likewise ilTelevant. As outlined above, usage is determined by the
water right, not the property the water right is attached to .
As the Court has now noted ad nauseam, forfeiture relates to the water right's non-use and
not the extent of the use within the underlying prope11y. 23 Jackson contends that only certain
portions of the field were watered and because all of the property specified in the decree has not
been watered, there is forfeiture. Barnes claims that these accusations are baseless, but also that
"forfeiture analysis does not consider where water was used or what water was available, but
considers only whether water was used pursuant to a water right on the parcel specified in the water
right."24 This statement conforms with the Court's findings that use of the water right, not that right
in relation to certain parts of the property, is what is important. Barnes cannot use such analysis to
prove that he has not fmfeited his rights only to tum around and say that Jackson somehow has.
Both parties are using the same argument and the same defense. Again, the Com1 need stress that if
water rights are not being used on certain land, and those water rights are not being used elsewhere
23

See infra footnote 17.

24

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 26, October 21 ,
2016.
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(on the same land) - in other words the owner is simply choosing not to use 2 cfs of his right - then a
forfeiture has occw-red; not because the land isn't being used, but because the water isn't. That
however has not happened here. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Barnes has forfeited
any of his water right therefore Summary Judgment is appropriately granted to Barnes as to
Jackson's counterclaim.
Finally, the Court would note that the Bankruptcy proceedings, and any stay associated with
such, are not related to this litigation and therefore will not be discussed. Although there were
bankruptcy stays in place, none had any bearing on the water 1ights in question.

CONCLUSION
Because Bloxham did not forfeit any of his water rights, the statutory period could not have
begun until Jackson bought the property in 2012. The five year period has not run, therefore a
statutory forfeiture has not occurred under Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Furthem1ore, Jackson used his
right in 2012 prior to Barnes filing this litigation, any asse1tion of reliance, or even Barnes
ownership of the property. Based upon the foregoing analysis, and the disfavor of water right
forfeiture in Idaho, it is this Court's determination that forfeiture has not occuned. For these reasons
Summary Judgment is not appropriate in favor of Barnes.
Additionally, because this Couit has found that forfeiture has not occmTed, and as this
litigation is based solely upon that premise it is therefore appropriate that Summary Judgment be
granted in favor of Jackson. It is well established law in Idaho that a district cou1t "may grant
summary judgment to a non-moving pruty even if the pruty has not filed its own motion with the
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court."25 In this case, the Comt is the ultimate finder of fact in regards to the legal. questions 26
presented and therefore can weigh the evidence in reaching a detennination. "A motion for
summary judgment allows the comt to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the
moving paity runs the risk that the court will find against it. ... "27
With all facts and inferences construed in the light most favorable to Jackson, the nonmoving party, the Court cannot find legal basis for granting forfeiture. The statutory period has not
nm and Jackson resumed use prior to Barnes interest or reliance. Based upon those two conclusions,
judgment must be granted in favor of Jackson. Forfeiture has not occurred.
Barnes Motion for Summary Judgment, as to the original complaint, is DENIED.
Summary Judgment will instead be GRANTED in favor of Jackson.
Summary Judgment will be GRANTED in favor of Barnes as to Jackson's counterclaim.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED November 16, 2016.

District Judge

Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P Jd 612, 617 (2001 ). See also, Aardema v. U. S. Dairy
Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 793, 215 P.3d 505 , 513 (2009); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Daity, LLC,
155 Idaho 853 , 855, 31 8 P.3d 622, 624 (20 14 ).
26 It is the Court' s duty to rule on matters of law and a jury's duty to determine issues of fact. See, Lubcke
v. Boise City/Ada Cty. Hous. Auth., Worrell, 124 Idaho 450 464, 860 P .2d 653 , 667 ( 1993 ). See also,
infra footnote 6.
21 Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
STATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC
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JUDGMENT
v.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Hon. David C. Nye
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiff s Complaint is dismissed.
DefendanCs Counterclaim is dismissed.
This case is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED November 17, 2016.
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Email:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (the "Barneses"), by and through their counsel of record
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
l l .2(b)(1 ), submit Plaintiffs ' Motion for Reconsideration, which is supported by the Memorandum
in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Reconsideration and the Affidavit of Robert L. Harris in
Support ofPlaintiffs ' Motion for Reconsideration, both of which are submitted contemporaneously
herewith.
The Barneses ask the Court to reconsider its Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment
and the resulting Judgment, and find that the Barneses are entitled to summary judgment, pursuant
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, as to both their claim for declaratory judgment against Kirk
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Jackson and as to Kirk Jackson ' s counterclaim, since there are no genuine issues of material fact
that (1) Jackson's water right (29-14032) was forfeited and not resumed before third pai1ies had
made a claim of right to the forfeited water and (2) the Ba meses' water right (29-14115) was not
f01feited. Thus, the Barneses are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both issues.

Dated this

7-f-

L

day of December 2016.

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
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Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendant/Co unterclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (the "Barneses"), by and through their counsel of record
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

l l.2(b)(1 ), submit this Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. For
the sake of brevity and clarity, the Barneses will utilize the tenns as defined in their prior briefing.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Barneses sought summary judgment as to both their claim for declaratory judgment
against Jackson and Jackson's counterclaim, based on the facts derived from the historical use of
29-10420, the common parent right from which both the Barneses' water right (29-14115) and
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Jackson 's water right (29-14032) derive.

It is undisputed that 29-10420 was regularly and

continuously used on the Barnes Property, first by Bloxham and then by the Barneses. Likewise,
it is undisputed that 29-10420 was never used on the Jackson Prope1ty between 2004 and, at
earliest, 2012.

Nevertheless, the Comi ultimately dismissed both the Barneses' claim for

declaratory judgment and Jackson ' s counterclaim. Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment , p.
12 (filed November 17, 2016) (the "Decision" ).
One point that may warrant factual clarification is, as the Court asked: given the pendency
of a transfer proceeding before IDWR, which could also adjudicate the forfeiture of 29-14032,
" [w ]hy then did Plaintiffs file this matter in District Court?" Decision, p. 2. First, the Barneses
filed this action because doing so constitutes a per se "claim of right to the water" forfeited that
will prevent the resumption of use or, in some cases of partial forfeiture, any additional resumption
of use. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 669, 680 (2003)
(citing Wagoner v. Jeffery, 66 Idaho 455 , 162 P.2d 400 (1945)). Second, at the time this action
was filed in district court, the transfer application (Transfer No. 80529) was not pending before
IDWR (the application was filed on November 16, 2015). At the prehearing conference for the
transfer held on January 27, 2016, the Barneses raised the forfeiture question again. As the
applicant, Jackson and his attorney, Mr. Wells, preferred to have the forfeiture matter determined
by the district comi rather than IDWR, and as a result, the transfer proceeding was put on hold
while the district court matter went forward. Thus, while we agree that pursuing the forfeiture
issue before IDWR " would have been a good choice," Decision, p. 2, Jackson picked the district
court forum to have the matter decided. Affidavit of Robert L. Harris in Support of Plaintiffs '

Motion for Reconsideration (the "Second Harris Afl"), ,r 4. Accordingly, the Barneses continued
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with this matter before this Comt, which can also adjudicate forfeiture, as contemplated by

Sagewillow.
In response to the Barneses ' Motion for Summmy Judgment, Jackson made two legal
arguments, namely: that his "water right was never forfeited because [ 1] all of the available water
assigned to the water right was used on the property and any non[-]use of water on Jackson ' s
property was the result of lack of water; furthermore, [2] the statutory period of non-use was tolled
during the time the real property was part of the bankruptcy estate." Objection Memorandum, p.
8. This Court correctly decided that the Bankruptcy issue did not have "any bearing on the water
rights in question" in this case. Decision, p. 11. However, Jackson's first argument led the Court
down an incorrect analytical track, focusing on the water associated with these water rights and
ignoring the irrigated acres (i.e., the beneficial use) of each water right. The Barneses therefore
ask the Court to reconsider its Decision, in light of the below-described principles of law.
ll. LRGAL AUTHORITY

As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, issues of water law "are extraordinarily complex"
and "there are no easy answers. " American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water

Res., 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007).

Forfeiture is certainly among "those

principles [that] are more easily stated than applied." Id. Any forfeiture decision is "highly fact
driven and [will] sometimes have unintended or unfortunate consequences." Id. While the
Barneses disagree with the Decision, they nonetheless feel that the Court-similar to how the
district court was described in the American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 case by the Idaho Supreme
Court- "did an exemplary job in analyzing the issues presented" in this case.

3

-
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reconsideration of three points of the Comt 's analysis will strengthen the Court' s analysis and
supply additional clarity to the complicated consideration of forfeiture in this case.
A. The actual irrigation of acres is the measure of the extent of beneficial use of an
agricultural water right. The diversion of water alone is not beneficial use.
The Court repeatedly emphasizes that " [f]orfeiture of a water right relates to the water
right's non-use, not the extent of the right's use, or non-use, within the property that the water
right is attached to. " Decision, p. 6 (emphasis added)(footnote omitted); see also id. , pp. 7, 8, 10.
However, while it is understandable for the Court to desire to focus on only the diversion of water
under a water right, this ignores the important aspect of acres irrigated under a water right. Simply,
the number of acres irrigated under such a right is the measure of the extent of beneficial use of
the right. In considering forfeiture, it is the extent of beneficial use- the end use of the waterthat is determinative. This is a bedrock principle of Idaho water law, which is evident from the
placement of the following statute so early in Idaho's water code found at Title 42: "The
appropriation [of water] must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the
appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such purpose, the right ceases."
Idaho Code§ 42-104 (emphasis added). See Idaho Code§ 42-222(2) (a water right is " lost and
forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it
was appropriated" (emphasis and underling added) . See Section II.B. , infra.
Every water right is made up of elements that determine its nature and extent. The "nature
and extent" of a water right is defined by its elements and often such elements are determined in
the context of a water rights adjudication, such as the SRBA. See Idaho Code§§ 42-1420, 421411(2). " [A] decree entered in a general adjudication such as the SRBA is conclusive as to the
nature and extent of the water right. " Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798,
4
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367 P.3d 193, 199 (2016). Every water right so decreed must include ' each element of a water
right as stated in subsections (2) and (3) of section 42-1411 , Idaho Code, as applicable. ' Idaho
Code§ 42- 141 2(6). In tum, Idaho Code§ 42-1411(2) explicitly provides that " [t]he [D]irector
shall determine the following elements " which are then listed, including:
(b) the source of water;
(c) the quantity of water used describing the rate of water diversion or, in
the case of an instream flow right, the rate of water flow in cubic feet
per second or annual volume of diversion of water for use or storage in
acre-feet per year as necessary for the proper administration of the water
right;
(d) the date of priority;
(e) the legal description of the point(s) of diversion; if the claim is for an
instream flow, then a legal description of the beginning and ending
points of the claimed instream flow; [and]
(t) the purpose of use;
Idaho Code§ 42-1411 (2) (emphasis added). This purpose of use is imp011ant, because " [t]he right
to appropriate water is for 'beneficial uses. "' Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman , 150 Idaho
790, 811 252 P.3d 71 , 92 (2011) (quoting IDAHO CONST. , Alt XV, § 3). Irrigation is one such
beneficial use. See, e.g., Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co. , 158 Idaho 269, 27 1, 346

P.3d 286, 288 (2015) (considering the "beneficial use of irrigation").
"Beneficial use is enmeshed in the nature of a water right," United States v. Pioneer Irr.

Dist. , 144 Idaho 106, 113 , 157 P.3d 600, 607 (2007), and is "the basis, the measure and the limit"
of a water right, Id. at 111 , 157 P.3d at 605. "In Idaho it is 'a well-settled rule of public policy that
the right to the use of the public water of the state can only be claimed where it is applied to a
beneficial use in the manner required by law. " ' Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 110, 157 P .3d at 604
(quoting Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Co., 40 Idaho 49, 60,231 P. 418, 422 (1924)). Any
appropriator of water "must apply the water to a beneficial use in order to have a valid water
5 -
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right in Idaho. " Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 110, 157 P.3d at 604 (emphasis added). In other words,
" [t]he appropriation [of water] must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the

appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such purpose, the right ceases."
Idaho Code § 42-104 (emphasis added). In Pioneer, the Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it
was the application of water to a beneficial use (the irrigation of acres) that creates a valid water
right for the inigator, and that the entity that is merely "diverting, storing, and distributing the
water" does not have a water right because it is not applying water to beneficial use. See Pioneer,
144 Idaho at 111, 157 P.3d at 605. In other words, it is the application to beneficial use- not
merely the diversion of water-that sustains a valid water right. See id. This is a longstanding
principle of Idaho water law. See Koon v. Empey, 40 Idaho 6, _

, 231 P. 1097, 1098 ( 1924)

("there can be no question that a water right becomes appurtenant to the land to which it has

been applied and upon which the water has been used for irrigation" (emphasis added)). 1
Additionally, the process of creating a new water right exemplifie the importance of actual
inigation being the measure of the extent of beneficial use. For a new appropriation of water, a
water user will undergo the permitting process. At the conclusion of the permitting process, a
water user will submit proof of beneficial use, which must then be verified by IDWR. To verify
the application to beneficial use, IDWR personnel will physically go out to the location and draft

This has long been the law in other western states as well. See Smith v. Hawkins, 120 Cal. 86, 88, 52, P. 139
(1898) ("No matter how great in extent the original quantity may have been, an appropriator can hold, as against
one subsequent in right, only the maximum quantity of water which he shall have devoted to beneficial use at
sometime within the period by which the right would otherwise be barred for non use."); See also Charles B. Roe,
Jr. and William J. Brooks, l oss of Water Rights - Old Ways and New, 39 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 23-1, 23- 11
( I989)(forfeiture statutes serve to 'clean up" paper rights so they confirm to what an appropriator is actually
authorized to put to beneficial use).
6 -
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a field report to detail the observed beneficial use. See IDAPA 37.03.02.35.01 . The field report
must include specific details, such as:
g. If the water is used for irrigation, the boundaries of the various
irrigated areas and the location of the project works providing water to
each shall be platted on the maps submitted with the report and the full
or partial acreage in each legal subdivision of forty (40) acres or
government lot shall be shown.
h. Irrigated acreage shall be shown on the field rep01t to the nearest
whole acre in a legal subdivision except the acreage shall be shown to
the nearest one-tenth (0.10) acre for permits covering land of less than
ten (10) acres.

id. (emphasis added). This focus on irrigated acres under an agricultural irrigation water right is
important because the beneficial use of an agricultural irrigation water right is actual irrigation,
which is measured by the number of irrigated acres. See id. The number of irrigated acres is also
important because it will affect the presumed rate at which water should be dive1ted. See IDAPA
37.03.02.35.03.a. ("For irrigation purposes, the duty of water shall not exceed five (5) acre feet
of stored waler for each acre of land to be irrigated or more than one ( 1) cubic foot per second
for each fifty (50) acres of land to be irrigated unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the
Director that a greater amount is necessary" (emphasis added)).
The "duty of water" is has an unusual name, but it embodies a basic and imp01tant principle
relating irrigated acres to ultimately what the diversion rate under a water right will be. The Water

Law Handbook explains:
Closely related to the rule of beneficial use is the concept of 'duty of water,"
which is that amount of water reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose
for which the water was appropriated , and no more. The rather odd phrase
"duty of water" is understood more easily in the context of the following
quotation from an early Idaho case: "It is a cardinal principle established by
law and the adjudications of this court that the highest and greatest duty of
water be required . The law allows the appropriator only the amount actually

7 -
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necessary for the useful or beneficial purpose to which he applies it. ' Munn
v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198, 207, 252 P. 865 (1926).

In Idaho, a statutory presumption regarding the duty of water has been
codified. "[N]o one shall be authorized to divert for irrigation purposes
more than one cubic foot of water per second of the normal flow for each
fifty (50) acres of land to be so irrigated, or more than five (5) acre[-]feet of
stored water per amrnm for each acre of land to be so irTigated, unless it can
be shown to the satisfaction of the department of water resources that a
greater amount is necessary." (Idaho Code § 42-202; see also Idaho Code
§ 42-220.] This amounts to one "miner's inch" of water per acre. [A
miner's inch is also expressed as 0.02 cfs.] Thus, for example, if a farmer
irrigates 200 acres, the state will presume the duty of water not to exceed
diversions of 200 x 0.02 = 4 cfs, absent a showing that more is needed.
Incidentally, diverting at constant rate of one miner's inch throughout a 200day irrigation season yields nearly eight acre(-]feet of diversions. Because
annual consumptive use by crops in Idaho typically is less than tlu·ee acrefeet, the inch-per acre target is ample, and in many cases likely more than
needed. Indeed, Idaho irrigators using wells and sprinklers typically divert
little more than the consumptive amount.
Jeffrey C. Fereday et al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK 31-32 (Givens Pursley LLP, September 1, 2016)
(footnotes

omitted)

(available

at:

http://www.givenspursley.com/uploads/pdf/water-law-

handbook-9-15-16.pdf) ; see Second Harris A.ff, ex. B. Thus, the amount of acres irrigated under
a farm irrigation water right determines a presumed diversion rate (i.e., one miner's inch or 0.02
cfs, per acre).
The water right document provided by Jackson's attorney, which is a representative sample
of water rights generally, demonstrates the interrelation of the purpose of use and the place of use
as well as the duty of water. See Affidavit of Peter M Wells, Ex. 3, p. I (Water Right 29-10420).
The beneficial use of 29-10420 was the irrigation of 112 acres in Bannock County .2 Id. There

2

For the sake of completeness, there is also a beneficial use for stockwater. Affidavit of Peter M. Wells , Ex. 3, p.
I. However, while under the "PURPOSE AND PERJOD OF USE" heading, 2.24 cfs is for irrigation and 0.03
cfs is for stockwater, the overall "QUANTITY" of 29-10420 is limited to 2.24 cfs and "the quantity of water
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is no other way to measure the beneficial use of irrigation. When 29-10420 provides that it "shall
provide no more than .02 cfs per acre," id. the amount of irrigated acres is vitally important. And
29- 10420 is not unique in this regard . The measure of an agricultural irrigation water right' s
beneficial use is the number of irrigated acres.3

B. Forfeiture, which includes partial forfeiture, occurs by statute, even though it is fo1·mally
declared later by a court or administrative tribunal, when a water right, or any portion
thereof, is unused for five years.
This Court correctly explained that [fJorfeitures are disfavored under Idaho law" and that
forfeiture of a water right "must be proven by clear and convincing evidence." Decision, p. 5
(footnote omitted). But Idaho law provides that a water right is " lost and forfeited by a failure for
the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated. " Idaho
Code§ 42-222(2). This includes partial forfeiture of a water right. State v. Hagerman Water Right

Owners, Inc. , 130 Idaho 727,735, 947 P.2d 400, 408 (1997). Allowing these unused water rights
to perish and be beneficially used by another is an affirmation of the " traditional policy of the state

under this right for stockwater use shall not exceed 13,000 ga llons per day." Id. This 13,000 gallon per day
(approximately 0.03 cfs) is in keeping with the so-called "domestic exemption", which in cludes stockwater for
livestock . See Idaho Code§ 42-11 l (l)(a). Because the stockwater domestic use of29-l 0420 has no bearing on
the analys is, it will not be discussed further.
3

Th is duty of water limitation is evident in 29- 10420 (prov ided by Jackson) as in a majority of Idaho water rights.
See Affidavit of Peter M. Wells, Ex. 3, p. 1. There, under the "PLACE OF USE" heading, 29- 10420 " is limited

to the irrigation of 112.0 acres within the place of use described above [i.e. , the 131.6 Acres Total described by
quarter-quarter under the same heading] in a single irrigation season." id. (capitalization modified). The 2.24 cfs
for irrigation (see the "PURPOSE AND PERIOD OF USE" heading) is for the irrigation of 11 2 acres. Id. Thus,
the duty of water-one miner's inch, or 0.02 cfs, per acre-is maintained: 2.24 cfs + 11 2 acres = 0.02 cfs per
acre. See id. (including, under the "QUANTITY' heading: " This right ... sha ll provide no more than .02 cfs per
acre" (capitalization modified)).
9 -
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of Idaho, requiring the water resources of this state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable
amounts through appropriation." See Idaho Code § 42-226.
To further these policies, the Idaho Supreme Court has afforded substantial deference to
IDWR' s long-standing "interpretation, policy and practice that partial forfeiture is a recognized
concept in Idaho." Hagerman Water Right Owners , 130 Idaho at 734, 947 P.2d at 407. The
Supreme Court has found that " (p ]artial forfeiture makes possible allocation of water consistent
with beneficial use concepts." Id. at 735, 947 P.2d at 408. To effectuate these policies, the focus
of the partial forfeiture inquiry is beneficial use. Id.

It is well-established that " [b]ecause there can be a partial forfeiture of water rights by
nonuse for five years, a resumption of use of only a portion of a water right prior to a claim

of right by a third party will only prevent the forfeiture of that portion of the water right."
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added). The
necessary corollary of this point is that any partial use of a water right, will result in partial

forfeiture of the unused portion of the water right. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho
at 735, 947 P.2d at 408. This includes forfeiture caused by omitting acres from the beneficial use
of an agricultural irrigation water right, as is the case here. See Section II.A. , supra.
Finally, "Idaho water law .. . provides that if a water right is abandoned or forfeited it
reverts to the state, following which third parties may perfect an interest therein." Hagerman

Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 735 , 947 P.2d at 408 (citations omitted). The forfeiture, or
partial forfeiture, of a water right occurs when it has not been used for five consecutive years,
provided there is no statutory exception applicable. Idaho Code §§ 42-222(2), 42-223.

IO
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The Court held that "[f]orfeiture of a water right relates to the water right's non-use, not
the extent of the right's use, or non-use, within the prope11y that the water right is attached to."

Decision, p. 6 (footnote omitted); see also Decision, p. 7, n. 19 ("the legal test of beneficial use of
necessity asks what the water is being used for, but it does not ask where the water is being used
within the subject property" (italics in original)). Respectfully, this holding is simply not correct
and is contrary to Idaho law. The very case cited by the Court in supp011 of this proposition
provides: "the doctrine of forfeiture is predicated upon a statutory declaration that all rights to use
water may be lost where an appropriator fails to make beneficial use of the water for a
statutory period regardless of the intent of the appropriator." Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 738,
552 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1976) (citations omitted, emphasis added). It is the failure to put the water
to beneficial use- which, for an agricultural irrigation water right, is the irrigation of acres, see
Section II.B., supra- that affects forfeiture. This must also be true for partial forfeiture, which is
provided for in the same statutory declaration. See Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at
735,947 P.2d at 408 . Thus, " [f]orfeiture of a portion of a water right may occur if beneficial use
is reduced for the statutory period." Second Harris Aff., ex. A (the "Administrator's Memo") ,
p. 3 (emphasis added). 4

4

The main point of the Administrator 's Memo is to clarify the timing of forfeiture. See, generally, Administrator 's
Memo. However, it outlines IDWR's particularly conservative calculation of the statutory forfeiture time period,
which IDWR would not enforce until "the end of the sixth calendar year." Administrator's Memo, p. 2. While
this interpretation has not been challenged, for purposes of this case, it does not matter because it does not change
the analysis. While the Barneses offer evidence that 29-14032 (as part of its parent right) was unused at least
until it was sold in 2012, Jackson cannot offer any evidence of any resumption of use before 2012. Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 24-25. Thus, whether forfeiture was
effective March 22, 2009 (as the Barneses contend), or December 31 , 20 IO (as the Administrator's Memo would
indicate), makes no difference.
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For these reasons, the Decision' s focus on only diversion of water and disregard for
irrigated acres (and, as a result, beneficial use too) gets the forfeiture analysis backwards. It is not
the mere diversion of water that prevents forfeiture- it is putting the water to beneficial use that
prevents forfeiture. Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 735, 947 P.2d at 408 ("a water
right holder cannot avoid a partial forfeiture by wasting that portion of his or her water right that
cannot be put to beneficial use during any pati of the statutory period" (emphasis added)). The
Supreme Court explained that "[i]f a water user cannot apply a portion of a water right to

beneficial use during any part of the statutory period, but must waste the water in order to
divert the full amount of the water right, a forfeiture has taken place." Id. (emphasis added)).
Thus, it is not the diversion of water- even all of the authorized diversion rate a water right- that
determines whether forfeiture has occurred. Rather, it is the failure to put water to beneficial use
under a water right that causes forfeiture and will reduce the amount of water available under the
water right. See Idaho Code § 42-222(2) (water rights are "forfeited by a failure for the term of
five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated"). The measure of
beneficial use of an agricultural irrigation water right is irrigated acres. See Section II.A., supra.
This principle bears repeating. Water merely diverted and not used eventually for irrigation could
be wasted. If diversion of water alone was the beneficial use of water, as this Court held, there
would be no need to reference the authorized beneficial use (i.e ., the end use of the water) on a
water right.
The law is Idaho is that the failure to irrigate acres will cause a forfeiture (or partial
forfeiture, as the case may be) of an agricultural iITigation water right. Another way to think of
partial forfeiture is that the water right has become appmienant to the land where it is put to
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beneficial use, see Mullinix, 158 Idaho at 277, 346 P.3d at 294 ("Ordinarily water ... become[s]
appurtenant to the land when used upon or in connection with such land" (quoting Molony v. Davis,
40 Idaho 443, 448-49, 233 P. 1000, 1001 (1925), emphasis omitted)), and by failing to put the
water to beneficial use on ce1iain acres for five years, Idaho Code § 42-222(2), the water right
appurtenant to those acres is forfeited. Thus, any conveyance of those acres (the water right
appmienant to which has been forfeited) will not convey any water rights. See Russell v. Irish , 20
Idaho 194, _ _ , 118 P. 501 , 502 (1911) ("A division of the land would divide the appurtenant
water right in the same proportion as it divided the land"). One of the most fundamental principles

of property law is that a grantor can convey only what the grantor owned at the time of the
execution and delivery of the deed. Thus, a grantee acquires no greater title or interest in the real
property conveyed by deed than his grantor had. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Jones, 235 Kan. 93,679
P.2d 682 (1984).
C. Because a water right is real property, the court must consider the facts and interests of
the parties' predecessors-in-interest.

In sustaining Jackson's resumption-of-use argument, the Court explained:
Barnes claims that it is not this litigation which defeats Jackson's
resumption of use defense, but rather in accordance with Sagewillow, it was
their reliance on Jackson's "extra" water which predates, and defeats, his
resumption .... [However,] Jackson affirmatively resumed use prior to
Barnes['] purchase of the adjacent property in 2014, therefore Barnes is
barred from asserting that they had relied upon Jackson's un-used water
since 2012. In their briefing, Barnes seems to imply that they are somehow
connected to their predecessor in interest, Craig Bloxham, and therefore
their timeframe can include time prior to their ownership. There is no
statutory or legal basis for such a claim and as Bloxham is not a party to this
litigation it does not make logical sense that the Barnes are somehow
grandfathered in to his usage, or reliance, upon Jackson 's unused water.

13
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Decision, p. 9.

However, the Court mistakenly analyzes resumption of use, misapplies

Sagewillow, and erroneously treats water right forfeiture as affecting a personal right rather than a
real property right.
"Under the resumption-of-use doctrine, statutory forfeiture is not effective if, after the fiveyear period of nonuse, use of the water is resumed prior to the claim of right by a third party."

Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. The only timeframe involved in resumption of use
is the five year timeframe during which non-use has occurred. Idaho Code§ 42-222(2). This does
not require any third party- the only inquiry is whether the water user has "appl[ied that] portion
of a water right to beneficial use during any part of the statutory period." Hagerman Water Right

Owners, 130 Idaho at 735, 947 P.2d at 408. In contrast, resumption of use and a claim of right are
events, not timeframes. Thus, the statutory forfeiture period can include "time prior to [the
Barneses'] ownership" of the Barnes Property. Decision, p. 9. Further, in the resumption of use
context, a claim of right is not a timeframe, but an event that occurred before the Barneses
purchased the Barnes Prope11y in 2014.
The only event that can prevent a resumption of use from reviving an otherwise forfeited
water right is a "claim of right by a third party" occurring prior to the resumption. Sagewillow,
138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (emphasis added) . There are three events that will constitute a
claim of right:
A third party has made a claim of right to the water if the third party
has either [ 1] instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or [2] has
obtained a valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority
date prior to the resumption of use, or [3] has used the water pursuant to
an existing water right.
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Id. (footnote and internal citations omitted emphasis added). With particular reference to the
second and third methods of making a claim ofright, the Supreme Court explained:
Prior to diversion, the water obviously cannot be identified as being the
water entitled to be used by any particular appropriator. Whether or not a
third party has made a claim to the water will usually depend upon evidence
showing that the water source was overappropriated and, because of nonuse
of water by the senior appropriator, water was available for use and used to
fill junior water rights, or by evidence showing that resumption of use by
the senior appropriator would diminish the quantity of water being used by
junior appropriators from an interconnected water source.
Id. at 842, n. 3, 70 P.3d at 680, n. 3. There is nothing in Sagewillow that requires the party alleging
forfeiture must be the same party that has made a claim of right by either the second or third
methods- such a claim of right can be made by any 'third party." Id. Thus, while the Barnes
cannot argue that they made a claim of right to the forfeited water associated with the Jackson
Property before 2014, the Barneses have shown that Bloxham, a "third party" as required by
Sagewillow (i.e., a water right user separate from the owner of the (pm1ially) forfeited water right),
made a claim of right before Jackson made any resumption of use. Amended Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summa,y Judgment , pp. I 0-11. Sagewillow does not impose any
sort of privity requirement on the " third party. ' See Sagewillow, 138 ldaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.
Further, the institution of this action by the Barneses is also a claim ofright under the first method
specified in Sagewillow that cuts off any attempted resumption of use by Jackson after August 29,
2014, when the Barneses' Complaint was filed. Complaint, pp. 1, 6; see also Sagewillow, 138
Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.
Lastly, even if the claim of right asserted by the second or third methods specified in
Sagewillow must be made by a party or privity (which the Barneses do not believe is the case), the
Barneses have met such burden. The Court's reluctance to allow the Barneses to assert Bloxham's
15 -
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claim of right in this regard (which the Decision refers to as "grandfather[ing]", Decision, p. 9)
erroneously considers water right forfeiture as affecting a personal right rather than a real property
right.
The Court is correct that the Bameses cannot assert Bloxham' s personal rights against
anyone. However, because a water right is real property, Idaho Code§ 55-101 ("Real property or
real estate consists of: . .. ditch and water rights"), appurtenant to the Barnes Property, Mullinix,
158 Idaho at 277, 346 P.3d at 294, which the Barneses purchased from Bloxham the Barneses are
entitled to assert the water rights they purchased even at a time when Bloxham held the water right.

See Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 703 , 963 P.2d 383, 386 (1998) (once "fixed as an
appurtenance to the real property," an interest may be "claimed by a successor in interest"). The
assertion of such appurtenant real property rights, based on a predecessor in interest, is common
and logical. See , e.g., Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 5, 156 P.3d 502, 506
(2007)· Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 407, 34 P.3d 1085, 1090 (2001) (' A claimant of a
prescriptive easement may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's predecessor for the
prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such predecessor's use with the claimant's own
use to establish the requisite five continuous years of adverse use"). Similarly, though with some
important differences, 5 to a prescriptive easement, forfeiture also affects the deprivation of a real
property right from a prior owner; thus, the consideration of water right forfeiture ought to also
allow the reliance on a predecessor's use to affect those results, just as in the case of prescriptive
easements. Consequently, whether or not some relationship is required between the Barneses and

5

Most notably, a key difference is that where a prescriptive easement is one landowner takin g a property right from
another, forfeiture of a water right is the reversion of the unused water right "to the state" after which the water
is "again subject to appropriation ." Idaho Code § 42-222(2).
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Bloxham in order for the Barneses to assert Bloxham' s claim of right to prevent any resumption
of use by Jackson , the Barneses can make that showing and, thus, Jackson's claimed resumption
of use is precluded by Bloxham ' s prior claim of right.
III. ANALYSIS

First, the water right associated with and appurtenant to the Jackson Property (whether
denoted as 29-10432 or as that particular portion of29-l 0420) was forfeited before Jackson bought
the prope11y. The Court repeats that "forfeiture relates to the water right's non-use and not the
extent of the use within the underlying property." Decision, p. 10 (footnote omitted). However,
this statement creates a dichotomous tension where there is none. A water right's use or nonuse is measured by the extent of the beneficial use within the underlying property. The

purpose of a water right is to put the water to a beneficial use. IDAHO CONST., Art. XV,§ 3. The
use must be beneficial, as a " water user is not entitled to waste water." Hagerman Water Right

Owners 130 Idaho at 735 , 947 P.2d at 408. Thus, any waste or non-use of water (both of which
are the lack of application to beneficial use) for five years without a statutory exception triggers
forfeiture or partial forfeiture. Id.
The Court incorrectly divorces its consideration of beneficial use of water (which the

Decision associates with the land or acres) from its consideration of diversion of water (which the
Decision describes as diversion of water or the water right itself). The Court found that "Bloxham
may have 'forfeited' his land [the Jackson Property] because he did not water it." Decision, p. 8.
Although the Cou11 continues on to discount the impact of this finding and considers only water
diverted under 29-10420; this weighty statement is correct, if unpacked conectly. Bloxham
forfeited that portion of his water right, 29-10420, that was appurtenant to the Jackson Property,
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by not irrigating those acres for far more than five years . Amended Memorandum in Support of

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summa,y Judgment, pp. 6-7. This constitutes a pa11ial forfeiture of that
portion of 29-10420 appm1enant to the Jackson Property.
Second, no statutory exception applies to stop the partial forfeiture described above. As
the Court noted, "Bloxham chose not to water the future Jackson [P]roperty because of difficulties,
but the reason doesn ' t matter.

Decision, p. 6 (emphasis added). As this implies, Bloxham's

decision not to irrigate the Jackson Property was a choice and not the result of any "circumstances
over which the water right owner has no control." Idaho Code§ 42-223(6). Because that is the
only statutory exception asserted by Jackson, there is no basis for this Com1 to find that any
statutory exception applies here to delay forfeiture.
Third, Jackson did not resume use of the water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property
before Bloxham, a "third pai1y," had asserted a claim of right to that forfeited water. Sagewillow,

I 38 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. Bloxham used the water forfeited from the Jackson Prope11y
pursuant to his water right.

As previously described , Spring Creek is over-appropriated and

Bloxham was a third party vis-a-vis Jackson and continued using 29-10420 when the Jackson
Prope1ty was alienated from him to the Bankruptcy Trustee, who Jackson has asserted was the
owner from whom Jackson purchased the Jackson Property. Amended Memorandum in Support

of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 15-16. Contrary to the Court's analysis, there is
no requirement that the Bloxhams themselves, or any other party to this proceeding, have made
the claim of right- merely that it be a 'third party." Sagewiflm,v, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.
Yet even if there is such a requirement or something similar, the Barneses have standing to assert
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the real property rights (i.e., involving water rights) of their predecessor in interest, Bloxham. See

Anderson, 136 Idaho at 407, 34 P.3d at 1090.
Finally, the Court was correct to dismiss Jackson' s counterclaim but did so for erroneous
reasons. The Court finds that the Barneses' argument that "forfeiture analysis ... considers only
whether water was used pursuant to a water right on the parcel specified in the water right" cuts
both ways and thus invalidates Jackson ' s counterclaim as well as the Barneses' claims. Decision,
p. 10 (citation omitted). The Court appears to have misunderstood the Barneses' argument. The
reference to water "used pursuant to a water right" presumes beneficial use, which is the only use
allowed pursuant to a water right. Likewise, the conclusion "on the parcel specified in the water
right" can also be rendered "on the acreage to which it is appurtenant." Again, it is not the
diversion of water that constitutes " use" of a water right as required to stave off forfeiture, Idaho
Code § 42-222(2); but it is the application to beneficial use that is "use" sufficient to avoid

forfeiture. For that reason, the fact that Bloxham diverted all the water allowed under 29-10420
is ilTelevant. Instead, the relevant and material facts here are that Bloxham applied the water to
beneficial use on the Barnes Property and never applied any water to beneficial use on the Jackson
Property. These facts caused the partial forfeiture of that portion of 29-10420 appurtenant to the
Jackson Property (that would later be denoted 29-14032) described above and preclude the
forfeiture of any portion of 29-10420 appurtenant to the Barnes Property (that would later be
denoted 29-14115) contended in Jackson's counterclaim.
Jackson's counterclaim fails because he has not provided any evidence of a water right' s
non-use on the Barnes Property for five years. He has only provided testimony that since 2012,
he has observed limited use on the Barnes Prope1ty. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
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Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 24-2 5. Thus, there is no issue of fact that any five year period
of non-use, required by Idaho Code§ 42-222(2), has occurred . The Court should dismiss Jackson' s
counterclaim for that reason alone.

IV. CONCLUSION
These three points of law will strengthen the Court's analysis and supply additional clarity
to the complicated consideration of forfeiture in this case. The diversion of water under a water
right is not the beneficial use of the water right. The application of that water for irrigation ofland
is the beneficial use (i.e., the irrigation of acres) is.

Partial forfeiture of a water right is

accomplished by the non-use of part of a water right; in this case, the failure to apply that portion
of the water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property to beneficial use by Bloxham' s choice not
to i1Tigate those acres (for whatever reason). Finally, Jackson's claim of resumed use is defeated
by Bloxham's prior claim of right to the forfeited water, which the Barneses- as Bloxham's
successor-in-interest- may assert.
Summary judgment should be granted to the Barneses' as to their claims and Jackson ' s
counterclaims. Jackson and his predecessor-in-interest forfeited what became 29-14032. No
exception to the forfeiture statute applies. The Barnes established a claim of right before Jackson
resumed use of29-14032. And Jackson cannot show a five-year period of non-use for 29-14115.

Dated this

t ~<{-

day of December 2016.

Robert L. Harris
HOLD EN , KIDWELL, HAHN
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D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
rharris@holdenlegal.com
Email:
arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Case No. CV-2014-3466-0C

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. HARRIS
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

KJRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

I, Robe1t L. Harris, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the testimony given in this sworn
statement is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is made on my personal
knowledge, and that I would so testify in open court if called upon to do so.
And being so sworn I depose and say:
I am over the age of eighteen ( 18) and am competent to testify to the matters contained

1.

herein.
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2.

I am an attorney practicing water law in Idaho since 2004.

3.

I represent Chad and Jane Barnes, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, in this matter and in the
transfer proceedings (the "Transfer"), instituted by Kirk Jackson before the Idaho
Department of Water Resources ("IDWR").

4.

At the time this action was filed in district court in August of 2014, Jackson's transfer
application submitted to IDWR (Transfer No. 80529) was not pending before IDWR (the
application was filed on November 16, 2015). At the prehearing conference held on
January 27, 2016, the Barneses raised the forfeiture question again. As the applicant,
Jackson and his attorney, Mr. Wells, preferred to have the forfeiture matter determined by
the district court, rather than IDWR, and accordingly the transfer proceeding was put on
hold while the district court matter went forward.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an Administrator's

5.

Memorandum, Multiple Programs Memo No. 2, re: Forfeiture Review Period, from Gary
Spackman (IDWR' s Director), dated March 2, 2012. It is intended to provide guidance to
IDWR employees regarding the consideration of forfeiture.
6.

Although it is not binding authority, water law practitioners rely on the guidance provided
by IDWR in memoranda such as Exhibit A. It is very persuasive guidance for JDWR
employees, including hearing officers.
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of excerpts used in the

7.

Memorandum in Supp01t of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration from the September 1,
2016 edition of the Water Law Handbook, written by Jeffrey C. Fereday, Esq.; Christopher
H. Meyer, Esq.; and Michael C. Creamer, Esq. and published by Givens Pursley LLP. It
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is available online at: http://www.givenspursley.com/uploads/pdf/water-law-handbook-9l 5-16.pdf, but these excerpts are included as a comiesy to the Court.
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ADMINISTRATOR'S MEMORANDUM

Multiple Programs Memo No. 2
To:

Regional Offices
Water Allocation Bureau

From: Gary Spackman,8~
Re:

FORFEITURE REVIEW PERIOD

Date: March 5, 2012
Idaho Code § 42-222(2) provides that all rights to the use of water shall be lost and forfeited
by a failure for the term of five years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was
appropriated. Idaho Code § 42-222(3&4) provides that the Department may grant an
extension for an additional five years for good cause shown if an application for extension is
made before the end of the five year period. Idaho Code § 42-223 provides for exceptions or
defenses to forfeiture. Experience in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) and other
court cases have provided additional guidance on the subject of forfeiture. In general,
forfeiture is not favored; however, the Department has a responsibility to review water rights
to determine if forfeiture has occurred prior to approving (or denying) certain applications
affecting existing water rights.
In 1999, the SRBA court issued a decision tolling the forfeiture period for a water right during
the time period that a claim is pending in the adjudication. The Department has presumed
that water rights are not forfeited for non-use during the five-year period following issuance of
a partial decree. For many water rights decreed in the SRBA, the initial five-year period has
ended or will end soon, and Department employees are increasingly faced with questions
regarding a cut-off date to determine if forfeiture has occurred and when action must be taken
to protect a water right from forfeiture. For example, if a partial decree is issued during the
middle of the irrigation season, is it appropriate to assume that five full irrigation seasons of
non-use (in addition to the first partial season) must pass before the right is considered to be
forfeited? If so, would the right holder need to initiate some action to protect the right from
forfeiture prior to the end of the five full seasons, or prior to the beginning of the sixth
irrigation season, or some other time? In the past, the Department has presumed that
resumption at the beginning of the sixth season would prevent forfeiture on the basis that
junior irrigation rights would not have had opportunity to establish some reliance on the
unused water during the non-irrigation season. What if the need for irrigation water is further
delayed in the sixth season due to a wet spring?
The purpose of this memo is to address the timing questions that arise during forfeiture
review by providing Department employees with a simple and uniform forfeiture review
period. This memo applies to forfeiture review associated with applications to lease a water
right to the Water Supply Bank, applications for extension of time to avoid forfeiture, and
applications for transfer of a water right. This memo applies to both irrigation and nonirrigation water rights.
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The Department will presume that beneficial use under a water right during a portion of a
calendar year or any defense or protection from forfeiture applicable during a portion of a
calendar year will apply to the entire calendar year. For example, if an irrigation right is used
to establish a cover crop at the beginning of an irrigation season and is not used during the
remainder of the irrigation season; the right will be considered protected from forfeiture
through December 31 of that calendar year. Likewise, if an irrigation right is decreed at the
beginning of a calendar year (prior to the beginning of the irrigation season) and is not used
at any time during the irrigation season, the right will still be considered protected from
forfeiture for that entire calendar year.
The Department will also presume that resumption of beneficial use under a water right for a
portion of a calendar year or any defense or protection initiated during a calendar year will
apply to the entire calendar year. For example, if an irrigation right is used to establish a fall
crop at the end of an irrigation season, even if the right was not used earlier during the
irrigation season, the right will be considered protected from forfeiture for that calendar year.
Likewise, if an application for lease to the Water Supply Bank is submitted before the end of a
calendar year and eventually approved and the right is not used at any time during that
calendar year, the right will be considered protected from forfeiture for that calendar year.
Strict application of Idaho Code§ 42-222(4) would require an application for extension of time
to avoid forfeiture to be submitted prior to the end of the fifth unprotected year of non-use.
However, the Department wishes to avoid questions and conflicts surrounding the timing of
resumption during an irrigation season and to maintain simple and uniform guidance to
Department employees.
Therefore, the Department will presume that resumption of
beneficial use or any defense or protection, including filing an extension of time to avoid
forfeiture, initiated before the end of the sixth calendar year will prevent a finding of forfeiture
by the Department.
As an example, if an irrigation right is decreed in the SRBA in January, 2004 and water is not
used during 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, then resumption or action initiating a
defense or protection from forfeiture must occur prior to the end of the calendar year in 2010.
The 2004 calendar year is considered protected since the decree was issued during that
year. The years 2005 through 2009 represent the five year period of non-use. The
Department would not find forfeiture if use resumed before the end of calendar year 2010.
An application to lease the water right to the Water Supply Bank or other action initiating a
defense or protection from forfeiture would apply similarly .
As another example, if an extension of time to avoid forfeiture is granted for five years, the
Department will presume that resumption of beneficial use or any defense or protection
initiated before the end of the sixth calendar year will prevent a finding of forfeiture by the
Department. Continuing with the example above, if an application for extension of time to
avoid forfeiture was submitted in 2010 and the Department granted an extension for the
years 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, then resumption or other action initiating a defense
or protection from forfeiture must occur prior to the end of calendar year 2015. Note that,
pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-222(4), the Department would still be required to provide notice
at least 60 days prior to the end of 2014 that resumption and a report is due by December 31,
2014. However, the Department would not find forfeiture if resumption of beneficial use or
1

Filing an application for transfer does not toll the statutory period for forfeiture of a water right due to non-use.
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other action initiating a defense or protection from forfeiture occurred prior to the end of
calendar year 2015 .
This memo does not change Department policy on partial forfeiture. Forfeiture of a portion of
a water right may occur if beneficial use is reduced for the statutory period as applied under
the guidance of this memo. When discussing forfeiture issues, Department employees and
water users should be mindful that any Department decision or action where forfeiture may
be an issue can be contested and certain facts may lead to a different conclusion in an
administrative hearing, or judicial review.
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of her home;, when a farmer switches crops or seed varieties to produce more or higher valued product that consumes
more water, or when a hydropower user adds additional generating capacity to an existing water flow. 33
The court did not mention other industrial uses, but the implication of his decision is apparent there too. Thus, a
description of the internal workings of an industrial facility is not part of a water right. Consequently, for instance, a
microchip producer might upgrade its facilities, enabling it to produce twice the quantity of product with the same amount
of water, without changing its water right. 34
C.

Diversion requirement

The rule as traditionally stated is that a water right requires a "diversion to a beneficial use." 35 That is, it is
necessary to artificially remove (or impound) water to obtain a legally protected right to its use. However, Idaho's
Supreme Court has ruled that the state constitution does not require a diversion where none is necessary to accomplish the
beneficial use. It is as yet unclear whether instream flow rights can be established in Idaho outside ofldaho 's rather
restrictive minimum stream flow statute. 36
D.

Beneficial use - generally

Under Idaho's Constitution, an appropriation of water must be for a " beneficial use."37 It is often recited that
beneficial use is "the basis, the measure and the limit" of any water right. United States v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist., 144
Idaho 106, 111, 157 P.3d 600,605 (Schroeder, C.J .). Indeed, Congress included this statement of the rule in the federal
reclamation law. 38 The concept arises from the fact that a water right is not a right to the water itself, but rather is a right
to use water owned by the people of the state. 39 In legal parlance, a water right is a "usufructuary" right. Thus, regardless
of what the right holder may believe his right to be, and regardless of what the right's license, decree or other
documentation proclaims, the extent of the right is limited to that amount which has actually been placed to beneficial
33 There would appear to be some limits to expansion in at least some circumstances. For example, adding electric generating
capacity presumably is permissible so long as the right holder does not increase the amount of water dive11ed through the penstocks.
However, an increase that requires a higher rate of flow presumably would not be allowed without obtaining a new water right.
34 The court also did not address the situation where the expansion could entail an increase in annual diverted volume and
potentially cause injury. This could happen, for example, where a 2 cfs diversion (a well, for example, or a pump in a stream) historically
was used an average of 14 hours per day for a particular commercial enterprise, but after facility enlargement it was used at this rate for 20
hours per day.
35

The diversion requirement is explored more fully in the Section on in stream flows, see part 21.F beginning on page 227.

36

!daho's instream flow law is codified at Idaho Code§§ 42-1501 to 1505. (See discussion in section 22.C at page 257.)

37 Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3 ("The right to dive11 and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses,
shall never be denied .. .. "). The Legislature has declared: "The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the
appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for such purpose, the right ceases." Idaho Code § 42- 104.
38 This phrase appears in various places in western water law, and is perhaps the best succinct statement of the fundamentals of the
prior appropriation doctrine. Congress included it as an express directive in section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, 390. See
Wells A. Hutchins, Idaho Law of Water Rights, 5 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 39 (I 968) (an appropriator is held to the quantity of water he is able to
apply to a beneficial use at a particular time, within the limit of his appropriation); 3 Kinney on Irrigation,§ 1579 (2d ed. 1912) (no one is
entitled to have a priority adjudged for more water than he has actually appropriated, nor for more than he actually needs); 2 Waters and
Water Rights§ 17.03(b) (1991); Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the Lcnv o/Swface Streams, 12 Wyo. L. J. 1 (1956)
(actual beneficial use is the measure of the right, and the right is not protected from loss by wasteful over-application); Golze, Reclamation in
the United States 95 (1961) (an essential pat1 of the appropriation doctrine is the requirement that water be put to beneficial use, and if
beneficial use lags, the right may be lost); Meyers, Tarlock, Corbridge & Getches, Water Resource Management 282 (3rd ed. 1988) (the
concept that beneficial use is the basis, measure and limit of an appropriative right is recognized by state constitutions, statutes and judicial
decisions throughout the Western states).

39

Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 39 Idaho 320, 323-24, 227 P.29 ( 1924).
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use,40 and the extent to which a prior right may be enforced as agai nst a subsequent right is lim ited to the amount that
actually is required by the senior.41 Thus, "paper" water rights in Idaho are subject to challenge, and likely ca nnot be
c hanged or transferred to a new place of diversion or use because they are not being put to beneficial use. 42 , Quite
simply, to the extent of non-use they are not water rights.
Idaho s constituti on, like those of most Western states, names only a few beneficial uses for which water may be
appropriated: agricu lture, domestic uses, manufacturing, mining and hydropower. 43 However, the Id aho Supreme Court
has ruled that this is not an exclusive list.
With the exception of those uses e levated to beneficial status by Article 15, § 3, of the
Constitution, the concept of what is or is not a beneficial use must necessarily change
with conditions . . . . The notion of benefic iality must include a requirement of
reasonableness.

State of Idaho, Dep 't of Parks v. lDWR, 96 Idaho 440,447, 530 P.2d 924, 931 (1974) (Bakes, J. concurring).
While it is well established in western water law that an appropriat ion of water must be
made for a 'beneficia l use, ' nevertheless in Idaho at least the generic term 'beneficial use'
has never been judicially or statutorily defined.

Dep 't of Parks, 96 Idaho at 443, 530 P.2d at 927.
Recent Idaho statutes have defined a few specific uses as beneficial. 44 However, the generi c term has never been
statutorily defined.
The case law has filled in the constitutional and statutory gaps. For example, Idaho Supreme Court decisions and
water ri ght licenses issued by the Idaho Department of Water Resources have approved fish and wildlife habitat,
aesthetics, recreation and similar purposes as beneficial uses in ldaho. 45 Today, the idea that only certain types of use are
" beneficial" is Iittle more than an historic relic. 46 The plain trend is toward recognition that, so long as the use serves
some purpose and is not inherently wasteful , it probably qua Iifies as a beneficial use.

40 See e.g., Graham v. Leek, 65 fdaho 279, 144 P.2d 475 ( 1943); Albrethsen v. Wood Rh·er Land Co. , 40 Idaho 49, 23 I P. 418
(1924) (decree is evidence of beneficial use of the right on ly as of the date of the decree).
41 American

Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. IDWR, 2007 WL 677947 (Idaho).

42

See e.g. , Hillman v. Hardwick, 3 Idaho 255, 28 P. 438 (1891).

43

Idaho Const. art. XV, § 3.

44

For instance, Idaho's Ground Water Recharge Act expressly states that "the appropriation and underground storage of water ...
for purposes of gro und water recharge shall constitute a beneficial use ." Idaho Code §§ 42-4201(2), 42-420 J A(2) (repealed in 2009); see
also, Idaho Code§ 42-234(2). In a similar vein, in 1996, the Legislature addressed the issue in the context of municipal water rights .
Municipal Water Rights Act of 1996, Idaho Code§ 42-222 ("A water right held by municipal provider to meet reasonably anticipated future
needs shall be deemed to constitute a beneficial use .... "). In a third example, the Legislature has declared certain instream uses to be
beneficial. Idaho Code§§ 42-1501 to 42-1505.
45 Judge Melanson, then of the SRBA Cou11, issued a ruling in a basin-wide issue confirming: "Under Idaho law, any person may
establish a diversionary water right, including to and from storage, fo r aesthetic, recreational or wildlife purposes." In re SRBA, Case No.
39576, Idaho Dist. Ct., Fifth Jud. Dist. (Basin-Wide Issue No.00-9 101 4, Amended Consent Decree, Feb. 25, 2009)
46 An example of such a "relic" is Empire Water and PoJ11er Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 19 13), in which a
federal court applying Colorado law denied an instream flow water right to a resort community build around a natural waterfall. "[W]e think
complainant [the town] is not entitled to a continuance of the fa lls solely for their scenic beauty. The state laws proceed upon more material
lines . . . . It may be that if the attention of the lawmakers had been directed to such natural objects of great beauty they would have sought to
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E.

Beneficial use - storage rights

It is also well established that storage of water in a reservoir is beneficial, so long as the storage water is
appurtenant to an identifiable area and used (either within the reservoir or after release) for a beneficial use, such as
irrigation, hydropower, municipal, or recreation purposes. 47
Ill Idaho, storage rights are licensed or decreed with multiple "purpose of use" components. On-stream irrigation
reservoirs will typically contain one or more "purpose of use" couplets such as:
•

"irrigation storage" and "irrigation from storage"

•

"power storage" and "power from storage"

•

"streamflow maintenance storage" and "streamflow maintenance from storage."

•

"stockwater storage" and "stockwater from storage"

•

"wildlife storage" and "wildlife from storage"

A single storage right may have more than on of these couplets of purposes listed.
The first purpose (e.g., "irrigation storage") describes the right to stor the water in the reservoir. The second (e.g.,
"irrigation from storage") describes the right to release the water from the reservoir for that stated beneficial use.
Holders of storage rights may also release water for purposes not listed on the right, such as flood control,
reservoir maintenance, or other emergencies. Whether such released water "counts" toward the fill of the storage right is
the subject of litigation as of this writing.
In some instances, a reservoir may also have a stand-alone purpose of use, such as "recreation storage," that does
not have any associated purpose corresponding to release of the water from the reservoir.
Each purpose of use will have an associated period of use. For example, the period of use associated with
"irrigation storage" is typically year round (reflecting the right to " dive1t" and retain the water wihin the reservoir any

preserve them, but we think the dominant idea was utility, liberally and not narrowly regarded, and we are constrained to follow it." Id. at
129. Certainly utility-beneficial use, to be precise- is the dominant idea. It would follow that a diversion to a useful aesthetic purpose,
such as golf course ponds or artificial trout streams in a community, would meet this test. Likewise other recreational uses such as snowmaking at ski resorts . None of these is expressly provided for in statute.
47

In the irrigation context, storage is seen as protection against recurring drought and as a source of supplemental supply for
appropriators whose natural flow rights may not provide them enough to complete the irrigation season.
"The supreme cotu1 held in 1941 that the maintenance of a dam, under permit from the Depa11ment of Reclamation [now the Idaho
Department of Water Resources], for the storage of flood and winter-flow waters, could not constitute a wrongful interference with decreed
rights on the stream, provided the owner of the dam released during the irrigation season the quantities of water necessary to supply the
decreed rights." Wells A. Hutchins, The Idaho Lmv of Water Rights, 5 Idaho L. Rev. I, 45 (1968) (citing Knutson v. Huggins, 62 Idaho 662,
115 P.2d 421 (1941).)
Several western states limit the amount of water which may be stored under the "one-fill rule" which allows a reservoir to be filled
only once per irrigation season. City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1968); Orchard City Irrigation Dist. v. Whitten, 361 P.2d
130 (1961). The refill issue is being litigated in Idaho as of this writing.
"The storage of water for future uses has long been held to be a beneficial use." Robert E. Beck, I Waters and Water Rights,§ 13.03
at 144 ( 1991) (citations omitted); "Initially, the system relented on this proposition [requiring immediate use] only with reference to the
building of reservoirs to catch otherwise unusable seasonal flows and floodwaters . . .. Now, of course, municipalities are allowed to acquire
supplies for projected future use; indeed, in many instances are required to, for long-term growth." Robert E. Beck, I Waters and Water
Rights,§ 12.03(c)(2) at 108 (1991) (citations omitted); Samuel C. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States § 378 at p. 410 (1911); 45 Am.
Jur. 2d Irrigation§ 38 (1969). But see, Jicaril/a Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126 ( I 0th Cir. 1981) (Albuquerque's storage of
San Juan/Chama water for 40 years was not a beneficial use due to evaporation losses.).
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time it is legally and physically avai!ab!e), while the period of use associated with "irrigation from storage" is limited to
the irrigation season.
Likewise, each purpose of use will have an associated quantity. In virtually all instances, however, these storage
and release from storage purposes are quantified solely in terms of annual volume (acre-feet). The absence of a rate of
flow reflects the fact that on-stream storage rights are allowed to store all physically and legally available water reaching
the reservoir. In other words, an on-stream reservoir is required to bypass only water that downstream rights are entitled
to dive1t.
Off-stream reservoirs (such as Lake Lowell) are licensed and decreed in a similar manner, with one critical
distinction. In addition to the purposes ofuse described above (which are quantified in annual volume), they will display
an additional purpose of use called "diversion to storage" that is quantified in terms of an instantaneous flow rate (cfs).
This purpose of use describes the right to dive1t the water from the stream (or, in some cases, ground water) to the offstream reservoir. Thus, a key difference between an on-stream reservoir and an off-stream reservoir is that on-stream
reservoirs are authorized to divert all water that is physically available in the stream and not required to satisfy other water
rights, while off-stream reservoirs (like other natural flow and ground water rights) are limited to a particular rate of flow.
At that time of licensing, each purpose of use must be proven separately. The "storage" and "diversion to
storage" components may be proven simply by showing the quantity of water that has been diverted to the reservoir.48 In
contrast, the "release from storage" component (e.g., "irrigation from storage") must be proven by showing actual
application to the end beneficial use.
Thus, if an irrigation reservoir stored water, but, at the time of licensing, had never actually used any of that water
for irrigation, the license would be denied because "irrigation from storage" purpose had not been shown. Mere storage of
water without an ultimate beneficial use is an insufficient basis to establish a water right. See, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1981) (Albuquerque's storage of San Juan/Chama water for 40 years was not a
beneficial use due to evaporation losses.).

F.

Duty of water

Closely related to the rule of beneficial use is the concept of "duty of water," which is that amount of water
reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which the water was appropriated, and no more. The rather odd phrase
"duty of water" is understood more easily in the context of the following quotation from an early Idaho case: " It is a
cardinal principle established by law and the adjudications of this cou1t that the highest and greatest duty of water be
required. The law allows the appropriator only the amount actually necessary for the useful or beneficial purpose to
which he applies it." Munn v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198,207,252 P. 865 (1926).
Each water right is limited by its "duty of water" even though the license, decree, or other basis for the right may
not quantify that amount. For instance, a person might hold a license for a right to divert 10 cfs to irrigate a pa1ticular
piece of land. Nevertheless, a competing user could argue that this rate of diversion is more than reasonably required. In
making this argument, the other user would contend that the quantity stated in the first user's licensed right exceeded the
duty of water and his diversion should be cut back to that duty. Such a challenge would arise ordinarily in a change or
transfer proceeding, in a delivery call situation, or in a general adjudication. 49

48 The same terms, "divert" or "diversion" are used to describe water entering both on-stream and off-stream reservoirs. Thus, for
an on-stream reservoir, IDWR considers all water entering the upper end of the reservoir that the right holder is not obligated to release to
satisfy downstream rights to be "diverted" to the reservoir and , hence, accrued toward the fill of that storage right. This issue, however, is
being litigated as of this writing.

49 Presumably, a challenge based on duty of water also could arise where the complaining party asserts that an appropriator is
diverting more than a reasonable duty during a particular time period (such as in the early or late season, when less water might be needed) .
Such a challenge would essentially be an assertion that the appropriator is wasting water.
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The duty of water concept ordinarily applies in the agricultural irrigation context and is often expressed in terms
of cfs of diversions from the source per irrigated acre.50 Some have suggested it has no application outside that context. 51
In Idaho, a statutory presumption regarding the duty of water has been codified. ' [N]o one shall be authorized to
dive11 for irrigation purposes more than one cubic foot of water per second of the normal flow for each fifty (50) acres of
land to be so irrigated, or more than five (5) acre feet of stored water per annum for each acre of land to be so irrigated,
unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the department of water resources that a greater amount is necessary." 52 This
amounts to one "miner' s inch" of water per acre.53 Thus, for example, if a farmer irrigates 200 acres, the state will
presume the duty of water not to exceed diversions of200 x 0.02 = 4 cfs, absent a showing that more is needed.
Incidentally, diverting at constant rate of one miner's inch throughout a 200-day irrigation season yields nearly eight acrefeet of diversions. Because annual consumptive use by crops in Idaho typically is less than three acre-feet, the inch-peracre target is ample, and in many cases likely more than needed. Indeed, Idaho irrigators using wells and sprinklers
typically divert little more than the consumptive amount.
The duty of water will include a reasonable amount of seepage, evaporation and ditch carriage loss, and can vary
from place to place depending on conditions. In addition, the one-inch-per-acre presumption can be overcome by
evidence that more (or less) water is reasonably needed. For instance, a user could obtain a water right for diversions of
11 cfs if he could demonstrate that 10 cfs was required for application to his 500 acres and an additional I cfs was lost in
transporting the water to the fields. Note that the water right is measured at the point of diversion. Only a portion of the
water diverted under a user's water right, perhaps 50 percent, is actually consumed beneficially in many agricultural
settings. As indicated above, canal diversions almost always are much higher per acre than ground water diversions.
The duty of water and beneficial use requirements both are central concepts in the corollary rule of Western water
law that a water right does not include the right to waste water. In addition, the courts and legislatures of many Western
states, Idaho among them, have announced that encouraging (or requiring) " maximum utilization" (or "optimum use") and
efficiency also are legitimate subjects of state regulation. 54 This makes sense. The constitutional requirements of priority
and beneficial use alone lay a broad foundation for these concepts.
G.

Measurement

Water users are required to maintain headgates or other controlling works at the point of diversion suitable to the
Department of Water Resources.55 Water users must monitor and repo11 their water usage only if there is a specific
requirement to do so imposed by the Depa11ment. Such requirements, if they exist, are typically shown as a condition of
the water right. 56
ln 1995, the Idaho Legislature authorized the Director to divide the state into water measurement districts to carry
out the water measuring requirements of Chapter 7, Title 42, Idaho Code. The Director oflDWR issued an order on
50

"The duty of water in the Payette River Drainage is generally based on not more than 0.02 cfs per acre with consideration given
for reasonable losses incurred, ... [T)he duty of water under the decree is 0.0167 cfs per acre ( 1.6 cfs/96 acres = 0.0 I 67)." Dovel v.
Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 65, 831 P.2d 527,533 (1992) (Justice McDevitt dissenting).
51 "Water duty
52

is limited to agricultural uses ." A . Dan Tarlock, law of Water Rights and Resources, § 5:66.

Idaho Code§ 42-202; see also Idaho Code§ 42-220 (repeating the requirement in the context of issuance of water right licenses).

53 A miner' s inch is a flow rate equal to 9 gallons per minute. Under the Idaho standard, there are fifty miner's inches in a cubic
foot per second ("cfs"); thus, a miner's inch is also expressed as 0.02 cfs.

54

See discussion of maximum utilization and optimum use in section 6.F at page 49.

55

Idaho Code § 42-70 I.

56

Idaho Code § 42-70 I.
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Robert L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (1.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, r.L.L.C.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
arawlings@holdenlegal.com
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Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,

Case No. CV-2014-3466-OC

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

NOTICE OF HEARING ON
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

V.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on the 22 nd day of December, 2016, at 2:00 p.m., or as soon
thereafter

as

counsel

can

be

heard,

before

the

Honorable

David

C.

Nye,

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in the above-entitled action, Chad and Jane Barnes, will call up for
hearing the following: Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.

Dated this

/'7~ ay of December 2016.

Robert L. Harris

'

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

I

-

& CRAPO, P.L.L.C.

NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the / ~ +-day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy
of the document listed below on the persons listed below by the method indicated.

Document Served:

NOTICE OF HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.

Post Office Box 3 70
216 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Fax: (208)234-2961
Email: pete@mrtlaw.net

( ) Mail
( /)1Iand Delivery
( ) Facsimile
( ) Courthouse Box
( ) Email

L
Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN

&

RAPO, P.L.L.C.

G:\ WP DAT A\RLH\17992 Barnes, Chad\Pleadings\Reconsideration NOTICE.docx
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Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
2 16 W. Whitman

P.O. Box 370
(.!) Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233-0132
~
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
0 Idaho State Bar No. 7724
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANT,S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs.
KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant

COMES NOW Defendant Kirk Jackson, by and through his attorney of record Peter M.
Wells, of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered, and hereby files Defendant's

Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. This Objection is supported by the Affidavit
of Kirk Jackson in Support of Defendants Objection to Motion for Reconsideration, Defendants
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaint(ff's Motion for Reconsideration, and the other pleadings in

the court's record at this time.
Defendant hereby requests this Court to deny Plaintiffs• Motion for Reconsideration.

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-0C

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION PAGE 1
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Dated this 15th day of December, 2016.

PETER M. WELLS
May, Ramme/1 & Thompson, Chartered

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Kirk Jackson was served on
the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile 208-523-9518
[ ] Hand Delivery

DATED this 15th day of December, 2016.

By: ~

' ~&T hompson, Chartered
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MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
216 W. Whitman
P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Telephone: (208) 233 -0132
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961
Idaho State Bar No. 7724
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-0C

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant

COMES NOW Defendant Kirk Jackson, by and through his attorney ofrecord Peter M.
Wells, of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered, and hereby files Defendants

Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.

Introduction
On November 17, 2016, this Court entered its decision on Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary

Judgment, denying the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing Plaintifrs case.
This Court also dismissed Defendants' Counterclaim. A Judgment was issued by this Court on
November 17, 2016. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 1, 2016.
Plaintiffs have not presented any new evidence to support their positions. Plaintiffs have made
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one new factual allegation in the Affidavit of Robert L. Harris in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration claiming that Defendant and Defendant's counsel were who desired this Court,

rather than the IDWR, to decide the issue of forfeiture. Defendant disputes this allegation and
will address it below. Plaintiff has attached a water law handbook published by a law firm that
has no precedential value, and contains no persuasive authority related to the facts of this case.
However, the handbook also does not the core issue in this case related to availability of water
and whether Bloxham is in fact a "third party" as contemplated by J.C. 42-222. Plaintiffs are
merely requesting this Court to reconsider its previous argument without any new evidence, or
binding law. Consequently, Plaintiffs• Motion for Reconsideration is presented without a basis in
law or fact, is frivolous and without foundation, and Defendant should be granted his attorney's
fees for being forced to respond to this Motion.
Plaintiffs claim that it is "undisputed that 29-10420 was regularly and continuously used
on the Barnes' property, first by Bloxham then by Barnes." Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion/or Reconsideration pg 2. While it may be true that there was some use of

29· 10420 on the Barnes' property, Defendant continues to dispute that 29-10420 was applied to

all of the property it was originally decreed to on the Barnes' property. Instead, Kirk Jackson
testified that there was a period of time where he witnessed the water right was not applied to the

Barnes' property, other than small quantities from 2012-2016. Affidavit of Kirk Jackson, 1,i
29-35.

Plaintiffs also claim it is undisputed," ... that 29- 10420 was never used on the Jackson
property between 2004, at earliest, 2012." Memorandum in Support ofPlainti.ff's Motion for
Reconsideration pg 2. Again, this matter is disputed by the testimony of Kirk Jackson who

testified that he witnessed flood irrigation on the property that he would purchase in 2011 when
he viewed the property. Affidavit of Peter M. Wells, Ex. 7, Depo. Kirk Jackson, p . 53.
The other point that Plaintiffs claim "may warrant factual clarification" is that Plaintiffs
claim that Jackson and his attorney picked the District Court forum to have the matter decided.

Id. 1 Jackson did not pick the District Court to have this matter decided. Plaintiffs filed this matter
It is unclear to Defendant why Plaintiff would even bring these issues up as they are not relevant to the
subject matter of the case. However, in an exercise of caution, Defendant wants the record to reflect that
the additional information supplied by Plaintiffs is not accurate, and Plaintiff is therefore supplying the
above recitation of what actually transpired at the Pre-Hearing Conference.
1
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in the District Court. See Complaint. After Plaintiff's case was filed, Jackson was advised by the
Idaho Department of Water Resources that contrary to their original opinion, he would need to
file a transfer application. Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in Support of Defendant's Objection to

Plaintiff's Motion to Reconside,; 16-10. A transfer application was filed with the Idaho
Department of Water Resources on November 16, 2015 by Jackson. There was no Pre-hearing
Conference held on January 27, 2016. It may be true that there was a prehearing conference
originally scheduled for January 27, 2016, but it was rescheduled from that date to February 2,
2016. ld. at 10-11.
At the February 2, 2016, Pre-hearing Conference, the Parties verbally agreed to a
settlement of all of the issues in the case, both the administrative issues before the IDWR and the
issues before this court. Id. at 13. That settlement agreement was later reduced to writing by
Plaintiffs' counsel. That Settlement Agreement was submitted to Defendant who signed the
agreement. Plaintiff then rejected the agreement that was signed by Defendant. Plaintiffs sent a
second agreement to Defendant, which Defendant did in fact sign again and return to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs then again rejected the docwnent that was drafted by their attorney and this matter was
then placed back on the Trial Court's schedule. Id. at 11-15.
In rnling on the Motion for Summary Judgment, it is Defendants' position that the Court
overlooked one of Defendant's' arguments which wi1l be addressed later. The Court states in its
decision, "Barnes contends, and is correct, that Jackson has never claimed any exceptions under
Idaho Code Section 42-223.,, Decision on Summary Judgment p. 5. This statement is in error.
Defendant did assert a defense pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-223(6).
Defendant' initial Answer and Counterclaim filed on October 10, 2014, by Defendants
counsel of record at that time states "Third Defense. The non-use of Water Right 29-14032
alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint is exempt from forfeiture under Idaho Code Section 42-223 and
common law." See Answer and Counterclaim p. 1, ,I 2. Further, in Defendants Memorandum in

Support ofDefendants Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, "Idaho Code
Section 42-223(6) states "No portion of any Water Rights shall be lost or forfeited for non-use if
the non-use results from circumstances over which the Water Right owner has no control.
Whether the Water Right owner has control over non-use of water shall be determined on a case
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by case basis11 Defendant's Memorandum in Support Defendant's Objection to P/aintiff 's Motion

for Summary Judgment pg 7-8. On pages 8-10 of Defendant's Memorandum in Support
Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant outlines the

issues that were out of his control. He explains in detail why it is that it was beyond the control
of the Parties to be able to irrigate with the available water. Therefore, Defendant did assert a

defense pursuant to Idaho Code Section 42-223. Plaintiffs also acknowledge that Defendants did
assert a defense under Idaho Code Section 42-223(6). See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration p. 18. ('Because that is the only statutory exception
asserted by Jackson there is no basis for this Court to find any statutory exception applies here to
delay forfeiture.")
The Barnes' have now asked this Court to reconsider its decision, but as stated above,
they provide no new law, or law on point to the relevant issue in the case. While the law they
state may be accurate statements of the law, it simply does not apply in this case.

STANDARDS RELATED TO FORFEITURE
Defendant previously stated in its Memorandum in Opposition to Summa,y Judgment t11e
standards related to forfeiture.
Idaho Code Section 42-222 requires the failure to use water
rights for a term of five (5) years shall cause those water rights to
be forfeited. However, ' ... abandonments and forfeitures are not
favored.' Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 713 (1937) . 'The party
asserting that a water right has been forfeited by nonuse for a
period of five (5) years has the burden of proving the forfeiture by
clear and convincing evidence.• Sagewi//ow, Inc. vs Idaho Dept of
Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 842(2003). 'Although the owner of the
Water Right has the burden of raising defenses to statutory
forfeiture, the burden of persuasion remains on the party claiming
that the water was forfeited, and that party must disprove the
defense.' Id. 'Clear and convincing evidence is generally
understood to be ..evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is
highly probable or reasonably certain.' •• In re delivery call ofA&B
brigation Dist., 153 Idaho 500, 516, 284 P. 3 d 225, 241 (2012).
This action was filed by the Plaintiffs. Therefore, it is the Plaintiffs that have the burden
of proving first, that a forfeiture occurred. If Plaintiffs can prove that a forfeiture occurred, then
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
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Plaintiffs have the added burden of disproving all of Defendant's defenses. Plaintiffs, as the
Court held, can not reach this burden.

THE LACK OF WATER IS DISPOSITIVE TO THE DETERMINATION THAT
NO FORFEITURE OCCURRED
Repeatedly, throughout Plaintiff's Memorandums in the summary judgments and
Plaintiffs' Motion/or Reconsideration, Plaintiffs hold to the principle that "Jackson•s argument
incorrectly focuses on the overall availability of water from the spring rather than the

properties' entitlement to water." See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment p . 7. Plaintiffs have offered no legal precedent of any kind to show that it is
the properties entitlement to water that must be considered, rather than the availability of water
for the property.
The Idaho Supreme Court has decided this issue clearly in Sagewillow, Inc. vs Idaho
Dep't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 843(2003).
Water rights are not forfeited because of failure to use them
for a period of five years if such failure is caused by
circumstances beyond the control of the water right holder.

citation omitted The fourteen surface water rights appurtenant
to the Knollin and Bird Ranches were later priority rights that
could only be delivered during high water flows. Sagewillow
raised the defense below that the evidence did not show that
water was available during the years of nonuse. The department
did not make any finding on that issue. Because Water Rights

cannot be forfeited by nonuse if water was not available and
Sagewillow raised that issue, the department must find that
water was available for Sagewillows use before it can find that
Sagewillow forfeited water rights by non-use of the water.
Therefore, on remand the department can address this issue.
Emphasis added.
It is clear that a forfeiture cannot occur if the water necessary for the water right was
unavailable. Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the forfeiture occurred. In this case,
Plaintiffs have provided no evidence showing that the water was available for use on Jackson's
property. As the Court correctly held "There is no indication of any forfeiture here." Decision on
Motion for Summary Judgment p. 7. The Court's decision is supported by Sage Willow as
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Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that water was available. The Court found "To the contrary,
[Bloxham] stated that 'there is typically not enough water to supply all of the water rights on the
system.n Id. at 6. Defendant provided unrebutted evidence that there was not enough water to
satisfy even his 40% of the parent water right. See Affidavit ofKirk Jackson, 115, -24. Further, the
Court's example is directly on point with the holding of Sage Willow:
If a fanner set aside not only a physical pivot comer, but also

water amount needed to water it, that portion of the Water Right
can truly be lost, not because the land was not used, but because
the water was not used. If the farmer didn't water his pivot comers
because he did not have enough water, he has not forfeited anything,
but that is different than the situation in which he could have watered,
but chose not to. There is a substantial difference between "could not"
and "would not".
Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 7..
In this case, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs, from Mr. Bloxham, is that the water
system did not have enough water to fulfill aH of the water rights on the system. His water right
was the only water right on the system at the time he operated the property. The inference as
found by this court is that Bloxham was using all of the water on his property. Id. This inference
is supported by the unrebutted evidence provided by Jackson that the water source does not
produce and has not produced enough water to satisfy even his water right. Affidavit of Kirk
Jackson, 115,-24. Plaintiffs have certainly presented no evidence that Bloxham wasn't using all
of the water. In fact, Plaintiffs have presented absolutely no evidence of any kind as to the
availability of water in the system. The unrebutted evidence in this case shows that a forfeiture
could not occur as the water being sought to be forfeited by Plaintiffs was not available.
Therefore, the Court's decision in this matter is correct. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration
must be denied.

BLOXHAM CANNOT BE A THIRD PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF FORFEITURE
It is undisputed that a forfeiture requires a "third-party" to either institute legal
proceedings to declare a forfeiture; obtain a new water right prior to reswnption; or use the water
pursuant to an existing right. Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842. One of the principal questions in any
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forfeiture is whether a third-party did in fact take one of the actions required in Sagewillow. In
this case, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of a third party taking any of the actions required

by Sagewillow to complete the forfeiture. Instead, Plaintiffs claim that Bloxham, the owner of the
parent right, not only forfeited a portion of his water right, but also claimed the portion of the
forfeited right al1 at the same time. Plaintiffs cite to no legal precedent for this illogical
conclusion. This is because as the Court held in its decision on Summary Judgment, if Bloxham
were in fact the third-party in this case, as the third·party who is claiming water against himself,
his partial forfeiture of his water right must apply to the water right as a whole. See Decision on

Motion for Summary Judgment pg 7-8. Bloxham cannot be a third·party who forfeits his own
right and then reclaims it.
There is no dispute that Jackson began applying water from the source to irrigate trees
that he planted in 2012. Affidavit of Peter M Wells, Ex. 7. He spent considerable time and money
to get the system up and running so that he could irrigate in 2012, 2013, 2014. Id. There is
further no dispute that Jackson in 2013 irrigated a wheat crop to harvest on his property. Id.
There is no dispute that Jackson took 40% of the available water in 2013 to water his crop.

Affidavit ofKirk Jackson ,i 25. Jackson testified there was not enough water to fulfi]I his full
water right, but he did take 40% of the stream. Id. Again, in 2014, Jackson continued to apply
40% of the stream for fall planting. No third party can be said to have claimed Jackson's water
prior to Jackson beginning to use his water as testified above because during these times Jackson
was taking 40% of the available water and applying it to his property. He may not have been
taking the whole stream or the full amount of his water right, but neither was Bloxham, who was
the only other user on the system during this time because there was not enough water to fulfill
the entire water decreed. Id. at ,i 23 . After Jackson got his system up and running in 2013,
claiming 40% of the water, Barnes purchased Blox.ham's property in January of 2014. By this
point though, Jackson was using all of his available water and there can be no argument that he
forfeited his water.
Plaintiffs' examples related to tacking in adverse possession cases are not substantially
similar to this case. First, in an adverse possession case you are required to claim someone else's
property and use it as if it is your own. In th-is case, Bloxham, did not claim someone else's
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property. Instead, the evidence shows that he only used his water right. From 2004. 2012,
Bloxham still claimed ownership of Jackson,s land. As a result, he never claimed someone else 's
property.
Second, the adverse possession analogy does not logically follow in this case. Jackson
began to use his water right prior to any third party claiming it. Bloxham did not claim the water
right belonging to Jackson between 2005 and 2012 as there was not enough water to fulfill all of
Bloxham's water. No evidence has been presented that Bloxham ever used more than his allotted
water right. The only evidence that has been presented shows the opposite. Therefore, the
adverse possession and prescriptive easement examples propounded by the Plaintiffs are
meritless.

JACKSON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE
SECTION 121.
Whenever a civil action is brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation the prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees. Idaho Code Section
12-121. A trial court may award attorneys fees on a prorated basis for any claims or defenses

necessitating this lawsuit that were frivolous, unreasonable, and without adequate foundation.
Idaho Military Historical Soc '.Y, Inc. vs Maslen, J56 Idaho 624, 632 (2014). It is only if there is a

legitimate, triable issue of fact or legitimate issue of law that a claim or defense is not frivolous .

Brannon vs City of Coeur d'Alene, 153 Idaho 843 (857) 2012).
In this case Barnes has asked this Court to reconsider its previous decision but has
presented no new evidence and has provided no law on point to the Court's previous decision.
Instead, Barnes has provided nearly twenty (20) pages of recitation of legal principles that do not
even apply in this case. Not once has Barnes addressed the issue of whether there is adequate
water as required by Sagewi/low. Barnes cannot identify a third party who claimed water in such
a way as to prevent Jackson from the use of his water. Barnes' Motion for Reconsideration is
instead a rehashing of his previous arguments disregarding the Court's findings. As a result, it is
frivolous. This Court has authority and discretion to award attorneys fees to Jackson for the
defense of this Motion for Reconsideration. Jackson therefore requests this Court to award
attorneys fees in this matter.
CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-0C DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PAGE 8
415 of 514

Dated this 15th day of December, 2016.

ffAkffe- ~ ~
PETER M. WELLS
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit ofKirk Jackson was served on
the folJowing named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Fans, Idaho 83405

bl! U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile 208-523-9518
[ ] Hand Delivery

DATED this 15th day of December, 2016.

B~

~· ~
~ ~ 1 1 & Thompson, Chartered
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MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD
216 W. Whitman/ P.O. Box 370
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC
Plaintiffs,

vs.
KIRK JACKSON,
Defendant

AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK JACKSON IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDER

STATE OF IDAHO )
: ss
County of Bannock )
I, Kirk Jackson after being duly sworn, do depose and state :
1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify to the matters stated here in.
2. I am making this affidavit of my own personal knowledge and belief.
3. This affidavit is being made in response to the Affidavit of Robert L Harris in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK JACKSON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S'
OBJECTION TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER - Page I
417 of 514

4.

Mr. Harris beginning in paragraph 4 makes reference to a transfer proceeding in the IDWR
action. This affidavit as intended to clarify and provide the court with the more accurate statement
of facts in this regard.

5. As stated in my previous affidavit, I purchased the property at issue in this case in April 2012. On
May 31st 2012, I filed the notice of change in water right ownership, which was attached to the

Affidavit of Robert L. Harris as Exhibit F.
6. From May of 2012 till November 2015, no one objected to me using a different point of diversion
than the historical diversion.
7. I had previously been in touch with the Idaho Department of Water Resources and it was my
understanding that I did not need to seek a formal change of my diversion.
8. In November of 2015, I was instructed by IDWR that Craig Bloxham had complained about my
use of a different diversion point. See Exhibit A.
9. It was my understanding from that instruction that I needed to file a transfer application for my
diversion. This is the transfer application referenced by Mr. Harris in paragraph 4 of his Affidavit

of Robert L Harris and Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.
10. In the administrative proceeding related to the transfer application, there was a hearing scheduled
for January 27th 2016. That hearing was 'never held but was continued to February 2nd 2016.
11. I attended the hearing on February 2nd 2016. I have personal knowledge of the events that
transpired at the hearing.
12. At the hearing on February 2nd 2016, neither I nor my attorney stated that we preferred for the
forfeiture matter to be determined by the district court.
13. Instead, at the hearing on February 2nd 2016, the Barnes' and myself entered into a settlement
negotiation and reached a settlement of our case in its entirety, both of the forfeiture action and
the IDWR action.
14. After we left the hearing of February 2nd 2016, Mr. Harris drafted two (2) different settlement
agreements, of which I signed both.
15 . Mr. Harris's clients repudiated our agreement and we were then forced to litigate this matter in
the district court.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
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DATED this 15th day of December, 2016.

KI:?12 ~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, Notary, this 15th day of December, 2016.

[SEAL]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Kirk Jackson was served on
the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the ma er indicated.
Robert Lynn Harris
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PL
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile 208-523-9518
IX]
: r-Mr'r'15@f\bldtnltj~/ . com

,;_Mcu t

DATED this 15th day of December, 2016.

ompson, Chartered
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State of Idaho

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
900 North SkylineDrive, Suite AIdaho Falls Idaho 83402-1718
Phone: (208) 525-7161 FAX: (:WS) 525•7177 www.idwr.idabo.gov
CL. ''BUTCH" ()'ITU· Goveoior
Gary SpackttlaJ) - D>WR D!Nctor

November 6, 2015

Kirk Jackson
POBox866
Pocatello, ID 83204

RE: Application for Transfer (Water Rlght 29-14032)
Dear Mr. Jackson:

t received a phone call yesterday from Craig Bloxham asking about the elements
and status of your water right ~ -14032. Specnically, Mr. Bloxham asked whether you
should file an application for transfer to change your poi~I of diversion from the original
(Bloxham) diversion structure to your recenUy-constructed diversion dam.

The statutes governing transfer applications are broadly worded. They state that
an appficatlon for transfer is required to change the point of diversion of a water right.
(See Idaho Code§ 42-108 and§ 42-222(1)) Historically, the Deparbnent has taken the
position thal moving a point of diversion wtthin the same legal tract described on the
face of the water ri$tlt generally does not require a tmnsfer.
For example, a water user wilh a point of diversion (ground water well) In the
NENE of Section 5, could usuaJly abandon the old weU and drjlla new well anywhere ill
the .NENE of Section 5 without fiUng any transfer application. A transfer would not be
needed ~use nothing is changing on the face of the water right - the point of
diversion would continue to be in the NENE of Section 5.
In your case, water right 29-14032 describes the authorized point of diversion
down to the 10-acre tract, in the SWSENW of Section 14, T11S, R37E. Your new point
of div~rsion is only 50 feet upstream of tt.,e existing point of diversion and would still be
located In the SWSENW of Section 14. Therefore, the point of <f1Version Hsted on the
face of your waler right does net need to change.
There are a few exceptions to the general rule Ihat a transfer Is not .needed tt you
stay within the same legal description. In the past, the Department.has held that, even
tt you are ·staying within the same designated tract, a transfer application must be filed ff
the originaJ point of diversion is not going to be abandoned. Stated a rrttte differently, a
transter application must be filed Uone point of diversion from a source is now
becoming two points of diversion.
·
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In your case, you are creating a new point of diversion oo the unnamed stream.
The other water users on 1he stream will continue to divert from the original (Bloxham}
intake structure. Where there used to be one diversion in the SWSENW of Section 14,
there will now be two. To remain consistent with previous practices of the Department
throughout the state, I am notifying you that you should file a transfer application to
change your point of diversion.
I have enclosed a partially-<;0mpleted transfer application form for you to review.
Please fill In the remaining fnfonnaHon. If the application accurately describes the
changes you would like to make to your water right, please sign the form and retum It
with the appropriate filing fee ($500). You wiU also need to prepare a map showing the
location of the original point of diversion and the new point of diversion and the distance
between the two points. The transfer application will be published in the local
newspaper and anyone who feels like they may be negatively impacted by the change
is free to file a protest
I recognize that there is a pending criminal case against Craig Bloxham tor
events occurring during the irrigation season. I've chose to send a copy of this letter to
Mr. Bloxham and to Matthew Kerns, prosecutor for Bannock County. Thanks tor your
prompt attention to this request Feel free to call if you have any questions or need
assistance preparing a map.
Sincerely,

~~~
(208) 525-7161

Encl: Application for Transfer (Point of Diversion)
Cc:

Craig Bloxham
Matthew Kerbs (by email)

2
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Robert L. Hanis (1.S.B. No. 7018)
D. Andrew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P,L.L.c.
1000 Riverwa!k Drive, Suite 200
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
fll'awlings@holdenlegal.com

Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
V.

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,

Case No. CV-2014-3466"OC

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad tmd Jane Barnes, by and through their counsel ofrecord Holden, Kidwell,

Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., submit this Reply Afemorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration. Again, the Barneses will utilize the terms as defined in their prior btiefing.
I. INTRODUCTION

The Barneses request that the Court reconsider the Decision in light of the principles raised
in the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (the "Reconsideration

Memorandum 11 ). Jackson has submitted Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion/or Reconsideration (the "Opposition Memorandum''), which raises two arguments against
the Bameses' Motion for Reconsideration, which ai·e addressed below.

1
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As to the factual challenge taken up by Jackson, in argument and by affidavit, the Bameses
agree that the circumstances surrounding how this case got to this Court is, ultimately, not critical.
However, the Ba111eses only provided that information to answer the question of interest to the
Comi and, despite apparently conflicting recollections, the facts remain that this case is properly

before this Court and, as the patties agree, this Couit may rule on water right forfeitiu·e.1
II. RECONSIDERATION
A. The use 01· non-use of an ag1·icultural inigation water right is determilled by its
application to beneficial use, i.e., the actual frtigation of acres, and not by the mere
diversion ohvnter undet the water right.

In water law, use (and its opposite, non-use) is defined by the application of water diverted

in accordance with a watet right to beneficial use. Idaho Code § 42-104 ("The appropl'iation must
be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in intei-est
ceases to use it for such putpose, the right ceases"). The meastu·e of the extent of beneficial use
of an agricultural irrigation water right is the number of acres irrigated. This principle is embodied
in water right elements, the permitting process, duty of water, and relation between an agricultural
watel' right's purpose of use and its place of use. See Reconsideration Memorandum, pp. 4-9.
Wisely, Jackson's opposition does not directly challenge this well-established principle of

water law. Jackson provides merely an out-of-hand dismissal of this authority as not "on point to
the relevant issue in the case." Opposition Memorandum, p. 4. Instead, Jackson chooses to focus
his argument, again, on the overall availability of water. At best, Jackson's atgument only
tangentially addresses the Bameses' point that it is the lack of application to beneficial use-the

absence of in·igation of acres for an agricultutal i1Tigation water right such as this- that constitutes
the non-use necessary to effect a forfeiture (or partial forfeiture) under Idaho Code§ 42-222(2).

The Affidavit of Kirk Jackson submitted with his Opposition Memorandum also contains information regarding settlement
discussions, which are not entirely accurate. These discussions are clearly not admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 408.
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B. The legal entitlement to water, not its actual availability, is factually significant.

Jackson,s argument misreads Sagewillow and misapplies Idaho water law ptinciples.
Jackson posits: "Plaintiffs have offered no legal precedent of any kind to show that it is the
prope1ties['] entitlement to water that must be considei-ed, rather than the availability of water for
the property." Opposition Memorandum, p. 5. This premise absolutely fails for two reasons: first,
the very quotation from Sagewillow provided by Jackson shows that the legal entitlement to water
is detenninative of forfeitme and, second, Jackson unde1n1i11es his position by demonstrating that
the Jackson Property was always legally entitled to 40% of any actual flows in Sprii1g Creek.
First, inSagewillow, the Comt explained:
2. Failure to find that Sagewillow, or its predecessoi-s, did not exercise the
surface water rights during five consecutive years that the water was
available. Water rights are not forfeited beca\1se of the failure to use them
for a period of five years if such failure is caused by circumstances beyond
the control of the wate1· right holder. Jenkins v. State, Department of Water
Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 647 P.2d 1256 (1982). The fourtee11 surface
water rights appmtenant to the Knollin and Bird Ranches were latel·
p1·iority rights that could only be delive•·ed during high water flows.
Sagewillow raised the defense below that the evidence did not show water
was available during the years of 1101mse. The Department did not make
any finding on that issue. Because water rights cannot be forfeited by
nonuse if the water was not available and Sagewillow raised that issue, the
Department must find that water was available for Sagewillo\.v'S use before
it can find that Sagewillow forfeited watet rights by nonuse of the water.
Therefore, on remand the Depaitment can address this issue.

Sagewillow, Inc_ v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 843, 70 P.3d 669, 681 (2003)
(emphasis from original omitted, these emphases added). Thus, in Sagewillow, the fo1feited water
rights (relating to the named Ranches) were oflater priOl'ity, meaning that the senior water rights
had to be satisfied in full before any wate1· could be used on the Ranches. See Idaho Code §
42-106 ("As between appropriators, the first in time is first in righfl Thus, because there was ari
unresolved issue of fact about whether there was sufficient water to satisfy the senior water rights,
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such that any water was available to the Ranches- i. e., whether the Ranches were legally

entitled to any wate1'-the case was remanded. Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 843, 70 P.3d at 681.
Second, Jackson has repeatedly asserted that he is entitled to 40% of any flows in Spting
Creek. See Opposition Memotandum, p. 7 (repetitively describing how "Jackson took 40% of the
available water"

or "40% of the stream"); see also Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in Support of

Defendant's' [sic] Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Summa,y Judgment, 128 ("I used 40% of
the water because I own about 40% of the original ground that Water Right 29-10420 was decreed
to irrigate"). More accurately, Jackson is entitled to 40% of the flows in Spring Creek if all other
water rights are calling for water. 2 This is because, as a child water right, 29-14032 shal·es tlic

same p1·iority date with all other rights descending from the same parent right. Thus, unlike

Sagewillow, 29-14032 is not junior to 29-14115. 29-14032 was entitled to 40% of the flows in
Spring Creek when all other water rights on Spring Creek are calling for delivery of water. This
applies with equal force before Jackson purchased the Jackson Property, as well as after. Thus,
just as Jackson asserts that he is now entitled to at least 40% of any flows; the Jackson Property
(even before Jackson purchased it) was likewise "entitled" to at least 40% of any flows. For this
reason, the amount of watel' actually in S1>ring Creek does l1ot matter-whether it was 1 cfs

or 5 cfs in a given year, the Jackson Pl·operty was always entitled to at least 40% of the flow
(up to the full amount of the water right). Obviously, if Jackson did not use any water on the
Jackson Property for the next five years, it would forfeit his water right- regardless of the actual
availability of water, because Jackson is entitled to use 40% of Spring Creek. Because pa1tial

2

If the other water righrs on Spring Creek were not calling for water (because, for example, hay has been swathed ori the other
portions of the authorized place of use and is drying), then Jackson would be entitled to more than 40% of the flows in Spring
Creek, and perhaps oven up to 100% of his entitlement. For purposes of this Reply Memorandum, reference to 40% of the
water presupposes that other rights are calling for their water oven though there are times when Jackson would have been
entitled to more than 40% of the water in Spring Creek.
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forfeiture applies in this xegard just as forfeiture does, the result should not be any different before
2012, when Bloxham owned both the Jackson Property and the Barnes Property.
Jackson somehow finds it determinative that ''Bloxham was using all of the water on his
property." Opposition Memorandum , p. 6 (citing Decision, p. 7). However, as the Court rightly
noted, "Bloxham chose not to water the future Jackson [PJroperty," Decision, p. 6 (emphasis
added). Indeed, Bloxham- for various reasons- made the conscious choice not to apply the
propmtional 40% of the available water to the Jackson Property (which was, and continued to be,
entitled to the watet equally with all the rest of the propelty iITigated by 29-10420) for more tl1an
five years. This caused that unused portion, appurtenant to the Jackson Property, to be forfeited.
C. Bloxham made a claim of right in 2012, alld the Barnes made a claim of l'ight in 2014,
fol·eclosing Jackson,s attem1>ts to resume nse of 29-14032.

Jackson erroneously claims that "Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of a third patty
taking any of the actions required by Sagewillow to complete the forfeiture. 11

Opposition

Memorandum, p. 7. First, a claim of right •.as described in Sagewillow, does not complete a
forfeitme, but tathet forecloses the efficacy of any resumption of use. Sagewillow, 138 ldaho at

837, 70 P.3d at 675 ("although statutory abandonment did actually occur, the forfeitw:e is not
effective if, after the five-year period, the original owner or appropriator resumed the use of the
water prior to the claim of right by a third party" (citation and quotation marks omitted, em.phasis
added)). As previously explained, there are three methods of making a claim of right:
A third party has made a claim of right to the water if the third party has
either [1] instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or [2] has obtained
a valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date
prior to the resumption of use, or [3] has used the water pursuant to an
existing water right.

Id. at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (footnote and internal citations omitted). Even though Jackson may

dispute the efficacy of Bloxham,s claim of right in 2012, when-at latest-the Jackson Property
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was alienated3 from Bloxham's ownership; Jackson cannot reasonably dispute that this action,
filed by the Barneses on August 29, 2014, constitutes a claim of right under the first method
outlined in Sagewillow.
Further, Jackson mischaracterizes the Barneses' argument, alleging: "Plaintiffs claim that
Bloxham, the owner of the parent right, not only forfeited a portion of his water right, but also
claimed the portion of the forfeited right all at the same time.'' Opposition Memorandum, p, 7,
Actually, these events did not occtff at the same time. First, Bloxham's non-use of that po1tion of
his water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property (from 2004 through 2012), by statute, caused
the forfeiture. Then, only a-fter the Jackson Property was alienated from his ownership (see

Footnote 3, supra), could Bloxham be a "third party" who is capable of asserting a claim of right
against the (already-forfeited) water right appmtenant to the Jackson Property that prevents any
resumption of use.
Jackson attacks the analogy between adverse possession and water right forfeiture posited
by the Bameses. Opposition Memorandum, pp. 7-8. Yet, neither of Jackson's attacks on this

analogy is valid. First, Bloxham did use his own water right from 2004-2012 (when his non-use

of it on the Jackson Pl'ope1ty led to the forfeiture), but it is only after he became a third party to
the Jackson Property (see Footnote 3, supra) that the Barneses argue that he made a claim ofright
against the water right apputte11ant to the Jackson Property. Second, Jackson claims that this
analogy is inc01Tect because he "began to use his water right prior to any third paity claiming it."

Opposition Memorandum, p. 8. This is nothing more than invalid logic, which cai1 be teduced to

While the sale of the Jackson Property to Jackson on April 26, 2012, provides a definitive date when Bloxham no longer
owned the Jackson Property, it is import~nt. to remember that the Jackson Property did not pass directly from Bloxham to
Jackson. As Jackson has repeatedly asserted, his immediate predecessor-in-interest to the Jack.son 'Property was the
Bankruptcy 'I'r!lstee of Bloxharn's Bankmptcy. Harris A.ff, Ex. D, p. 5 (Response to Request for Admission No. 1).
Consequently, at some point-which ls not exactly delineated in the record-the Jackson Prope11y passed from Bloxham's
ownership to the BankrtupcyTrustec's ownership. his at that point in time that Bloxham became a third party relative to the
Jackson Property.

6

REPLY MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
427 of 514

208-523-9518

T-971 P0007/001 0 F-588

the argument that the Barneses cannot rely on the claim of right made by Bloxham because
Bloxham never made a claim of right. However, Bloxham dicl make a claim of right and the
analogy is only provided to demonstrate that the Barneses can assett Bloxham's claim of right (if
any relationship between them is required, which the Bameses contend is not, see Reconsideration

Memorandum, pp. 13-17; because, as an asse1tion of an interest in real property (analogous to
adverse possession), the Barneses are entitled to step into the shoes of their predecessor-in-interest.
Rather than contesting the argument that Bloxham was a third party, capable of asserting a
claim ofright, after the Jackson Property was no longer his (see Footnote 3, supra); Jackson mei-ely
conflates the timeline of the Ba.meses' argument as described above. Yet, for the sake of
completely rebutting Jackson' s erroneous objection, the argument-presented only in aheadingwarrants refutation. A third party is a "person who is not a party to a lawsuit, agreement, or other

transaction but who is usu[ally] somehow implicated in it; someone other than the principal
parties." BLACK'S LA w DICTIONARY 1617 (9th ed. 2009). Sagewillow requires that a claim ofright

be made by a "third party." Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. Once Bloxham no
longer owned the Jackson Prnpei-ty, he was a third paity relative to the Jackson Property and could,
therefore, assert a claim of right against the water right appm1enant to the Jackson Prope1ty.
Thus, by the time Jackson pi.u·chased the Jackson Property, Bloxham made a claim ofright
by using all of the available water on his remaining prope1ty. In any event, the institution of this

action on August 29, 2014, see Complaint, constitutes an absolute claim of right by a third party
(this time, the Ba.meses), foreclosing any of Jacks011's subsequent attempts to tesume use of
29-14032 (including all of2014's activities, which are described as occurring in September 2014,

or later, see Harris Aff, Ex. C, p. 7 (Response to Jntenogatory No. 10)).
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III. JACKSON'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Any award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 , as requested by Jackson, would be

entirely inappropriate for at least two reasons.
First, an award of "reasonable attorney's fees" is only allowed ''to the prevailing party or
patties" in a civil action. Idaho Code § 12-121. The prevailing party analysis mandated by Idaho

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l )(B) is required in order to award attorney fees under Idaho Code
§ 12-121. See Sytinga Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin., 159 Idaho 813,367 P.3d 208,226

(2016) ("Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) guides the prevailing party analysis"). Ill this
analysis, ''the issue ... is not who succeeded on more individual claims, but rather who succeeded
on the main issue of the action.'' Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEIZ Const., LLC, 154 Idaho 45,
49,294 P.3d 171, 175 (2012). This Court can appo11ion attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121

according to those claims or defenses brought frivolously. Idaho Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v.

Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,632,329 P.3d 1072, 1080 (2014), reh'g denied (Aug.6.2014). However,
there is no autho1·ity for the Cou.-t to apportion the pl·evailing party analysis by considering
one motion in a vacuum, without all the rest of the action; in fact, the Idaho Supreme Comt
explained that "the prevailing party question is examined from an overall view of the action, not a
claim-by-claim analysis." Id. at 630,329 P.3d at 1078 (citation, quotations, and brackets ornitted).
Even if Jackson prevails on this Motion for Reconsideration (although he should not),
Jackson is certai11ly not the prevailing party in this litigation. If the status quo of the Decision is
maintained, both parties' claims of forfeiture have been dismissed. Thus, both parties have
partially prevailed, and no award of attorney fees is allowed by Idaho Code § 12-121. See Seiniger

Law Office, P.A. v. N. Pac. Ins. Co. 145 Idaho 241, 251, 178 P.3d 606,616 (2008) ("Both parties
1

seek attorney fees purstlant to LC. 12-121. Each party has partially prevailed before this Court.
Therefore, we conclude that neither party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal").
8
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Second, contrary to Jackson's mere allegations that the Barneses have ''provided no law on
point the Court's previous decisiont Opposition Memorandum, p. 8, the Barneses have explained
legal errors made in the Decision that ought to be corrected, Of significant importance is providing
this Couit the opportunity to consider the absolutely critical law on beneficial use, which the Comt
did not address in its Decision. It is critical to have the record reflect appropl'iate consideration
and discussion of beneficial use in the context of a forfeiture. Requesting reconsideration of this
issue is not frivolous or tmreasonable-it is essential. Additionally, the issue of "whether thei-e is
adequate water/' Opposition Memorandum, p. 8, is not a material issue because, as described
above, Sagewillow imposes no such requirement and "adequate watet" to completely satisfy any
water right at issue is inelevant sit1ce the Jackson Property was always (so long as the appurtenant
water right existed) entitled to 40% of any available water. See Section H.B .• supra. Further> the
Barneses can, in fact, "identify a third party who claimed water in such a way as to prevent Jackson
from [resuming] the use of his water [right]." Opposition Memorandum, p. 8. Bloxham did so on
or before AprH 26. 2012 (and while Bloxham owned the Barnes Prope1ty) and the Bameses did so
on August 29, 2014. See Section 11.C., supra.
IV. CONCLUSION

The water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property (called, for the sake of ease 29-14032,
both before Jackson bought the Jackson Property and after) was forfeited by Bloxham>s choice not
to irrigate the Jackson Property, which at all times was entitled to 40% of all available water in
Spring Creek. No exception, or defense, applies to prevent forfeiture. Jackson's attempt to resume
use of 29-14032 are prevented by others' claims of right. The Barneses have made a claim of
right, either by instituting this action (on August 29, 2014) or, together with their predecessor h1
interest (Bloxham), by using 29-14032's forfeited water to irrigate their place of use. As a result,
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the Court should reconsider its Decision and grant the Motion for Summa1:y Judgment filed by
Plaintiffs in its entirety.

jA

Dated this -zo<I! day of December 2016.

~R& .~

HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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Attorneys for Chad and Jane Barnes
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Coµnterdefendants,
V,

Case No. CV-2014M3466-OC

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaima11t.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes, by and through thei1' counsel of record Holden,
Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., submit this Supplemental Memo1'andum in Support of

Plaintiffs ' Motion for Reconsideration, to address the Special Master's Memorandum Decision
and Order on Motion for Summa,-y Judgment jn SRBA Subcase Nos. 63-02446, 63-02486, and
63M02499 1 (Monarch Greenback, LLC), dated December 16, 2009 (the ''Monarch Decision"), as
directed by the Comt at the hearing on Plaintiffs· Motion for Reconsideration, held on December

ln the SRBA, the water right number is used as the case number. The first two digits of the water right number
before the ''r"contain the basin number, and the remaining digits are the "subcase" number. By visiting this
website, httP.;//srba.idaho.gov/SR,EPT.HTM, and typing in the basin number and the subcase number, a docket
will appear with links to most of the documents submitted in the matter before the SRBA court.
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22, 2016 (the "Hearing"). Again, the Bameses will utilize the terms as defined in their prior
btiefing.

I. ARGUMENT

judge), Ted Booth, addressed a motion for summary judgment regarding the possible
adjudication of three claimed mining water rights. The claims were objected to by numerous
persons and entities> including the United States (all of whom were denoted in the A1onatch

Decision as "Bray et al." (hereinafter "Bray"). Bray asserted that the claimed mining water
rights had been forfeited. The Monarch Decision addressed the interplay of forfeiture, a then
newly-enacted defense to forfeiture for mining water rights found at Idaho Code § 42-223(11),

an existing defense to forfeiture (§ 42-223(6)), and the resumption of use doctrine from the

Sagewillow case.
As described below, the legal principles contained in the Monarch Decision actually
support the Ba.meses' position in this matter, rather tl1a11 hinder it as asserted by Jackson. As a
factual matter, the Special Master found that "there [was] 110 genuine issue of material fact that
there has been a five (5) year period of nonuse of these water rights prior to the filing of the
claim by Monarch Greenback in 2005.)' Monarch Decision, p. 5. Based on that preliminary

finding, the Special Master then had to address a motio11 for summary judgment from Bray
raising legal questions relating to the application of two statutory forfeiture exceptions: Idaho
Code§§ 42-223(11) and 42-223(6). See Monarch Decision, p. 6.

A. The Barneses have proposed the conect forfeiture analysis, which shows that the forfeitute
of 29-14032 has been completed.
Bray argued the statutory forfeiture exceptions did not apply to the water rights because
"forfeiture under Idaho Code § 42-222 happens automatically, by operntion of the statute» and

2
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,.,
"does not require an administrative 01· judicial determination in order for the forfeiture to be
complete." Monarch Decision, p. 8. After selectively quoting from the Monarch Decision,
Jackson asserted at the Hearing that the Bameses' position on forfeiture2 is just like that of Bray,
· · ·· whlch . war·,iltiri'iately ·rejected by" the ·speciar Miisfor. ·-·However,

this- rs· iiot ·accui·ate·_. . . ·w hile

Bray's ''automatic forfeiture" argument is meant to foreclose the application of the statutory
forfeiture exceptions contained in Idaho Code § 42-223, the Barneses have never taken such a
position. The Barneses have argued that, while forfeiture is a statutory process specified in
Idaho Code § 42-222(2), fotfeiture always "take[s] a third pa1ty (in this case, the Bameses), later,
to assert and demand the adjudication of the forfeiture because of cet'fain statutol;t exceptions
(see Idaho Code § 42-223) and common law exceptions (e.g., the tesnmption of use

doctrine) that may apply.,, Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summa,y

Judgment, p. 21 (italics in original, emphasis added) (11.ote that this sentence immediate follows
the statements the quotation ht Footnote 2, above). In other words, while Bi-ay argued that the
forfeiture process was automatically accomplished after five years of non-use of a water right)
the Bameses have repeatedly asse1ted that the finding of five years of non-use is just the sta1ting
point of the forfeiture analysis. The Barneses agree with the Special Master that "forfeitnre is
not automatically [and conclusively] effective upon a five-year period of nonuse," Monarch

Decision, p. 9.
The Special Master held that a "better analytical framework [thatt that proposed by Bray]
is that a. forfeitme is not effective or complete -- and hence the use of such right may be resumed

2

See, e.g., Reply Memo1·andum in Support of Plaint{l)'s' Motion for Stmmimy Judgment, p. 21 ("Idaho law does
not require any affmuative action to effect the forfeiture of a water right described in Idaho Code § 42-222(2).
According to the language of that statute, the forfeiture is automatic npon five years of non-use" (emphasis
omitted)).
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- unless and until [a claim of right. as described] in Sagewillow actually occurs." Monarch

Decision, p. 9 (italics in original). This is in line with the Barneses' p1'oposed analysis:
The analysis considering fol'feiture of a water right propedy considers:
first, whether there has been a forfeiture; seco11d. whether thete are any
. . ··-·exemptions"that prevent forfeifore; and, lliira, 1f lliere 1ias been a fod'eltui:e
with no applicable exemption, whether the water right owner resumed use
before other water right users made a claim of right or instituted
proceedings to adj'udicate the forfeiture.
Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. This

analysis is in keeping with the Monarch Decision, although it is of somewhat broader

application, as necessitated by the issl.les faced in this case.
B. To qualify as a statutory fo1·feiture exception, cil'cumstances beyond the watel· user's
control must 1·elate to an impediment to the legal entitlelnent 01· availability of water, which
is not the case hei·e.

The Monarch Decision specifically addresses the statutory forfeiture exception contained
in Idaho Code§ 42-223(6), which provides:
No portion of any water right shall be lost or forfeited for nonuse if the
nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner has
no control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of
water shall be detem1ined on a case-by-case basis.
Idaho Code § 42-223(6). Monarch Greenback asserted tllis defense on the basis of "low ore

prices, technological limitations and regulatory obstacles."

Monarch Decision, p. 13 .

Ultimately, the Special Master determined that these did not qualify as "circumstances over
which the water right owner has no control'• within the meaning of the statute. Monarch

Decision, p. 15. However, it is the analysis by which the Special Master reached this conclusion
that is imp01tant.
The Special Master agreed that "this defense to forfeiture is limited to circumstances
beyond the control of the water user in their use of water, i.e. disruptions in the available supply
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of water or acts of others that wrongfully interfere with water use." Monarch Decision, p. 14.
The Special Master based this conclusion on two cases, explained thus:
In Sagewillow, the paity against whom forfeiture was being asse1ted raised
the defense as to ce11ain water rights that such rights wete later priority
· · ·---··· ···--··-----..iglits and coulil only be delivered during @gfi wate1· flows. Because
the Depmtment did not make findings on whether water was available
dming the years of nonuse, the Court ordered the Department to make
such findings on remand. In Sagewillow, the applicability of the subject
defense to forfeitul'e •·elated only to the unavailability of watel' due to
the lights being juniol' pl·iority "high flow" watel· rigbts that may not
have been available each year. In other words, the defense would be
applied to circumstances whel'e the water was Un.available to the
users; not to ch·cumstances um·elated to the availability of water that
would merely explain why the watet user made a choice not to use
available water.

In Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Piepel', 133 Idaho 82, 982 P.2d 917
(1999), the Court held that a Carey Act operating company could not lose
its water rights to forfeiture due to the nonuse of the water by a
shareholder in the company. The Court recited the following as
circumstances beyond the control of the Aberdeen-Springfield Car1al
Company: (a) the destruction of the ditch connecting the non-using
shareholder's land with the canal system; (b) the neighbor's unwillingness
to allow the ditch to be reconstrncted; and (c) the non-using
shareholders['] individual decision not to use canal company water.
Again, these circumstances relate to actual unavailability of the water as
opposed to circumstances that would explain a choice by the user n.ot to
divert.

Monarch Decision, pp. 14-15 (italics in original, emphasis added).
Jackson has seized on the phrases in the Monarch Decision describing the unavailability
of water in Sagewi/low and Pieper- however, doing so myopically ignores most of the facts in

those cases, as pointed out in the Monarch Decision itself.
Pieper provides very little guidance for three teasons. First, Idaho statutory provisions
now provide that a canal company cannot forfeit a water right due to non-use by a canal
company shareholder. Idaho Code§ 42-223(7). Second. the complicated legal position in which
a canal company exists (i.e., holding legal title to a water right while having a fiduciary duty to
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provide that water to the compauy shareholders, who hold equitable title to the watet right,

United States v. Pioneer Irr. Dist.) 144 Idaho 106, 111, 157 PJd 600, 605 (2007)) has no
analogy in this case. And, third, the circumstances described in Pieper are not related (by

---- ·--·armlogy-or otlierwisetto the sitbatioffifflhis ·case:· ....... · · ·
Sagewillow demonstrates that it is the legal entitlement to water-which, ultimately,
subsumes the actual availability of water- that is significant. As the Special Master pointed out

in Sagewillow, the defense against fol'feittite asserted was that the water rights "were later
priority rights and could only be delivered during high water flows.'' Monarch Decision, p. 14.
In other words, the only reason the actual availability of water was significant in Sagewillow is
because the water right being challenged was junior to other water rights and, thus, unless there

was water actually available in excess of the senior water tights' entitlements for the junior water
right holder to divert and use (i.e., apply to beneficial use in acconlance with the water right).
Here, the circumstances are markedly different. 29-14032 (Jackson)s water right) is not

junior to 29-14115 (the Barneses' water right)- they have the same pl'io1·ity date. 29-14032 is
now, and always has been, entitled to 40% of the available water in Sprh1g Creek. See Reply

}.tfemorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion/or Reconsideration, pp. 4-5. Thus, the amount of
the flow in Spring Creek~which is the crux of Jackson's argument and the basis for the Comt' s

Decision in favor of Jackson- is irrelevant. Pursuant to the water right, the Jackson Property
was always entitled to some water; in other words, there was always wate1· available to the
Jackson Property and when Bloxham owned the Jackson Property, he made a decision not to

use it at that location.
As to the other component of tl1e Monatch Decision, the Special Master concluded that
the other forfeiture exception- Idaho Code § 42-223(11 )-js "lmconstitutionally retroactive in
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its operation to the extent that the statute attempts to require a thh'd party user, who [h]as moved
up in the tabulation of priorities by reason of the nonuse of a senior right, be moved back down
in such tabulation." Monarch Decision, p. 1 (under Summary of Ruling), Accordingly, to
· ··· · ·· prevenrinjuryto an ·ex1stmg wafer user, tlie Special Master lield tTiaPirctafio-'Cocfe1"·42·~·223(1 l)

can still prevent such a right from being forfeited, but only if the use of water under such right is
subordinated to use of water under the third party claim.(s).'1 /d. 3
II. CONCLUSION

While Jackson's water right is not a mining water right, the no-injury principle articulated
by Special Master Booth in his application of the mining statutory exemption to forfeiture is
nevertheless critical to the analysis of this case. If allowed, Jackson's resumed use of water on
Spring Creek will make less water available to Barnes and will cause injury to the Bameses'
water right. The Special Master explained:
the acquisition of rights by a third paity water user as contemplated in
Sagewillow would constitute the occun·ence of an event that fixes the
relative rights of the patties. In other words, under Sagewillow a third
party junior water right holder moves up the ladder of priorities once the
senior's right to resume use is extinguished. Under such circumstances a
senior water usel· cannot be allowed to resume use under [a statuto'l-y
forfeiture exception) whel·e such resumption would cause the juniol' to
move back down the ladcler of pl·io:ritics. The reinsertion of a senior
water right into the tabulation of priorities would constitute injury to the
junior.

Monarch Decision, p. 12 (emphasis added). It is evident that being tied (i.e., on the same nU1g)
with another water right user on the ladder of priorities is not the same as being the only water
right user on that rung of the ladder. Thus, the injmy caused by the "reinsertion'' of 29~ 14032
into the Spring Creek water system is real to the Bameses.

3

According to the docket, the ultimate result of the water rights at issue in Monarch is that after the Monarch
Decision was issued, the water right claims were recommended to be disallowed. All parties agreed to that
conclusion, and as a result, the claims were disallowed by Presiding Judge Eric Wildman on February l, 2010.
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At the Hearing, when facing the fact that Bloxham irrigated only part of his property (the
Ba111es Prope1ty. and not the Jackson Property) with the limited water flowing in Spring Creek,
the Court asked. "what more could Bloxham have <loner The Court appears to be entertaining

not be "punished" with forfeiture because thel'e was not enough water. However, this view is
inconect. The problem with tl1is view becomes apparent when the sallle question posed by the
Court is posed with the opposite underlying supposition- i.e.• that Bloxham desired to forfeit
that portion of his water right appurtenant to the Jackson Prope1ty. From that mindset: what
more could Bloxham have done?
However, as the Coutt c01Tectly noted: "It appears Bloxham chose not to water the future
Jackson [P]rope1ty because of difficulties, but the i·eason doesn't mattel·.'' Decision, p. 6
(emphasis added). Bloxham's intent is i1Televant. There is no place in the fol'feiture analysis for
any consideration of intent. Jackson's argument in this regard is misplaced and irrelevant.
One hypothetical worth considering is taking the facts of this case and putting them into
the holding of Sagewillow as that case was discussed in the Monarch Decision. There, the case
was remanded because there was an unresolved issue of fact about whether there was sufficient
water to satisfy the senior water rights, such that any water was available for the junior
(forfeited) water rights~i.e., whether the fol'feited water rights wete legally entitled to any
watea·. Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831. 843, 70 P.3d 669, 681

(2003). Here, there is no such issue of fact. 29-14032 is not (and nevel' has been) junior to 2914115; with the result that the Jackson Property has always been entitled to 40% of the water in
Spring Creek (up to the full amount specified in the water right). Thus, water has always been
available for use on the Jackson Propea·ty. The effect of the fact that "Bloxham chose not to
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water the future Jackson [P]roperty," Decision, p. 6, is that a forfeiture occurred- as dictated by

the forfeiture analysis.
The Jackson Property, despite the availability of water. was not the recipient of water

ore·thaii" ·rive. years." . ~fo
. . .·benefidaffy" "iised . "({ e:·~·-11iigatedfJoi:···iu"

·statuto1j .forfeiture e~ception

applies to excuse this 11on-use. Once Bloxham became a third party (via the alienation of the
Jackson Property from his ownership). and Bloxham continued to divert a:n.d use whatever was
available from Spring Creek for in·igation of what would eventually become the Bames Property,
Bloxham assei-ted a cla.im of right prior to any resumption of use by Jackson. Thus, the
forfeiture of the water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property (29-14032) is effective,
complete, and final, and only in need of a formal adjudication of such forfeitiu·e as described in
the Monarch Decision. As a result, the Court should reconsider its Decision and grant the

Motion/or Summa,y Judgment filed by Plaintiffs in its entirety.
Dated this tf'J{A day of December 2016.
Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.LC.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce1tify that on the u,..,a..._ day of December, 2016, I served a tme and conect
copy of the docl.unent listed below on the persons listed below by the method indicated.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:
( ) Mail
Peter M. Wells
MAY, R.AMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
( ) Hand Delivery
Post Office Box 370
( ..-)'Facsimile
216 W. Whitman Street
( ) Comthouse Box
( ) En1ail
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Email: pete@mrtlaw.net
Document Served:

Robert L. Harris, Esq.
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
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CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC

CHAD BARNES and
JANE BARNES,
Plaintiffs,

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S

vs .

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN

KIRK JACKSON,

SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
Defendant

COMES NOW Defendant Kirk Jackson, by and through his attorney of record, Peter M.
Wells, of the firm May, Ra1mnell & Thompson, Chartered, and hereby responds to the Plaintiff's

Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration .
THE PARTIES ALL AGREE THAT FORFEITURE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE
IMMEDIATELY UPON THE FIVE(5) YEAR PERIOD OF NON-USE.
At the Hearing on the Motion to Reconsider, it was Defendant's counsel's understanding
that Plaintiff's argument was that forfeiture was effective upon a period of five(5) years of
nonuse of water by an individual. At the hearing, Defendant's counsel informed the court about
the Monarch Greenback decision, wherein a special master determined that forfeiture was not

CASE NO. CV-2014-3466-OC RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PAGE l
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"automatically effective upon a five(5) year period of nonuse." See Monarch Decision, p. 9. This
is different than what Defendant understood the Plaintiff's argument to be. Plaintiffs now claim
"The Barnes' agree with the special master that 'forfeiture is not automatically [and
conclusively] effective upon a five(5) year period of nonuse."' Plaintiff's Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Plaint[ff's Motion for Reconsideration, p.3. Consequently, it appears
that all of the Parties now agree that just because you have not used water for a period of five( 5)
years does not automatically mean that you have forfeited the water. Instead both Parties seem to
agree with the statement put fmward by the special master as follows:
This language in Sagewillow makes it clear that the
doctrine of resumption of use does not involve the
resurrection of a forfeited right, as asserted by Bray
et al.; but rather establishes that a forfeiture is not
effective, even after the passage of the five(5) year
period of non use, unless there has been a claim of
right by a third party (i.e. unless one of the listed
events has occurred). Indeed the whole concept of
resumption of use is antithetical to automatic forfeiture.
If a water right became fully and completely forfeited
upon five(5) years of nonuse, the right could not be
resurrected through a resumption of use. The better
analytical framework is that a forfeiture is not effective
or complete -- and hence the use of such right may be
resumed- unless or until one of the events listed in
Sagewillow actually occurres (i.e. a third party either:
(1) institutes legal proceedings to declare a forfeiture;
(2) obtains a new water right prior to resumption; or
(3) uses the water pursuant to an existing right).
Monarch Greenback Decision, p . 9. While the Parties agree on the analytical framework to be
followed, they still disagree as to whether a forfeiture actually occurred.
Plaintiffs continue to put fmward the position that it is the "legal entitlement to water"
not the availability to water that is significant. They continue to cite to Sagewillow and now
Monarch for this premise when both Sagewillow and Monarch specifically state that the defense
is unavailability of water. "Because water rights cannot be forfeited by non use if the water was
not available and Sagewillow raised that issue, the department must find that water was available
for Sagewillow's use before it can find that Sagewillow forfeited water rights by non-use of the
water." Sagewillow, 138 Idaho 831, 843. "In Sagewillow, the applicability of the subject defense
CASE NO . CV-2014-3466-OC RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF ' S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PAGE 2
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to forfeiture related only to the unavailability of water due to the rights being junior priority
"high flow" water rights that may not have been available each year. In other words, the defense
would be applied to circumstances where the water was unavailable to the users ... ". Monarch
Decision, p. 14-15. Further, there is no case in Idaho where a forfeiture has been allowed in
situations where there is not enough water to fulfill the water right. Plaintiffs ask this Court to
expand the forfeiture doctrine to include a situation that has never been recognized by Idaho
Courts.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief asks this Court to rehash issues the Court has already
decided without presenting anything new. Instead, the Brief misconstrues many of the facts. For
example, Plaintiffs claim that if Jackson resumed use of the water on Spring Creek it will make
less water available to Barnes and will cause injury to Barnes' water right. This is disingenuous
due to the fact that Jackson was on the system two (2) years prior to Barnes.
The undisputed facts show that Jackson in 2012 began to immediately use his water.
Because his neighbors would not allow him access to the historical diversion structures, he had
to make due with limited availability of water in 2012. In 2013 though, he irrigated a crop using
at least 40% of the available water from Spring Creek. There is no injury to Barnes as Barnes is a
subsequent purchaser to Jackson. Jackson was using his available water prior to Barnes
purchasing the property. As a result, this Court must deny Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration.
Dated this S

t;!:-

day of January, 2017.

PETER M. WELLS
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration was served on the following
named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated.
Robert Lynn Han-is
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC
P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

[x] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile 208-523-95 18
[ ] Hand Delivery

DATED this 5th day of January 2016.

By:;Z/~
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.

Case No:CV-2014-0003466-OC
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

KIRK JACKSON, an individual
DefendanVCounterclaimant.
THE PARTIES came before the Court on the 22 nd day of December, 2016 for a
hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration . Robert Harris appeared in person on
behalf of the Plaintiffs.

Peter Wells appeared in person on behalf of the Defendant.

Stephanie Morse was the Court Reporter.
At the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from the parties on Plaintiffs' Motion .
Thereafter, the Court gave the parties time to file supplemental briefing .

The

Plaintiffs will have one (1) week after today to file a supplemental brief. The Defendant will
have one (1) week from receipt of Plaintiffs' brief to file a responsive brief. The Plaintiffs
will then have 2 days after receipt of Defendant's responsive brief to file a reply brief. The
Court will then take the matter under advisement and issue a written decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Case No.: CV-2014-0003466-OC
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 1 of 2
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DATED this

b 4"-

day of January, 2017.

D~
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the
manner indicated.

Ji!!_

Robert L. Harris
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN
& CRAPO , P.L.L.C.
PO Box 50130
Idaho Falls , ID 83405-0130

Peter M. Wells
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD.
216 W Whitman
PO Box 370
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370

D U.S. Mail
C8] E-Mail: rharris@holdenlegal.com

D Hand Deliver
D Fax: (208) 523-9518
D U.S. Mail
D Hand Deliver
D Fax: (208) 234-2961

C8] E-Mail: pete@mrtlaw.net

Robert Poleki
CLERK OF THE COURT
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Robe1t L. Harris (I.S.B. No. 70 I 8)
D. Andtew Rawlings (I.S.B. No. 9569)
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.c.
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200

P.O. Box 50130
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208)523-0620
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518
Email:
rharris@holdenlegal.com
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arawlings@holdenlegal.com

Attomeys for Chad and Jane Barnes

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH DISTRJCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
'V.

Case No. CV~2014-3466-OC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes, by and through their counsel oftecord Holden, Kidwell,
Halm & Crapo, P.L,L.C., submit this Supplemental Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for

Reconsideration, to address the Monarch Decision, and to reply to Jackson's Response to
Plaintiff's [sic] Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's [sic] Motion for
Reconsideration (the "Response"). Again, the Bameses will utilize the terms as defined in their

pi-ior bl'iefing.

I. ARGUMENT
Jackson believes that the Bameses' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration ("Supplemental Memorandum") merely "asks this Court to rehash

issues the Court has already decided without presenting anything new." Re~ponse, p. 3. In fact,
1
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the Supplementa( Memorandum presents new legal argumentation based or~ the Monarch
Decision- which Jackson brought up at the Hearing- and the application of that persuasive

authority to the circumstances of this case. While Jackson unfairly claims that the Baineses
"misconstrue[] many of the facts," in actuality, throughout these proceedings on the Motion fot

Reconsidetalion, the Bameses apply the law as it exists, rather than Jackson's statements of how
he wishes the law was.
A. Water was available for use on the Jackson Pl'Operty and its non-use for moa·e than five years
initiated the fol'feinne of 29-14032.
Jackson again challenges the legal determination of whether water was "available" to the
Jackson Property and what that means. Jackson argues that there has never been a forfeiture
"where there is not enough water to fulfill the water right." Response, p. 3. Howevet, Sagewillow
(the only case cHed by Jackson in support of this dubiotlS proposition) arose in the context of junior
water rights, which can only be considered unused when there is sufficient water to satisfy the
senior water rights and thus legally entitle the junior water right to divert and use water. Opposition

Memorandum, p. 5 (citing Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831 , 843, 70
P.3d 669, 681 (2003)) (emphasizing the necessity of a "find[ing] tl1at water was available for
Sagewillow's use before it can find that Sagewillow forfeited water rights by non-use of the water''
and ignoring the explanation, just three sentences earlier that the "surface water right appurtenant
to the K.nollin and Bird Ranches were later priority 1ights that that could only be delivei-ed during
high water flows"). In contrast, the Bameses have provided context regarding these cases and
cited others demonstrating that the legal entitlement to, or availability of, water under a water right
is legally significant. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Reconsideration,
pp. 3-4 (citing Sagewillow); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion/or Reconsideration,

pp. 10-12 (citing State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727> 735> 947 P.2d 400,
2
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408 (1997); Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 738, 552 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1976); Administrator 's

Memo (Second Harris Afj, ex. A)).
The unique circumstances of this case--i.e., the fact that all the water rights at issue here
(either being forfeited or constituting a claim of right against the forfeited water right) descend
from the same parent right and thus have the same priority date-mandate a careful parsing of the
relevant authority. Here, when there was a water right appurtenant to it, the Jackson Property was
entitled to 40% of the available flows in Spring Cteek. Assuming for the sake of the argument
that there was never enough water in Spring Creek to fully satisfy all of the water rights diverting
from it, such a fact is immaterial to this analysis.
Despite making generalized statements, Jackson has not pointed to a case that co11.siders
the availability of water in an.y context of other than legal entitlement of a junior water right to
water. In contrast, the Barneses have demonstrated through authorities-Sagewillow, Hagerman,
Administrator's Memo, Monarch Greenback- that the legal entitlement (or availability) of water

is the determinative fact. There is no expansion of forfeiture (a statutory mandate, not a common
law doctrine, as Jackson would like to portray it) in applying the statutes as written, undertaking
the apptopriate forfeiture analysis denoted by the Idaho Supreme Court, and considering whether
water was available to hTigate the Jackson Prope1ty (i.e., whether the Jackson Property, not all of
the prope1ty owned by Bloxham, could have been inigated).
Here, the Jackson Property was always entitled to 40% of the available water. At any point
while Bloxham owned the property and the water i-ight, Bloxham could have inigatecl the Jackson
Property. But the Jackson Pl"operty was not inigated at all between 2004 and 2012 by
Bloxham

01·

the bankruptcy trustee. Furthermore, Jackson did not resume using the Jackson

Prope1tf s water right (denoted 29-14032) before a third patty (Bloxham) made a claim of right to
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after the Jackson Property was alienated from Bloxham. Taken \ogether, these fact effectuate and
complete a forfeiture of 29-14032.
B. Jackson's wrongful use of his forfeited water right would cause inju.-y to the Barncses.

Jackson m·gues:

Plaintiffs claim that if Jackson resumed use of the water on Spting Creek it
will make less water available to [the] Bames[es] and will cause injury to
[their] water right. This is disingenuous due to the fact that Jackson was on
the system two (2) years prior to Barnes.

Response, p. 3. This line of argumentation is without merit. It is absurd to contend, as Jackson
does, that an individual col.lid violate a neighbor's real ptoperty tights and a subsequent neighbor
has no recoiirse because there cannot legally be injury to the subsequent purchaser. A water right
is real property. Idaho Code§ 55-101. The Barneses absolutely would be injured by Jackson's
wrongful use of water for which the water right has been completely forfeited. Their status as
purchasers of the Barnes Property subsequent to Jackson's purchase of the Jackso11,Property is

il1'elevant.
II. ANALYSIS
Jackson attempts to confuse the forfeiture analysis to diver the comt's attention away from
the appropriate legal conclusion that 29w 14032 was forfeited. Jackson has never actually engaged
in the entire forfeiture analysis outlined under Idaho law, preferring to focus on nari-ow details,
taken out of context, to make u11supported claims about forfeiture, For instance, one error Jackson
repeatedly invites the Couit to make is to conflate the consideration of non-use with resumption
of use. Taken as a whole, the forfeiture analysis proceeds thusly:
•

Forfeiture is made possible by five consecutive years of non-use. Idaho Code §
42-222(2). Here, there has never been any contest that absohltely no water was
applied to beneficial use on the Jackson Prope1ty at any point between 2004 (when
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the parent dght was decreed) and, at least, 2012 (when Jackson bought the Jackson
Prope1ty). Water was available and, even though the Jackson Property was entitled
to 40% of the available water, "Bloxham chose not to water the future Jackson
[P]roperty.'' Decision, p. 6.
•

Thei-e are certain defenses to forfeiture. Idaho Code§ 42-223. Specifically, a "right
to the use of water shall not be lost by forfeitUl·e pursuant to the provisions of section
42-222, Idaho Code, for a failure to apply the water to beneficial use under the
conditions specified in any subsection of this section." Id. Thus, these defenses
relate to the five-year forfeiture period, described above. Id. Here, Jackson has
asserted various "circumstances over which the water right owner ha[cl]

110

control.,, Idaho Code§ 42-223(6). However, Jackson misapplies Idaho Code §
42-223, because none of the circumstances asserted by Jackson occur during any

relevant portion of the five years that effected the forfeiture of the water right
appurtenant to the Jackson Property. Specifically, Jackson has-at various times-

asse1ted:
o The Jackson Property (and perhaps the water right 29-14032) were ''under
the control of the United States Bankruptcy Tmstee" during Bloxham's
bankruptcy, "(f]rom June of 2006 to April of 2012." Amended MSJ

Memorandum, pp. 7-8 (quoting Harris Alf., ex. C, p. 7 (Jackson's discovery
responses)). However, more recently, Jackson has explained that "(t1ront
2004-2012, Bloxham still claimed ownership of Jackson's land."

Opposition Memorandum, p. 8. This negates Jackson's prior assertions
regarding the Trnstee (and the automatic stay) since the bankruptcy did not
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affect (and the bankruptcy estate apparently did not include) the Jackson
Property until 2012.
o Jackson at one point also clairned that the automatic stay of bankruptcy
applied to prevent forfeiture of 29-14032. Objection Memorandum. pp. 1013. The Court C0ll'ectly concluded that the automatic stay did not affect the
forfeiture analysis. Decision, p. 11.
o Jackson also claimed that in 2012 the "Bloxhams prevented [Jackson] from

exercising his water right as they told him they would not allow him to
access the diversion tluough their property.'' Amended MSJ Memorandum,
pp. 7-8 (quoting Harris Afl, ex. C, p. 7 (Jackson's discovery responses)). 1

The five years of non-use were already accomplished by 2012, meaning that

this claim cannot relate to Idaho Code § 42-223. The Bloxhams were under
no obligation to assist Jackson in resuming use and (correctly) believed that

The Idaho Supreme Court has already addressed this type of argument, and it is in Barneses' favor under a
forfeiture analysis. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the refusal to grant an easement for a ditch is not a
circumstance over which they have no control because all water users have the ability to exercise eminent domain
for a ditch easement, as described in the following case:
Peipers have also failed to show that any benefit to ASCC was received under
inequitable circumstances. Even though the Peipers' neighbor told George Peiper that he
was using wheel lines and that Peiper could "forget about" installing a new ditch, the
Peipers are entitled by statute to co11denm an easement for a replacement ditch. Idaho Code
§ 42- 1106 states: "In case of the refusal of the owners or claimants of any lands, through
which any ditch, canal or conduit is proposed to be made or constructed, to allow passage
thereof, the person or persons desiring the right of way may proceed as in the law of
en1inent domain." Id.; see also White v. Marty, 91 Idaho 85, 86-87, 540 P.2d 270, 271-72
(1975), ovemded on other grounds by Carr v. Magistrate Court, 108 ldaho 546, 549, 700
P.2d 949,952 (1985).

ihe fact that installing a new ditch connecting their land to the headgate might be
expensive or inconvenient is irrelevant. Since an easement for a new ditch could have been
condemned, the Peipers have always had access to ASCC water if they wished to acquire
it.

Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999).
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29-14032 had already been forfeited. What more evidence of a claim of
right by the Bloxhams could there be than this?
•

Once (presumptively) forfeited, use of a water right can be resumed unless a third
party has made a claim ofright on the unused water. Sagewil/ow, 138 Idaho at 842,

70 P.3d at 680. This is a creation of the common law, which means that only the
preceding defines both the doctrine of resumption of use and a claim of right.
Furthel', Idaho Code § 42-223 has absolutely no relation to either the resumption of
use doctrine or a claim of right. Thus. there is no ptovision for considering whether

a delay in the resumption of use was caused by circumstances beyond the water
uset's contl'Ol. See Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842. 70 P.3d at 680. Here:
o Bloxham made a claim of right to the water as soon as the Jackson Property
was alienated from his ownership in Spring 2012.

Reconsideration

Memorandum; pp. 13-17, 18-19. Further, the Bameses also made their own
claim of right (by instituting this action to declare a forfeiture) in August
2014. See id.
o Jackson did not resume use of 29-14032 until after Bloxham's claim of
right, re11dering such resumption ineffective. Futther, and in construing the
disputed facts in Jackson's favor, before the Bameses· 2014 claim of l'ight,
Jackson had only resumed use of a small amount of 29-14032. In 2012,
Jackson used at most 30,000 gallons (0.092 acre feet, or 3% of what would
irrigate one acre) to water an orchard and, in 2013, Jackson inigated at most
l Oacres. Amended MSJ Memorandum, p. 13.
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Finally, as to Jackson's counterclahn, Jackson has simply presented absolutely no evidence
that there was ever five years of non-use. Reply Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion for
Summa,y Judgment, pp. 24-25.

Ill. CONCLUSION
As a result of this C01Tect forfeiture analysis under Idaho law explained again in the

Monarch decision-applied to both the Barnes~s' claim and Jackson's counterclaim- is that the
Court should reconsider its Decision and grant the Bameses' Motion/or Summmy Judgment in its

entirety.

Dated this

q ¢t

day of January 2017.
Robe1t L. Harris
HOLDEN, KlDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
STATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY

CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC
Plaintiff,
DECISION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

v.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant.

Hon. David C. Nye

On January 15, 2016, Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (collectively "Barnes"), filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. After several continuances, the Court heard oral argument on
October 31, 2016. On November 17, 2016, the Court issued a decision denying Barnes Motion
and alternatively granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Jackson. ' The Court entered
Judgment in favor of Kirk Jackson that same day.
On December 1, 2016, Barnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Cou1t. Oral
arguments were held on December 22, 2016. Both sides were given additional time to submit
written memorandum regarding a particular case which had been brought up during the hearing.I

The Court found that as a matter of law, the statutory requirements of forfeiture had not been met.
In that case, "Monarch Greenback" (In Re SRBA case No. 39576), the special master ruled that
forfeiture is not automatic upon a five year period of non-use, but that a claim of right by a third party
must be made. Both parties and the Court agree with this concept. The disagreement is whether or not a
1
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All briefing has now been received by the Couit. 3 After a complete review of all material, the
Cou1t now issues the following decision DENYING the Motion for Reconsideration.
For a discussion regarding the underlying facts, as well as the procedural history of this
case, the Cou1t would point to the Decision on Summary Judgment of November 17, 2016.
At the outset the Court would like to compliment Counsel for both sides. The facts of this
case lead to certain aspects being essentially issues of first impression by a District Court in
Idaho. 4 The briefing throughout has been exceptional and very informative. Oral arguments have
likewise been helpful. The Court has extensively reviewed all available material, including
relevant caselaw, SRBA decisions, treatises, and handbooks in reaching its decision today and
thanks the attorneys for their help with these difficult and novel concepts.

DISCUSSION
The two main points raised by Barnes in his Motion for Reconsideration are ( 1) that the

Court did not take into account the beneficial use standard in denying summary judgment and (2)
that the Comt misunderstood the status of Craig Bloxham, the predecessor in interest, as a third
party who relied upon the water rights in question prior to Jackson's resumption of use. 5 Each will
be addressed in tum. Other matters will then be b1iefly touched upon.
As the Court noted during oral argument, this case is pruticularly difficult because the two
parcels in question were once one large parcel. Much of the analysis in regards to forfeiture and the

third part claim occurred in this case. That is discussed in the second pa1t of this decision.
The final material was received January 9, 2017. The Motion was under advisement as of that date.
4 Because most of these matters would have been solved by the SRBA were it sti ll in existence, this is one
of, if not the first case dealing with forfeiture post-SRBA.
5 The parties dispute whether Jackson effectively resumed use, however the Cot11t has previously ruled
that he did in fact resume use. See, Decision on Summary Judgment, pg. 9, November 17, 20 I 6.
3
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statutory requirements to find such would be easier were this still a single parcel of land. The fact
that the pru1ition and sale of the property happened to fall lru·gely in line with prior watering habits,
in that one parcel was heavily watered and the other not at all, is also problematic. Further
complicating things is the fact that Bloxham, the previous owner of the [single] pru·cel, filed for
bankruptcy and the property was part of that process during the time it was bought by both Barnes
and Jackson.
Beneficial Use
Although Barnes is correct in the assertion that the Court did not mention beneficial use
extensively in its decision on summary judgment, beneficial use was nevertheless considered. In
particular, footnote 19 on page 7 made almost the exact point that Barnes contends the Com1 left
out - namely that beneficial use plays an integral role in water rights. However, because the
Court found that the statutory five year period had not run, a more in depth analysis of beneficial
use under §42-222 was unnecessary.
Throughout briefing, and at oral ru·gument, Barnes seems to imply that determining
beneficial use is a separate standard or test used when deciding if forfeiture has occurred. It is
however, not a separate test, but rather a part of the whole. Idaho Code § 42-222(2) states that "all
rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and forfeited by a
failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was
appropriated ... ." Beneficial use is clearly intertwined with the five year statutory period.
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Unfortunately, beneficial use, while a relatively simply phrase, "has never been judicially or
statutorily defined',<; in Idaho. While it appears from all available sources that whatever is socially
acceptable would qualify as an appropriate type of use 7 and that the amount of use has been defined
as the actual amount that is not wastefully used,8 nothing clearly lays out how much of a subject
property must be used, as is Barnes contention.
While Barnes is adan1ant that the Court's reasoning that forfeiture does not ask where the
water is being used, but simply if it is being used, is incorrect, no definitive caselaw has been cited
for this proposition. It does appear from some of the cases cited by Barnes that such a conclusion
could be drawn from the underlying principles, but other cases and statutes refute this. While dozens
of Idaho cases focus on what the actual use of a water right is and how much of the right is being
used, not one case specifically mentions where the water is being used as being relevant. There must
clearly be a purpose or use for each water right and an appropriate allotment, but no condition is
expressed in relation to where usage occurs within the subject property.
Barnes contends that acreage is the proper measure of beneficial use when dealing with
inigation water rights; however, while a measurement of acres may be one way to determine
beneficial use, it is not the sole method, nor is it statutorily required. Interestingly, in certain water
law scenarios, acreage does not matter at all. Idaho Code § 42-219, which deals with the issuance of
water right licenses for large irrigation projects, explains that beneficial use is dete1mined by
State or Idaho, Dep 't of Parks v. IDWR, 96 Idaho 440, 443 , 530 P.2d 924, 927 ( 1974) (Bakes, J.
concurring). See also, Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 811 , 252 P.3d 71 , 92
(2011).
7 Clear Springs, 150 Jdaho at 811 , 252 P.3d at 92.
8 Idaho Const. art. XV,§ 7; Clear Springs, 150 Idaho at 808, 252 P.3d at 89; Idaho Ground Water Assoc.
v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 160 Idaho 119, 369 P.3d 897, 907 (2016), reh'g denied (May 9, 2016).

6

Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC
DECISION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Page 4 of 15
460 of 514

looking at the project or district as a whole "without regard as to whether each and eve,y acre
under the project is irrigated or not.',<)
Barnes themselves used the Court's reasoning as a defense to Jackson's counterclaim when
they stated that "forfeiture analysis does not consider where water was used or what water was
available, but considers only whether water was used pursuant to a water right on the parcel
specified in the water right. " 10 The Court is not using this reference as some sort of "gotcha" scheme
to paint the Plaintiffs into a corner, but rather to illustrate that these matters are murky and there is
little caselaw or precedence that can be relied upon under the circumstances.
Similarly, while Barnes continues to asse1t that availability has nothing to do with the
analysis of forfeiture it is clear that availability is in fact taken into account. "In order for a water
right to be forfeited water must be available to satisfy the water right during the alleged period of
non-use." 11 Furthennore, in an Idaho Supreme Court case in which a trim line was imposed on a
senior water right holder's delivery call in order to "ensure maximum and beneficial use of the
State's water resources ... ," 12 the Court made clear that the senior water right holder was still
"entitled to the full measure of its rights, subject to availability of water and beneficial use
limitations." 13
Neither Barnes' assertion that availability of water is wholly irrelevant in a Comt's inquiry
for forfeiture nor their claim that the location of the actual usage within the subject prope1ty must be
Idaho Code§ 42-219(4).
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summa1y Judgment, pg. 26, October 21 ,
2016.
11 Wood v. Troutt SRBA subcase no. 65-05663 B (May 9, 2002) (emphasis added).
12 Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 160 Idaho at 369, P.3d at 907.
13 Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 160 Idaho at 369, P.3d at 910.

9
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measured is watertight. What law is on point is far from settled in both of these areas and simply
cannot be controlling one way or the other on the Court. Fact specific circumstances are what
caused the Court to find that a statutory forfeiture had not occurred in this case and those san1e
specific facts are still the basis for upholding that decision today.
Specifically addressing the substance of Barnes beneficial use argument, the Comt would
simply note that it too is hard to parse through. Barnes appears to take the inconsistent position that
Bloxham, the predecessor in interest to both parties, did not beneficially use the water 14 and yet at
the same time claim that he did beneficially use the water. 15 The rationale behind this distinction
falls along what became the respective parcels. As noted, the fact that the single propetty was sold
as two properties makes this analysis unique and not in line with some of the cases cited. Barnes
claims that Bloxham did not beneficially use his water on the Jackson property, therefore it should
be forfeited, but that he did beneficially use water on the Ba.mes property and that it should be
preserved. 16 Furthermore, under a Dovel theo1y, Barnes believes that his shares should not be
reduced at all, but that the proportioned Jackson shares can simply become his.

Dovel v. Dobson is a 1992 Idaho Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a district
court decision (and the underlying decision of the director of the Idaho department of water
resources) where the depmtment found that a p01tion of a water right had been forfeited by nonuse,
but did not reduce the overall diversion rate, rather just the number of acres the water right was

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, pg. 12 December I, 2016.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, pg. I 9, December 1, 2016.
16 Id. "Instead, the relevant and material facts here are that Bloxham applied the water to beneficial use on
the Barnes Property and never applied any water to beneficial use on the Jackson Property."
14

15
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intended for. 17 Interestingly the Supreme Comt did not "consider whether the director should have
reduced the diversion" 18 rate, but simply that the director did not abuse his discretion in not reducing
the diversion rate.
The Court understands why Barnes relies so heavily on Dovel - it is as close to a case on
point as has been presented to the Comt; in certain respects. Barnes believes that Dovel dictates that
in this case the Jackson prope1ty can be cut off from their water rights but that Barnes can retain all
of his water rights including any Jackson forfeits. However, as admitted by Counsel when the Cou1t
asked whether the amount should be reduced as to Barnes property, ''there is no case out there that
says what (] you do with the rate that's allocated to those acres." 19 While it was not reduced in

Dovel, that decision was not pursuant to any legal standard, but done at the discretion of the director
of the department.

Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 64,831 P.2d 527, 532 (1992). In Dovel the decreed water right was for
1.6 cfs on 96 acres (three separate fields made up these 96 acres). The Court found that the 6 acre field had
not been watered and therefore was forfeited, but also found that the water had been beneficially applied to
the remaining 90 acres therefore did not reduce the overall cfs allotment.
18 Jd.(emphasis added).
19 Transcript of Hearing held December 22, 2016, pg. 25. This statement, along with the holding in Dovel,
however causes the Court some pause as such a contention does not mesh with what is purportedly the
IDWR practice in relation to pivot corners on agricultural fields . Although not relevant to the facts of this
case, it appears that when a farmer does not plant and water his corners at least once every five years then
that water is taken away. Why it is not simply reapportioned to the rest of the field, similar to what
occurred in Dovel further compels the Court to believe that what took place in Dovel is not the norm, but
rather the exception. As was noted in the original decision on summary judgment, it is this Court's
position that "If a farmer sets aside not only a physical pivot corner, but also the water amount needed to
water it, that portion of the water right can truly be lost, not because the land was not used, but because the
water was not used. If the farmer didn't water his pivot corners because he did not have enough water, he has
not forfeited anything, but that is different than the situation in which he could have watered, but choose not
to. There is a substantial difference betv,een 'could not' and 'would not."' Decision, pg 7. The above being
said, such is simply the Court's perspective. If the IDWR takes a different approach, such is their prerogative.
17
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Every case that involves water law is very fact specific. Although Dovel is similar in certain
ways to the facts in this case, it is vastly different in others. Dovel involved the transfer of an
existing water right along with a permit for a new right whereas this case involves a forfeiture
action. Dovel involved senior and junior water right holders which do not exist in this case as
Jackson and Barnes' rights have the same decree and priority date. Most notable though is the fact
that in Dovel, although separate fields were involved, it was all under one owner before and after the
resolution of the litigation. Because of the prope1ty division in this case, things are not as clear.
Barnes and Jackson both bought prope1ty with the understanding that water rights were attached to
them; they both used them; they both claim the other did not. While Dovel is instructive in many
ways the outcome of that case is not detenninative on the outcome of this case. 20
Under Barnes' theory, the Court would have to conclude that Bloxham, a non-patty to this
lawsuit, did not beneficially use his water right - or rather that he only beneficially used it on what
would become the Barnes' propeity and not the Jackson prope1ty - thus effectuating a pru1ial
forfeiture, but retain all the water rights and reassign them to Barnes. This is something the Court is
unwilling to do.
First, such a result requires the Cow1 to look back in time to make a determination of what
should be equitable today. Second, the result the Barnes promulgates (and not that the Cow1 isn't
On a somewhat related note, in it's decision , the Court used the phrase "Bloxham may have 'forfeited'
his land because he did not water it. .. ." Decision, pg. 8. Barnes contends that this implies the cou11
understood that (similar to what happened in Dovel) land could be essentially removed from the water
right decree and reapportioned elsewhere. This however is reading too deep into that phrase. The Cou11
was merely trying to make a comparison and use the same verbiage to illustrate that Bloxham not
watering certain land could be seen as a poor financial move in that he may be "forfeiting" profits or other
intangible benefits by letting land simply sit vacant, but it was not used to mean that he was in any legal
sense giving up title or interest to the land or that such would relate back to the water right such as in
Dovel. Using a different phrase would have been more prudent.

20
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aware that this truly can be the case sometimes) is that Bloxham had been forfeiting his water for
years and not even known it, but that Barnes can claim all the benefits from his en-or because
Barnes bought the watered property.
In a state where forfeitures are highly disfavored and beneficial use is liberally construed it
seems neither legal nor equitable to completely extinguish Jackson's water rights. Furthermore, as
the Com1 has shown, usage within a subject property is not a hard and fast rule, and the more
general principle which asks if water is being used appropriately subject to an existing water right,
irrespective of where on the property, is a logical and legal extrapolation of the rationale behind a
beneficial use standard.
Bloxham beneficially used his water right, all that was available to him, at all relevant times
in question. Where on the subject property he watered is not dispositive in this case. While acreage
can be used as a measurement of beneficial use it is not required. Not using water on what would
become the Jackson prope11y is not indicative of non-beneficial use requiring forfeiture. Bloxham
used his water right period. No forfeiture occuned during Bloxhams time of use which took place
m1til April 2012. The statutory 5 year period of non-beneficial use has not been met.
With all of these questions there is noticeably a lack of "clear and convincing evidence" as
required to prove a forfeitme. One might then wonder why summary judgment was not simply
denied and the case moved to trial. Forfeiture is a legal question under Idaho Code §42-222
therefore this Court made a legal determination. The clear and convincing standard was not met.
The Com1's decision stands.
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Craig Bloxham - Third Pa11y Status
The second area in which Barnes sought review is in relation to Craig Bloxham and his
status as a third party. In its original decision on summary judgment the Court found that Barnes
was not connected, in any legal sense, to Bloxham and could therefore not claim his third pat1y use
as a counter to Jackson's resumption of use defense. The Com1's analysis did not take into account
Bloxham himself as a third party who had relied on the water, therefore this topic does indeed
deserve additional attention.
Barnes correctly cites to Sagewillow for the proposition that anyone can be considered a
third pa11y and that while litigation or more fonnal means would assuredly be considered a claim, so
too could simple be "[using] the water pursuant to an existing water right."2 1 Barnes then asse11s that
because Bloxham was in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy he was quasi - alienated from his property and is
thereby considered a third patty. Interestingly, Barnes did not originally asse11 this. Barnes had
originally claimed that Bloxham was Jackson's predecessor-in-interest22 however in Defendant's
Response to Discovery Requests Jackson denied that Bloxham was his predecessor in interest and
instead stated that the Federal Bankruptcy Corn1 was. 23 After that response, Barnes took up this
position as well even going so far as to say that it wasn't even the Estate, but specifically the
Bankrnptcy Trustee who was the predecessor-in-interest and controlled who could use the water and

21 Sagewillow v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 669, 680 (2003) (internal
citations omitted).
22 Although it is clear from the original complaint that Barnes understood that Jackson acquired the
property from the Trustee of the bankruptcy estate via warranty deed, Plaintiffs Requests for Admission
repeatedly calls Bloxham, and not the Estate or Trustee, the predecessor-in-interest.
23 Defendant's Response to the Barnes' First Set of Discovery Requests, pg 10. This document is attached
to Harris's Affidavit, Ex.. D contemporaneously filed with Barnes Amended Memorandum in Support of
Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment on October 3, 2016.
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when.24 The asse1iion that the Bankrnptcy Estate, or the Trustee, rather than Bloxham, was the
predecessor-in-interest to Jackson lies in the murky waters of bankruptcy law and asks the question:
who is the legal holder of title to prope1iy in a bankruptcy estate and is the debtor considered a thirdparty to that estate.
In laymen's terms an estate is a separate legal entity. In the case of a decedent, the estate is
the legal owner of all propetiy until distributed to heirs or devisees. In a bankruptcy proceeding, all
the property a person owns at the time they declare bankruptcy is placed into an estate which is
controlled by a Bankruptcy Trustee. However no legal title is ever transferred. The question then, is
what is the extent of ownership or control that the Trustee has in relation to the debtor?
Bloxham filed for Chapter 7 Bankrnptcy on October 12, 2005; however, even as late as
December 2015 he claimed that "between 2004 and 2012 ... I owned the property at that time." At
the very least, it seems clear that Bloxham considered himself the owner of the prope1ty even while
he was going through bankruptcy.
The idea of "ownership" is a bit of a misnomer in regards to bankruptcy. While a trustee has
a duty to marshal and liquidate assets that are in the estate, and could thereby be deemed to have
control of them, title to the specific assets (property for example) is never transferred to the trustee
or even to the estate. Legal title remains in the name of the debtor. As a matter of course, when a
bankruptcy estate is opened, property (except that claimed under any exemptions) becomes pati of
the estate, but no deed of any kind is executed. When property is liquidated and sold from the estate
a Trnstee's Deed is required as a matter of law because the Trnstee has control of, but not legal title

24

Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 12.
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to, the property. It therefore cannot be said that a debtor becomes a legal third party to his own
estate even if he does not maintain control of assets because he still retains ownership via title.

In this case, it is unclear to the Cou1t how or why Bloxham was able to continue working his
land even during the pendency of his bankrnptcy, but the reason is hardly necessary. Although his
property had become pait of the Bankruptcy Estate, it was still titled in his name. Bloxham could
not have any kind of third patty legal status to his own estate. Bloxham cannot claim that he was a
third party under Sagewillow to defeat Jackson's resumption of use defense. 25
Jackson's Defense
In Defendants Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration Jackson notes that the
Court's statement that Jackson never raised a defense under Idaho Code § 42-223 is an enor.
Jackson is conect. The Com1 enoneously stated that no defense was raised, when what should have
been stated is that a defense was raised, but not found valid by the Cout1.
Jackson, in his initial Answer and Counterclaim, as well as in his b1iefing, asserts a defense
under Idaho Code § 42-223(6). Subsection 6 states that "no portion of any water right shall be lost
Although not specifically stated, were Bloxham to assert that he (or his bankruptcy estate) was a third
party to Jackson, that argument too would fail. The reasons set fo11h above regarding "ownership" would
eliminate any claim that the estate had against Jackson. Immediately upon the sale of the property to
Jackson, Bloxham (individually) would probably be considered a third party to Jackson, however it does
not appear that a third party claim arose. Jackson bought the property in April 2012. The water right was
not split until May 31, 2012, so if Jackson and Bloxham were using any water at that time, they were
using the same right together. If neither used water until after the split (unlikely) the timing would then be
scrutinized to the point of being useless. The Court will not get into a day by day analysis to determine
who watered first or if that would be considered resumption or a claim of right - such is hardly necessary
as the Court has already determined that a five year period of non-beneficial use did not occur prior to
that time. Therefore, even were the Court to entertain the idea that Bloxham was a third party to Jackson,
the statutory five year clock would have only been running for a month (since the prope1ty was sold in
April 2012) making any forfeiture, resumption, or third patty analysis premature. There was no forfeiture
when Bloxham owned the whole prope1ty, during the time that Jackson and Bloxham each owned half, or
during the time that Jackson and Barnes each owned half. No forfeiture has occuJTed.
25
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or forfeited for nonuse if the nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner
has no control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of water shall be dete1mined
on a case-by-case basis."
Although not explored in Idaho, the defense in this case of circumstances being out of
Jackson's control is not one of an act of god or some other external force, but quite literally that he
could have no control because he did not own the prope1ty. Jackson's defense relates back to when
Bloxham owned the property and is essentially that any nonuse of water on what would become his
prope1ty was the result of a lack of water. This however is pure speculation.
Bloxhan1 has stated that he was able to gravity sprinkle some p01tions of what would
become the Jackson property and that the rest was dry farmed 26 and while Bloxham futther admits
that "there is typically not enough water to supply all of the water rights on the system," 27 it does not
necessary follow that this is why he didn't water the Jackson property. There could have been
complications to be sure, but it could simply have been dry farmed because that is what he decided
to do, absent considerations concerning water. The record is not clear and the Cornt simply does not
know.
While the fact is that Jackson was not the owner of the prope1ty for the majority of the time
in question relating to forfeiture, there is no evidence to supp01t his claim that Bloxham did not
water what would become his (Jackson's) property for reasons that were out of his (Bloxham's)
control. Jackson's defense is dismissed.

26
27

Affidavit of Craig Bloxham, paragraph 14.
Affidavit of Craig Bloxham, paragraph 19.
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CONCLUSION

Receiving a request for reconsideration is not something the Comt takes lightly. Substantial
time has been spent reviewing the record, the briefing, and all available caselaw on the subject. In
accordance with the above analysis, the Comt remains of the opinion that no forfeiture occurred
under Idaho Code §42-222. Summary Judgment as to Jackson stands. The Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED January 25, 2017.

DAVIDC. NYE
District Judge
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Plaintiffs/Appellants, Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes, by and through
their counsel of record, appeal against the above-named Defendant/Respondent, Kirk
Jackson, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Decision on Motion for Summary

Judgment (filed November 17, 2016); the Decision on Motion for Reconsideration (filed
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January 25, 2017); and the Judgment (filed November 17, 2016), entered in the aboveentitled action by the Honorable David C. Nye, District Judge, presiding. A copy of the
judgment and orders being appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and
orders described in paragraph 1, above, are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rules
1 l(a)(l) and 1 l(a)(7), Idaho Appellate Rules.

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to assert in
the appeal (which does not prevent the Appellants from asserting other issues) is as
follows:
a.

Did the District Court apply an erroneous analysis to the question of
forfeiture and partial forfeiture of a water right?

b.

Did the District Court err in determining that the application of a water
right to beneficial use had no bearing on the use or non-use of a water
right?

c.

What is "beneficial use" in the context of a water right forfeiture analysis?

d.

Did the District Comi err in holding that no portion of an agricultural
irrigation water right can be forfeited when the water user applies all
available water on only a portion of the authorized acres?

e.

While "water must be available to satisfy the water right" in order for a
water right to be forfeited, does this require the actual availability of all
the water licensed under the water right or is it the legal availability to use
water that is available?
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f.

Did the District Cou1t err in determining that a water user who has
forfeited a p01tion of his water right on certain property ca1rnot, after being
alienated from the property, assert a claim of right effective to foreclose
any effort to resume use of the water right on the property?

g.

In the event of a partial forfeiture, are only the authorized irrigated acres
under the water right reduced, or is a pro-rated portion of the diversion
rate authorized under the water right also reduced?

h.

Just as partial forfeiture exists under Idaho law, if a water user only
partially resumes use of a water right before a claim of right is asserted, is
the water user entitled to the full water right or only that portion he has
resumed use of?

1.

Did the Court err m granting summary judgment on behalf of Kirk
Jackson and dismissing the Bameses' claim?

4.

There is no order sealing any portion of the record in this case.

5.

The Appellants request that a copy of the transcript from the following hearings:
a.

October 31, 2016- the Court hearing on Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary

Judgment;
b.

December 22, 2016- the Court hearing on Plaintiffs ' Motion for

Reconsideration;
c.
6.

No other transcripts are requested.

The Appellants request that all pleadings and attachments filed in this case along with all
other documents in the clerk's record automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho
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Appellate Rules be made part of the record in chronological order.

Specifically, the

pleadings are as follows:
a.

Complaint, filed August 29, 2014;

b.

Answer and Counterclaim, filed October 10, 2014;

c.

Return of Service, filed October 16, 2014;

d.

Answer to Counterclaim, filed October 31, 2014;

e.

Request for Trial Setting, filed April 1, 2015;

f.

Defendant's Response to Request for Trial Setting, filed April 6, 2015;

g.

Order for Submission of Information for Scheduling Order, filed May 1,
2015;

h.

Joint Statement oflnformation for Scheduling Order, filed May 15, 2015;

1.

Order Setting Court Trial, filed June 2, 2015;

J.

Plaintiffs' Witness Disclosure, filed January 11, 2016;

k.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 15, 2016;

1.

Affidavit of Craig V. Bloxham (including all exhibits thereto), filed
January 15, 2016;

m.

Memorandum in Suppo1i of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment,
filed January 15, 2016;

n.

Notice of Hearing, filed January 15, 2016;

o.

Substitution of Counsel, filed January 15, 2016;

p.

Defendant's Witness Disclosure, filed January 20, 2016;

q.

Amended Notice of Hearing, filed February 8, 2016;

r.

Amended Notice of Hearing, filed March 3, 2016;
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s.

Second Order Setting Court Trial, filed April 11 , 2016;

t.

Notice of Service, filed July 15, 2016;

u.

Notice of Service, filed August 12, 2016;

v.

Notice of Taking Deposition of Kirk Jackson, filed September 14, 2016;

w.

Notice of Hearing, filed September 28, 2016;

x.

Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed October 3, 2016;

y.

Declaration of Roy Calvin Henderson (including all exhibits thereto), filed
October 3, 2016;

z.

Affidavit of Robert L. Harris (including all exhibits thereto), filed October
3, 2016;

aa.

Plaintiffs' Witness Disclosure, filed October 6, 2016;

bb.

Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, fi led October 17, 2016;

cc.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Objection to Motion for
Plaintiffs Sunmrnry Judgment, filed October 17, 2016;

dd.

Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in Suppo1i of Defendant's Objection to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (including all exhibits thereto),
filed October 17, 20 I 6;

ee.

Affidavit of Peter M. Wells (including all exhibits thereto), filed October
17, 2016;

ff.

Reply Memorandum m Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed October 24, 2016;

gg.
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Defendant's Witness Disclosure, filed November 4, 2016;
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hh.

Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment, filed November 17, 2016;

11.

Judgment, filed November 17, 20 16;

JJ.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, filed December 1, 2016;

kk.

Memorandum in Suppo1t of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, filed
December 1, 2016;

ll.

Affidavit of Robert L. Harris in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration (including all exhibits thereto), filed December l , 2016;

mm.

Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, filed
December I , 2016;

nn.

Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, filed
December 15, 2016;

oo.

Defendant's Memorandum m Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration, filed December 15, 2016;

pp.

Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in Support of Defendant's Objection to Motion
for Reconsideration (including all exhibits thereto), filed December 15,
2016;

qq.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Reconsideration,
filed December 20, 2016;

rr.

Supplemental Memorandum m Support of Plaintiffs'

Motion for

Reconsideration, filed December 29, 20 I 6;
ss.

Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum m Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, filed January 5, 2017;
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tt.

Supplemental Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration,
filed January 9, 2017; and

uu.
7.

Decision on Motion for Reconsideration, filed January 25, 2017.

The Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted
as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: all of the exhibits attached to the
pleadings, motions, objections, memoranda, declarations, and affidavits.

8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below:
1.

Name and Address: Stephanie Morse, P.O. Box 594, Inkom, Idaho
83245.

b.

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript.

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all paiiies required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of March, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l hereby certify that on this 1st day of March, 201 7, I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys and/or individuals listed below by the
method indicated.

Document Served:
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Attorneys and/or Individuals Served:

Peter M. Wells
& THOMPSON, CHTD.
Post Office Box 370
2 I 6 W. Whitman Street
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370
Fax: (208) 234-2961
Email: pete@mrtlaw.net
MAY, RAMMELL

Court Repo1ier:
Stephanie Morse
P.O. Box 594
Inkom, Idaho 83245

IZI Mail
D Hand Delivery
D Facsimile
D FedEx Delivery
IZI Email

IZI Mail

D Hand Delivery
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D Email
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
STATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No.: CV-2014-3466-0C

Plaintiff,
DECISION ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant.

Hon. David C. Nye

On January l S, 2016, Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (collectively "Barnes"), filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court held oral argument on October 31, 2016, and took the
matter under advisement. After reviewing the record and the briefing in this matter, the Court
now issues the following decision DENYING the Motion.
As a threshold matter, the Court will address the question of jurisdiction. Although not
raised by either party, a brief analysis is important. In 1987, the State of Idaho commenced the
Snake River Basic Adjudication (SRBA) for the purpose of inventorying water claims in Idaho.
During the pendency of the SRBA, any claims or issues related to water rights were taken up
almost exclusively by that Court. The SRBA however has issued its final findings and is now
closed. To the Court's knowledge this is one of the first, if not the first case, dealing with
Cnsc No,: CV-2014-3466-OC
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forfeiture post-SRBA, therefore jurisdiction is a relevant question. Under Idaho Code Section
42, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDRW) is vested with the authority to handle all
matters relating to the administration of water uses and water rights. With the SRBA closed, the
IDWR once again stands at the forefront of any water rights issues. 1 Why then did Plaintiffs file
this matter in District Court?
Succinctly put, under Idaho Code § 55-101 (3), that which is appurtenant to land 1s
considered real property. In Idaho, water rights are appurtenant to the land; therefore, such
matters can be validly brought in front of a court of general jurisdiction such as was done here.
Plaintiffs could have brought this matter before the IDWR, and for subject matter expertise and
judicial economy,2 that would have been a good choice, but there is nothing which would legally
preclude them from bringing it before this Court instead. The Court finds therefore that it does
have jurisdiction and that the matters are ripe for review.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 22, 2004, the SRBA issued a Partial Decree for Water Right 29-10420 to Craig
Bloxham. Bloxham was the predecessor in interest to both parties in the present litigation.
Bloxham's property is located in Bannock County, Idaho near the city of Downey and has been
owned by his family for over 40 years.

1 This is not to say that the IDWR ever gave up any authority. While the SRBA was ongoing, for
expediency, judicial economy, and uniformity, that forum took up most matters relating to a decreed
water right. Once decreed, if changes were sought, the party could go back to the SRBA or to the IDWR.
Both agencies have been heavily involved in these matters over the last 30 years, but now with the
conclusion of the SRBA, all administrative matters have reverted to the IDWR.
2 As a pending transfer action has been undertaken in that forum relative to this case.
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On October 12, 2005, Bloxham filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy. On April 26, 2012, Kirk
Jackson purchased certain property from the bankruptcy trustee. As Jackson did not purchase the
whole of the property, the appurtenant water right was split proportionally. On May 31, 2012, a
Notice of Change in Water Rights Ownership was filed with IDWR. Water Right 29-10420 was
split into Water Right 29-14031 and Water Right 29-14032. Jackson obtained 29-14032 and
Bloxham' s bankruptcy estate retained 29-14031. On January 31, 2014, Chad and Jane Barnes
purchased the other portion of Bloxham's property and with it, Water Right 29-14031.
On August 29, 2014, Barnes filed suit against Jackson requesting a declaration of
forfeiture of a water right pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Barnes alleges that Jackson has
not used his water right for the statutory period and therefore has forfeited it. On October 10,

2014, Jackson filed an answer denying forfeiture and a counterclaim alleging that Barnes has not
been using his water right either and that if his rights are forfeited, Barnes' should likewise be
forfeited. On January 15, 2016, Barnes moved for Summary Judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate
only when "the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." 3 Generally, the record is to be construed in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, with all reasonable inferences drawn in that

3Smith

v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 (daho 714,718,918 P.2d 583,587 (1996) (quoting LR.C.P.
56(c)); See also, Moss v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 303, 647 P.2d 754, 758
(1982).
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party's favor. 4 However, the standard differs when the court, rather than a jury, will be the
ultimate trier of facts. When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may,
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the
undisputed evidentiary facts. 5 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (whether a jury is
involved or not) the Court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or to resolve controverted
factual issues. 6
Initially, the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests
with the party moving for summary judgment. 7 If the moving party can "establishes the absence
of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of
material fact on the challenged element of the claim does exist. " 8 If the moving party is
successful in shifting the burden to the nonmoving party to show the existence of an issue of fact
on the challenged element, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials contained in the pleadings, but must come forth with evidence setting forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial on the challenged elements. 9
If the nonmoving party fails to do so, it will result in a court granting an order of
summary judgment in favor of the moving party. 10 However, summary judgment is not proper if

Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007). See also, Herra v. Conner, 111
Idaho 1012, 729 P.2d 1075 (Ct. App. 1986).
5 Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 220 P.3d 575 (2009).
6 Altman v. Arndt, 109 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1985).
1 Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007).
8 Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., Nampa, 139 Idaho 192, 195, 75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003).
9 Id.
10 Id.
4
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reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the
available evidence. 11

DISCUSSION
This case is brought by Barnes in an effort to have Jackson's water right deemed forfeited
for non-use. Idaho Code 42-222(2) governs such forfeiture:
All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost
and forfeited by a failure for the tenn of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial
use for which it was appropriated and when any right to the use of water shall be lost
through nonuse or forfeiture such rights to such water shall revert to the state and be
again subject to appropriation under this chapter; except that any right to the use of
water shall not be lost through forfeiture by the failure to apply the water to
beneficial use under certain circumstances as specified in section 42-223, Idaho
Code.
Forfeitures are disfavored under Idaho law and the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently
held that forfeiture must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 12 Essentially, the party
claiming a water right is forfeited must prove that ( 1) five years of non-use has occurred, (2) there
are no exceptions under Idaho Code § 42-223, and (3) there are no defenses which can effectively
be raised. Although the claimant of the water right has the burden of raising defenses to statutory
forfeiture, the burden of persuasion remains on the party claiming that the water right was
forfeited. 13
Barnes contends, and is correct, that Jackson has never claimed any exceptions under Idaho
Code § 42-223. That leaves for discussion the statutory five year period of non-use and any defenses
Jackson has raised. Each will be addressed in turn.

Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,746,215 PJd 457,466 (2009).
v. State Dept. of Water Resources, 103 ldaho 384,389,647 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1982).
13 Sagewil/ow v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70P.3d 669, 680 (2003).
11

12 Jenkins
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5 Years of Non-Use
During the pendency of any water right claim in the SRBA, the statutory five year period
was tolled 14. In this case, that would mean that the five years could not start running until 2004. 15
Barnes contends that from 2004 to 2012, Water Right 29-14032 16 was not put to beneficial use and
should therefore be forfeited. This assertion is based upon the affidavit of Craig Bloxham, the
previous owner, who stated that he had not watered that portion of land which would eventually
become the Jackson property during that timeframe. This assertion however misses the mark.
Forfeiture of a water right relates to the water right's non-use, not the extent of the right's
use, or non-use, within the property that the water right is attached to. 17 In essence, forfeiture occurs
when the owner does not use his full water right. In this case, until the parent right was split in 2012,
the water right was appurtenant to the whole of Bloxham's property and Bloxham has never
testified that he failed to use his full water right. To the contrary, he has stated that "there is typically
not enough water to supply all of the water rights on the system." 18 Simply because Bloxham chose
not to water that portion of land that would eventually become Jackson's property does not mean
that he forfeited his water right. It appears Bloxham chose not to water the future Jackson property
because of difficulties, but the reason doesn't matter. That [parent] water right was attached to the

In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 36-02708 et al. (Facility Volume cases) (Idaho Fifth
Judicial Dist., May 2002) (R. Barry Wood presiding); In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 6505663B (Wood v. Troutt) (Idaho Fifth Judicial Dist. - SRBA, May 2002) (Judge Roger S. Burdick).
15 Neither party is claiming that the period should run from any other date; however, Bloxham testified in
his affidavit that he has not watered what became the Jackson property since the mid-t 990s. While that
may have been the case, the statutory clock did not start until the decree of rights in 2004.
16 Jackson contends that Water Right 29-14032 did not exist until 2012. It did exist, but as part of the
parent Water Right 29-10420, along with 29-14031. Although not designated as such until 2012, of
necessity both 14031 and 14032 were part of 10420 and thus were also given a decree date of 2004.
17 Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735,738,552 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1976).
18 Affidavit of Craig Bloxham, paragraph 19.
14
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whole property and Bloxham was using it how he saw fit. The only question then could be one of
partial forfeiture, but Bloxham never indicated any instance where he did not use his full amount, or
in the least, the full amount available to him. The Court again stresses that the water right is what is
at issue. Any kind of forfeiture, even partial, occurs if the water right is not being used, not if the
land under said water right is not being used. 19 There is no indication of any forfeiture here.
During oral argwnent Barnes cited to a Water Law Handbook for one example, and both
parties used the example of pivot comers. All of the examples presented were relevant and correct
but were based upon whether or not the full appropriation of water was being used. Redundant as it
is, the Court must point out again that the water right is what must be the focus of inquiry. If a
farmer sets aside not only a physical pivot comer, but also the water amount needed to water it, that
portion of the water right can truly be lost, not because the land was not used, but because the water
was not used. 20 If the farmer didn't water his pivot comers because he did not have enough water, he
has not forfeited anything, but that is different than the situation in which he could have watered, but
chose not to. There is a substantial difference between "could not" and ''would not."
Such may have been the case here. It is not clear wheth~r Bloxham was using his full right
(all inferences appear that he was), but if he was, and was putting his full share to beneficial use regardless of where on his property - then no forfeiture has occurred. Furthermore, if Bloxham
The Court is not trying to split a hair too finely here because the legal test of beneficial use of necessity
asks what the water is being used for, but it does not ask where the water is being used within the subject
property. Barnes clearly recognizes this because he uses this same reasoning as a defense against
Jackson's counterclaim.
20 If the farmer has 10 cfs for his 1000 acre field, and holds out 100 acres and lcfs for his comers he may
lose that 1 cfs due to partial forfeiture, BUT if he holds out those 100 acres and then uses the extra 1 cfs
elsewhere on his property (the same property that water right is attached to), he is still using the water for
beneficial use and it is not forfeited. Furthermore, the farmer could even transfer that right to some other
place or use and avoid forfeiture altogether.
19
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wasn't using his full share and now wants to assert that he did partially forfeit his water right (in that
he did not use all of his allotment), the result must of necessity be as to one, as to all. The forfeiture
would not magically only cut out Jackson's property, but would reduce the water right allocation as
a whole and both subsequent property owners' shares would decrease. Furthermore, now that claims
have been made upon said rights, any claim for forfeiture during Bloxham's time would be barred.
Because Bloxham never forfeited any of his [parent] water right it can hardly be said that
one of the children rights relates back to 2004 to begin the statutory five year period. That may be
the decree date, but the child rights existence was, at that time, still as part of the parent right. The
Court must focus therefore on the parent right as a whole, not what portions would someday
become the children rights, and their associated property. Although Bloxham may have "forfeited"
his land because he did not water it, the Court looks to the water right itself, not the appurtenant
land, and by all accounts Bloxham put that (the water right) to full and beneficial use.
Because Bloxham did not forfeit any of his water right, the statutory period could not have
begun until April 2012 when Jackson bought the property. That period would need to run until April
2017 to comply with the Statute. The five year period has not run therefore a statutory forfeiture has
not occurred.
Although the above analysis is dispositive, the Court wil1 undertake a brief discussion as to
the defense ofresumption as that will also bear on the Court's final outcome.
Resumption of Use Doctrine
The most common defense to a claim of forfeiture is that of resumption of use. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that:
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Under the resumption-of-use doctrine, statutory forfeiture is not effective if, after the
five-year period of nonuse, use of the water is resumed prior to the claim of right by
a third party. A third party has made a claim of right to the water if the third party
has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or has obtait:ied a valid water
right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date prior to the resumption of
use, or has used the water pursuant to an existing water right. 21
At some point in time near the filing of this litigation Jackson constructed a darn to divert
water to his property. Because of uncertainties as to which occurred first - the filing of this litigation
or the building of the dam - Barnes claims that it is not this litigation which defeats Jackson's
resumption of use defense, but rather in accordance with Sagewillow, it was their reliance on
Jackson's "extra" water which predates, and defeats, his resumption. The building of a dam
however is of little consequence to the Court, when, as acknowledged by Barnes during oral
argument, Jackson testified to trying to use the water as early as 201222 -two years before Barnes
even bought the property.
Jackson affirmatively resumed use prior to Barnes purchase of the adjacent property in
2014, therefore Barnes is barred from asserting that they had relied upon Jackson's un-used water
since 2012. In their briefing, Barnes seems to imply that they are somehow connected to their
predecessor in interest, Craig Bloxham, and therefore their timeframe can include time prior to their
ownership. There is no statutory or legal basis for such a claim and as Bloxham is not a party to this
litigation it does not make logical sense that the Barnes are somehow grandfathered in to his usage,
or reliance, upon Jackson's unused water. Jackson's resumption of use defense stands.

21
22

Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 PJd at 680 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Deposition of Kirk Jackson, pg 53-61.
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Counterclaim
Jackson has filed a counterclaim in this action alleging that Barnes has forfeited a portion of
his water right because of non-use. Jackson claims that because Bloxham testified that there is not
usually enough water to supply the whole system, he could not have been using all the water and
therefore some of it could be forfeited. As outlined above however, as long as a person uses the full
amount that is available to him, it is deemed to be his full amount, whether or not it is the full cfs
allotment decreed in the actual water right. Furthermore, Jackson's allegations that Barnes has not
irrigated "all" of his property are likewise irrelevant. As outlined above, usage is determined by the
water right, not the property the water right is attached to.
As the Court has now noted ad nauseam, forfeiture relates to the water right's non-use and
not the extent of the use within the underlying property. 23 Jackson contends that only certain
portions of the field were watered and because all of the property specified in the decree has not
been watered, there is forfeiture. Barnes claims that these accusations are baseless, but also that
"forfeiture analysis does not consider where water was used or what water was available, but
considers only whether water was used pursuant to a water right on the parcel specified in the water
right.m 4 This statement conforms with the Court's findings that use of the water right, not that right
in relation to certain parts of the property, is what is important. Barnes cannot use such analysis to
prove that he has not forfeited his rights only to turn around and say that Jackson somehow has.
Both parties are using the same argument and the same defense. Again, the Court need stress that if
water rights are not being used on certain land, and those water rights are not being used elsewhere
See infra footnote 17.
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 26, October 21,
2016.

23
24
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(on the same land) - in other words the owner is simply choosing not to use 2 cfs of his right -then a
forfeiture has occurred; not because the land isn't being used, but because the water isn't. That
however has not happened here. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Barnes has forfeited
any of his water right therefore Summary Judgment is appropriately granted to Barnes as to
Jackson's counterclaim.
Finally, the Court would note that the Bankruptcy proceedings, and any stay associated with
such, are not related to this litigation and therefore will not be discussed. Although there were
bankruptcy stays in place, none had any bearing on the water rights in question.

CONCLUSION
Because Bloxham did not forfeit any of his water rights, the statutory period could not have
begun until Jackson bought the property in 2012. The five year period has not run, therefore a
statutory forfeiture has not occurred under Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Furthermore, Jackson used his
right in 2012 prior to Barnes filing this litigation, any assertion of reliance, or even Barnes
ownership of the property. Based upon the foregoing analysis, and the disfavor of water right
forfeiture in Idaho, it is this Court's detennination that forfeiture has not occurred. For these reasons
Summary Judgment is not appropriate in favor of Barnes.
Additionally, because this Court has found that forfeiture has not occurred, and as this
litigation is based solely upon that premise, it is therefore appropriate that Summary Judgment be
granted in favor of Jackson. It is well established law in Idaho that a district court "may grant
summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the
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court.m' In this case, the Court is the ultimate finder of fact in regards to the legal questions 26
presented and therefore can weigh the evidence in reaching a detennination. "A motion for
summary judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the
moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it. ... ' 127
With all facts and inferences constrned in the light most favorable to Jackson, the nonmoving party, the Court cannot find legal basis for granting forfeiture. The statutory period has not
run and Jackson resumed use prior to Bames interest or reliance. Based upon those two conclusions,
judgment must be granted in favor of Jackson. Forfeiture has not occurred.
Barnes Motion for Summary Judgment, as to the original complaint, is DENIED.
Summary Judgment will instead be GRANTED in favor of Jackson.
Summary Judgment will be GRANTED in favor of Barnes as to Jackson's counterclaim.
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED November 16, 2016.

. YE

District Judge

Harwood v. Ta/berl, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612, 617 (200 I). See also, Aardema v. U.S. Dairy
Sys., Inc., 14 7 Idaho 785, 793, 21 S P.3d SOS, S13 (2009); Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC,
155 Idaho 853,855,318 P.3d 622,624 (2014).
26 It is the Court's duty to rule on matters of law and a jury's duty to determine issues of fact. See, Lubcke
v. Boise City/Ada Cty. Nous. Alllh., Worrell. 124 Idaho 450,464,860 P.2d 653,667 (1993). See also,
infra footnote 6.
27 Harwood, 136 Idaho at 677.
25
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
ST ATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC
Plaintiff,
DECISION ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

v.
KIRK ,JACKSON, an individual,
Defendant.

Hon. David C. Nye

On January 15, 2016, Plaintiffs, Chad and Jane Barnes (collectively "Barnes"), filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. After several continuances. the Court heard oral argument on
October 31, 2016. On November 17, 2016, the Court issued a decision denying Barnes Motion
and alternatively granting Summary Judgment in favor of Defendant Jackson.• The Court entered
Judgment in favor of.Kirk Jackson that same day.
On December 1, 2016, Barnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court. Oral
arguments were held on December 22, 2016. Both sides were given additional time to submit
written memorandum regarding a particular case which had been brought up during the hearing.i

The Court found that as a matter of law, the statutory requirements of forfeiture had not been met.
In that case, "Monarch Greenback" (In Re SRBA cnse No. 39S76), the special master ruled that
forfeiture is not automatic upon a five year period of non-use, but that a claim of right by a third party
must be made. Both parties and the Court agree with this concept. The disagreement is whether or not a
1

2
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All briefing has now been received by the Court.3 After a complete review of all material, the
Court now issues the following decision DENYING the Motion for Reconsideration.
For a discussion regarding the underlying facts, as well as the procedural history of this
case, the Court would point to the Decision on Summary Judgment of November 17, 2016.
At the outset the Court would like to compliment Counsel for both sides. The facts of this
case lead to certain aspects being essentially issues of first impression by a District Court in
Idaho. 4 The briefing throughout has been exceptional and very informative. Oral arguments have
likewise been helpful. The Court has extensively reviewed all available material, including
relevant caselaw, SRBA decisions, treatises, and handbooks in reaching its decision today and
thanks the attorneys for their help with these difficult and novel concepts.

DISCUSSION
The two main points raised by Barnes in his Motion for Reconsideration are (1) that the
Court did not take into accoWlt the beneficial use standard in denying summary judgment and (2)
that the Court misunderstood the status of Craig Bloxham, the predecessor in interest, as a third
party who relied upon the water rights in question prior to Jackson's resumption of use.5 Each will
be addressed in tum. Other matters will then be briefly touched upon.
As the Court noted during oral argument, this case is particularly difficult because the two
parcels in question were once one large parcel. Much of the analysis in regards to forfeiture and the
third part claim occurred in this case. That is discussed in the second part of this decision.
The final material was received January 9, 2017. The Motion was under advisement as of that date.
4 Because most of these matters would have been solved by the SRBA were it still in existence, this is one
of, if not the first case dealing with forfeiture post-SRBA.
5 The parties dispute whether Jackson effectively resumed use, however the Court has previously ruled
that he did in fact resume use. See, Decision on Summary Judgment, pg. 9, November 17, 2016.
3
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statutory requirements to find such would be easier were this stilJ a single parcel of land. The fact
that the partition and sale of the property happened to fall largely in line with prior watering habits,
in that one parcel was heavily watered and the other not at all, is also problematic. Further
complicating things is the fact that Bloxham, the previous owner of the [singleJ parcel, filed for
bankruptcy and the property was part of that process during the time it was bought by both Barnes
and Jackson.
Beneficial Use
Although Barnes is correct in the assertion that the Court did not mention beneficial use
extensively in its decision on summary judgment, beneficial use was nevertheless considered. In
particular, footnote 19 on page 7 made almost the exact point that Barnes contends the Court left
out - namely that beneficial use plays an integral role in water rights. However, because the
Court found that the statutory five year period had not run, a more in depth analysis of beneficial
use under §42-222 was unnecessary.
Throughout briefing, and at oral argument, Barnes seems to imply that determining
beneficial use is a separate standard or test used when deciding if forfeiture has occurred. It is
however, not a separate test, but rather a part of the whole. Idaho Code § 42-222(2) states that "all
rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and forfeited by a
failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was
appropriated .... " Beneficial use is clearly intertwined with the five year statutory period.
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Unfortunately, beneficial use, while a relatively simply phrase, "has never been judicially or
statutorily defined',6 in Idaho. While it appears from all available sources that whatever is socially
acceptable would qualify as an appropriate type of use7 and that the amount of use has been defined
as the actual amount that is not wastefully used, 8 nothing clearly lays out how much of a subject
property must be used, as is Barnes contention.
While Barnes is adamant that the Court's reasoning that forfeiture does not ask where the
water is being used, but simply if it is being used, is incorrect, no definitive caselaw has been cited
for this proposition. It does appear from some of the cases cited by Barnes that such a conclusion
could be drawn from the underlying principles, but other cases and statutes refute this. While dozens
of Idaho cases focus on what the actual use of a water right is and how much of the right is being
used, not one case specifically mentions where the water is being used as being relevant. There must
clearly be a purpose or use for each water right and an appropriate allotment, but no condition is
expressed in relation to where usage occurs within the subject property.
Barnes contends that acreage is the proper measure of beneficial use when dealing with
irrigation water rights; however, while a measurement of acres may be one way to determine
beneficial use, it is not the sole method, nor is it statutorily required. Interestingly, in certain water
law scenarios, acreage does not matter at all. Idaho Code§ 42-219, which deals with the issuance of
water right licenses for large irrigation projects, explains that beneficial use is determined by
State or Idaho, Dep 't of Parks v. IDWR, 96 Idaho 440, 443, 530 P.2d 924, 927 ( 1974) (Bakes, J.
concurring). See also, Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 811, 252 P.3d 71 , 92
(2011).
1 Clear Springs, 150 Idaho at 811, 252 P Jd at 92.
8 Idaho Const. art. XV, § 7; Clear Springs, 150 Idaho at 808, 252 P.3d at 89; Idaho Ground Water Assoc.
v. Idaho Dep'I o/Water Res., 160 Idaho 119,369 PJd 897,907 (2016), reh'g denied (May 9, 2016).
6
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looking at the project or district as a whole "without regard as to whether each and every acre
under the project is irrigated or not.'-1>
Barnes themselves used the Court's reasoning as a defense to Jackson's counterclaim when
they stated that "forfeiture analysis does not consider where water was used or what water was
available, but considers only whether water was used pursuant to a water right on the parcel
specified in the water right." 10 The Court is not using this reference as some sort of"gotcha" scheme
to paint the Plaintiffs into a comer, but rather to illustrate that these matters are murky and there is
little caselaw or precedence that can be relied upon under the circumstances.
Similarly, while Barnes continues to assert that availability has nothing to do with the
analysis of forfeiture it is clear that availability is in fact taken into account. "In order for a water
right to be forfeited water must be available to satisfy the water right during the alleged period of
non-use." 11 Furthennore, in an Idaho Supreme Court case in which a trim line was imposed on a
senior water right holder's delivery call in order to "ensure maximum and beneficial use of the
State's water resources ... ," 12 the Court made clear that the senior water right holder was still
"entitled to the full measure of its rights, subject to availability of water and beneficial use
limitations." 13
Neither Barnes' assertion that availability of water is wholly irrelevant in a Court's inquiry
for forfeiture nor their claim that the location of the actual usage within the subject property must be
Idaho Code § 42-219(4}.
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 26, October 21,
2016.
11 Wood v. Troutt SRBA subcase no. 65-056638 (May 9, 2002) (emphasis added).
12 Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 160 Idaho at 369, P.3d at 907.
13 Idaho Ground Water Assoc., 160 Idaho at 369, P.3d at 910.

9

10
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measured is watertight. What law is on point is far from settled in both of these areas and simply
cannot be controlling one way or the other on the Court. Fact specific circumstances are what
caused the Court to find that a statutory forfeiture had not occurred in this case and those same
specific facts are still the basis for upholding that decision today.
Specifically addressing the substance of Barnes beneficial use argument, the Court would
simply note that it too is hard to parse through. Barnes appears to take the inconsistent position that
Bloxham, the predecessor in interest to both parties, did not beneficially use the water 14 and yet at
the same time claim that he did beneficially use the water. 15 The rationale behind this distinction
falls along what became the respective parcels. As noted, the fact that the single property was sold
as two properties makes this analysis unique and not in line with some of the cases cited. Barnes
claims that Bloxham did not beneficially use his water on the Jackson property, therefore it should
be forfeited, but that he did beneficially use water on the Barnes property and that it should be
preserved.16 Furthermore, under a Dovel theory, Barnes believes that his shares should not be
reduced at all, but that the proportioned Jackson shares can simply become his.

Dovel v. Dobson is a 1992 Idaho Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a district
court decision (and the underlying decision of the director of the Idaho department of water
resources) where the department found that a portion of a water right had been forfeited by non use,
but did not reduce the overall diversion rate, rather just the number of acres the water right was

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, pg. 12, December 1, 2016.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, pg. 19, December 1, 2016.
16 Id "Instead, the relevant and material facts here are that Bloxham applied the water to beneficial use on
the Barnes Property and never applied any water to beneficial use on the Jackson Property/'
14

15
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intended for. 17 Interestingly the Supreme Court did not "consider whether the director should have
reduced the diversion•Hs rate, but simply that the director did not abuse his discretion in not reducing
the diversion rate.
The Court understands why Barnes relies so heavily on Dovel - it is as close to a case on
point as has been presented to the Court; in certain respects. Barnes believes that Dovel dictates that
in this case the Jackson property can be cut off from their water rights, but that Barnes can retain all
of his water rights including any Jackson forfeits. However, as admitted by Counsel when the Court
asked whether the amount should be reduced as to Barnes property, "there is no case out there that
says what [] you do with the rate that's allocated to those acres." 19 While it was not reduced in
Dovel, that decision was not pursuant to any legal standard, but done at the discretion of the director

of the department.

Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 64, 831 P.2d 527, 532 (1992). In Dovel the decreed water right was for
1.6 cfs on 96 acres (three separate fields made up these 96 acres). The Court found that the 6 acre field had
not been watered and therefore was forfeited, but also found that the water had been beneficially applied to
the remaining 90 acres therefore did not reduce the overall cfs allotment.
18 /d.(emphasis added).
19 Transcript of Hearing held December 22, 2016, pg. 25. This statement, along with the holding in Dovel,
however causes the Court some pause as such a contention does not mesh with what is purportedly the
IDWR practice in relation to pivot comers on agricultural fields. Although not relevant to the facts of this
case, it appears that when a fanner does not plant and water his comers at least once every five years then
that water is taken away. Why it is not simply reapportioned to the rest of the field, similar to what
occurred in Dovel further compels the Court to believe that what took place in Dovel is not the nonn, but
rather the exception. As was noted in the original decision on summary judgment, it is this Court's
position that "If a fanner sets aside not only a physical pivot comer, but also the water amount needed to
water it, that portion of the water right can truly be lost, not because the land was not used, but because the
water was not used. If the farmer didn't water his pivot comers because he did not have enough water, he has
not forfeited anything, but that is different than the situation in which he could have watered, but choose not
to. There is a substantial difference between 'could not' and 'would not."' Decision, pg 7. The above being
said, such is simply the Court's perspective. If the IDWR takes a different approach, such is their prerogative.
17
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Every case that involves water law is very fact specific. Although Dovel is similar in certain
ways to the facts in this case, it is vastly different in others. Dovel involved the transfer of an
existing water right along with a permit for a new right whereas this case involves a forfeiture
action. Dovel involved senior and junior water right holders which do not exist in this case as
Jackson and Barnes' rights have the same decree and priority date. Most notable though is the fact
that in Dovel, although separate fields were involved, it was all under one owner before and after the
resolution of the litigation. Because of the property division in this case, things are not as clear.
Barnes and Jackson both bought property with the understanding that water rights were attached to
them; they both used them; they both claim the other did not. While Dovel is instructive in many
ways the outcome of that case is not determinative on the outcome of this case. 20
Under Barnes' theory, the Court would have to conclude that Bloxham, a non-party to this
lawsuit, did not beneficially use his water right - or rather that he only beneficially used it on what
would become the Barnes' property and not the Jackson property - thus effectuating a partial
forfeiture, but retain all the water rights and reassign them to Barnes. This is something the Court is
unwilling to do.
First, such a result requires the Court to look back in time to make a detennination of what
should be equitable today. Second, the result the Barnes promulgates (and not that the Court isn't
On a somewhat related note, in it's decision, the Court used the phrase "Bloxham may have 'forfeited'
his land because he did not water it ...." Decision, pg. 8. Barnes contends that this implies the court
understood that (similar to what happened in Dovel) land could be essentially removed from the water
right decree and reapportioned elsewhere. This however is reading too deep into that phrase. The Court
was merely trying to make a comparison and use the same verbiage to illustrate that Bloxham not
watering certain land could be seen as a poor financial move in that he may be "forfeiting" profits or other
intangible benefits by letting land simply sit vacant, but it was not used to mean that he was in any legal
sense giving up title or interest to the land or that such would relate back to the water right such as in
Dovel. Using a different phrase would have been more prudent.
20
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aware that this truly can be the case sometimes) is that Bloxham had been forfeiting his water for
years and not even known it, but that Barnes can claim all the benefits from his error because
Barnes bought the watered property.
In a state where forfeitures are highly disfavored and beneficial use is liberally construed it
seems neither legal nor equitable to completely extinguish Jackson's water rights. Furthermore, as
the Court has shown, usage within a subject property is not a hard and fast rule, and the more
general principle which asks if water is being used appropriately subject to an existing water right,
irrespective of where on the property, is a logical and legal extrapolation of the rationale behind a
beneficial use standard.
Bloxham beneficially used his water right, all that was available to him, at all relevant times
in question. Where on the subject property he watered is not dispositive in this case. While acreage
can be used as a measurement of beneficial use it is not required. Not using water on what would
become the Jackson property is not indicative of non-beneficial use requiring forfeiture. Bloxham
used his water right period. No forfeiture occurred during Bloxhams time of use which took place
until April 2012. The statutory 5 year period of non-beneficial use has not been met.
With all of these questions there is noticeably a lack of "clear and convincing evidence" as
required to prove a forfeiture. One might then wonder why swnmary judgment was not simply
denied and the case moved to trial. Forfeiture is a legal question under Idaho Code §42-222
therefore this Court made a legal determination. The clear and convincing standard was not met.
The Court's decision stands.
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Craig Bloxham - Third Party Status
The second area in which Barnes sought review is in relation to Craig Bloxham and his
status as a third party. In its original decision on swnmary judgment the Court found that Barnes
was not connected, in any legal sense, to Bloxham and could therefore not claim his third party use
as a counter to Jackson's resumption of use defense. The Court's analysis did not take into account
Bloxham himself as a third party who had relied on the water, therefore this topic does indeed
deserve additional attention.
Barnes correctly cites to Sagewillow for the proposition that anyone can be considered a
third party and that while litigation or more formal means would assuredly be considered a claim, so
too could simple be "[using] the water pursuant to an existing water right."21 Barnes then asserts that
because Bloxham was in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy he was quasi - alienated from his property and is
thereby considered a third party. Interestingly, Barnes did not originally assert this. Barnes had
originally claimed that Bloxham was Jackson's predecessor-in-interest2 2 however in Defendant's
Response to Discovery Requests Jackson denied that Bloxham was his predecessor in interest and
instead stated that the Federal Bankruptcy Court was.23 After that response, Barnes took up this
position as well even going so far as to say that it wasn't even the Estate, but specifically the
Bankruptcy Trustee who was the predecessor-in-interest and controlled who could use the water and
21

Sagewillow v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 669, 680 (2003) (internal
citations omitted).
22 Although it is clear from the original complaint that Barnes understood that Jackson acquired the
property from the Trustee of the bankruptcy estate via warranty deed, Plaintiffs Requests for Admission
repeatedly calls Bloxham, and not the Estate or Trustee, the predecessor-in-interest.
23 Defendant's Response to the Barnes' First Set of Discovery Requests, pg 10. This document is attached
to Harris's Affidavit, Ex. D contemporaneously filed with Barnes Amended Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on October 3, 2016.
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when. 24 The assertion that the Bankruptcy Estate, or the Trustee, rather than Bloxham, was the
predecessor-in-interest to Jackson lies in the murky waters of bankruptcy law and asks the question:
who is the legal holder of title to property in a bankruptcy estate and is the debtor considered a thirdparty to that estate.
In laymen's terms an estate is a separate legal entity. In the case of a decedent, the estate is
the legal owner of all property until distributed to heirs or devisees. In a bankruptcy proceeding, all
the property a person owns at the time they declare bankruptcy is placed into an estate which is
controlled by a Bankruptcy Trustee. However no legal title is ever transferred. The question then, is
what is the extent of ownership or control that the Trustee has in relation to the debtor?
Bloxham filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy on October 12, 2005; however, even as late as
December 2015 he claimed that "between 2004 and 2012 ... I owned the property at that time." At
the very least, it seems clear that Bloxham considered himself the owner of the property even while
he was going through bankruptcy.
The idea of "ownership" is a bit of a misnomer in regards to bankruptcy. While a trustee has
a duty to marshal and liquidate assets that are in the estate, and could thereby be deemed to have
control of them, title to the specific assets (property for example) is never transferred to the trustee
or even to the estate. Legal title remains in the name of the debtor. As a matter of course, when a
bankruptcy estate is opened, property (except that claimed under any exemptions) becomes part of
the estate, but no deed of any kind is executed. When property is liquidated and sold from the estate
a Trustee's Deed is required as a matter oflaw because the Trustee has control of, but not legal title

24

Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pg. 12.
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to, the property. It therefore cannot be said that a debtor becomes a legal third party to his own
estate even if he does not maintain control of assets because he still retains ownership via title.
In this case, it is unclear to the Court how or why Bloxham was able to continue working his
land even during the pendency of his bankruptcy, but the reason is hardly necessary. Although his
property had become part of the Bankruptcy Estate, it was still titled in his name. Bloxham could
not have any kind of third party legal status to his own estate. Bloxham cannot claim that he was a
third party under Sagewillow to defeat Jackson's resumption of use defense. 25
Jackson's Defense

In Defendants Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration Jackson notes that the
Court's statement that Jackson never raised a defense under Idaho Code § 42-223 is an error.
Jackson is correct. The Court erroneously stated that no defense was raised, when what should have
been stated is that a defense was raised, but not found valid by the Court.
Jackson, in his initial Answer and Counterclaim, as well as in his briefing, asserts a defense
under Idaho Code § 42-223(6). Subsection 6 states that "no portion of any water right shall be lost
Although not specifically stated, were Bloxham to assert that he (or his bankruptcy estate) was a third
party to Jackson, that argument too would fail. The reasons set forth above regarding "ownership" would
eliminate any claim that th.e estate had against Jackson. Immediately upon the sale of the property to
Jackson, Bloxham (individually) would probably be considered a third party to Jackson, however it does
not appear that a third party claim arose. Jackson bought the property in April 2012. The water right was
not split until May 31, 2012, so if Jackson and Bloxham were using any water at that time, they were
using the same right together. If neither used water until after the split (unlikely) the timing would then be
scrutinized to the point of being useless. The Court wilt not get into a day by day analysis to determine
who watered first or if that would be considered resumption or a claim of right - such is hardly necessary
as the Court has already determined that a five year period of non-beneficial use did not occur prior to
that time. Therefore, even were the Court to entertain the idea that Bloxham was a third party to Jackson,
the statutory five year clock would have only been running for a month (since the property was sold in
April 2012) making any forfeiture, resumption, or third party analysis premature. There was no forfeiture
when Bloxham owned the whole property, during the time that Jackson and Bloxham each owned half, or
during the time that Jackson and Barnes each owned half. No forfeiture has occurred.
25
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or forfeited for nonuse if the nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner
has no control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of water shall be determined
on a case-by-case basis."
Although not explored in Idaho, the defense in this case of circumstances being out of
Jackson's control is not one of an act of god or some other external force, but quite literally that he
could have no control because he did not own the property. Jackson's defense relates back to when
Bloxham owned the property and is essentially that any nonuse of water on what would become his
property was the result of a lack of water. This however is pure speculation.
Bloxham has stated that he was able to gravity sprinkle some portions of what would
become the Jackson property and that the rest was dry farmed 26 and while Bloxham further admits
that "there is typically not enough water to supply all of the water rights on the system,"27 it does not
necessary follow that this is why he didn't water the Jackson property. There could have been
complications to be sure, but it could simply have been dry farmed because that is what he decided
to do, absent considerations concerning water. The record is not clear and the Court simply does not
know.
While the fact is that Jackson was not the owner of the property for the majority of the time
in question relating to forfeiture, there is no evidence to support his claim that Bloxham did not
water what would become his (Jackson's) property for reasons that were out of his (Bloxham's)
control. Jackson's defense is dismissed.

26
27

Affidavit of Craig Bloxham, paragraph 14.
Affidavit of Craig Bloxham, paragraph 19.
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CONCLUSION
Receiving a request for reconsideration is not something the Court takes lightly. Substantial
time has been spent reviewing the record, the briefing, and all available caselaw on the subject. In
accordance with the above analysis, the Court remains of the opinion that no forfeiture occurred
under Idaho Code §42-222. Summary Judgment as to Jackson stands. The Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED January 25, 2017.

DAVIDC. NYE
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
STATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY
CHAD BARNES and JANE BARNES,
husband and wife,
Case No.: CV-2014-3466-OC

Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT

v.
KIRK JACKSON, an individual,
Hon. David C. Nye
Defendant.

JUDGMENT JS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed.
Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed.
This case is dismissed with prejudice.
DA TED November 17, 2016.

District .Judge
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1 . Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment held
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:
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DATED this 21st Day of March, 2017 .
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